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After the Union, Scotland remained semi-independent, with 
its own church, legal and political structures. Governments had the 
choice either of ruling it from London, treating it as an English 
province, or of according power to a Scottish 'manager', in effect, 
and sometimes in name, a Secretary of State for Scotland. Such 
delegation had advantages and disadvantages. It might be vital 
to the direction of Scottish representatives at Westminster, 
particularly if government had only a narrow majority. It also 
raised the spectre of the manager using his delegated power against 
his 'masters'. Furthermore, the manager's Scots supporters 
expected him to further their interests. All these aspects are 
visible in the career of Henry Dundas, Scottish manager from 1783. 
His early prominence in Scottish politics rested on personal 
ability and family influence. His success as manager was based 
on the consent of a large part of the Scots landed interest, whose 
aspirations he understood and advanced, and upon his friendship 
with the Prime Minister, William Pitt. His careful construction 
of regional alliances and his deployment of government patronage 
made him by 1790 the single most important Scots politician. 
Resistance to him survived in Scotland, centred on the emerging 
Whig party but including many who disliked him personally. As 
manager he fostered personal policies on church and 
legal appoint- 
ments and his influence with Pitt allowed him to protect 
Scots 
interests where these did not clash with English political or 
administrative requirements. He was largely indifferent to the 
working of the Scots revenue boards and these stagnated amidst 
spreading corruption. As a Cabinet minister, Dundas symbolised 
vii. 
both the growing integration of the Scottish and English ruling 
classes and the participation of the former in the government 
of the empire. The impact of the French Revolution and the 
radical reform movement split the Whigs, some joining government, 
others lapsing into silence. Dundas recognised the long-term 
threat to the old order posed by the emerging industrial society, 
and this threat and the nature of the war, led to the gradual 
evolution of a Scottish Tory party focussed on Dundas and Pitt. 
Pitt's successor, Addington, initially continued Dundas's power 
as manager but later withdrew it and Dundas (now Lord Melville), 
disturbed at Addington's failings in office, eventually used his 
Scots influence to participate in his removal in 1804. Melville's 
return to office was brief and he was impeached in 1805 for 
malversation of naval funds. His political influence remained 
strong and survived the limited attacks made by the Grenville 
government. His friends remained aligned with the late Pitt's 
English allies and in this group can be seen the core of the 
nineteenth-century Scots Tory party. 
viii. 
PREFACE 
I have almost lost count of the debts that I have incurred 
in pursuing this study. The foremost is to my parents who gave 
me the encouragement to persevere. I am also grateful for help 
of various sorts from the following: Richard Aherne, John Ballantyne, 
George Barbour, Dr. John Brims, Dr. William Brydon, Hugh Cheape, 
Dr. Tristram Clarke, Dr. Alexander Fenton, Dr. Ian Grant, Colin Hendry, 
Ian Hill, John McLintock, Dr. Alexander Murdoch, Dr. James Parker, 
Dr. Nicholas Phillipson, Dr. Alexander Reid, John Simpson, Dr. 
Frances Shaw, Dr. John Shaw, Professor J. Morgan Sweeney and Dr. 
Graham Townend. My supervisor, Dr. William Ferguson, has been a 
fund of sound advice and of patience. Mrs. Doris Williamson who 
typed this work has not only managed to read my handwriting but 
has frequently saved me from my mistakes. 
I have enjoyed the help of the staffs of several libraries and 
archives, all of which are recorded in the bibliography but I should 
add acknowledgements to the staffs of the Historical Manuscripts 
Commission and of Connaught Halls of Residence in London. 
All students of Scottish History owe an enormous debt to those 
owners of private archives who have opened their papers to public 
inspection, whether by placing them in public repositories or by 
allowing the National Register of Archives (Scotland) to channel 
wandering researchers into their homes. In this last respect I 
am grateful for being allowed to inspect the private archives of 
the following: Mrs. A. Dundas-Bekker of Arniston, the Earl of 
Dundee, His Grace the Duke of Hamilton, the Hopetoun Papers Trust, 
and Mr. and Mrs. J. Trotter of Inverness (Trotter of Bush papers). 
David J. Brown 
Edinburgh March 1989 
1. 
CHAPTER ONE 
HENRY DUNDAS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF SCOTLAND 
"... the management of the affairs of Scotland as it is 
called, considered as a separate department, is but a 
paltry business not calculated to fill the mind of any 
man possessed of a high mind or extended ideas. You 
know these to be my genuine sentiments ... 
". l 
Henry Dundas, later Viscount Melville, was, at the height 
of his power, one of the three most prominent men in the government 
of William Pitt. 
2 
He was unpopular with most Scots who were 
outwith the narrow political nation and he was reviled for 
suppressing the first democratic reformers and for presiding over 
a political structure widely recognised to be corrupt and 
unrepresentative. 
3 
To modern Scots he remains a controversial 
figure, identified as a founder of the Scottish Conservative Party 
and as the man who brought to near perfection the system of 'managing' 
Scotland. 
There are three published biographies of him by Lovat-Fraser, 
5 
7 







Of the longer works, 
Furber and Matheson alone make use of Dundas's papers, some of 
which had been sold by his descendants in the 1920s. Perhaps 
as much again remained with the family and was not accessible 
until it was opened to the public at the Scottish Record Office 
in the 1960s. 
12 
This 'new' material, together with the great 
number of private archives now open to public inspection, 
radically alters many of the details set out in the longer 
biographies. 
2. 
In the 50 years since Furber and Matheson wrote, there has 
been a resurgence in interest in eighteenth century Scottish 
politics. This owes something to a similar movement in England, 
sparked by the works of Sir Lewis Namier. 
13 
It is also related 
to a post-war discontent with the working of the Anglo-Scots 
Union and a consequent desire to explore its early history. 
Drs. Ferguson and Sunter have explained the forms of local 
electoral politics. 
14 
Dr Riley has detailed the political and 





Scott18 and Murdoch19 have each studied 
aspects of government and politics in Scotland, so that there 
is now a full picture of the subject from 1707 to 1780. Scots 
historians have long understood that Dundas was merely one in a 
line of parliamentary managers - 'ministers for Scotland' - but 
the full implications of this are not apparent in the standard 
biographies and the lack of continuity between them and the 
recent works noted above, is now glaring. It is also clear 
that the state of Scottish politics in Dundas's era has to be 
related properly to developments in English affairs and to the 
impact of the French Revolution on British domestic politics. 
What follows is a study only of aspects of Dundas's Scottish 
affairs. In 1790, he was described "As Prime Minister for 
Scotland and next to the Minister of England 1120 and his Scottish 
influence gained enormously from his status as a British politician. 
This will inform what follows but the vast bulk of his papers - 
even after his own weeding - forbid any detailed study of his role 
as an English Home Secretary, an Indian administrator, a war 
3. 
strategist and an imperialist. 
21 
Dundas was the dominant Scottish politician of his era and 
all accounts of him agree on his sociability. He was good 
humoured and apparently open, "well calculated by talent and 
manner to make despotism popular". 
22 
In an alcoholic age, his 
consumption was legendary: "That damnd [sic ] fellow Dundass [sic ] 
was born upon a rock and can drink up the ocean", wailed Chancellor 
Thurlow, after a near-fatal drinking bout. 
23 
Such social 
graces were no small part of a politician's armoury and Dundas's 
possession of them in abundance form the most famous aspect of his 
character. Beyond this, he is more elusive. His marital life was 
unhappy. His first wife deserted him, to his great distress24 and 
only after a long interlude, during which he pursued several 
eligible ladies, 
25 
did he remarry. His bride in 1793 was Lady 
Jane Hope, 24 years his junior. She came from the Hopetoun 
family and Dundas would later admit that his political ambition 
had led him to her. At first there was love, but later it 
paled and they would grow apart. 
26 
His private happiness came 
from his children and his friends. 
He never travelled abroad and his education at Dalkeith 
Grammar School27 and Edinburgh University, was narrow. "He 
had very little general knowledge from which he could draw 
materials for his speeches but he had a great deal of invention 
and acuteness in his own mind". 
28 
His handwriting was appalling 
but the clarity of his draft papers shows an ordered mind and he 
had a prodigious appetite for work. His was the mind of an 
administrator rather than of an innovator but he was by no means 
opposed to change. In politics his principles were somewhat 
4. 
outmoded. He held in general that it was the King's right to 
choose his own ministers and the politicians' duty to support 
them. This was a recognised creed and he was genuine enough 
in following it. Nonetheless his adherence to it laid him 
open to charges of being willing to support any government and 
accusations of opportunism would always haunt him. 
29 
Connected 
with the public perception of a slippery politician was distaste 
at his dealings. Corruption hung over him like a grey cloud. 
"His connexion [sic I with Dundas was Pitt's great misfortune", 
said Wilberforce. 
30 
Dundas's friends knew him to be personally 
honest but he was never careful in choosing his associates. In 
part this was some reflection of the fact that he had to do much 
of the aloof Pitt's dirty work. Worse, his family, like Lord 
Grenville's in England, was known to profit greatly from 
sinecures and pensions at the public expense. When he was 
impeached in 1805, many saw it as both just and overdue. There 
is little doubt that Dundas allowed this atmosphere to persist: 
"he was very blameable in not checking the abuses of persons 
31 
under him". 
Dundas was large-minded. In parliament "no man was more 
implacable in his hatreds, 
32 
but out of doors there was little 
rancour and he always felt able to throw crumbs of charity to 
his opponents. 
33 
His surprisingly Namierite view of politics 
meant that he had little difficulty in considering 
doing business 
with most people. 
34 
Only after his impeachment does a genuine 
bitterness appear in his politics. 
35 
There is no doubt that 
the years wore him down and close friends detected a more cynical 
5. 
detachment as time passed. 
36 
Probably it was inevitable. 
He was a Scots patriot and he kept his Scots accent without 
shame, although it served to make him prominent in debate. 
37 
In 1807, he wrote of Scotland's right to be protected from the 
unjust interference of English politicians supporting a change 
in the Court of Session38 and in 1811 he vented fury at plans 
to desecrate Linlithgow Palace by making it a French prison. 
39 
His supposed proclivity to promoting his countrymen was a common 
cry against him and he knew it and tried to guard against it, 
to no avail. 
40 
The Scots ruling classes benefited greatly 
from his influence in England and many would doubtless have 
endorsed one sycophant's description of "a nobleman whos[e] 
name must ever be dear, to every lover of his country, and 
in particular to every Scotsman". 
41 
There is much in a similar 
vein in his papers, some of it a reflection of the perceived duty 
of a Scots politician to protect Scottish interests in London, 
42 
It is doubtful, however, whether many commoners would have addressed 
him as one fellow did, "you who is esteemed a father to his 
cuntry [sic]". 
43 
Later, in discussing Dundas's early career, we will again 
see the importance of his personality and abilities but these 
alone do not explain his extraordinary influence in Scottish 
affairs. This was rooted in his relationship with the very 
narrow Scottish political nation and in the governmental 
relationship between Scotland and England. 
6. 
The Scottish political constituency in the 1780s totalled only 
some 4000 individuals and in a still primarily agricultural 
economy, their power over the rest of society was founded on 
landownership. 
44 
At the top of the social scale stood the nobility. In 
this period there were 86 families with Scottish titles45 and 
perhaps a dozen peers connected with Scotland, holding Irish 
or British titles, such as Lords Fife and Seaforth. 
46 
Within 
the group as a whole, there were wide variations in status and 
activity. About a dozen families, such as Argyll, Atholl, Gordon 
and Queensberry, were very wealthy, owning considerable properties, some- 
times in several counties, with a correspondingly high political 
influence. 
47 
Several titles were held by women who, with the 
exception of the Countess of Sutherland, took little concern 
in politics. 
48 
The Lords Fairfax re American residents. 
Many other peers were in financially straitened circumstances. 
The sixth Lord Bellenden was reduced to cadging tiny loans 
from his fellow peers49 and the seventh Marquis of Tweeddale 
found his house and rents sequestered for debts in 1798.50 
Many Scots noble families were in receipt of government pensions 
and to some this was a crucial part of their income. 
sl 
There 
is little doubt that such pensions could influence a peer's 
politics and were sometimes meant to. 
52 
The need of many 
peers for military or naval employment had a similar effect. 
53 
While the Scots peerage as a whole benefited from the economic 
improvements of the period, it is clear that the effect of these 
on their political conduct should not 
be exaggerated. Very few 
7. 
ever became wealthy enough to contemplate paying the full price 
of opposing government. 
54 
After 1707, the Scottish nobility were represented at 
Westminster by sixteen of their fellows, returned from among 
their ranks at each general election. The elections were held 
at Holyrood and the peers could cast their votes either in 
person, by sending the election clerks a signed list of their 
preferences, or by entrusting proxy votes to a friend. 
55 
Government interference in these elections was normal, and 
the bustle and indignity of standing - "election martyrdom", 
Lord Cathcart called it56 - was widely resented. Some peers, 
disliking a system that put them on a different footing from 
their English brethren, refused to stand for election. 
57 
One consequence was an increasing pressure on government to grant 
British titles to Scots. In 1782, the standing order of the House 
of Lords of 1711, forbidding Scots peers with British titles to 
sit in the House, was overridden. By 1806, another twelve 
had been added to the list58 and already by 1800 at least 
thirteen Scots peers were patiently waiting for the 
promotion. 
59 
British peerages were used as a prime reward 
for services to government and in time they also became one 
of the main agencies for assimilating the Scots aristocracy 
60 
into the wider British nobility. 
The influence of the peerage inevitably extended, as land- 
owners, into the elections for the county and burgh MPs. When the 
Earl of Kellie wrote in 1804 that he scrupled to interfere openly 
in St. Andrews burgh politics "for fear of the consequences, being 
8. 
a peer", a displeased Lord Melville told him, "Everybody laughs 
at such an idea... ". 
61 
In some counties the peerage had a 
potentially commanding influence and we shall see that this was 
the subject of considerable resentment. 
In 1788, it was calculated that there were 2662 votes 
enrolled in the Scottish counties, although it is less clear 
how many actual voters there were, since an individual could 
be enfranchised in several counties. 
62 
There were three 
possible qualifications for a freeholder. 
63 
He could claim 
inclusion on the county freeholders' roll if he held lands of 
the Crown with a valued rent of £400 Scots or more, 
64 
or if he 
similarly held lands valued at 40/- of 'old extent'. a medieval 
tax assessment. The third qualification, introduced in 1743, 
allowed landowners in Sutherland who held property of the Earl 
of Sutherland of a valued rent of at least £200 Scots, to claim 
enrolment. By the late century the first type of vote was the 
most common. 
For much of the eighteenth century, there was a constant tension, 
sometimes open, sometimes latent, between the lesser and the greater 
landowners. The creation of 'nominal' or 'fictitious' votes was 
at once a cause and a symptom of this tension. It had quickly 
become accepted that possession of the bare superiority of 
land 
valued at £400 Scots was an adequate qualification and that a 
freeholder need not possess the actual land itself. Consequently 
a major landowner could, by various legal 
devices, parcel out 
superiorities from his holdings, giving them 
in liferent to 
friends. They would then be eligible to claim enrolment as 
freeholders. 
65 
Vote 'creation' had proceeded intermittently 
9. 
since the Union. If a vote founded on a superiority was legal, 
a 'nominal' vote, where the holder was intended to be completely 
beholden to the person who had given it to him, was not. Proving 
the intention of nominality was difficult, however. In 1714 
and again in 1743, oaths were instituted to try to deter 
nominal voters but they had little effect and perjurers 
cheerfully took them. From 1743, the Court of Session had 
a jurisdiction in franchise disputes and the decisions of the 
county freeholders' meetings about accepting or rejecting 
votes could be appealed to it. Unfortunately the Court was 
afraid of its judgements being appealed to the House of Lords 
and its cautious decisions did little to hinder vote creation. 
Then, in 1768, as a result of scandals and court cases arising 
from the general election , the Court of Session introduced 
a list of questions, 'special interrogatories', that freeholders 
could put to claimants at their head court. They were searching 
questions, designed to identify nominal votes, and unsatisfactory 
answers were just grounds to refuse enrolment. Unfortunately, the 
House of Lords disallowed interrogatories in 1770 and from then 
on, with no serious checks on nominal votes, the county electoral 
rolls expanded as the major landholders set to work creating votes. 
Between 1759 and 1788, Ayrshire's electorate doubled and many other 
counties had a similar experience. 
66 
This undoubtedly added a 
bitterness to county politics as genuine freeholders came to be 
swamped by fictitious votes, and it prompted calls for reform. 
The basic unit for county politics was the 'interest' - the 
word had a general application throughout eighteenth century British 
politics -a group of individuals working together to advance or protect 
10. 
their own influence. An interest might consist of a nobleman 
and such friends as would follow his lead or it might be a group of 
gentlemen bound together by friendship or kinship. Kinship and 
family loyalties were the most common binding agents in politics 
in the early century and they remained a prominent feature in 
Dundas's era. 
67 
Behind them, politics was the pursuit of power and 
power was the ability to bestow good things on one's friends and 
supporters. This had always been true and a vote in Scotland 
(as in England) was partly viewed as a ticket giving possible 
access to favours, such as jobs in local or central government, 
government pensions and employment in the army or navy. By 
the late century this pursuit of patronage was even more marked 
and the political allegiance of an ever-growing number of 
individuals could be assured only by the provision of favours. 
68 
The Duke of Buccleuch was disturbed by this venality: 
"It quite disgusts me to see the want of feeling and 
proper, moral rectitude of conduct in many persons of 
this country when any office is in question. Judges, 
Dukes, Lords and commoners are all equally bad if an 
office suits their friend no matter what the nature of 
the office is, or what are the qualifications necessary 
to fill it. Public justice, and the civil government 
of the country is [sic ] seldom thought of by them". 69 
Dundas himself, at the time of his impeachment, would have cause 
to lament one manifestation of this new climate, the desertion 
of fair-weather friends. 
70 
Some counties were effectively dominated by one interest, 
normally because of one dominant landowner, as in Bute or 
Sutherland. Much more common was a situation where two or three 
11. 
groups would contend for control of the representation, forming 
and breaking alliances over 
patterns. 
71 
In four count 
Fife and Stirlingshire, the 
a large number of 'genuine' 
active political life. In 
the local politics revolved 
the years in sometimes bewildering 
ies in particular, Aberdeen, Ayrshire, 
patterns of landholding produced 
freeholders, with a correspondingly 
Ayrshire and Stirlingshire much of 
around the struggles by the gentry 
to maintain their influence in the face of the pretensions of 
local nobles. 
72 
In 1811, the Ayrshire situation was 
described in a way that has some relevance to opinions in 
other counties: 
"... it is very improper that peers should have any 
weight in putting in any Member of Parlt far less in 
dictating to a county as Lord Eglinton does & putting 
in his nephew one day & his brother the next. It is 
destroying the House of Coms & sinking the respectable 
landed proprietors". 73 
We will see later that the rise of party politics distorted 
some of the older political patterns. 
74 
It does not seem that 
the nature of county politics differed significantly between 
the highland and lowland areas. 
75 
Their economic interests 
could differ widely, however, and this could spill over into 
disputes between rival groups of Scots MPs in parliament. 
76 
The Scottish burgh MPs represented an electorate of about 
1300 men in 66 Royal Burghs. 
77 
Edinburgh returned one MP, 
and the remaining burghs were gathered into fourteen groups, 
nine with five burghs, five with four, each group electing 
one MP. At parliamentary elections, the council of each 
burgh chose a delegate and the delegates in a burgh group 
12. 
elected the member. In four-burgh groups, the delegate from 
the returning burgh had a casting vote in the event of a tie. 
78 
Parliamentary contests focussed on the burgh councils and the 
system was completely corrupt. The burgh magistrates were a 
tiny group. The burgh constitutions had mostly been frozen 
since 1707, and all had self-elective councils, so that it 
was usual for the outgoing council to choose the incoming one 
at the annual council elections. Burgh politics was thus 
confined to a cosy clique. Unaccountable to the generality of 
the inhabitants, the magistrates, who were sometimes non-resident, 
could do much as they wished with municipal revenues and property. 
They could also incur debts in the town's name and impose local 
taxes. 
79 
There was considerable variety in the condition of 
the burghs. Some were so small and by the late century of such 
economic insignificance, as to be completely under the sway of 
a local notable. In 1795, the great majority of the fifteen 
magistrates in Lochmaben were beholden to the Duke of Queensberry, 
some by loans of money, others through holding tenancies on his 
lands. 
80 
Lesser landowners could also exert some influence in 
burghs and the defeat of James Campbell's attempts to sit for 
the Stirling seat in 1791 was partly due to local gentlemen 
wishing to end his family power in the burghs. 
81 
Many 
burghs retained a grasping independence, returning loyalty to an MP 
or local patron only for so long as he kept them supplied with 
favours. If he ceased to be attentive, they would desert 
him. 
82 
Bribery, unknown in county politics, was widely practised 
in the burghs. An analysis of the Scots constituencies in 1810 
13. 
lists seven burgh groups which "will generally be carried by any 
candidate not sparing his and supported 
83 
g purse, by government". 
Even this fails to convey the unpredictable nature of burgh politics. 
The Stirling election of March 1791, mentioned above, demonstrated 
this. Most corrupt of the burgh seats - "the fullest purse will 
carry it" - three candidates appeared, all claiming government 
support. 
84 
Government actually supported Sir James Campbell 
but were slow to publicise it85 and no end of writing in 
Campbell's favour could reverse the ill effects of this. 
86 
It was a violent contest, with the kidnapping of Queensferry 
magistrates to prevent their voting for the delegate, a riot 
at Inverkeithing and serious irregularities in the election of the 
Culross delegate. Government even had to endure the mortification 
of seeing its local officials opposing Campbell, who eventually 
lost. 
87 
Not surprisingly, the state of affairs in the burghs, 
like the counties, led to demands for reform. 
For most of the period of this study, the nature of the 
political system was under question. We shall see that from 
1792 a considerable number of the common people, totally outside 
the system, were demanding a share in political power. 
88 
Within 
the political nation there was discontent with the operation 
of the county and burgh elections and a movement was on foot to 
end government interference in the peerage elections. There 
was also pressure from the immediate fringes of the political 
nation, from men possessed of property certainly, but whose 
attentions were not always welcomed by the political classes. 
14. 
The lesser landholders had been active on the periphery of 
county politics since the mid century. They were enabled to 
do this as commissioners of supply, charged with assessing the 
land tax. Aside from their normal business, more and more 
county commissioners from the 1770s had taken to holding 
meetings to discuss local and national affairs, such as internal 
defence measures or agricultural legislation. 
89 
The movement 
that arose to try and reform the county electoral system drew 
strength from the commissioners of supply who particularly supported 
those among the reformers aiming for a wider franchise. 
90 
At 
these county meetings the commissioners stood on an equality with 
the freeholders and while this was approved of in some circumstances 
- for instance when the counties were voting loyal addresses - it 
was not always to the taste of the freeholders. This is clear 
from a description of a Dumfriesshire meeting of 1806 
"... the court of commissioners of supply, where 
your Lordship knows, the wishes of gentlemen are 
often controuled [sic ] by the very inferior landed 
proprietors, while the freeholders of a county may be 
supposed more under the influence of a better 
judgement... ". 91 
The commissioners' activities went some small way to broadening 
the political nation but their wider aspirations were blocked from 
1793. 
The appearance of 'new money' became a subject of concern to 
the landed classes from the late 1760s, as the first men who had 
made money in trade or imperial service began to return home in 
numbers. Some, possessed of considerable wealth, started to 
exploit the failings of the county electoral system, buying up 
15. 
estates and creating votes. The threat that these new men - 
"nabobs" - were thought to pose to the influence of established 
landed families has recently been examined by Murdoch and 
Dwyer and they have identified it as one thread to the gathering 
support for the abolition of nominal votes in the years after 1770. 
This was not least because many Scots estates were entailed, 
precluding vote creation and putting their owners at a dis- 
advantage to the incomers. More generally, Murdoch and Dwyer 
have pointed to the fear of nabobs as a well from which Dundas, 
championing the interests of the established families, could 
draw support. 
92 
It is difficult to be certain how much 
Dundas benefited from this. It is undeniable that he spoke and 
wrote in a manner that shows he understood and was prepared to 
capitalise on the anxieties of the landed classes. 
93 
Similarly, 
in his years in power he did much to buttress the traditional 
ruling group, writing on at least one occasion of "the great 
aristocracy of Scotland (by which alone I venture to affirm it 
can be effectually governed)". 
94 
Equally, however, he had 
close ties with several 'nabobs', notably David Scott of 
Dunninaid and James Brodie of Brodie, both of whom had made 
fortunes in Indian trade. In fact both men illustrate the likely 
reason why 'new money' did not in the end cause real upset in Scots 
politics. Both came from old families and both returned to their 
home counties to share most of the social values of their 
neighbours. 'Nabobs' remained a regular topic of comment 
throughout Dundas's period but much of it was based on snobbery. 




and others would compare notes on incoming landowners. 
97 
It is likely that several, like John MacLeod of Colbecks, had 
to endure "jealousy of a man-of-the-purse". 
98 
The group as 
a whole, however, did not pose a substantial threat to established 
power and anxiety about them was replaced by more pressing fears 
in the 1790s. 
In the long term, it was the rise of industrial society that 
would spell the end of the old system. The landed classes were 
certainly wary of "the rise of manufactures". In 1809, Buccleuch 
felt that industry had expanded too far, to the point where the 
workforce was outstripping the available food supply. Capital, 
needed for agricultural improvement, was being drawn off to the 
new industries and he pointed to regular unrest among the 
industrial workforce. 
99 
Montrose was already convinced that 
agricultural wealth and industry had weakened the nation's 
martial spirit and he wrote of the "evils of commercial prosperity if , 
100 
The impact of the French Revolution undoubtedly furthered this 
general concern about the workforce. Nonetheless, the impact 
of industrialization should not be exaggerated. Scotland remained 
a largely rural economy until after 1820. The major economic 
change in Dundas's lifetime was in agriculture. The roots of the 
Scottish agricultural revolution go back into the seventeenth 
century 
101 
and change began to gather pace after 1750. Yet 
it was the price rises during the war years 1793-1815 that 
financed the 
greatest burst of improvement. In the lowlands the old system of 
communal farming was being steadily replaced by single tenant 
farms, 
17. 
while in the highlands the first clearances were beginning. 
Overall, there was a gradual move to the concentration of land 
in even fewer hands and to a rise in estate rents. This served 
to strengthen the economic power of the landowners. Certainly 
the future was augured by the Carron Ironworks, erected from 1759 
and by the appearance of cotton mills from 1778. But the 
industrial revolution proper was still on the horizon and most 'indus- 
trial' concerns such as weaving, salt and coal extraction, distilling 
and brewing, were geographically dispersed and often controlled by, 
or beholden to, the landed interest. 
102 
While it is true that 
some merchants and manufacturers found their way into the burgh 
reform movement, there was as yet no large, prosperous urban 
middle class able to make effective demands for reform. 
In one narrow way, the new commercial world did press into 
the old political game. As trade and commerce expanded, so the 
banks became more important. In Dumfries, the provost, David 
Staig, was local agent for the Bank of Scotland. For some years 
he made himself the principal politician there by "prostituting 
the paper of that company for political purposes". 
103 
His powers 
of credit over his fellow councillors allowed him to bid defiance 
both to Buccleuch and Queensberry, who had traditionally vied to 
direct the burgh's affairs. 
104 
The leading men in St Andrews 
similarly derived some influence from control of the Bank of 
Scotland's agency there. 
'°5 
It is almost certainly the potential 
for misusing credit in this way that explains the concern taken 
by politicians in the affairs of the Edinburgh banks. 
18. 
In conclusion, it is clear that the electoral system in 
Henry Dundas's time was undoubtedly corrupt and archaic, having 
been framed for the society of late seventeenth-century Scotland. 
Yet it was not wholly anachronistic and it still gave a reasonable 
reflection of the realities of political power. We will 
see time and again that the landed classes were prepared to 
accommodate some of the legislative demands of the emerging 
commercial classes, mainly in economic matters. Otherwise 
economic power and social reaction combined to defeat demands 
for reform. It is a striking illustration of the continuity 
of the landed elite's power, that a political state of the 
Scots counties, drawn up in 1810, would easily have been 
recognised by a Scots politician of forty years before. 
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The very narrowness of this political nation made it possible to 
conceive of one man being able to understand and represent its wishes. 
The constitutional relationship between Scotland and England came 
very close to creating a necessity for such a man. 
The Union of 1707, in transferring the centre of Scottish 
politics to London, served to conclude the process by which the 
direction of Scottish affairs had been moving South since the 
Union of the Crowns in 1603. Yet the Union was only a 
legislative one and was complete only in a narrow sense. 
The Scottish political nation gave allegiance to the Westminster 
parliament but the Scottish church and judiciary remained 
separate. The social structures of both countries were similar 
but there were wide cultural differences and the Scottish economy 
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was much the weaker of the two until past the mid-century, 
when it had completed its re-orientation away from older 
markets towards those now open in England and the Empire. 
The political elites in both countries would grow together as time 
advanced but the process was coming to fruition only at 
the end of the century. While this coming-together is one 
theme in this study, it was still the case that Scots politicians 
throughout the period would have political objectives sometimes 
quite different from their English counterparts. 
In the aftermath of the Union, the principal problem for 
Scots and English politicians was how to integrate the politics 
of the two nations. The Treaty of Union had fixed the Scottish 
representation at Westminster to the arbitrary figure of 45 MPs 
and 16 representative peers. 
107 
In London, the Scots would 
commonly act as a group where Scottish concerns were involved, 
usually planning their strategies at the British Coffee House. 
108 
In the defence of Scottish interests, they would regularly 
demonstrate cohesiveness in what one Scot called 
"that jealous irritability of temper we have been 
so long, and I am inclined to think rather justly 
accused of, as a distinguishing characteristick [sic ] 
national feature... ". 
109 
In the factional world of British parliamentary politics this 
undoubtedly gave them a potential importance beyond their mere 
numbers and it made their affiliations of some interest to English 
politicians. This importance was magnified when governments were 
weak and where the actions of only a few MPs or peers could spell 
the difference between continuance or collapse for a minister. 
lo, 
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The above were political considerations at Westminster. 
At the level of executive government, the different forms of 
church, law, administration and local politics in Scotland made 
the country a mystery to most English politicians. The departments 
of state in London had little idea about Scots affairs 
110 
and this 
could make it difficult to decide on filling the many Scottish 
offices in government's gift. We shall see repeatedly that 
government could have considerable influence in deciding Scottish 
elections but it required local knowledge to render such influence 
effective, and this was not always available in London. 
The abolition of the Scottish Privy Council in 1708, engineered 
by the Scottish Squadrone party, had left a vacuum in Scottish 
government. English government could not look to a body of 
official advisers for information. Occasionally, there was a 
Scottish Secretary of State, with the nominal direction of Scottish 
affairs. In practice his power depended directly on his own personal 
influence. This was most obviously the case with the Marquis of 
Tweeddale, Secretary 1742-6. With no real influence in Scotland 
and little support from government, he had to watch impotently 
ill 
as the third Duke of Argyll retained the lead in Scottish affairs. 
The office finally lapsed in 1746 and thereafter most Scottish 
business was transacted either at the Northern (later Home) 
Department or at the Treasury. For the decision making process 
in governing Scotland, the English ministers were left with a 
choice. They could delegate powers of patronage and influence 
to an individual to superintend Scotland as a 'manager'. The 
manager could have cabinet rank, or he might have influence without 
21. 
office. Alternatively, ministers could opt to govern Scotland 
as a Northern county of England, directly from the state offices 
in London. Obviously neither form of control need be exclusive 
and a manager might be subjected to regular interference from 
London, as was the Duke of Argyll when he managed Scotland for 
the Duke of Newcastle. 
112 
There were pros and cons to each 
form of administration and the changing circumstances of 
British politics caused changes in the nature of Scottish govern- 
ment. 
The existence of a manager presented problems both to his 
Scottish subjects and his London masters. To give him power 
in Scotland, the London administration had to delegate some or 
all of the Scottish patronage to his distribution. Inevitably 
in the working of eighteenth century politics, with its ties of 
obligation, this would increase his personal influence. This 
was of little matter while his relations with ministry remained 
friendly. But if the two fell out, the manager might wield 
this delegated influence against his masters. The possibility was 
long recognised and was enunciated by a Scots MP writing to the 
Home Secretary, Lord Pelham, in 1802: 
"I offered myself very early to your Lordship as at all 
times ready to contribute any information or explanation 
in my power, that might facilitate your arrangements for 
holding in your own hands the direct and personal manage- 
ment of Scotch affairs without any of those dangerous 
delegations, so injurious to Scotland - and so hazardous 
for the administration under which they are permitted - 
involving an Imperium in Imperio, and erecting a 
powerfull [sic ] machinery ready to be used for the 
demolition or support of ministers - as may suit the politics 
or inclinations of the person to whom the authority is 
delegated". 113 
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For the Scots, the system of management had two potential 
abuses. It meant the partial or total exclusion from the fount 
of patronage for any opposed to the manager personally. If his 
opponents could secure favours directly from government, this was 
their gain. But the stronger the manager's influence at Westminster, 
the tighter was his grip on Scots patronage and the more total 
was his opponents' exclusion. The term "Dundas Despotism" 
114 
refers as much to the manipulation of the electoral and 
patronage system as it does to the repression of the Scots 
radicals. 
An all-powerful manager could also embarrass his friends. 
Just as he could use his influence against his London colleagues, 
so he might use it to lord it over his Scottish constituents. 
This is one of the main themes behind the unrest caused by Dundas 
in 1785 when he tried to restructure the Court of Session. 
115 
A strand of Scottish opinion disliked management on principle, 
since it prevented a full completion of the Union by placing Scottish 
government on a footing different from that of English. 
116 
These 
views were still in evidence late in the century, Boswell objecting 
that it degraded Scotland to have a manager 
"bringing the people of Scotland to St. James's and 
the Treasury, as a salesman drives black cattle to 
Smithfield. Poor dumb beasts! Why should they not 
walk up themselves, and bellow as they may incline? "117 
Needless to say, there were numerous advantages to be had 
for both Scots and English politicians from having a manager. If 
the manager had real influence his Scots supporters could count on 
getting favours. It also meant that Scottish interests might be 
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properly protected by otherwise indifferent English governments. 
At a minor level this could involve pressing Scottish business 
stuck in the wheels of bureaucracy. More important, it 
could stop English intrusion. In 1785, at the height of the 
uproar surrounding the Court of Session reform, the Marquis of 
Buckingham advanced a candidate for the vacant gown in the Court. 
George Home's comment suggests that a manager was expected to 
enforce standards: 
"... to give it to the 
friend would be a most 
power and influence of 
is not sufficient to p 
unanswerable objection 
the Court". 118 
Marquis of Buckinghames [sic I 
improper nomination and if the 
our present Scotch ministers 
revent it, it affords an 
to the proposed alteration in 
The management system made life easier for Scots politicians, 
who at least knew where to turn when they wanted something. 
119 
It was also easier to negotiate with a fellow Scot, as Lord 
Seaforth explained to Melville: 
"I have an idea that you will & indeed must see this 
in the proper light - but I feel it difficult to explain 
it to English Ministers & indeed I cannot with any of them 
go so confidentially into the minutiae as I have to you", 
120 
From an English point of view, appointing a manager meant that 
difficult matters could be dealt with by a man experienced in 
Scottish affairs. Dundas told Boswell that a manager was of 
benefit to government: 
"He said it was better for the country, a salesman, as I 
called him; better for individuals not. For when all 
could scramble, they would have a chance [to] get more 
for themselves and their friends, without regard to merit. 
Whereas an agent for government must distribute to the 
best purpose. He has a trust". 
121 
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Having outlined the broad principles of 'management' it 
is necessary to anticipate a little and to examine Dundas's 
methods in detail. He was one of the most successful of the 
managers but he understood that he was only the latest of 
several. 
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The Argyll family had managed Scotland successively 
for Walpole and Newcastle, and Stuart Mackenzie had done the same 
for Bute and Grenville. From 1765, there had been a hiatus. 
With no pressing domestic issues and a series of reasonably 
stable ministries, the Scottish politicians could be left to their 
own devices. No manager was necessary and Scotland was therefore 
run directly from the state departments in England. 
123 
When 
management was resumed in 1783 with Dundas at the helm, some of his 
methods were such as his predecessors would have recognised. But 
there were also crucial and instructive differences. An account 
of these methods underpins much of the thesis that follows. 
The two basic duties of a manager were firstly to support 
local political alliances and groupings friendly to government 
and secondly to deploy the available Scottish patronage in 
government's best interests. Dundas's electoral operations 
will be discussed in later chapters. The very considerable number 
of offices and favours in its gift contributed substantially to 
government's influence in Scotland124 but by Dundas's era they 
were by no means all in the direct gift of the manager. Many 
nominations to local revenue and judicial offices would be 
made by the local MP provided he was a government supporter. 
Dundas as manager would only become involved where a dispute 
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led government offices to call for his advice, or where the 
local MP was unfriendly to government. 
125 
This system predates 
Dundas's years of power and he inherited it, making few changes 
to it. It almost certainly developed in the years after 1765, 
when English offices, without the advice of a manager, had to 
work on the principle that if an MP supported government, he could 
expect to fill local appointments. One or two MPs would still 
get Dundas to do some of their business soliciting jobs about 
the London offices126 and he was very often resorted to for his 
extra leverage in procuring more exalted favours. Overall, 
however, Scottish local patronage was distributed almost 
automatically from London and this had implications for Dundas's 
role as manager. Much of the work of Argyll and Stuart Mackenzie 
had involved chasing up government departments to forward 
Scottish appointments. 
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Dundas did not have this work and 
dealt only with major appointments in this way. Consequently 
London government already had machinery, in a way that it 
apparently had not had in earlier periods, to dispense with at 
least some of the services of a Scots manager. 
The manager had always had a role in whipping in the Scots 
MPs. They would often ask Dundas whether their presence was 
necessary128 but Dundas himself recognised that the crucial 
factor in securing their attendance was the government circular 
letter, sent out at the beginning of each session. 
129 
This 
too was a function for which a manager was largely unnecessary. 
The day-to-day management of Scotland under Dundas was shaped 
by several considerations, not least his ability to visit it. 
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Prior to 1792 he usually managed one or two annual visits, splitting 
his time between Midlothian and his residence at Dunira in Perthshire. 
Purchased in 1783, Dunira provided both a retreat and a base from 
which to visit Northern allies. Most previous managers had had a 
highland residence and Dunira was a public symbol of Dundas's affinity 
with the highland landowners. On his Scottish visits, he would be 
mobbed by supplicants130 and Dunira afforded a partial escape. 
In the late 1780s, Dundas's principal work concerned the affairs 
of India and Scotland and his business was easily dealt with 
during his long working day. 
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From 1792, the onerous demands 
made on his time by the campaign against the radicals and then 
by his work as a war minister, forced adjustments on his Scottish 
government. His Northern visits became fewer and shorter and 
he came to rely more on secretaries. 
From the 1770s, Dundas had employed William Bell, an Edinburgh 
writer, as his secretary132 but between 1783 and 1788, the post 
was empty until the appointment of Robert Hepburn, son of a Scots 
customs commissioner. 
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Hepburn was employed until December 1793 and was 
briefly replaced by James Chapman, until William Garthshore took 
over in July 1794.134 Garthshore had tutored the Earl of Dalkeith 
and acted for Dundas as secretary until mid-1797,135 His 
replacement, William Budge, served Dundas until 1801 and again 
1804-5,136 Unusually, and as a clear indication of the pressure 
of work, Budge was shadowed by two other secretaries, Frederick 
Colquhoun, 1797-9 and James Colquhoun, 1799-1801.137 From 1798, 
Henry Scott Alves appears as a copyist and as a full secretary 
from 1804.138 Dundas's Indian business was handled separately 
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by William Cabell until his death in 1800 and thereafter by 
Cabell's nephew, Benjamin Jones, and John Meheux. 
139 
Dundas employed his secretaries to considerable advantage. 
From 1792, and perhaps earlier, incoming mail was summarised 
in secretarial minute books and Dundas would annotate the entries, 
specifying the action required. Much can be learnt from these 
books. 
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Most striking is the extent to which business was 
delegated. Dundas would clearly do some soliciting at 
government offices141 but it was more common for him to have 
a secretary pursue matters. 
142 
Often a secretary would reply to 
letters after receiving instructions 
143 
although Dundas did 
answer a goodly number himself. Many letters were apparently 
ignored. 
On one view, this system was founded on the necessity of an 
overworked Dundas delegating his burden. From another, it 
indicates his strong position as a Scottish manager. Unlike 
Argyll, who could never fully rely on Newcastle, Dundas, as we will 
see later, had the assurance of Pitt's support. From this position 
he did not have to fear being thwarted by others operating on the 
government bureaucracy and his use of a secretarial system in this 
way shows the confidence with which he could work. 
Another consequence of Dundas's pre-occupation with revolution 
and war from 1792, was the re-emergence of a 'sub-minister' in 
Scotland. The Duke of Argyll had employed Andrew Fletcher, Lord 
Milton in this role and Milton had superintended Scottish affairs 
when Argyll was absent, serving as a point of contact for Scots 
wishing government action or patronage. 
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Prior to 1791, Dundas 
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managed most of his Scottish business himself. His half- 
brother, the Lord President Dundas, had acted as a communications 
link with Scotland between 1778 and 1783 but he did not continue 
this role after 1784. Ilay Campbell, Lord Advocate 1784-9, took 
the lead in Scottish legislation145 but he filled no major role 
in patronage distribution or electoral politics. Campbell was 
not himself important politically146 and his office as yet 
had few political duties. 
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Campbell's successor as Advocate was 
Robert Dundas, Henry's nephew and son-in-law. The character of 
the office changed under him, but this was not immediate. He had 
certainly dabbled in politics as Solicitor General from 1784148 
but still his uncle held the reins. The absence of a sub-minister 
became serious in 1792: 
"It is a great loss to the internal government of 
Scotland, that there is no person in it to unite the 
friends of administration in any common measure... 
Lord Advocate is too much occupied by his official 
and professional business, to attend to the necessary 
detail... particularly in times like the present". 149 
Rundas recognised this problem and asked George Home of 
Branxton 
150 
to act as a sub-minister, corresponding with the 
friends of government in Scotland and with Dundas in London. 
Home declined and thought the task would fall to Buccleuch and 
others. 
151 
In fact it fell to the Advocate. "His abilities 
and acquirements were both moderate", wrote Cockburn, who would 
still have agreed with Ramsay's description of "a young man, whose 
spirit and abilities, tempered by prudence and urbanity, surprised 
both friends and foes". 
152 
His prosecution of the radicals made 
him hated in Scotland. 
153 
He would regularly consult his uncle 
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before making major decisions and some observers had no high 
opinion of this. 
154 
In fact he was little different from previous 
sub-ministers. He would liaise with government's friends around 
Scotland, channelling information to Dundas155 and his uncle would 
pass him knotty problems requiring local knowledge. 
156 
He took 
a personal interest in church affairs157 and had some say in 
judicial appointments. 
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Otherwise, the major decisions on 
Scottish appointments and the concerting of electoral pacts lay 
with Dundas. Charles Hope, Lord Advocate from 1801 to 1804, 
continued the office's role as a centre of executive government 
but he had few of his predecessor's political duties. 
159 
These 
remained with the Dundas family. 
While Dundas's distribution of patronage will be discussed 
fully in later chapters, it is appropriate to deal here with two 
categories of favours, both in his direct gift: East Indian jobs, 
and pensions. The former is particularly associated with his 
name and was not available to previous managers. 
Dundas's use of East Indian patronage reflects his dual role 
as a British politician - largely ignored in this study - and as a 
Scottish manager. It is sometimes implied that he held the lion's 
share of Indian patronage, 
160 
and contemporaries accorded him much 
influence in it. The truth is different. Government's India 
legislation of 1784 created a Board of Control to supervise 
the East India Company's governance of India and Dundas quickly 
came to dominate its business. The Board had limited power to 
161 
recall unsuitable appointees but nominations of writers (civil 
servants), military cadets, assistant surgeons and other officials 
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in India and China remained with the Company's 24 directors. 
This cannot be overemphasised. 
162 
Between 1788 and 1793, the directors appointed an annual 
average of 37 writers, 62 cadets and 24 assistant surgeons. 
163 
Numbers fluctuated thereafter, but the trend was upward and 
by 1798 they intended to appoint 29 writers and 163 cadets. 
164 
The available patronage was divided into 28 shares and of these 
two were given as an informal gift to the Board of Control. 
165 
In practice, this meant Dundas. 
166 
What assistant surgeoncies 
he received came directly from the Chairman of the directors and 
his deputy. 
167 
In 1792, Dundas officially had four writers to 
nominate and no cadets. In 1797, the numbers were six and six 
respectively, falling to three and six in 1798.168 To these 
were added what he could bargain from the directors. In 1797, 
he obtained two cadetships from friendly directors, in addition 
to six from the Company. 
169 
In 1801, Dundas nominated three 
writerships170 and the directors gave him the vast total of 36 
cadets, while bargaining obtained him another seven, with three 
171 
surgeoncies. 
The distribution of his 1801 patronage is indicative of 
Dundas's general use of East Indian favours. Edinburgh's Provost 
Fettes saw two friends off to India, Alexander Dunsmuir and David 
Buchan. The Aberdeenshire MP, Ferguson of Pitfour, was given a 
Bengal cadetship for William Donaldson Turner, and his neighbours, 
the Duke and Duchess of Gordon had two friends similarly rewarded. 
Other patrons whose candidates benefited from Dundas's largesse 
included the Marquis of Tweeddale, George Paterson of Castlehuntly, 
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Sir William Pulteney and Lady Aboyne. Scots beneficiaries 
predominated, but there were others as well, including the 
Duchesses of Gloucester and of Dorset, Lady Smith Burges and 
Sir William Lowther. 
172 
Despite the avalanche of begging letters, Dundas's patronage 
was limited. 
173 
Save for 1801, his annual appointments 1784-1801 
appear to average about ten. This was not the Scotticization of 
East India174 but within Scottish politics the impact was dis- 
proportionate. Indian appointments, especially writerships, 
could be tickets to great wealth and people would wait 
patiently for such a prize. 
175 
We have noted a few beneficiaries 
above and later we will meet others. Dundas's recommendation 
of individuals to the Indian governors was also valuable - "a 
letter from him would have as much weight as one from King George", 
wrote one official 
176 
- and it was an easy favour to bestow. He 
made considerable numbers of them. 
177 
If Dundas's access to Indian patronage added to his influence 
in Scotland, he was not the sole channel. Ten Scotsmen were 
Company directors between 1784 and 1802 and could be expected to 
forward their countrymen. 
17$ 
One, William Elphinstone, used his 
patronage to help the opposition interest in Stirlingshire. 
179 
David Scott, Dundas's friend at the India House, used his to 
reinforce his parliamentary seat, first in Angus then in the 
Perth Burghs. 
180 
The Minto family, sometimes in opposition, 
had access to Indian posts for their Roxburghshire allies. 
181 
Clearly, if the Scottish presence in India was very marked 




Pensions on the Scottish civil establishment were granted 
under the Privy Seal and formed another of the patronages at 
Dundas's disposal. He described his distribution of them as 
"confined to persons of rank whose fortunes are 
inadequate to their situation, to men of literature, 
and to persons in indigent circumstances who from 
personal distress or having large families without 
the means of education are creditable objects of the 
King['Is beneficence". 183 
Widows and orphans, or persons of literature might expect a 
pension of £100,184 while an earl down on his luck could hope 
for £300.185 Dundas always denied mixing politics in pension 
distribution and superficially this was true. The reality was 
different. The available lists186 show several noble families 
receiving pensions and we have suggested above that this could 
condition their politics. Similarly, many of the indigent 
families on the list had got there through friends with political 
influence. Thus, a Mary Hamilton received a pension on the 
application of the Lanarkshire MP, after the principal gentlemen 
in the county had pressed her case. 
187 
Others were solicited 
on similar grounds188 and it is clear that pensions provided 
outdoor relief for the political classes. The extent of all 
this should not be exaggerated. Demand always outran supply189 
and from 1793 the pressure of war on the available funds was so great 
that Dundas was advised to grant no more pensions, 
190 
For the 
next eight years he constantly informed supplicants that nothing 
was to be had 
191 
and things did not ease until after 1801. 
Some of those not placed on the civil establishment were 
put on a 'private' pension list. The composition was similar 
to that of the larger public list but the pensions were far 
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smaller192 and the list also included confidential payments 
to the seceding churches. 
193 
These pensions were paid by the 
Crown Agent194 and may have had some connection with secret 
service payments. Secret service payments proper remain 
mysterious. Some money was used to pay loyalist writers and 
spies during the struggle with the radicals195 and some was 
disbursed by the Crown Agent. 
196 
Dundas also received money 
directly and he would send it to Robert Dundas of Beechwood, his 
lawyer, to Hugh Warrender and to James Newbigging, all of whom 
acted in his private business. They used it variously in the 
1784 election campaign and in Stirling Burgh elections. 
197 
There are hints of such money being used in Cupar politics. 
198 
The actual extent and effect of such expenditures is unclear. 
It clearly embarrassed Dundas and little evidence remains in his 
papers. It was not a topic of importance in any Scots politician's 
papers and this alone suggests that it was probably not of great 
significance. 
199 
Having discussed the principles and methods by which Scotland 
was governed in the years after 1707, and having emphasised 
something of the continuity between Dundas's 
'managerial' work and 
that of his predecessors, it is time to give some account of 
his 
career prior to 1783. 
He started political life with an excellent pedigree, the 
son of Robert Dundas, Lord President of the 
Court of Session by 
his second marriage to Anne Gordon of Invergordon. 
His father's 
early death placed him under the tutelage of 
his step-brother 
Robert, also to become Lord President. 
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Both Lord Presidents had been active politically, joining 
the Squadrone party of the early century in its struggles with the 
Dukes of Argyll. In later years the second Lord President had 
retreated from public affairs, even declining to be Scottish 
manager, when the post was offered by Rockingham in 1765.200 
Nonetheless, the family retained a substantial political 
influence in Midlothian, 
201 
they were on good terms with the 
Hopetouns in West Lothian, 
202 
and Henry Dundas's mother's 
relatives gave them a connection in Cromarty politics. In 
time, marriage would prove a significant source of influence 
for the Dundases. The marriages of three of the second President's 
daughters into the families of Colt of Auldhame, Hamilton of 
Pencaitland and Buchan of Kelloe gave the family an important 
interest in East Lothian. Another daughter married a Lanarkshire 
laird, Sir John Lockhart Ross and a fifth married Sir John Scott 
of Balcomie, whose death, in 1775, gave the Dundases a commanding 
influence in Fife. 
203 
Henry Dundas commenced as an advocate in 1763 and undoubtedly 
was good at it. 
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In time, it would give him a remarkable grasp 
of Scottish electoral law. He also participated fully in the 
debating societies of Enlightenment Edinburgh. 
205 
In 1765, he 
married Elizabeth, daughter of David Rannie of Melville, an Indian 
merchant, and he received a dowry of £10,000 and the estate of 
Melville. 
206 
In Spring 1766, while in London pleading Scottish 
appeals, he was appointed Solicitor General upon his predecessor's 
promotion. He was apparently not without rivals207 
but it 
appears that the 7th Earl of Lauderdale pressed his claims. 
208 
This was the beginning of Dundas's ascent but the major step 
35. 
came in 1767, when he befriended the young Duke of Buccleuch. 
Henry, 3rd Duke of Buccleuch commanded considerable 
electoral influence in Midlothian and South Eastern Scotland. 
Tutored by Adam Smith, he visited his Scottish estates for the 
first time in 1767, just after coming of age. 
209 
Apparently 
at this time he was introduced to Dundas by the Midlothian MP, 
Sir Alexander Gilmour. 
210 
The two quickly formed a lifelong 
friendship and within a short time it was clear that Dundas, 
the Lord President and Buccleuch were acting together. 
211 
In 
the normal run of eighteenth century politics, the Duke should 
have led the group but this did not happen. The apparent retreat 
of the Scots nobility from London politics at this period has 
been discussed212 and while it is likely to have been due to the 
individual personalities involved rather than to some general 
cause, 
213 
Buccleuch is certainly a case in point. He championed 
the cause of the Independent Peers in the 1774 election214 but 
took a back seat thereafter, involving himself only in the management 
of peerage elections. He supervised his electoral influence in 
Southern Scotland and devoted much time to his estates but otherwise 
he avoided the national stage. 
215 
By contemporary standards then, 
his relationship with Dundas was unusual, and pamphleteers lampooned 
216 
him for being 'duped' and 'led' by the Arniston family. 
Allied with Buccleuch, Dundas began planning a political 
career. In 1770, Sir Alexander Gilmour, then in parliament with 
the support of the Dundases, was informed that Dundas would likely 
want the seat at the next general election. Gilmour, deep in 
debt, needed the seat to avoid a debtor's jail and when it became 
36. 
clear that Dundas could make no provision for him, he decided to 
make a fight of it. When Dundas realised a contest was likely, 
he wrote to the Prime Minister, Lord North, to announce his 
intention of supporting government if elected. 
217 
The election 
did not come until 1774, and Dundas easily saw Gilmour off. 
Gilmour's financial problems would soon overtake him and while 
Dundas would later do much to help him, 
218 
his immediate treatment 
of him was considered by some to be treacherous. 
219 
From this period, Dundas's career falls into two overlapping 
phases. The first was the struggle between 1774 and 1781 to 
assert his and Buccleuch's claim to be leaders in Scottish 
politics. The second was his rise to prominence in British 
politics, 1774-1782. 
Within months of his entering parliament, reports circulated 
"of the Duke of Buccleuch's imagining that he should be Prime 
Minister for Scotland, and that Harry Dundas was to act along with 
him". 
220 
In May 1775, Dundas was appointed Lord Advocate, partly 
with Lord Mansfield's influence. The previous Advocate, 
James Montgomery, replaced Lord Chief Baron Norton, who resigned on a 
pension. 
221 
Dundas proceeded to use his new office to advantage. 
He briefly took up his predecessor's attempts to forward a bill 
to curtail nominal votes222 and he was involved in legislation 
of 1775 that ended the legal servitude of Scottish coalworkers223 
Concern at emigration to America led him to controversial measures 
in 1775, when he ordered customs officials and JPs to act to 
inhibit the exodus. 
224 
This caused murmuring, and it is the 
beginning of a theme used by Dundas's critics in later years: that 
he had a disposition to authoritarian and arbitrary measures in 
37. 
pursuing his objects. 
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In 1776, he supported an abortive 
attempt to introduce a Scots militia226 and in 1778 he was 
foremost in the ill-fated endeavours to grant relief to Scottish 
Catholics. All this activity was designed to assert his claims 
to leadership in Scots politics. 
227 
We have observed that there was no Scottish manager after 1765 
and Dundas clearly wanted the post. Yet Lord North showed no 
disposition to make such an appointment and this gave the Scottish 
infighting of the period the air of a sterile and artificial feud. 
The abdication of the Scots nobility from national politics meant 
that Dundas and Buccleuch faced a limited field. Bute's son, Lord 
Mountstuart, aspired to the lead in Scots politics and Brady has 
argued that he was associated with a heterogeneous group of 
individuals who, under better leadership, might have opposed 
Dundas. 
228 
Unfortunately, despite his resentment of Dundas and 
Buccleuch, Mountstuart was a poor leader and inconsistent in his 
objectives. 
229 
Nor is there much evidence that the Wemyss family 
in Fife, the Elphinstones in Dunbartonshire, Lord Fife in Banffshire, 
or any of the others cited by Brady were interested in such a 
contest or its issue. The Scots politicians were apparently 
indifferent. The one exception was the political grouping around 
Sir Laurence Dundas of Kerse, a distant relative of Henry. A 
former army commissary, he entered British politics in the mid- 
1760s and by 1768 had a considerable influence in Scotland. This 
grew in the next decade and prior to 1774 he directed five MPs 
in parliament. In Scotland he had greater or lesser influence 
in Edinburgh, Stirlingshire, the Northern Isles, the Stirling and 
Linlithgow burgh groups, Dunbartonshire and Clackmannan. A firm 
38. 
supporter of Lord North, he wanted a British peerage but it 
does not seem that he particularly wished to have the leadership 
in Scots politics. From 1774, he was under siege. The 4th Duke 
of Argyll and other nobles were attacking his influence in Stirling- 
shire and Dunbartonshire, while Dundas and Buccleuch were trying 
to capture Edinburgh from him. 
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It is tempting to see this struggle as one between old 
established interests and the new commercial wealth represented 
by men like Sir Laurence. Henry Dundas was certainly prepared to 
use this sort of vocabulary in his propaganda campaign, but the 
struggle was essentially personal. Sir Laurence had made the 
mistake of offending too many people at once and he had the 
misfortune to be in the way of Buccleuch and Dundas in Edinburgh. 
In later years, Henry Dundas would indicate that he bore his opponents 
no ill-will and there is some evidence to support this. 
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Unfor- 
tunately for Sir Laurence, Edinburgh, at the centre of Scottish 
administration and polite society, had a peculiar importance 
in the politics of the country and any aspiring manager had 
to control it. 
232 
For six years the two factions battled to 
control the city, a struggle that ended only with Sir Laurence's 
death in 1781. North had studiously avoided taking sides, until 
Sir Laurence had moved to the opposition benches in 1779. After 
his death, opposition expected to lose the loyalty of his son, Sir 
Thomas Dundas, but he stood by them233 and would be an important 
member of the opposition based on party and 
ideological principles 
that opposed Pitt after 1783. 
39. 
In 1780, an observer of the Edinburgh feuding remarked: 
"This town has long been thought of consequence. My 
opinion is, that the way to gain it, is, not to make direct applications here, but to show the possession 
of power, & consideration at London". 234 
Henry Dundas was certainly acquiring consideration in London. 
His first speeches in parliament advocated stern measures against 
the American rebels. In March 1777, at Buccleuch's insistence, 
North gave Dundas a half share in the Keepership of the Signet. 
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Dundas was independent enough to oppose North's proposals to 
treat with the Americans in February 1778, and in doing so 
infuriated the King. 
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In June 1778, Dundas could modestly 
report: 
"You know I am no partial advocate for L-d N[. ] and have 
no attachment to him, for he has none to me. 237 
This situation was about to alter radically. 
From the Summer of 1778, the American war, in progress since 
1775, began to go wrong, with the British defeat at Saratoga and 
the entrance of France. Unrest in Ireland was paralleled by 
growing opposition in parliament led by Lord Shelburne, opposed to 
American independence and preaching administrative reform, and by 
Lord Rockingham, who desired peace, if necessary at the price of 
conceding independence. 
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Outside parliament, there were the 
first stirrings of demands for political reform. This crisis was 
Dundas's opportunity. His talent for public speaking was well 
developed and he was government's best Commons debater: 
"Far from shunning the post of danger, he always seemed 
to court it; and was never deterred from stepping forward 
to the assistance of ministers by the violence of opposition, 
by the unpopularity of the measure to be defended, or by the 
difficulty of the attempt". 239 
40. 
This talent was Dundas's principal asset and it was this that got 
him so far forward so quickly. Added to it, was the small 
following of Scots MPs that he had gathered around him. 
Assessments of the size of the group are difficult. After 
the election of 1780, the number fluctuated between eight and 
twelve, drawn from Scottish and English seats. 
240 
It was a 
respectable size, much the same as Lord Shelburne's following. 
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Equally important was Dundas's developing role as the focus for Scots 
MPs generally disposed to support government, although otherwise 
unconnected with him. By March 1779, he could boast: 
"I am in so high feather at present, that I don't know 
how to conduct myself. It would be affectation to 
conceal what I certainly know to be the fact, that at 
this moment since last Monday night, I am held forth 
by administration, and allowed by opposition the - 242 
can say no more or you would think my head turned". 
Dundas was already in pursuit of a prize, the whole Keepership 
of the Signet for life, a pursuit that appears to have become 
symbolic of his larger ambition to become North's manager for 
Scotland. While he felt "the administration so much more obliged 
to me than I ever can be to them", 
243 
North was slow to reward him. 
The King was keen to tie Dundas to government and on 24 April 
North indicated a willingness, given time, to get him the whole 
Signet. 
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By now, Dundas was government's linchpin in the 
Commons and in mid-May there was talk of high office for him. 
This he ignored, continuing to demand the Signet. When the offer 
finally came, the King would not make a life grant. Dundas 
refused it, expressed "zeal to support his government" and prepared 
to return to Scotland. 
245 
In the end, he took the advice of 
41. 
Chancellor Thurlow, who persuaded him to indicate to North and the 
King a willingness to obey their commands. The appointment was 
settled by 15 June 
246 
and Dundas stayed for the close of 
parliamentary business. Within days, Spain joined the war 
against Britain and thereafter Dundas's support for North, whose 
problems were mounting, was unabating. 
In Spring 1780, government hit a bad patch, with Dunning's 
motion against the influence of the Crown narrowly passing the 
Commons. North was dispirited, but improved parliamentary 
management, the shock of the Gordon riots, a temporary weakening 
in the links binding opposition and an equally temporary upturn 
in the war, all contrived to rescue the situation. 
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Dundas was to 
the fore in defending government but in the Summer he was furious 
to learn that another Scots office had been granted for life, while 
he was still refused that favour. 
248 
Parliament was dissolved in September but while Dundas was 
given government money to try and dislodge Sir Laurence Dundas 
from Edinburgh, 
249 
it does not appear that he was accorded any 
general oversight of the Scottish elections. Nonetheless, he 
was now an influential man and one friend reported, 
"I am 
standing publicly upon the credit of your name, & have 
derived 
great benefit from it". 
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He had some concern in the peerage 
election and, an augury of future difficulty, 
disagreed with Lord 
Stormont, Secretary for the Northern Department, about the 
selection of candidates. 
251 
At the close of the general 
252 
election, 41 of the 45 Scots MPs were government supporters. 
42. 
By October 1780, Dundas had concluded that victory in America 
was unlikely and that the King should be advised to allow peace 
negotiations offering the Americans independence. 
253 
Time 
would confirm him and some ministers in this view but the King's 
refusal to consider defeat was to become North's millstone. The 
elections had done little to increase government's majority. 
254 
Dundas did not hurry to London, partly from the press of 
Scottish legal business, partly from pique at North's failure 
to get him the Signet for life. He was also unhappy at 
government's lack of direction. 
255 
When he did return, he resumed a stout support of government. 
In February 1781, North appointed him chairman of a committee 
investigating the causes of war in the Carnatic. This was the 
beginning of his fascination with Indian affairs. 
256 
In July, he 
declined North's offer of a seat at the Treasury since it would 
imply that either it or his Advocateship would become a sinecure. 
He reaffirmed his loyalty to North but also hinted that family 
obligations might constrain him to leave parliamentary life. 
The appointment would have allowed Dundas to assume the management 
of Indian business and there had been hints of better offices to 
come. 
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Richard Rigby, the Paymaster General, suggested Dundas 
be appointed Colonial Secretary to try and obtain peace. Dundas 
dismissed the idea; the services prosecuting the war "would not 
easily bear the yoke of a proud hotheaded Scotch man" determined 
to restore discipline and efficiency. 
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By November, his attitude 
had hardened and the deadlocked policy produced by a ministry who 
saw defeat as inevitable and a King who saw retreat as unthinkable, 
43. 
became impossible for him. He resolved to oppose further 
expeditions to America and to speak out, regardless of the 
personal cost. On 28 November, he caused a sensation, with 
a speech calling on North to tell the King that the war must be 
abandoned. 
259 
Privately Dundas, with the support of Rigby and 
others, began to press North to dismiss the incompetent Lords 
Germain (the Colonial Secretary) and Sandwich (First Lord of the 
Admiralty). Germain's removal in particular would publicly signal 
North's desire to end the war. 
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Dundas was aware that demands for Germain's dismissal found 
no favour with the King and he was equally conscious of his 
unpopularity with other ministers. He was warned of Stormont's 
resentment: 
"for that it is impossible for any body in his situation 
to feel pleasant in the prospect daily before his eyes 
of another person in possession of the confidence of 
Scotland, with great influence there, and the avowed 
favourite of the minister". 
North flattered Dundas, saying he would not go on if Dundas withdrew 
his support 
261 
but still he would not drop Germain. Dundas and 
Rigby resorted to blackmail, refusing to attend parliament. With 
a dwindling parliamentary majority, North was compelled to accede 
to Germain's removal in February. The King was furious with Dundas. 
262 
By now, desperate to stop Dundas's awkwardness - he was still 
demanding Sandwich's removal - North tried to restrain his 
conduct by offering him the Treasureship of the Navy. Dundas 
would not accept it unless he also got the Signet for 
life, and the 
matter stuck. 
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Given Dundas's unpopularity with the Cabinet, 
44. 
he doubted whether North could persuade the King to make a life 
grant and this apparently suited him. He felt that his 
"situation of a long time had been awkward", a reference to his 
continued support for government despite its failure openly to 
advocate peace. Now he was able to say publicly that if the 
King did not give him a life grant, he would take it as a sign that 
his aid was not required in parliament. 
264 
In fact Dundas continued to support North, but the end was 
near. The Cabinet had abandoned all plans for offensive war 
in December 1781, but while the King accepted this, he would 
not accept its implication, the recognition of American 
independence. Consequently ministers could not openly 
admit a readiness to negotiate peace, although the bulk of 
parliament, surveying economic dislocation and military failure, 
now wanted an end to hostilities. This dichotomy between what 
government wanted to do, and what it could admit to doing, broke 
its credibility. The government majority began to wither. On 
22 and 27 February, opposition moved addresses calling for an end 
to offensive war in America. The first was defeated by one vote 
only, in a debate in which Dundas, as a junior minister with a 
licence to speak more plainly than his seniors, made it clear that 
Germain had been removed precisely because offensive war was no 
longer intended. The second division saw government defeated 
by 234 votes to 215, with only a little over one half of the Scots 
MPs supporting North. 
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Over the next few days the King and North tried to save the 
government. In late February, Dundas advised North to resign266 
but in early March he suggested plans for strengthening his 
45. 
position and said he would not join any government that did not 
include North. 
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By 9 March, Dundas was certain that opposition 
would form a government but he was determined to accept no favours 
from them, "unless Lord North's retreat is in every respect such 
as he is satisfied with". North had apparently given Dundas 
assurances of the Signet and he was resolved to retain his 
Advocateship. 
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On 20 March, North resigned. 
Dundas has often been charged with political opportunism. 
His relationship with North does not bear this out. Dundas 
supported him through thick and thin despite being denied the 
prize he coveted. It is equally clear that from late 1780 he 
was consistent in advocating the cause of peace with America, and this at 
some personal cost. His position as North's representative in Scotland 
is less clear. The limited evidence in his own papers, in the 
Dundas of Arniston papers and in William Eden's correspondence 
suggests that while he was closely involved in Scottish legal 
patronage from 1778, his influence did not extend much further. 
North appears not to have given him full status as manager. 
Stormont, Secretary for the Northern Department, had nominal 
oversight of Scots affairs but this did not stop Dundas profiting 
from his obvious closeness to ministers in London. 
North was replaced by a ministry comprising Rockingham, 
Shelburne and Charles J. Fox. Dundas was allowed to keep his 
Advocate's post but when it became clear that the King was still 
unwilling to grant the Signet for life, 
he decided to resign. 
Again it was Thurlow who talked him out of it. He pointed out 
that the new government was so discordant that it could not endure 
46. 
and eventually the King would need Dundas. And then Dundas 
could dictate his price. Meantime, wrote Dundas, "my interest 
must be compleatly [sic I at a stand perhaps forever, certainly 
for sometime", and he wished it to be understood that he was not 
in government's confidence. 
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Dundas's precise relationship 
with Rockingham's administration is unclear. In the past, 
Rockingham had disapproved of appointing a Scottish manager 
and the limited evidence indicates that this was again the case. 
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Shelburne, anxious to strengthen his own position, endeavoured 
privately to win Dundas's confidence but Dundas was wary and 
their meetings came to no conclusion. 
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At Rockingham's death on 1 July, his government had made 
progress in administrative reform but none at all in the pursuit 
of peace. The King, hating Fox whom he saw as a corrupting 
influence on the Prince of Wales, asked Shelburne to form the new 
administration. Fox and many of his supporters promptly abandoned 
Shelburne and the new government began to look very weak. 
272 
With 
the King's permission, Shelburne immediately offered Dundas the 
Signet for life, the Treasurership of the Navy, the management 
of Scotland and hinted at a Cabinet post. Dundas gave no direct 
answer but returned to London. 
273 
Privately, he affected a wish 
only to retain his Advocate's post, with his power and influence 
in Scotland and he would only return to office if his family's 
financial independence was secured. 
274 
He was in a strong 
bargaining position. George Home reported: 
"From what I can learn[, ] his assisstance 
[sic ] in 
the House of Commons is thought indispensable to oppose 
Mr Fox. This is not only Lord Shelburne's sentiments, 
11275 but those of Generall [sic ] Conway and the Greenvilles 
[sic ] 
47. 
Dundas initially refused the Treasurership settling for the 
rest. This was not enough for Shelburne, who probably wished 
to have Dundas tied to him in a way that he had not been to 
North, and he threatened to give up the government completely, 
unless Dundas took the Treasurership. Eventually, and only after 
getting North's approval, did Dundas accept. Shelburne also 
wanted him to resign the Lord Advocateship. 
276 
Again, this may 
have been an attempt to bind Dundas more securely to ministers, 
by closing a line of retreat. By October he was prepared to 
resign the Advocateship and Shelburne resolved that it should 
go to Ilay Campbell. 
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This fell through when Campbell, 
deferring to the pretensions of the Solicitor General, Alexander 
Murray, refused to accept. Since Shelburne was unwilling to 
appoint Murray, Dundas had to continue as Advocate, but he stopped 
taking the salary and so could at least deny that he held it as 
a sinecure. 
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Murray, who apparently had Lord Mansfield's 
advice, also missed his chance of a vacant Session gown, given, 
at Dundas's recommendation, to John Swinton. 
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In January 
1783, Dundas would retreat on his agreement to resign the 
Advocateship. Shelburne, reported Dundas, asked "if I 
meant from the general tenor of my conversation to get out of 
politicks [sic ] and leave him [at] the first fair opportunity[? 
]". 
Dundas again asserted his loyalty to Shelburne's administration 
and there the matter rested, but the question gives some 
insight 
into the devious Shelburne's suspicions about Dundas. 
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Even with the support of Dundas and of Dundas's 
friends Rigby 
and the Northite William Adam, 
281 
Shelburne's administration was 
48. 
never secure. George Home observed, "The ministry I beleive [sic ] 
are very unsetled [sic ]. Their strength consists in the dissensions 
of their enemies... ". 
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Dundas knew that its survival depended 
on its making peace with the other powers as well as America. 
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Lord North, with perhaps 120 followers in the Commons, stood 
aloof. Partly he was annoyed with the King's failure to repay him 
old election debts but principally he wished to see Shelburne's 
peace plans before committing himself. 
284 
The opening session 
of parliament in December 1782 was disastrous for government 
supporters. They were clearly in a minority, there were 
dissensions among ministers concerning the interpretation of 
the preliminary articles of peaceyand government was saved only 
by North's briefly putting his weight in their scales. 
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Negotiations in the Winter failed to strengthen government. 
William Pitt, a relative newcomer to parliament but already a 
minister, refused to contemplate North's getting office - the two 
had clashed in' debate - and so ministry could offer North nothing. 
Dundas tried to intercede with his old friend in early February 
but they quarrelled badly on some point. 
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A second attempt 
a few days later by Dundas and Rigby was equally unsuccessful. 
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The initiative had passed to opposition and Fox, unwilling to support 
any government including Shelburne, began to sound out North. 
Long arch-rivals in parliament, they now came to an understanding, 
forming a coalition. On the night of 17-18 February 1783, 
government was beaten in a Commons' division on the address to 
the King concerning the peace preliminaries. Shelburne's 
ministry, narrowly based, had had little chance and was wrecked 
49. 
by the actions of Pitt in blocking North's return to office. 
Initially unsure of his plans, Dundas could see by 22 
February that Shelburne must fall. He decided to resign his 
Treasurership, but would remain Advocate and declared 
"that the new administration to be made up of North[']s 
& Fox[']s must not at all count upon me as a political 
aid for I have nothing to do with their politicks [sic ]. 
Endeed [sic ] if ever I engage in politicks again with 
any keenness it will only be at the instigation of Mr 
Pit [sic J who perhaps has no fault but too much 
virtue". 
This was prophetic. By now, Dundas was angry with North for 
joining Fox, feeling "nothing but regrett [sic. ] and resentment at 
the contemptible conduct of a former friend", but he was "in 
raptures with Mr Pitt, his talents [, ] his virtue and his 
integrity". 
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These were the first seeds of the extraordinary 
friendship that would grow between the two men. Pitt's oratory 
and abilities had made a considerable impression since his arrival 
in parliament and on 24 February, Dundas wrote to Shelburne with 
a project for forming a government under Pitt. The inspiration for 
the plan had come from Shelburne and Dundas pressed it enthusias- 
tically, writing of Pitt's qualities and, crucially, of the fact 
that being a newcomer, few could object to him on the basis of old 
290 
rivalries. Dundas pressed Shelburne to put the plan to the King. 
The King, desperate to avoid the accession of the hated Fox, took 
it up and Dundas was sure Pitt would accept. 
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In fact Pitt, 
seeing the balance of the Commons against such an attempt, 
decided 
against trying. Dundas was despondent. 
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Next, the King tried 
to form an administration with Lord Gower, asking Dundas to 
lead 
in the Commons as a Secretary of State. Despite strong royal 
50. 
pressure, Dundas declined involvement. 
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Eventually the King 
had to turn to North, Fox and the Duke of Portland but even here 
there were difficulties and on 20 March, when it looked as if 
North and Portland might split, the King again sent for Pitt. 
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By 24 March, Dundas was certain Pitt would form a government 
but the next day his hopes were gone: "How all this anarchy is to 
end God only knows". 
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On 2 April, the King accepted the 
inevitable and Fox and North took office. 
From the start, the King publicly signalled his lack of 
confidence in his new ministers by refusing to hear any of 
their requests to grant peerages. 
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Meantime he was stuck with 
them. There was as yet no credible alternative government nor 
even an excuse, beyond his own dislike, for dismissing them. 
Dundas had no intention of joining Fox and North, nor any 
government, unless Pitt was "an essential part" and his immediate 
strategy was to support or oppose government measures on their 
merits. Meantime he would keep his Advocate's post, considering 
it unlikely that there would be any rush to eject him. 
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His 
tenure was not long continued. Portland, as Home Secretary, 
initially indicated that there was to be no Scottish manager but 
Sir Thomas Dundas quickly came to fill this role. 
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The reason 
is not hard to find. In May, to much hilarity for he had earlier 
opposed it, Dundas supported Pitt's call for parliamentary 
reform. 
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This and his sullen hostility in Scotland was 
noted. Already the core of a Scottish Whig party was taking 
shape and it had no wish for Dundas's continuance 
in power, 
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In July, William Adam, who had followed North into the Coalition, 
51. 
was warned that 
"... the Advocate never had so much intrest [sic ] in 
this country [Scotland] as at present by making them 
beleive [sic ] he is imediatly [sic ] to be in full 
power". 301 
Once this became clear, the Coalition dismissed Dundas in 
August. 
302 
The Crown Agent was also sacked and Ilay Campbell, 
only recently appointed Solicitor General, finding himself 
excluded from the confidence of the new Advocate, Henry Erskine, 
decided to resign. 
303 
Government now set to work to crush its 
Scottish opponents and in September Adam could report "great 
satisfaction in hearing from all my friends in Scotland that 
attachment to the present government daily gains ground there". 
304 
In fact, the Coalition had little time left to tighten its Scottish 
grip. 
The revelation of Fox's plan to reform the East India Company, 
with its apparent implications for his personal power and for the 
safety of the constitution, caused a political storm. Now at 
last there was an issue on which the political nation had been 
aroused and from which the King and the opposition might profit. 
Discreetly, through intermediaries, the King and Pitt began to 
negotiate. The result of these communications would 
bring Pitt 
to the fore in British politics and with him Henry Dundas. 
52. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE STRUGGLE FOR SCOTLAND, 1783-1792 
"How has Dundas overtopt us all? "1 
On 11 December 1783, in great confidence, Henry Dundas 
informed Ilay Campbell that "A great personage viewed the [East 
India] Bill as it deserved, but seeing no remedy[, ] was under 
the necessity of succumbing. He now knows that if his 
present ministers take [? ]fit another is ready to step in and 
protect him". Even as Dundas wrote, the King had begun the 
manoeuvres that would defeat Fox's India Bill in the Lords so 
allowing him to dismiss the Coalition on 18 December and instal 
Pitt .2 
From the outset, Pitt was faced with a hostile Commons majority. 
A quick dissolution had been intended but the state of the finance 
bills and the need to avoid offending the independent members by 
precipitately subjecting them to the expense of an election, made 
it necessary for the new minister to try and ride the Commons. 
3 
For three months, ignoring repeated defeats in debate and under a 
constant barrage of criticism for the manner in which he had come 
to office, he would work to win over the independents and encourage 
opposition defections. As the sole minister in the Commons, this 
was the crucial moment of his career and it is clear that he relied 
much on Dundas's parliamentary skills. 
4 
Dundas had secured the Duke of Gordon's support even before 
the Coalition was dismissed and other Scottish defections began 
almost immediately. 
5 
In Scotland, Henry Erskine was replaced as 
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Lord Advocate by Ilay Campbell and Alexander Wight, Solicitor 
General, by Dundas's nephew Robert. As in England, Pitt was 
determined to show that his was to be a reforming administration 
and he caused a stir in Scotland in February. Refusing Dundas's 
advice in two customs appointments, he promoted instead two 
meritorious serving officers. "This is something in the 
Chatham stile [sic ]", remarked one observer drily, "but I am 
afraid it is not the way to get a majority in the House of 
Commons" .6 
Indeed, Dundas was as uncertain of the outcome of the parliamentary 
struggle as others and this can be followed in his letters to Campbell. 
Conscious in late January of the possibility of their removal, 
nonetheless with the support of the King, the Lords and the public, 
Pitt and he were not "disposed to be moderate". 
7 
With his 
extraordinarily Namierite view of politics, he frequently 
discussed a remodelled government, taking in some of the former 
administration but eventually concluded that this would best be 
done in a new parliament. 
8 
In any case, events were moving in 
Pitt's favour and by 8 March the opposition majority was reduced 
to one. 
9 
With the Supplies and the Mutiny Bill passed, Pitt 
was able to dissolve parliament on 24 March. 
As early as 18 December, Dundas had been preparing for an 
election and told Campbell, "It must be our peculiar care to lose 
no ground in Scotland that can be gained ... have this important 
object in view". Soon after, he was trying to fix on suitable 
candidates for government sponsorship in some seats. 
' 
The 
Scottish elections of 1784 were not obviously different from 
77. 
previous ones and there was little place in the system for the 
public opinion that influenced some English contests. 
11 
Nor 
was there much evidence of East Indian patronage being deployed 
in Scottish constituencies. 
12 
Fourteen seats went to a poll 
and there were threats of contests in another seven. 
13 
Dundas 
was very active, concerning himself in a variety of constituencies, 
trying to concert local alliances to return friends for government 
or guiding efforts to shake sitting opposition MPs. He was 
himself threatened with an opposition in Midlothian, although 
nothing materialised. 
14 
The net result of the Scottish elections 
was the return of twenty eight members more or less sympathetic to 
Pitt and seventeen supporters of the former ministers. 
15 
This 
was better than Dundas had hoped but it was not a triumph and he 
knew in advance that "if too many of our best friends had not been 
bound up by compromises and engagements on occasion of former 
elections our present election would have been a triumphant one 
,l 
16 
endeed [sic ]. 
The peerage election of 8 May was initially more satisfactory 
to ministers, returning twelve supporters and only three 
opponents. 
17 
There had been a warm dispute concerning certain of 
the votes tendered and Lord Selkirk, inclined to Pitt's politics 
but currently trying to organise resistance to government interference 
in such elections, threatened with Lord Kinnaird to try to invalidate 
the whole proceeding. 
18 
In this they failed but the government's 
success had belied its poor organization. Their list of candidates 
was not clearly known - the system of a "King's List" of the 
government's candidates had been dropped - and even Dundas was 
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less than sure-footed in his advice to the voters as to who to 
support. 
19 
George Home, a clerk at the election, received 
eleven lists from absent peers, most of them different and in 
total presenting twenty seven candidates. He concluded that 
a few more such elections would give the peers "a surfeit of 
freedom, and beg directions from the minister of the day upon whom 
20 
to bestow their votes". 
For the next six years, government and opposition would each 
struggle to extend their Scottish influence. At first it appeared 
that opposition held the initiative. Recent historians, while 
accepting the underlying stability of his position, have emphasised 
the inexperienced Pitt's rough apprenticeship, involving repeated 
parliamentary defeats and embarrassments in the years 1784-6.21 
These problems were mirrored in Scotland and gave opposition some 
hope that a continuance of the chronic political instability 
of the years after 1782 might somehow return them to power. 
In early July 1784, in a show of independence, several Scots 
Pittites joined with their opponents to force the withdrawal of 
a proposed coal tax22 and in August even Lord Advocate Ilay Campbell, 
acting in his capacity as MP for the Glasgow Burghs, joined opposition 
to a duty on printed linens. 
23 
Dundas could only groan that the 
Scottish MPs "do not take matters upon a high tone and are too 
attentive to court a little popularity". 
24 
Over the winter he 
detected Scottish disaffection with Pitt's commutation and cotton 
taxes but was unconcerned. 
25 
The next year the pattern continued. 
Pitt was persuaded by Scots pressure to repeal his muslin tax26 
but his Irish trade proposals caused as great a storm in Scotland 
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as elsewhere. The Scots landed interest feared that they 
would encourage an easy importation of cheap Irish grain and 
opposition was quick to mobilise discontent in that quarter. Nor 
was government successful in allaying these fears: 
"When administration themselves tell the landed interest 
they are to be injured he would be as mad as Don Quixote 
or as silly as his squire who would attempt to convince them 
of the contrary". 27 
The Scots landowners joined the general tide against Pitt's plans 
for Ireland and simultaneously they proceeded to deliver a personal 
blow to his Scottish lieutenant's bill to reform the Court of 
Session. 
In essence a plan to increase the salaries of the Scottish 
judges by reducing their number from fifteen to ten, the affair 
convulsed Scotland and gave Dundas a lesson he was rarely to 
forget. The idea was not new - it had been considered before and 
would be again28 - but it was presented suddenly29 and without 
any proper consultation with the Scottish legal establishment. 
30 
Ilay Campbell was immediately checked in moving the bill by the 
objection of Sir Adam Fergusson - himself an ally of Dundas - 
that it violated the Treaty of Union. For over a month the 
Scottish political nation went into ferment. Dr Phillipson has 
examined the row for the light it sheds on Scottish attitudes 
towards the assimilation of Scotland and England after 1707.31 
Here another theme is of interest; the anger at Dundas's use of 
his position as government manager to impose his pet scheme from 
on high. George Home spoke for many: 
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"... The precipitation with which it is carried on 
appears to me in the highest degree impolitick and 
indiscreet. It is as great a mark of the insolence 
of power as ever3I had occasion to observe in any 
Scots Minister". 2 
Early in June, Campbell failed to persuade the Commons 
even to support the principle of the bill. Quite simply, the 
Scots members had rebelled. In retrospect, Robert Dundas, then 
Solicitor General, would write: 
"... tho['] the interest and influence of administration, 
was at that time most intensive, and tho['] every exertion 
was used to persuade people of the necessity of some such 
change our most steady and zealous personal friends even 
deserted us,.. " 33 
Through the Summer and Autumn, Dundas was made well aware of the 
strength of Scots feeling by a series of county addresses against 
the bill34 and by a biting pamphlet from James Boswell, attacking 
any reduction in the number of judges and at the same time 
inveighing against the system of management in Scottish politics. 
35 
In December, he finally and publicly dropped the idea. The fiasco was 
a mistake that he would not repeat. Never again did he try to 
move in potentially sensitive Scottish matters without careful 
consultation beforehand with representatives of the political 
classes. 
At this early period, the Whigs opposed to Henry Dundas in 
Scotland were optimistic and appeared to enjoy significant support. 
In February 1785, they formed the club of the "Independent Friends" 
in Edinburgh to rally and strengthen opposition. At its first 
outset it had one hundred members, with a further fifty one passing 
through in later years. 
36 
Among the first intake would be sixteen 
nobles, including the Earls of Buchan, Glencairn, Kellie, Loudoun, 
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Dumfries and Findlater, with Lords Saltoun, Cathcart, Sempill 
and Elphinstone. There were also three judges, Lords Elliock, 
Ankerville and Swinton, twelve MPs and a body of lesser gentlemen 
and landowners, from all over Scotland. The whole was leavened 
by a group of advocates led by Henry Erskine. With James 8th 
Earl of Lauderdale, Erskine would dominate the Scots Whigs for 
almost thirty years. A witty, humane and sociable man, he 
combined great legal skill with an acute political judgement 
that can be too easily missed against the background of his years 
of seemingly futile opposition to the Dundas interest. He had 
a personal political interest in Fife, the Earl of Buchan was 
his brother, and by marriage he was related to the Glencairn 
family. 37 
Not all the Independent Friends would be consistent in their 
loyalty but they still gave a fair show of strength. The Scottish 
Whigs were in close touch with the English opposition through Sir 
Thomas Dundas, who had been Portland's Scottish manager in 1783, and 
William Adam. Adam had early been a Northite and an ally of 
Dundas, but he had gravitated to Fox and by the late 1780s had the 
central role in the developing Whig electoral organization. 
Charles Innes WS was a regular go-between for the Scots and 
English Portlandites - at this period the Duke was still 
publicly perceived as the central figure in opposition - and 
he 
has left some account of his activities as a messenger and 
local adviser. 
38 
Opposition was tireless in seeking opportunities to discomfit 
the ruling party. In July 1784, they fanned resentment at rumours 
that Dundas had granted some unpopular pensions, causing George Home 
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to write that "if the story be true it perhaps would not have 
been very defensible in any times but in the present it would 
be unpardonable". 
39 
Advantage was taken of the discontent 
concerning the Irish proposals and the Court of Session bill 
and late in 1785, attempts were made to channel dissatisfaction 
felt by West of Scotland manufacturers into addresses against 
government. 
40 
The Faculty of Advocates became a centre of 
opposition activity and in May 1785 it was said that "Mr Dundas 
has nobody to support him in the Faculty, the bustling members 
of it are his declared opponents". 
41 
It was here that the 
Whigs had a striking success in December 1785. Learning that 
Dundas intended to resign his position as Dean of the Faculty, 
they began a hurried canvass and obtained enough votes to secure 
Henry Erskine's election before the incumbent had had time to 
arrange the succession for a government supporter. 
42 
In the 
years to come, Erskine would make full use of the valuable public 
platform that the office gave him. In this respect, the opposition 
could also count on support from the Scottish newspapers which were not 
43 
well disposed to Pitt's government. 
From the outset, opposition in Scotland drew support from two 
sources. For the committed, the Whigs proper, there was - as in 
England -a burning resentment at the manner in which Pitt 
had come to 
power. This resentment would propel the supporters of Fox 
for 
years to come. Opposition also drew significant support 
from 
a certain aversion to Dundas and his methods. By 
1784, Scots had seen 
him in public for almost twenty years and many had formed an unfavour- 
able opinion. In that year, Lord Selkirk reported that 
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"Mr Pit [sic I has lost vastly of his popularity here; 
I argued all I could for him through the Winter in many 
companies, & yet found he lost ground daily:... & his 
friendship or connection with your friend H[. ] Dundas 
hurt him much more than it served him in this country; 
I mean in Scotland, I do not mean Edinr & its county". 
44 
There is much exaggeration in this but it identifies a continuing 
strand in Scottish politics. A full articulation of the sentiment 
is to be found in "A Character of Henry Dundas" written in the 
late 1780s. This detailed his personal aggrandisement, his 
political opportunism, his manipulation of Scottish elections and 
his iron grip on the patronage of government. He was accused of 
using the Crown lawyers "as the instruments of executing vengeance" 
on the government's opponents and the anonymous writer concluded, 
"Is it possible that the English as well as Scots can remain 
blind to this conduct so dangerous to them all? 1145 
Part of the problem from Dundas's point of view was that he 
was the first Scottish manager since 1765 and enjoyed the full 
confidence of government. It is clear that some of the Scottish 
elite disliked the management system46 and to the extent that 
Dundas was good at his task, resentment was inevitable. This 
was George Home's view, writing of Berwickshire: 
"The personal prejudices you suppose agt [sic ) Mr 
Dundas in our county are nothing but words, Party 
must assume some name or other as a bond of union 
... they 
have no other dislike to him at bottom but 
that of keeping their friends out of power... ". 
47 
This view gives little weight to Dundas's slightly unsavoury reputation 
and Erskine, writing twenty years later, would accord much signifi- 
cance to Dundas's managerial system in shaping the politics of the 
time: 
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"... the sole and absolute management of Scotland, and 
the exclusive patronage in this quarter, having been left 
to that noble Lord [Melville], the consequence has been 
that Scotland has been divided into two political parties, 
those who supported Lord M. and those who opposed 
administration". 48 
This opinion ignores the fact that the Scottish opposition drew 
strength from people who would have supported Portland from 
principle in any case, but it is strongly suggestive of the way 
in which they could benefit from a body of discontent in the 
country. By July 1786, Erskine felt able to provide Portland 
with a rosy view of the opposition's prospects in Scotland: 
"I am happy to be able to assure your Grace that in 
spite of the weight of power against us, the friends 
of your administration in this part of the Kingdom 
have uniformly encreas'd [sic ] and are daily encreasing, 
and in point of birth, wealth and abilities form a 
phalanx, of the force of wch the present servants of 
Government here are fully sensible". 
49 
The Whigs worked through the 1780s, endeavouring to broaden this base 
of support by associating themselves with other currents in Scottish 
politics. 
In the light of later events, it is too easy to forget that Pitt 
came to power as a reforming minister and that Dundas himself had 
passable credentials as an innovator, most notably in his 
support for the 1775 bill to remove nominal votes from the 
Scottish Counties. 
50 
Indeed, Dundas seems to have been quite 
sincere in his support for Pitt's unsuccessful bill to reform 
the English franchise in 1785, explaining his motives at length 
to Buccleuch. 
51 
In this climate, several groups in Scotland 
had reason to hope for success in their aspirations for reform. 
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Agitation for burgh reform had begun late in 1782, in part 
benefiting from the climate of reform that had followed on the 
disasters of the American war. 
52 
The abuses in the electoral 
practices and financial administration of the 66 Royal Burghs 
had long been apparent and the burgh reformers had a popular 
cause. A general convention of delegates from 33 burghs met in 
Edinburgh in March 1784. The opposition was enthusiastic in its 
support and well represented on the committee appointed to draft the 
bills proposed to be put to Parliament. The committee also 
included Lord Gardenstone, a Lord of Session and a firm ally of 
Dundas, itself some indication of the broad nature of support for 
the cause. 
53 
The plan to press for electoral reform was dropped when 
electoral reform generally was defeated in England but for three 
years the reformers publicised their grievances concerning 
financial malpractices through a series of reports and test 
cases in Scotland. Finally in 1787, they took their claims to 
parliament. No Scots member could be found to raise the matter 
54- 
and eventually Fox persuaded Sheridan to undertake it. From here, 
the reformers' hopes were slowly crushed. The clear association 
of their cause with parliamentary opposition had begun. Ilindas, 
it is true, had no wish to end a state of affairs that suited 
him all too well and to that extent the reformers' case was sure to 
meet obstruction in any case. But Sheridan's pursuit of the 
business was half-hearted and Dundas had little difficulty in 
brushing him aside in repeated jousts in the following years. 
55 
For a long period, burgh reform languished in this frustrating 
limbo. 
86. 
Fundamentally different was the pressure to reform the 
Scottish county franchise. 
56 
It derived significant support from 
within the system and unlike burgh reform, its main objective - 
the ending of fictitious votes - could not be exclusively 
identified with opposition. The multiplication of nominal 
votes, by which larger landowners dominated local elections at 
the expense of lesser, genuine freeholders, had been a grievance 
dating back to 1768. It had been periodically aired since then, 
each time with more support. 
57 
In 1782, after a seven year 
lapse, demand for reform revived, in response to blatant 
vote-creation by several landowners in the North and North 
East. The cause quickly became a national one. It was 
popular with small freeholders, even comparatively conservative 
men, and by 1785 a national committee had prepared a bill to 
restrict nominal votes. It was "cooly received" but George Home's 
observation on it points to the movement's attraction: 
"... I cannot help being of opinion that votes on 
liferent superiorities and on wadsetts should be 
cutt [sic ] off, It seems a necessary measure to 
lessen the growing aristocratical influence in this 
country... " 58 
The county reformers also included an element who wished to 
broaden the franchise. This naturally came to number opposition 
figures such as Henry Erskine and Sir Thomas Dundas in its ranks 
but it also had some few government supporters including, perhaps 
surprisingly, a major landowner, James 3rd Earl of Hopetoun. As 
late as mid-1792, he advised Henry Dundas to countenance modest burgh 
and county reforms: 
87. 
"A gradual consollidation [sic ] of property & 
superiority - with a diminish'd qualification will 
give us real freeholders holding of the Crown - like King Arthur's men - firm & steady -a phalanx 
always ready to stand by & support King & 
Constitution". 59 
In fact, even as he wrote, Hopetoun could see the movement 
in the doldrums. The strength of its support came from resentment 
of fictitious votes and when these were seemingly ended by a 
decision of the Chancellor in 1790, so the mass of the movement's 
supporters among the freeholders deserted. Theirs had been an 
essentially selfish object and they had little real interest in 
lessening the value of their votes by widening the electorate. 
Ironically, nominal votes would remain60 but this was not immediately 
perceived. Those reformers who pressed for a lowering of the voting 
qualification would soldier on but they were now drawing support 
mainly from lesser heritors and commissioners of supply, a large 
group certainly, but so much less effective for being almost outside 
the political system. 
61 
In its dabblings with the peerage elections, the opposition had 
much greater success. Resistance to the government practice of 
issuing a list of favoured candidates - the "King's List" - to the 
electors, had commenced in 1770 and had persisted thereafter. The 
"Independent Peers" as they were styled had enjoyed considerable 
support and were led into the 1774 election by the Duke of Buccleuch. 
By 1782, they had forced government to abandon the crude "King's 
List" system in favour of more discreet methods. 
62 
One of the 
consequences of freer elections was the muddle and confusion that 
allowed success to a few opposition peers in 1784. Amidst this, 
88. 
the Independent Peers continued to demand an end to all government 
interference in their elections. Many of these men were actually 
well affected to Pitt - Hopetoun and Strathmore are cases in point - 
but the sentiment was not exactly mutual. 
63 
In practice, resistance 
to government interference necessitated co-operation with opposition 
peers and the latter were careful to exploit this: 
"Those who from principle or connexions [sic ] are 
adverse to the present administration of course vote 
in a body for any person to whom government does not 
wish well, and they have the address to persuade great 
numbers [of] the real wellwishers of the present 
administration to join them in an association to vote 
against any man who has the good wishes of government, 
and this they call supporting the independance [sic ] 
of the peerage of Scotland". 64 
Dundas's comment had followed the result of the peerage election of 
28 March 1787. 
The elevation in 1786 of two representative peers, Queensberry 
and Abercorn, to British titles had provided opposition with a major 
success. While Dundas had maintained that no by -election was 
necessary, Stormont, for the opposition, had persuaded a Committee 
of the Lords that the two could not sit both as representative and 
British peers. 
65 
In the ensuing election, opposition threw its 
weight behind Lords Selkirk and Kinnaird, both Independents but 
seen as potential converts, while government, accepting that Selkirk 
would win, tried to elect Cathcart to the second place. Despite 
much effort, they failed and Kinnaird and Selkirk were victorious. 
66 
Worse was to follow. The election had been heated, with objections 
raised to the votes of two British peers, Gordon and Queensberry. 
These objections were taken to the Lords and on 18 May that House, 
with an apparent alliance between Scottish opposition and Independent 
89. 
Peers, further weakened government's ability to interfere in 
their elections, by resolving that British peers could no longer 
vote. 
67 
Dundas was furious.. "They have certainly no reason 
to complain now of any indecent or offensive interference ... in 
their elections", he told Buccleuch. He proceeded to outline 
a notion he had taken to show government's displeasure at such 
conduct by systematically denying military and other patronage 
to such Independent Peers as allowed themselves to be led by 
opposition. 
68 
Dundas's aspirations to strengthen government's influence in 
the peerage elections were little advanced by the time Dalhousie's 
death precipitated another by -election in January 1788. This 
time the government candidate, Lord Cathcart, was successful but 
only after a hard contest with the Earl of Dumfries. 
69 
For 
several years the Scottish representative peers would continue 
to pose problems for government, culminating in seven of them 
supporting opposition during the Regency crisis, a number 
produced partly by the 1787 election and partly by gradual 
defections from government ranks since 1784.70 
All this activity sustained the Scottish opposition in 
optimism through the 1780s and Dundas not only detected this 
optimism but was at times perturbed by it. 
71 
In fact the Whig 
party was much weaker than its supporters believed. 
The general cause of this was the return of stability to 
British politics. Pitt's initial problems did not endure and 
by 
late 1786 his ministry was secure. He had learned many of his 
90. 
hardest lessons and the continuance of the King's support for 
him and the gradual return of prosperity after the war years 
confirmed his position. Dr Paul Kelly has argued that the 
influence of party feeling on politics at this period has been 
exaggerated and that the system was reverting to the 18th century 
pattern of stable, broadly based ministries faced by smaller 
opposition groupings. Since the King would not countenance Fox as 
his minister, the instability that would follow any ousting of Pitt 
by parliament could bring the constitutional machine to a halt. 
With most politicians motivated by no ideology beyond a devotion 
to the constitution, and when the benefits of ministerial 
patronage were certain only in tranquil conditions, ministerial 
stability was clearly to be preferred. Further, the greatest 
part of the business of parliament - that concerning raising 
supplies - lay outside the sphere of party politics, and carrying 
on the King's government was still seen as a patriotic duty. 
Attitudes of this nature were a serious obstacle to the development 
of party in politics. Kelly's views are contentious as regards 
English politics but they are useful in considering Scotland. 
72 
The quirks of the Scottish electoral system, concentrating so 
much power in so few hands, had returned many opposition supporters 
in 1784, proportionately more than in England. This should not be 
allowed to conceal the fact that the Scottish political climate 
was not conducive to opposition. The view of one Scots MP that 
"it is regarded as a kind of treason to speak of the measures 
of government with the smallest contempt"73 would seem to have been 
a common one. At the commencement of Dundas's attempt to alter 
91. 
the Court of Session in 1785, George Home commented that despite 
private irritation, 
"The generall [sic I want of attention in this country 
to all matters of publick [sic I concern, and the 
generall dislike that all moderate and sensible men 
have, to appear as the fomentors of opposition prevent 
any public notice from being taken of it... ". 74 
At bottom, the real cause of this was that separation from 
government meant separation from its favours. With an efficient 
manager directing government patronage distribution it was easy 
to starve opponents of the ability to reward their followers. 
Without this power opposition could hardly expect much support from the 
various nobles, freeholders and burgh mongers, all of whom had 
families to provide for, incomes to supplement. This, the 
fundamental strength of government in Scotland, cannot be 
overemphasised. Scots tended to regard electoral office as 
the route to preferment in a way that the English, no retiring 
people themselves, found peculiarly offensive. 
75 
One writer to 
Pitt felt obliged to defer to his countrymen's notoriety, beginning, 
"altho' a Scot I desire neither place, post, or pension if . 
76 
Quite simply, independence of government, or opposition to it, 
was expensive and in a country poorer than England, proportionately 
fewer of the politicians could afford it. 
77 
Successive ministries 
could count on a good Scottish following. 
78 
This, the venal 
aspect of Scots politics, should not however totally obscure other 
considerations that disposed Scots to support government. 
Many Scots politicians were old-fashioned "King's men". As 
late as 1807, one gentleman could write, "the King has an undoubted 
92. 
constitutional right, by his royal prerogative, to dismiss his 
ministers, and to chuse [sic ] others in their room, when he 
pleases ... never being a party man ... I have always thought 
it my duty to support His Majesty's Government". 
79 
Even 
Boswell, shamed at Scotland's support for "each administration of 
whatever principles", during the great constitutional struggles 
from 1760 to 1784, still felt obliged to describe himself as 
80 
a "steady Royalist", placing his objections against "evil counsellors". 
Dundas himself, with one lapse in 1804, to the end of his career 
asserted his belief in the King's right to choose his own ministers. 
For some this doctrine conveniently provided post facto justification 
for supporting the distributors of favour, but the concept of an 
abstract Scottish loyalty to the monarch's position in politics 
should not lightly be dismissed. 
Subservience to the government of the day may also have 
been rooted in a desire to erase the taint of disloyalty that 
had attached itself to Scots in the wake of the Jacobite rebellions. 
Anti-Scottish feeling in England has been compared with anti- 
semitism and there were flashes of it in this period, particularly 
at the time of Dundas's impeachment. 
8' 
A desire to be accepted 
as full partners in the Union may well have led some Scots to be 
more loyal than the loyal. 
Conservatism ran deeply in the Scottish ruling class. While 
there was broad agreement on the need for amendment of irregularities 
in the county electoral system, opposition's apparent support for more 
general measures of reform did them little service with this group. 
Administrative ('economical') reform was approved of, but Patrick 
93. 
Home's view on burgh reform points to harder attitudes generally 
to political reform: 
"... I am in general an enemy to all innovation in the 
old established forms of any part of the constitution 
unless upon the clearest grounds of necessity. That 
there may be defects, or even abuses, in a regulation 
of three hundred years standing and upwards is not 
unlikely, but it becomes [a] matter of serious consider- 
ation, whether it may not be wiser, to submit to these 
defects and abuses, of which the extent are known, than 
to risk a violent change, the consequences and effects of 
which cannot be known". 82 
Clearly this conservatism was founded on the self-interest 
of the elite in preserving their monopoly of power but their 
fear of change should not be underestimated. The Gordon 
riots in London in 1780, the violence of the Glasgow weavers' 
strike of 1787 and the irregular eruptions of popular fury in 
Scotland, most obviously in grain riots but also in a variety 
of other forms, kept the Scottish rulers in mind of 'the people 
below'. 
83 
A perception of the fragility of their position may 
well have formed one of the motives discouraging them from doing 
anything to upset the mechanisms of established order. Dundas 
himself gave some hint of this sensitivity in 1784: 
"Both as a politician and an individual I lament the 
prospect of a bad season for nothing is so apt to sour 
the minds of the governed agt [sic ] their governors 
as empty bellies, whereas in a year of plenty 4they look upon everything with a favourable eye .8 
To state the difficulties facing the opposition in Scotland 
is not to deny the existence of party politics there, only to 
define the limits within which it operated. It is not enough 
to dismiss the opposition as 'factious and discontented men', 
the common jibe of the time. By opposing Pitt and Dundas, they 
94. 
largely excluded themselves from the prospect of favour, although 
as we will see, it would have been possible for many of them to 
have made their peace with government. Their principles cost 
them dear. Henry Erskine's blighted legal career is the most 
obvious example, but there were others, like Lord Saltoun who, 
"however great the inconveniency he suffered from that cause he 
chose rather to bear than in any degree to deviate from those 




The problem for the Scottish Whigs was that they were in a 
minority position, with the structure of politics increasingly 
working against them. Where in England opposition styled their 
association the 'Whig Club', the Scottish equivalent, the 
'Independent Friends', had been titled carefully, so as not to 
deter recruits. 
86 
Unfortunately the device worked all too well 
and some joined who were not entirely in tune with the Whigs' 
political aims and whose loyalty would not endure. It is in 
the interaction between Dundas, as government manager, and the 
Independent Friends that this problem of ambiguous loyalties 
becomes stark. 
Dundas was a child of the politics of the mid-century, the 
age immortalised in Namier's portrait of a struggle 
between "ins" 
and "outs", little embarrassed by political 
ideology. Only in 
retrospect would he himself date the 
dawn of party politics, of 
a serious, unbridgeable division between 
factions in the political 
classes, as commencing about 1790.87 At this period, while 
acting 
to crush opposition, he did not see his work 
in party or ideological 
terms. Thus in discussing Stirlingshire politics in 
1788, he 
disclaimed any wish to disturb Sir Thomas Dundas, with whom he 
95. 
would, in view of their family relationship, prefer to connect 
his politics. Nonetheless, if government intended to attack 
opposition generally, he was "ready to forego these considerations 
and fi ht ever where on the Common 
88 
gy publick [sic ] bottom... ". 
That Sir Thomas, a committed Whig, might not be willing to concert 
politics with his relative seems not to have entered Henry Dundas's 
consideration and with this attitude he constantly tried to chip 
away the ranks of opposition. 
The Earl of Buchan was the recipient of government favours, 
although it did not ultimately affect his loyalties, and there is 
evidence that Dundas tried to convert Glencairn. 
89 
Lords Kellie, 
Cathcart and Elphinstone, all members of the first intake of the 
Independent Friends, would defect to government before 1790. 
Among the non-nobles, James Brodie of Brodie would also be lost. 
The case of Alexander Fergusson of Craigdarroch is a striking 
example of how loose the ties binding men to opposition might be. 
"Attached to the Dean of Faculty and Opposition", in 1790 he 
approached a surprised Robert Dundas to solicit a favour, stating 
that his support for Queensberry - then in opposition - was "from 
conviction of the propriety of the head of that family having the 
lead in the County & Boroughs" of Dumfriesshire. When Buccleuch 
succeeded to Queensberry's title, so he - and government - could 
expect Craigdarroch's support. 
90 
The Earl of Breadalbane's case 
is also indicative of the fluid border between government and 
opposition. In general he supported opposition 
but he did not 
join the Independent Friends for some time and he was sometimes 




was willing to offer him patronage for friends while the Earl, 
pursuing personal advantage in his struggle with the Duke of 
Atholl in Perthshire, was quite prepared to support a Pittite 
candidate to that end. 
92 
It was not the consistency of conduct 
that a party system would demand. Indeed, Perthshire and 
Stirlingshire politics both demonstrated another feature hinting 
at the potential impermanence of opposition influence. Both 
fielded a fair vote for opposition candidates but this was a reflection 
of local struggles between major landowners, respectively the Dukes of 
Atholl and Montrose, and lesser freeholders, resentful at their 
counties being dominated by such men. The latter would support 
opposition candidates as their local champions, rather than from 
commitment to their politics. 
93 
One of the few logical conclusions to be drawn from the confusing 
evidence, is that a system of party politics - that is, a division 
between politicians on lines of fundamental principle, not easily 
bridged - was creeping in. This change was slow and while there 
was a dedicated core to the Scots opposition, many of its 
associates were less certain in their loyalties. This growth 
of party was not always clearly perceived and it was sometimes 
grafted onto struggles commenced at a much earlier period. 
Occasionally the transition could be seen in relief, as when 
old loyalties were sundered or relatives parted over 
differences of 
94 
opinion on the new party issues. 
From all the problems besetting opposition, the government, 
not surprisingly, was the beneficiary. 
If the structure of Scottish politics tended to lead Scots 
to favour the government of the day, it should not 
be overlooked 
97. 
that much of what Pitt's administration did for Scotland in its first 
years was very popular. The restoration of the Forfeited Estates 
in 1784, a long cherished ambition of Dundas's, ended gloomy 
memories of 1745. Intended by Fox and North before they were 
dismissed, disannexation was opposed by Chancellor Thurlow, who 
nearly wrecked it on 13 August in an attack in the House of 
Lords, "when the Scotch Parlt (as he calls our sixteen) were 
off their guard". 
95 
Government would be able to count on the 
support of the newly restored families in Scotland and in any 
case it had long been clear that the commissioners overseeing 
the estates had failed in their task of improving them. 
96 
The Scottish Whigs might have discovered discontent among West 
of Scotland manufacturers in September 1785, but several weeks 
later, Dundas could find none of it. The merchants, he reported, 
were recovering from their war losses and much approved Pitt's 
fiscal policies. 
97 
Pitt's reputation for probity, particularly when compared to 
Fox, probably served him as well in Scotland as it did in England 
and there is also limited evidence that he benefited from the 
memory of his late father's popularity in the North. 
98 
Shy, 
austere, aloof - 'The Great Solitary' - Pitt showed the witty 
and genial aspects of his character only to a select few 
friends, 
among them Dundas. 
99 
Their friendship was not approved of by 
some of Pitt's English friends who saw Dundas as a 
bad influence 
both on his political mores and on his drinking habits, 
but it 
was nonetheless a genuine friendship founded on the respect of 
the elder man for the younger's abilities and perhaps also on 
98. 
Pitt's affection for Dundas as a father figure. In early 1784, 
Dundas had written of Pitt "I feel him to be sent down from 
heaven as a saviour to this country", and their acquaintance, 
not at first close, was intimate by early 1787 when Pitt was 
a constant visitor to Dundas's Wimbledon villa. 
100 
This 
friendship would only strengthen as time passed. Outside the 
Cabinet until 1791, Dundas enjoyed with Grenville the position of one 
of Pitt's closest advisers for several years beforehand. By 1794, 
Pitt could write "of every act of his being as much mine as his" 
and there is little reason to doubt the sincerity of his distress 
at Dundas's repeated wish to resign in the years after 1794.101 
This relationship between Scottish manager and Prime Minister was 
closer than any since that of Walpole and Ilay. It was the 
foundation of Dundas's success, promoting him from being a 
successful Scottish politician to being the greatest of the 
Scottish political managers and a British politician of the 
first rank. 
Looking back, Dundas would write, with pardonable exaggeration, 
"the whole patronage of Scotland was concentrated in 
my person ... 
during the whole time of my political 
connexion [sic ] with Mr. Pitt. He nor no department 
of government ever gave me a moment's trouble on that 
score", 
102 
This conferred enormous power on Dundas, whose influence over 
Pitt was resented in England. Thomas Orde's jibe that 
Dundas 
"is said to take possession of the minister and conduct 
him as 
103 
he pleases", would have been no reproach in Scotland, 
however. 
Indeed, opposition in Scotland 
99. 
"sometimes held the same language privately ... but 
they were wiser than to use it in publick [sic ] as 
it would have been the most effectual means of 
confirming and extendinTothe opinion of Mr Dundas's 
power and importance". 
1 
Dundas made full use of his position, pressing Pitt for Scottish 
causes. On British peerages he chided, "that these favours 
must not always be confined to the South side of the Tweed"105 
and he would prod Pitt when Scottish business became forgotten 
through the premier's notorious carelessness. While it was 
always the case that some Scots would circumvent Dundas and go 
direct to Pitt, especially where great favours were concerned, 
106 
most saw Dundas as the fount of favour. Even those who bypassed 
him were often liable simply to receive Dundas's decisions at 
second hand, from Pitt's pen. 
107 
From 1784, backed by "all the 
hellish powers of administration", Dundas slaved to extend the 
influence of the government party in Scotland. 
108 
From the start, Pitt's ministry enjoyed wide support among 
the great nobility of Scotland and this would endure for many 
years. This, even before the radical upheavals of the next 
decade would shake the political nation, spelt electoral disaster 
for the Portland party in Scotland. 
The great aristocrats were attracted to Pitt's government 
by 
the same motives that inspired their social inferiors; political 
patronage, loyalty to the King and a preference 
for stable 
government. All had a social position to maintain and 
this 
required access to government favours. The 
Duke of Hamilton, 
complaining at Pitt's ignoring his letters, put 
it nicely: 
100. 
"it makes me appear in an odd point of view to those 
people who press me to ask favours, & who look up to 
me as the channel through which those favours are to 
come", 109 
The inability to provide this service for clients could subject a 
noble to the contempt incurred by Breadalbane, never totally 
comfortable with government, whose local gentry in 1800 considered 
him 
"as [a] man that niether [sic ] is or ever will be 
good for anything. they [sic ] therefore for the sake 
of their families wish to connect themselves with some 
person of influence as Ld B may live many years". 110 
Needless to say, estrangement from government not only raised 
the spectre of government interference against his local interests, 
it also debarred an aristocrat from the plums in the gift of the 
Crown. It was in a spirit of self-interest that the group as a 
whole accepted the advice of Dundas as Pitt's Scots lieutenant. 
In the West, John, 5th Duke of Argyll (1723-1806), did not 
pursue an active political career, concentrating instead on 
highland improvement, 
ill 
while maintaining the family position 
in Argyll, Dunbartonshire, Stirlingshire and the Ayr and Glasgow 
Burghs. Dundas had had dealings with the family from 1775112 
and Argyll, who much approved Dundas's influence with Pitt in 
Scots affairs, had family links with Ilay Campbell, Dundas's 
lieutenant. 
113 
His principal need was military and naval 
patronage for the Argyllshire freeholders and he was sensitive 
about his grip on the distribution of these sorts of favours in 
the county. 
114 
Until 1806, when the Whig 6th Duke succeeded, 




Douglas, 8th Duke of Hamilton (1756-1799), had promised 
support to Pitt even as the Coalition was dismissed, and he 
returned Sir James Steuart, a government supporter, for 
Lanarkshire. 
118 
Much of his correspondence was concerned with 
soliciting favours for friends and relatives but there were 
occasional strains on his relationship with Pitt, who rarely 
answered his letters 
119 
and in 1790, while he supported 
government men in Glasgow and Lanarkshire, his support in West 
Lothian and the Linlithgow Burghs was less than Dundas required. 
120 
The full details are obscure but by October 1794 he could again 
write of his "attachment to government". 
121 
Dundas, re-inforced 
by the Hopetouns, bluntly rebuffed his attempt to bring forward 
a candidate for the Linlithgow burghs in 1796, despite the Duke's 
support for government elsewhere and this may reflect earlier 
frictions. 
122 
If Duke Douglas was a friend to Pitt, his successor 
from 1799 was an opposition politician and in later years Melville 
would describe this as almost the only Scots family of high rank 
123 
attached to the Foxites. 
The Hopetoun family, with influence in West Lothian, Dumfriesshire 
and the Stirling Burghs had long been close to the 
Arniston family 
and the 3rd Earl (1741-1816) was a Pittite. 
124 
A supporter of 
county reform and an Independent Peer, bitterness at the result 
of the 1790 peerage election led to rumours of 
his joining 
opposition125 but he made no such move and Dundas's marriage 
to 
his sister in 1793 firmly united the family to the 
Dundas interest. 
Hopetoun apparently expected a British peerage but he 
had to wait 
years and in the meantime his family rose to 
become one of the most 
102. 
prominent in the rank of the Scots Tory party. 
126 
Dominant in Perthshire and maintaining an influence in 
the Perth Burghs (more, he claimed, for government's benefit 
than personal advantage), John, 4th Duke of Atholl (1755-1830) 
was an old acquaintance of Dundas and a supporter of Pitt from 
the outset. 
127 
While he solicited many favours, 
128 
his main claim 
for twenty years was for compensation for his family's losses 
sustained when the Isle of Man was compulsorily purchased by 
government in 1764. This he pursued with great persistence, 
obtaining redress only during Pitt's difficult second 
administration, when the premier required all the support he 
could get. 
129 
Dundas would enjoy Atholl's support to the end 
of his careerl30 but it was not always a smooth relationship. 
In 1794, they clashed over Atholl's wish to allow his sick brother 
to resign his seat for Perthshire, a plan that inadvertently 
wrecked Dundas's hope to elect his son for the county. 
131 
In 
X796, Dundas admonished the Duke for a proposed misuse of Perth 
customs patronage and this friction seems to have continued for 
132 
some time. 
The Sutherland family completely dominated that county and 
133 
had some influence in the Northern Burghs. The Countess 
Elizabeth (1765-1839) and her husband George, Lord Gower, later 
Marquis of Stafford (1758-1833), supported Pitt consistently until 
1805, when they left him, principally because of the King's 
rejection of a government including Fox, but partly also 
from 
Pitt's bad management in the declining months of his life. 
134 




Wigtownshire, Kirkcudbrightshire and their burghs all felt the 
influence of John, 7th Earl of Galloway (1736-1806). He supported 
Pitt from 1784136 but Dundas would later write of his "intriguing 
trickiness" 
137 
and their relationship was less cordial. He 
acted with government in the South Western elections of 1790 but 
his conduct in the peerage election was less astute and he was 
conscious of the bad taste left in government mouths. 
138 
In 1796, 
he supported administration in the peerage election and, only grudgingly, 
in Kirkcudbrightshire. 
139 
His reward was the British peerage he 
had so long solicited with the support of his relatives the 
Staffords140 but his wish to assert his family strength in 
Kirkcudbrightshire from 1795 would lead to a contest with Dundas's 
ally Patrick Heron in 1802 and to a general struggle in the South 
West. 
141 
Not till the 8th Earl succeeded in 1806, would Dundas 
again rely on the family. 
In 1783, Dundas was anxious to prevent any alliance between 
the 11th Earl of Eglinton (1726-96), the 13th Earl of Glencairn 
(1749-91), Sir John Shaw Stuart and John Craufurd, lest it deliver 
Ayrshire and Renfrewshire to opposition. In the end, his 
friend Sir Adam Fergusson was persuaded to allow Eglinton's 
candidate to sit for Ayrshire unopposed. 
142 
The Earl had 
initially supported Fox against Pitt's minority government but 
quickly changed sides, 
143 
Thereafter he wavered, supporting 
Pitt's major legislation but, becoming close to the Prince, 
joined Fox at the Regency Crisis. He was a government candidate 
144 
at the 1790 peerage election. This wavering did not affect 
the arrangements concerted for Ayrshire in 1784 and when Hew 
104. 
Montgomerie was appointed to office, Dundas's friend McDowall of 
Garthland was returned with Eglinton's aid, until Fergusson could 
be seated in 1790.145 The Dundas-Eglinton alliance strengthened 
thereafter and in 1795 Dundas was informed that the Earl "would 
in my opinion adopt any plan with regard to Ayrshire which you 
recommended". The 12th Earl of Eglinton (1739-1819) was a 
Whig, but he put the protection of his Ayrshire interest first and 
except for a period in 1806 and 1807, he was on generally good 
terms with Dundas. 
146 
Glencairn was an Independent Friend and associated with 
opposition. 
147 
His death in 1791 passed the title to an Anglican 
cleric, a brother-in-law of Henry Erskine and described as 
independent. 
148 
He had but a poor fortune and made no impact 
on Scottish politics, spending much time soliciting English church 
149 
preferment. 
The Cassillis family under the 10th Earl (? - 1792) was opposed 
to Pitt, yet despite this the premier countenanced favours for his 
kinsmen. 
150 
The short-lived 11th Earl had no influence on events and 
even as he was dying, his heir was offering the family support to 
government in return for an English seat in the Commons. 
151 
Succeeding in 1795, he supported government and was returned at 
the 1796 peerage election. 
152 
His utterances at a public meeting 
at Ayr in 1797 gave cause for doubts about his allegiances but he 
remained loyal to Dundas until the end of Pitt's first administration, 
153 
Represented by two men in Dundas's years of power, the Bute 
family controlled little beyond the county of that name. The 3rd 
Earl was a supporter of Pitt, until his death in 1792,154 while his 
105. 
son, who had been an unsuccessful rival to Dundas for the leader- 
155 ship of Scottish politics in the 1770s was an opposition Whig. 
By early 1793, although contemptuous of the Pitt ministry's 
abilities, he inclined to support their measures for the safety 
of the nation and within a year he was a declared supporter. 
156 
He had few dealingswith Dundas, probably a reflection of their 
earlier rivalry. 
One of the most powerful of the Scottish nobles, William, 4th 
Duke of Queensberry (1725-1810) was an old acquaintance of Dundas. 
157 
Unbounded in his support for Pitt's minority government, he still 
felt able to pursue a personal struggle for the Dumfries Burghs 
against another government supporter, Sir James Johnstone. 
158 
An English resident, he was unpopular in Scotland. Conscious 
of his worth, he could be imperious in pressing his claims, as 
in 1787 when he succeeded, against government wishes, in appointing 
a most unsuitable candidate to the sheriffship of Dumfries. 
159 
Queensberry deserted Pitt during the Regency Crisis and at 
the General Election of 1790 he returned two opposition men for 
the Linlithgow and Dumfries Burghs. 
160 
In fact, his flirtation 
with opposition was uncomfortable and short-lived and he eventually 
rejoined the government camp. 
'61 
It is sometimes said that he made 
over his electoral influence to Buccleuch in 1790, but this is 
mistaken. 
162 
His relationship with Dundas was considered uneasy, 
the latter receiving advice in 1795 as to how the Duke might be 
shaken in Dumfriesshire, 
163 
In the end, an accommodation was 
reached, whereby Dundas's brother-in-law, Alexander Hope, was 
returned for the Dumfries Burghs, and in 1801 Dundas could write 
106. 
that Queensberry would not form ideas about that seat "different 
164 
from my wishes". 
Even before we move to consider the politics of North 
East Scotland, it is clear that, with temporary fluctuations, 
Dundas could draw considerable support from the great nobility. 
He would write that "It is my practice and ever has been, to 
support the great aristocratical interests of my country and 
this upon principles of a well considered policy... ". 
165 
Of 
course this was but a recognition of the realities of political power 
in pre-industrial Scotland but there seems little doubt that he was 
genuine in the sentiment. 
'66 
Nevertheless it is important to be 
clear about his role. It is wrong to see those men who chose to 
take his lead, as being either in his thrall, or as part of a 
'Dundas Interest'. 
167 
Several were indeed close to him as 
friends or relatives - Buccleuch, Hopetoun and Gordon, for instance. 
Others dealt with him solely as the government's minister of the 
day for Scotland and some became restive because they could not always 
reconcile the demands of supporting government with their own local 
ambitions. With some exceptions - notably Atholl and Montrose168 - 
the great nobility no longer actively participated in national 
politics and were content to take the guidance of the "understrapper" 
from Midlothian. 
169 
In their private moments, some must have looked 
down on him and there is just a hint of this in a letter by Argyll 
to Dundas commenting on the delay in granting a favour: 
"Nor will you I hope consider my request in the same 
light as that of many other claimants; considering I 
have within a short period expended more money in 
support of government, than is equal to ten times the 
value of this pension... ". 170 
107. 
This suggestion is stronger in Galloway's statement to Pitt, "that 
my parliamentary interest is superior to almost any in Scotland 
excepting the Duke of Queensberry". 
171 
Nowhere is Dundas 
mentioned, deliberately emphasising the degree to which Scots 
politics revolved around the great nobility. 
Dundas's position as manager would occasionally allow him 
to 'bully' or threaten individual magnates but it is in the 
sense that he intended it, that we should understand his description 
of himself as "a cement of political strength to the present 
administration". 
172 
He was enabled as government manager to 
serve the interests of the Scots nobles and in turn could persuade 
them into arrangements that suited government. As the period 
advanced, the defections to opposition of such notables as Hamilton 
in 1799, Sutherland in 1805 and Argyll in 1806 demonstrated a truism 
about the position of Dundas and government. If a great noble was 
absolutely determined to oppose administration, government could 
certainly inconvenience him but in the short term it was very 
173 
difficult to defeat him on his home ground. 
The embryo Whig electoral organization of the 1780s has attracted 
much attention174 but even the Whigs were conscious that they 
had 
no roving man of business, travelling Scotland to concert their 
efforts. Even with all the obstacles facing them, it 
is clear that they 
failed fully to take what opportunities the system offered them. 
Mackenzie of Seaforth, a prominent Portlandite, instanced 
the loss of Sir James Grant of Grant from the opposition 
fold as a 
consequence of this lack of attention175 and indeed 
it was in the 
North that Dundas was most dramatically to advance the government 
cause in these years. 
108. 
Dundas knew Alexander 4th Duke of Gordon (1743-1827) 
of old176 and when he wrote to him in December 1783, advising 
him of the King's displeasure with the Coalition, Gordon was 
easily persuaded to join Pitt. Gordon was then trying to 
put his estates in financial order and he stated a wish 
for a British peerage and provision for his brother-in-law 
John Fordyce, the disgraced Receiver General of the land tax. 
Both were subsequently granted. 
177 
In general Gordon indicated 
a willingness to take Dundas's lead but his professions of 
178 
ignorance in politics should not be taken too seriously. 
Averse to 'political bustle'179 he was well schooled in Scottish 
politics, well advised and continually using his position to demand 
favours of Dundas. 
180 
Nevertheless theirs became a genuine and 
enduring friendship. 
Gordon's chief antagonist was James, 2nd Lord Fife (1729-1809). 
An independent supporter of government, he was a major landowner 
in Moray, Banff and Aberdeenshire, besides controlling Banff 
town. His extensive vote creation had made him unpopular with 
many genuine freeholders and in all three counties he was in dispute 
with Gordon, a rivalry founded on mutual dislike. 
181 
Other 
groups complicated the political landscape. The Earl of Findlater 
(1750-1811) with influence in Morayshire and the Elgin Burghs, and 
Sir James Grant of Grant, an opposition supporter with power in the 
Burghs and Inverness-shire, were allies of Fife. The Moray 
Association, a body of local gentry led by James Brodie of 
Brodie, was committed to ridding Morayshire of Fife's nominal 
voters. 
182 
Fife himself faced the threat that his nominal votes 
109. 
in these counties could be reduced by either Brodie or Grant, 
both heirs of his entail. 
183 
Dundas's concern with the North stemmed mainly from the 
possible return of opposition MPs through a Fife/Gordon collision 
but partly also from the uncertain allegiance of Sir James Duff, 
Fife's son and MP for Banffshire, 
184 
and from the presence of 
William Adam as member for the Elgin burghs. He began by siding 
with Gordon. He may have abetted a 1785 petition against Fife's 
election for Morayshire185 and he assisted James Brodie to elect 
his brother Alexander for Nairnshire at a by -election in that 
186 
year. 
The death of Alexander Garden, member for Aberdeenshire, led 
to a by -election in 1786. A hard contest ensued between James 
Ferguson of Pitfour, backed by Dundas and Gordon, and George Skene 
of Skene, supported by Fife. Both professed support for 
administration. 
187 
Skene was victorious -a "temporary success" 
Gordon called it - and in the wake of defeat, the Moray Association 
working to reduce Fife's votes in Aberdeenshire, threatened to halt 
operations without an agreement as to the future representation of 
Elginshire. Faced with this, Gordon asked Charles Gordon to 
prepare a state of Northern politics and concert a new 
strategy. 
188 
Examining all the permutations, this favoured an 
alliance between Gordon, the Moray Association and, 
if Dundas 
could arrange it, Grant and Findlater. 
189 
Dundas's reaction is 
unknown. Probably it was unfavourable. 
At about this time he 
rejected Fife's offer of an accommodation 
190 
but his job as 
government manager was "to keep all parties 
dutifully subordinate 
110. 
to administration" and any offensive alliance with the Moray 
Association in Elginshire would surely drive Fife into 
opposition. 
191 
His instincts were probably for a Fife-Gordon 
alliance and by February 1787, Charles Gordon was advising 
him to promote this, preferably involving Grant and Findlater 
in the arrangement. 
192 
Certainly within weeks of this, Dundas 
was conversing with Fife about the prospects for an agreement 
with Findlater and Grant and by early May, Fife was anticipating 
a "treaty of peace" with Dundas. 
193 
On 28 June, Sir James Grant 
was informed of impending arrangements for the North by the 
novelist Henry Mackenzie, his brother-in-law and a Dundas 
confidant. Dundas acknowledged Gordon's ill-usage of Grant 
and hinted plans to seat both Grant and his son in parliament. 
194 
It is possible that Grant's secession from opposition dates to 
this period. By late August, Dundas was at Dunira. His intentions 
for the North were already decided and he had discussed them in 
confidence with Charles Gordon. Unaware of all this, the Duke 
was preparing to manufacture fifty nominal votes in the Northern 
counties, in preparation for a new struggle with Fife. 
195 
Early 
in September Dundas met the various parties in the North East. 
196 
The precise negotiations are unclear but concluded with a 
letter of 20 September from Dundas to Gordon. 
197 
The Duke had 
refused to agree to a coalition with Fife, involving peace in 
Aberdeenshire and the return of Sir James Grant for Moray. Instead 
he preferred a general contest, which Dundas was convinced would go 
badly for the Gordons. Dundas's own plan would have attached Grant 
and Findlater to the Duke. Dundas concluded by saying that 
he would 
111. 
not countenance a proposal by Lord Fife nor solicit his support for 
Grant and Ferguson. The sting, however, was in the tail of his 
letter. While Dundas would continue to support Gordon and 
Ferguson in Aberdeenshire, his duty to government required that 
if their success looked doubtful, he would have to act in any 
way necessary to prevent an opposition candidate being returned. 
By now, Skene had moved to opposition198 and Dundas's letter was 
a warning that if Ferguson could not defeat him, he might look 
elsewhere for a candidate. The Duke replied immediately but 
seemed unconcerned. Relying on Dundas's judgement, he acquiesced 
in his determination to avoid involvement in the impending struggle 
but hoped that Dundas might in the future procure him Findlater's 
and Grant's support. 
199 
This disagreement did not harm Dundas's friendship with Gordon 
but by now Dundas was convinced that Fife was so strong as to 
carry the three counties himself, unless opposed by all the others. 
This induced him, over the Duchess of Gordon's objections, to listen 
to Fife's advances. Over the next year he became convinced of 
Fife's sincerity and in September 1788, apprised of Gordon's 
weakening position in Aberdeenshire, he wrote to Fife, urging that 
his "jarrings" with the Duke -a hard battle to enrol votes was 
impending at the Michaelmas court200 - should not induce him again 
to support Skene. Fife's reply was much to Dundas's satisfaction, 
giving him complete freedom to choose candidates for the counties 
and burghs and stating that his support for Skene, originally given 
on the understanding that he would support Pitt, was at an end. 
This held out the prospect of bringing in Sir James Grant and Ferguson 
112. 
of Pitfour in place of Skene and Adam. 
201 
Fife may already have 
had a promise of a British peerage. Findlater certainly had 
strong hopes for such a favour. Dundas had seen that in several 
places, Findlater would hold the balance in any struggle between 
Fife and Gordon and by September he was central to Dundas's 
plans for replacing William Adam with Sir James Grant and putting 
Grant's son in place of Sir James Duff. 
202 
Findlater had already 
abandoned support for Adam in June. 
203 
By the end of 1788, the North East was largely settled. An 
unexpected vacancy in Banffshire in 1789 allowed Ferguson into 
parliament sooner than had been planned. 
204 
This "extra" 
seat ultimately allowed the inclusion of the Brodies - hitherto 
apparently unnoticed - into the final arrangement and when the 
shuffling was concluded in 1790, Alexander Brodie was seated for 
the Elgin burghs. Similarly the inclusion of the Grants obtained 
their support for Colonel Norman MacLeod's candidacy in Inverness- 
shire. 
205 
Dundas could be well pleased with his work. The essential 
problem had been to reconcile the personal differences of two 
government supporters, while winning over others who did not support 
government. It was solved partly by judicious use of patronage and 
mainly by Fife's willingness to turn the other cheek to Gordon's 
provocations, probably in return for the promise of favours. It 
was never a stable relationship, although Dundas worked to promote 
amity between Fife and Gordon. 
206 
Much later, Fife and Dundas 
would fall out, but by then franchise cases had much reduced Fife's 




James Grant was probably won over by the prospect of obtaining 
two seats in parliament. Only Findlater came off badly. The 
public revelation of his homosexuality in late 1790, meant the 
refusal of his British peerage and he later fled the country 
in disgrace. 
208 
Apart from the effort being put into concerting coalitions 
of local interests in its favour, the government made some minor 
gains in its support among the Scots commons between 1784 and 
1790. 
Of the MPs elected in 1784, one certainly changed his allegiances. 
Charles A. Cathcart, member for Clackmannanshire, had voted with Fox 
and North but was unconnected with them and prepared to support 
administration if he approved of their policies. 
209 
He quite 
quickly became a government supporter. 
210 
Between the general elections, there were nineteen by -elections 
in Scotland involving a change of member. The results were mixed 
but overall government made slight headway. Eleven elections 
involved the replacement of one government supporter with another, 
211 
although in the cases of Aberdeenshire (1786) and Kirkcudbrightshire 
(1786) the two incomers would later defect to opposition, one (Skene) 
permanently, the other (Stewart) for a short period only. For 
Dundas personally, the most noteworthy of these elections was 
probably that for East Lothian in 1786, which returned a 
relative, John Hamilton of Pencaitland. 
212 
Two by -elections, for the Tain and Haddington Burghs in 1786 
and 1787 respectively, merely replaced one opposition supporter with 
another, but a second election for the Tain Burghs in 1786, returned 
114. 
a government supporter and Dundas relative, Sir Charles Ross of 
Balnagown. 
213 
This last election was one of six in the period 
where the new member differed in politics from his predecessor. 
Of these, those for Nairnshire (1785) and Banffshire (1789) 
have been mentioned above. The Renfrewshire election of 1786 
was held in consequence of an agreement made by the candidates 
at the general election, to divide the representation during the 
parliament. William McDowall of Garthland, the sitting member 
and a government supporter, resigned as agreed but then unexpectedly 
contested the seat. He had no success and was replaced by Sir 
John Shaw Stewart, an opposition man. 
214 
The death of Robert 
Skene, the opposition MP for Fife in 1787, prompted Colonel William 
Wemyss of Wemyss, then MP for Sutherland, to resign that seat 
and contest his home county. This produced problems for Dundas, 
who had hitherto used his personal interest in Fife, inherited from 
the Scotts of Balcomie, to oppose Wemyss. 
215 
Sir John Henderson 
of Fordell, the unsuccessful government candidate for the county 
in 1784, also solicited Dundas for a continuance of his support. 
Faced with two government supporters in conflict, Dundas and Pitt 
unsuccessfully tried to persuade them to compromise but without 
success. Fearing the successful intervention of a third 
candidate of opposition principles, Dundas reversed his previous 
stance and supported Wemyss, rejecting a mortified Henderson. 
216 
In the ensuing contest, Wemyss was joined by the Anstruthers of 
Anstruther, hitherto in opposition, in return for Dundas's agreement 
not to disturb their interest in the Anstruther Easter 
Burghs. 
217 
Wemyss was ultimately victorious and while Henderson was counselled 




an inveterate opponent of Dundas. 
219 
There is some evidence that 
part of the price paid by Wemyss for Dundas's personal support in 
Fife was a surrender of some of his local patronage to him. 
220 
The Glasgow Burghs election of 1790, caused by Ilay 
Campbell's elevation to the Bench in November 1789, presented 
a minor setback to administration. The government supporters, 
led by the Duke of Hamilton and the Glasgow council, put forward 
John Dunlop as an interim candidate. 
221 
Hamilton secured 
Glasgow and Rutherglen but an opposition candidate, John Craufurd, 
captured Renfrew - the returning burgh - and, through the negligence 
of the Duke of Argyll's supporters, Dumbarton. 
222 
This secured 
his election. It was a short-lived success, however, and he was 
defeated by McDowall of Garthland at the general election. 
Overall, it would appear that government made a net gain of 
two supporters among the Scots members between 1784 and 1790. 
This general advancement of government influence in Scotland was 
rudely interrupted by the political uproar precipitated by the King's 
illness between November 1788 and February 1789. This was the 




was in Scotland when it began but was in close touch with 
Pitt. 
Like others, he seems initially to have expected the 
King's death 
and with it a change of administration. 
224 
Once it was clear 
that George III would live but would be indefinitely 
incapacitated, 
the question of a Regency arose. 
By late November, government was summoning its Scottish 
225 
supporters and parliamentary proceedings 
began in earnest on 
8 December. The opposition, by now closely associated with the 
116. 
Prince of Wales and elated by the prospect of power, pressed for 
him to be given immediate and unrestricted exercise of sovereignty. 
It was an extraordinary doctrine for Whigs to assert and over 
the coming weeks government supporters made much of this and other 
blunders by an often divided and discordant opposition, while 
developing and advancing their own case for a Regent restricted in the 
scope of his actions, in expectation of the King's recovery. The 
overall situation was not favourable to government, however. 
Fettered or unfettered, the Prince was sure to dismiss them and 
Pitt's strategy was one of delay, of drawing out the proceedings, 
in the hope that the King would recover. 
The repeated divisions in the course of the struggle showed 
226 
that, with some exceptions, the government ranks remained steady. 
There were some cracks nonetheless, and among the Scots peers 
Eglinton and, astonishingly, Queensberry moved to opposition. 
227 
Queensberry's defection brought Sir Robert Laurie to the opposition 
ranks228 while Eglinton's brother, Hugh Montgomerie, simply avoided 
voting. 
229 
Alexander Stewart, MP for Kirkcudbrightshire also 
defected230 but Sir James Duff, who decided to support the Prince's 
claims, was promptly made to resign his seat by his irate father, 
Lord Fife. 
231 
In all, some twenty Scots members consistently 
supported government during the struggle232 and eleven supported 
opposition. 
233 
Among the representative peers, the gradual changes 
in loyalties since 1784 found seven of them voting with opposition 
234 
and one abstaining. 
In Scotland, as in England, opposition's morale ran high. 
They began to prepare for a general election235 and it was rumoured 
117. 
that they had already divided the expected spoils. Erskine, 
it was said, was to be Advocate, Robert Cullen and William 
Robertson were to be joint-solicitors and Alexander Wight was to 
be put on the bench. 
236 
They were free with other promises. 
237 
When Dundas looked back on the crisis, he would write that 
the strength of Pitt's position had gained from the Prince's 
indiscreet behaviour, leading "the country to believe that he 
was in the hands of an unpopular faction in whom he was immediately 
to repose his confidence and the conduct of his government in 
place of retaining his father's government at that time highly 
popular... ". 
238 
It was a view of the British scene generally, 
but it was as true of Scotland as of England. 
239 
George Home 
thought that "it would be a strong step as Regent to dismiss 
a popular and successfull [sic ] administration 11240 and while 
opposition had some success in organising addresses to parliament 
favouring their cause, Pitt's supporters seem to have had the 
advantage. 
241 
Sir Thomas Dundas in Stirlingshire was told 
frankly by a Scottish ally, "Everywhere in this country Mr Pitt's 
242 
popularity has the ascendancy over that of Mr Fox". 
Ministers in fact expected little from the Prince but 
and by mid-February, their time had run out. 
Pitt's dismissal 
243 
final bill for a Regency was on its way through the Lords and would 
be 
law within days, at which point the days of 
his ministry would be 
numbered. And then the King recovered. 
The Regency Bill was 
forgotten and Pitt was more firmly in office than ever. 
His 
strategy of delay had paid off only at 
the last moment. 
118. 
It is difficult to predict what would have happened in 
Scotland had the crisis ended otherwise. There had undoubtedly 
been turncoats in the ranks of government's Scottish supporters - 
they would be punished 
244 
- and there was clearly a Scottish 
'government in waiting'. But much of the political nation seems 
to have been with Pitt and while the Scots would in the long run 
certainly have fallen in with any new administration, it would 
probably not have been a comfortable transition. The conduct 
of opposition during the crisis had not been edifying and Pitt 
profited from this. 
245 
There is some reason to believe that 
opposition in Scotland lost some of its support as a result. 
246 
Within a month of the crisis ending, George Home, surveying the 
Scottish scene generally, could remark, "ministry here, are not 
less popular than they are in England, tho' we have not the same 
 247 way of showing it. 
The only crumb of comfort that Scottish Whigs could draw 
from the Regency Crisis was its apparent effect on the election of 
June 1789 for the Clerkship of the General Assembly. 
248 
The death 
of the previous incumbent had made this minor office another focus 
of the long-running struggle between the Moderate party in the 
kirk, who supported Dr Alexander Carlyle as their candidate, and 
the Evangelicals, who supported Professor Andrew Dalzell. The 
identification of the two factions with the government and the 
opposition politicians respectively, was not total and the 
Clerkship "which of itself was a triffle [sic I acquired 
importance from its being like almost everything else drawn 
into the great VORTEX of politicks". 
249 
At the height of the 
canvass there is some evidence that the prospects 
for a change 
119. 
of government had some effect on Evangelical support, one 
Moderate remarking that "their [sic I is such a spirit in the 
country clergy against them at this time that we have all enough 
to do to support Dr Carlille's [sic ] interest". 
250 
Crucial 
to the result of the contest was the intervention of the Duke 
of Portland. Apparently on the verge of office, he was able to 
use this to persuade a third candidate, Robert Walker, minister 
of the Canongate, to stand down and so avoid asplit in the 
Evangelical vote. 
251 
At the Assembly in June, the election 
was the centre of heated debate. Carlyle had 145 votes 
to Dalzell's 142 but Henry Erskine for the Evangelicals, to the fury 
of the Moderates, persuaded the Assembly to examine Carlyle's votes. 
Several were found to be invalid and he was forced to concede 
defeat. 
252 
This defeat would usher in a period of tribulations 
for the friends of Carlyle and in June 1790 Professor George Hill, 
by then effective leader of the Moderates, would write that 
"the situation of the Moderate interest in the church 
has become very distressing. We have to combat our 
old enemies who are accustomed to oppose us at all 
points; And in every question that trenches upon 
politics these old enemies are re-inforced & 
led by 
a desertion of all the Foxites. The summit to which 
Harry Erskine's ambition is allowed at present to 
reach, is to appear the governor of our church; 
And 
he & his friends are indefatigable in all those 




The preparations for the general election notwithstanding, 
Scottish politics were comparatively quiet 
in 1789. The death 
of Lord President Thomas Miller 
in September led to an arrangement 
whereby Ilay Campbell succeeded to 
his office and Robert Dundas, 





He would hold this place for twelve years, occupying 
a central position in the events of the new decade and playing 
a political role very different from that of his predecessor. 
Very quickly he would become his uncle's right-hand man in 
Scottish affairs. For Henry Dundas there may have been a brief 
reflection upon the past. He was offered the Lord Presidency 
but declined it, citing Campbell's qualifications and stating 
"that my secession from all political life at this time 
would be a very fatal step to the strength and hold 
government has of Scotland. It is unnecessary to enter 
into the reasons, but it is a truth that a variety of 
circumstances happen to concur in my person, to render 
me a cement of political strength to the present adminis- 
tration, which, if once dissolved, would produce very 
ruinous effects". 255 
There was some exaggeration in his claim but it also signalled the 
end to his legal career, suspended six years before. 
"If a generall [sic ] election was to take place just now, it 
would be one of the quietest we have seen it . 
256 
George Home would 
have cause to qualify this opinion later257 and in fact the election 
was one of the most active of the period, with struggles in sixteen 
of the county and burgh seats. 
258 
For Dundas it was the 
culmination of six years' preparation and while some of the 
contests were of little concern to government - that of Roxburgh- 
shire, for instance, where both candidates were government 
supporters259 - others were of consuming interest. 
The elections in the North East went according to the 
agreements of the past two years. In the South west, 
Ayrshire, 
Wigtownshire and Kirkcudbrightshire unanimously returned government 
supporters with help from Dundas, in the 
face of opposition from Lord 
D aer. 
261 
Elsewhere, considerable progress was made by Dundas in 
121. 
ejecting opposition MPs. In Orkney, Thomas Dundas was replaced 
by John Balfour 
262 
and in West Lothian Sir William Cunynghame 
was removed after much effort and planning that dated at least 
as far back as 1788.263 In the Aberdeen Burghs, Dundas's nominee 
Alexander Callander ousted Sir David Carnegie. 
264 
Other attacks on opposition were less successful. Determined 
to stop Sir John Sinclair's return for Caithness, Dundas had 
commenced a campaign in 1788 to elect a son-in-law of the Duke 
of Gordon. 
265 
This attack worried Sinclair's friends but early in 
April 1790, he and Dundas began to edge towards an agreement, 
Sinclair even offering to stand down if he were made a Baron of 
Exchequer. 
266 
The negotiations were difficult but in the end 
Dundas's opposition was withdrawn. 
267 
Probably he recognized 
that Sinclair could not be beaten and he may already have had a 
promise of the baronet's later support in the Wick burghs. 
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In Stirlingshire, government supported Sir Alexander Campbell 
of Ardkinglass against Sir Thomas Dundas. 
269 
The contest was 
very close and government were optimistic. 
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In fact, Sir 
Thomas was returned after a skilfully conducted election meeting 
at which his supporters not only managed to eject several of Sir 
Alexander's supporters from the roll, but also to reject the claim 
for enrolment of the candidate himself. A narrow government 
majority became a narrow victory for Sir Thomas, and Campbell's attempt 
to have the election annulled by the House of Commons failed. 
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In Renfrewshire, a determined attempt by Dundas and William McDowall 
of Garthland failed to unseat Sir John Shaw Stewart. 
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McDowall 
himself had had problems enough in the Glasgow burghs, where he 
122. 
had to buy his opponent out of the contest for £900.273 
In Fife, William Wemyss faced the opposition of Henry Erskine 
but this was not carried to the poll, 
274 
while Charles Hope of 
Waughton was elected as government candidate for the Dysart Burghs 
against John Craufurd, an active Whig. 
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Only in the Anstruther 
Easter Burghs could opposition take some comfort from the return 
of Sir John Anstruther against a challenge from the Kellie family 
backed by administration. 
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The contests for Dumfriesshire and the Dumfries Burghs were 
rooted in the personal feud between the Johnstones, backed by 
Hopetoun in the county, 
277 
and Queensberry. Queensberry was 
victorious in both but whereas this was of little moment to 
Dundas in the county - Sir Robert Laurie, with his patron, would 
come to repent his stance on the Regency278 - the defeat of Sir 
James Johnstone in the Burghs replaced an independently minded 
friend to Pitt with an opponent, Patrick Miller of Dalswinton. 
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In Cromartyshire, an apparent defeat for Dundas's friend 
Alexander Brodie, who was forced to split the representation with 
Duncan Davidson, in fact led to the election of a man who proved to 
be a government supporter. 
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When the dust had settled, Dundas could be well pleased. 
The government party would appear to have done proportionately 
better in Scotland than elsewhere. 
281 
The most optimistic 
opposition observers reckoned that they had elected ten 
followers282 
but this was an overestimate and their core support was nearer to 
four; William Adam, Sir Thomas Dundas, Thomas Maitland and John 
Shaw Stewart. Five others wavered in their stance, at times 
123. 
supporting opposition, at times not. These included Sir John 
Sinclair, William Grieve, Patrick Miller, Sir John Anstruther 
and George Graham. 
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The results were almost exactly as 
anticipated by the Earl of Hopetoun three months before, when 
he had predicted that seven ninths of the Scots commons, perhaps 
more, would support Pitt. 
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Both Hopetoun and Dundas had cause to be much less satisfied 
about the results of the peerage election, if for different reasons. 
The government campaign to secure a favourable result from 
the peerage election was conducted in a more aggressive manner than 
for years past. The existence of an opposition list of candidates was 
known by mid-1789285 and the first stirring of resistance to this was 
a request by Moray, Balcarres and Elphinstone - all government 
supporters - that Buccleuch should lead them in concerting the 
election of government sympathisers. 
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They advocated an 
exclusive pact for mutual support among twelve or thirteen peers, 
and its terms, and the correspondence of its supporters, shows both 
their fear of the Independent Peers' organization and the manner 
in which the latter were now seen as coterminous with opposition 
proper. 
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This, and the embarrassed plight of such Independents 
as supported government, now to be penalised for their association with 
the Whigs in the increasingly polarised politics of the period, was 
neatly described by Cathcart: 
"... to give themselves a pretext to say they are not party 
men they have put into their list two who will probably 
support the measures of government... So much are they 
linked with opposition that it has occasioned much debate 
and difference of opinion among them how to get rid of 
certain peers with whom they have not wished to connect 
themselves, or who have kept clear of them and who will 
e pressed upon them by the chiefs of nevertheless be 
opposition". 
124. 
Dundas was soon conferring with Pitt, Grenville and Buccleuch 
on the conduct of the campaign and government lobbying was 
intense. 
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The main casualties of the contest were in fact 
the Independent Peers who wished for elections free from government 
interference. They had difficulty in getting votes from govern- 
ment supporters290 and Dundas's treatment of them verged on 
duplicity. He certainly negotiated with them291 and until 
late in the day both Hopetoun and Strathmore were led to believe 
that they had government's good wishes. 
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In practice, the policy 
towards them that Dundas had advocated over two years ago was now 
in operation. 
The government's friends supported a core list of thirteen 
peers, the final list probably having been settled by Buccleuch294 
and there are signs that more ambitious souls aimed at a return 
of sixteen. 
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To the end there was confusion, with Galloway's 
loyalties in particular being doubted by government peers. These 
doubts were resolved too late in the day to save his election. 
296 
With thirty candidates in all, the election took place on 
24 July. 
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The bitter nature of the contest was fully reflected 
in the result. Thirteen peers were elected outright, nine from 
the government list, four from the ranks of opposition. 
298 
Six 
peers tied for the remaining three places, all with equal votes. 
299 
The election itself was heated and marked by "disagreeable altercation", 
including Stormont's threat to bring the returning clerks before the 
House of Lords for accepting Lord Ochiltree's vote. Four votes 
were objected to and a protest was taken against Lord 
Napier's. 
300 
Henry Dundas, surveying the scene, pointed to the bad luck 
125. 
experienced by his friends. One extra voter would have returned 
three government men and much would have hung on the absent Earl 
of Errol and upon Gordon, whose signed list arrived too late. 
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The opposition group had held together well while the Independents 
were squeezed out. Hopetoun was particularly bitter, writing 
sarcastically that 
"It is most creditable to His Majesty's Ministers to 
have applyed [sic. ] all their weight to obtain such a 
a return prop'd by bad votes to the exclusion of their 
best friends & admission of their declar'd ennemies [sic ]ýý. 
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In the aftermath of the election, once it was clear that there 
would be no immediate re-election to fill the three vacant places, 
the various factions organised themselves to take protests to the 
House of Lords concerning the validity of several of the votes cast. 
The government peers banded together to defend their voters, and 
hence the election of several of their brethren, and the opposition 
did likewise. 
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The various disputes would take several years 
to settle. 
Of the election as a whole, Dundas hoped that the outcome would 
304 
break the Independent Peers' movement. In fact, the spirit of 
independency survived, but it was one of the last seriously 
contested elections for some years. This was, however, 
due mainly 
to the impact on domestic politics of developments in France. 
"Now that opposition is almost annihilated, the danger is, 
that you and your friends run riot ... and think no more of 
the state". 
James Edgar's friendly note to Dundas of March 1791 gives some sense 
of the period of comparative political calm 
that had followed the 
305 
general election, but this was now coming to an end. 
The French 
126. 
Revolution, now almost two years old, was casting a shadow 
over British politics. More immediately, the Ochakov Crisis, 
threatening to involve Britain in an unpopular and impossible 
war with Russia, was about to shake the ministry, dividing the 
Cabinet and dismaying many government supporters. 
306 
Pitt 
survived but the resignation of Leeds the Foreign Secretary, 
allowed the promotion of Grenville, and the advancement of Dundas 
to the Home Office. Dundas considered this promotion only to be 
temporary, to last into 1792,307 but events were soon to overtake 
this plan. These changes formalised the positions that Dundas 
and Grenville had long enjoyed as Pitt's closest advisers and 
they were the penultimate stage in Pitt's weakening of the once 
powerful royal party in the Cabinet. The removal of the 
duplicitous Chancellor Thurlow in early 1792 completed the 
process. 
Several Scottish issues also came to a head in mid-1791. The 
attempt to repeal the parts of the Test Act whereby Scots holding 
English offices had to receive sacraments by Anglican rites, had 
begun almost as soon as similar moves to relieve the English 
dissenters had been defeated in 1790.30 
8 
The issue was raised 
and pressed by the Rev. Thomas Somerville and after a dramatic 
and lengthy debate, the General Assembly of 1790 appointed a 
committee to pursue the matter. By November 1790, this 
had produced a memorial outlining the case for repeal and stating, 
among other things, that the Test was 
'derogatory to the Rights and 
Dignity of a high spirited people'. 
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This assertion of a Scottish 
claim to equal treatment with England gives a clear picture of one 
127. 
of the main motivations of the measure's supporters - irritation 
at the fact that in some ways Scottish presbyterians were second- 
class citizens, despite being members of an established church. 
Despite this rapid progress, the decision of 11 February 
1791 to take the matter to parliament was already doomed to 
failure. The Church of England - and hence the government - 
could scarcely countenance a bill that might again raise the 
Test Act as an issue in England, 
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Further, the move for 
repeal had, despite the repealers' best efforts, become a party 
issue. With some blurring at the edges, the Moderate party 
opposed repeal, while it was supported by the Evangelicals and 
the Scots opposition. 
311 The Moderate members of the committee 
had endeavoured to thwart the business in its progress312 and 
provided government with arguments against it, notably that the 
issue proceeded from no popular demands in Scotland, had excited 
little public interest and was being improperly pursued in being 
presented to parliament, rather than directly to the monarch, as 
was the Assembly's normal practice. 
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Several of these arguments 
were deployed by the government when the matter came before the 
Commons on 10 May and the motion was rejected by 149 votes to 62. 
Dundas's influence was particularly marked in getting Scots 
members to oppose it. 
314 
The association of the cause with 
opposition had been fatal and it was an early example of the 
ill-effect that the French Revolution was beginning to have on 
calls for reform. 
The repeal case enjoyed support from one unexpected source. 
In May, Norman Macleod, elected for Inverness-shire with Dundas's 
128. 
good wishes, fell out with government over Dundas's refusal to 
promise him an Indian appointment. 
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An erratic, unpredictable 
man, he promptly moved to support opposition on a wide variety of 
issues, latterly becoming the self-appointed parliamentary spokesman 
for the Scottish radicals. As was normal in such cases, he 
forfeited his rights to nominate candidates to government posts 
in Inverness-shire. 
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More important in the long run than the Test Act was the passage 
of the Corn Law of 1791, operative from November. Designed to 
replace legislation of 1773, it was the subject of considerable 
public interest in Scotland, introducing the principle that farmers 
would receive bounties for exporting grain, while importation would 
be prohibited until prices in a district - Scotland was ultimately 
divided into four - rose above 16/- a boll. 
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As early as May 
1790, George Chalmers - an experienced Scottish lobbyist - had 
pointed out that a proposed grouping of Edinburgh with eight 
Southern and South Western counties - several with traditionally low 
meal prices - meant that the capital, far off, could be enduring 
high prices and grain riots for some time before average prices 
in the district rose so high as to allow importation. 
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That 
English districts were allowed to import at a markedly lower price 
than Scotland - 16/- per quarter, where in Scotland it was 16/- 
for the smaller boll - was a further objection, and it was raised 
by both the burghs and some landowners. 
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McDowall of Garthland, 
a landed gentleman sitting as a burgh MP, was neatly caught 
in the 
middle, feeling that the importation price for Scotland could 
reasonably be lowered to 15/- per boll and expressing alarm at the 
129. 
inclusion of Ayrshire and Wigtownshire - low price counties - 
in the district with Glasgow. Hitherto the old laws had 
meant that Glasgow was constantly open to importation. 
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At an 
early stage, Dundas had been congratulated for "using that influence 
which you justly possess in moderating the views of the country 
gentlemen which on subjects of this kind are often carryed [sic ] 
beyond their proper limits". 
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In fact the final legislation, 
although the most glaring anomalies were amended, still represented 
a clear victory for the landed interest and an assertion of their 
absolute dominance of the system at the expense of the tiny 
manufacturing interest. More importantly, because it directly 
threatened their living standards, it became another grievance 
added to the complaints of the Scottish lower orders. Almost 
unannounced, long overlooked by their social betters, and against 
a background of political upheaval in France, they were about to 
step to the centre of the Scottish political stage. 
The first Scottish reactions to the French Revolution were 
mixed, ranging from the ultra-conservative Lord Fife's abhorrence 
of "the horrid scenes in France"322 to the generally sympathetic 
tone of the Scots press, which had never been particularly well 
disposed to Pitt's administration. 
323 
As in England, conservatives 
saw many benefits to be derived from France's 
being riven by 
internal dissensions324 From November 1790, Burke's Reflections 
on the Revolution in France began seriously to 
influence the thinking 
of the English ruling class against the revolutionaries and while 
this work was not much admired in Scotland325 the debate about the 




gathered in intensity from February 1791 with the publication 
of the first part of Paine's Rights of Man, the second following 
a year later. This had no wide circulation in Scotland prior 
to Midsummer 1792 
327 
and as yet the Scottish upper classes were 
not faced with organised demands for political reform from below. 
Nonetheless, Paine's work, with its criticism of political 
corruption, social inequality and hereditary privilege, was 
anathema to them. 
328 
They were comparatively ignorant of the 
lives and aspirations of the lower orders and many might have 
seconded a later verdict that they 
"are in generall [sic ], metaphysicians, consequently 
very obstinate and very presumptuous, they acquire this 
from the religious books they read, and whatever may be 
the advantage of Presbetry [sic ] in other respects, 
it contains a strong leaven of Republicanism, and that 
leaven is still greater among all the Refiners upon 
Presbetry, Burghers, Anti-Burghers[, ] Cameronians &ca[. ] 
If the French doctrines are more dangerous here than 329 in England it proceeds from the causes I have mentioned... " 
Additionally it is clear that many in the landed classes were 
suspicious of the growing urban manufacturing society and its 
workforce330 and they had before them as proof the violence of the 
Glasgow weavers' strike of 1787.331 A growing fear of social 
unrest began to grip the political elite. This applied to 
many who were not at all well affected to Dundas and in this 
the Scottish political nation came to mirror the developing crisis 
of opposition in England, where Burke had split with Fox in May 
1791 and where a division of opinion was becoming apparent between 
the more conservative Whigs, led by Portland, and Fox's followers. 
For seven years opposition had been sustained by justified resentment 
at the manner in which the King and Pitt had conspired to remove them 
from office but for many this now gradually became irrelevant. Fox, 
131. 
however, remained true to this article of faith and in this and in 
the enthusiasm of himself and his allies for the principles of 
the French Revolution and for wider measures of political reform, 
he began to drift apart from the Portlandites. 
In Scottish terms this hardening attitude against reform was 
evidenced in early 1792. On 2 April, Dundas thwarted attempts 
immediately to abolish the slave trade. "I say God preserve us 
all from the rage of Reform and Reformers" wrote one supporter, 
332 
but the cause had been enormously popular in Scotland among the lower 
and middling ranks333 and they were furious. On 18 April, Dundas 
again saw off the attempts of the inept Sheridan to put Scottish 
burgh reform before the Commons. Even as Sheridan raised the 
business, he launched into a eulogy of the French Revolution and 
the matter was abruptly swept from the House on a wave of 
indignation. 
334 
Against the background of near total resistance to reform, 
a tide of bitterness welled up from the lower orders. To anger at 
the rejection of the slave trade repeal and burgh reform were 
added resentments against the corn law and against certain 
government taxes, particularly those of the excise. 
335 
Tension 
had been growing for over a year and boiled over into an extra- 
ordinary Summer of riots running from May to July, stretching 
from Berwickshire to Ross. The manifestations were various, 
ranging from the burning of Dundas in effigy in many places 
because of his opposition to reform, through to disturbances on 
account of local grievances. Most spectacular of all was the riot 
in Edinburgh on 4-5 June, when the traditionally rowdy celebration 
of the King's birthday became an overtly political 
demonstration 
132. 
against Dundas and the government and culminated in attempts to 
storm the houses of local dignitaries. Contemporary observers 
explained these events either as the consequence of "a spirit 
of reform and opposition to the established government" spurred 
6 on by Paine's writings, or they endeavoured to point to specific 
local causes for each disturbance. 
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In practice, the political 
nation, looking at the overall picture, drew the former 
conclusion and began to fear revolution. This was immediately 
evinced in a series of county and other meetings to vote loyal 
addresses in support of the government's proclamation against 
seditious writings. This had been made on 21 May with - another 
sign of the times - the support of Portland, 
337 
but while its 
impact on Paine's sales was limited, it produced an interesting 
litmus test of political allegiances. In Stirlingshire, the 
change was dramatic. Dundas was advised that while the county 
"is in general adverse to our side of the question in 
all political questions, the gentlemen & landed prop- 
rietors present approved of the propriety of addressing 
His Majesty[, ] with the exception of Mr Peter Spiers who 
considered it unnecessary. The meeting not wishing any 
dissentient voice elected Mr Speirs preses & he was obliged 
to sign the address". 338 
That this general movement to address the King was part of a 
defence of the social order and not yet a conversion to the politics 
of Pitt and Dundas is strongly suggested by the Berwickshire 
meeting. Here the gentlemen "inimical to administration" would 
support the address but were not willing to allow any inference to 
enter it that they approved of the King's ministers. 
339 
The 
opposition was changing position but this was to be on its own 
terms. 
133. 
The nervousness of the political classes was demonstrated in 
the actions of the county and burgh reformers in July. A 
series of local meetings in April had shown that county 
reform still had considerable support among the lesser heritors. 
340 
Nonetheless, the sense was gaining ground, as one opponent put it, 
that the times "are such as seem to call upon all men who have 
any real publick [sic I spirit to unite in resisting the present 
fashionable rage for innovation ... if the exertions of the 
reformers were successful ... the first effect will be to 
deprive the people of their contentment & industry... 11.341 
This was fully reflected in the July convention of county 
reformers at Edinburgh. The Lord Advocate had taken steps to 
ensure a "majority of moderate men"342 but in fact the principal 
role of persuading the meeting to defer consideration of electoral 
reform until a further meeting in December was played by the 
conservative Whig, Sir Thomas Dundas, aided by Henry Erskine. 
343 
The burgh reformers, meeting in Edinburgh in late July, took a 
similarly cautious line. 
344 
The news of the late Summer, that the lower orders were 
forming groups to promote reform - the Societies of the Friends 
of the People - would serve to make others among the ruling elite 
waver in their attachment to opposition and reform. The pattern 
of Scottish politics for the previous decade was breaking up and 
that for the next decade was starting to form. 
134. 
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SCOTTISH POLITICS DURING THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR 
"The sword of extinction now hangs suspended by a hair 
over all property & civilised society, & that therefore 
every heart & hand ought to unite in matter[s] of higher 
importance than private pique". 1 
In July 1792, came the first stirrings of what became the 
Scottish radical reform movement. Buoyed up by the now strong 
demand for parliamentary reform, a group of radical reformers in 
Edinburgh tried to interest the burgh reformers in combining to 
pursue this object. Rebuffed, they formed the "Associated Friends 
of the People" to achieve more equal representation and shorter 
parliaments. 
2 
The movement quickly attracted wide popular support 
with numerous local societies, mainly in Fife, Tayside and the Central 
Belt. 
3 
Avowedly pursuing their aims by constitutional means, the 
rank and file were mainly tradesmen. They were not generally 
levellers, but economic liberals opposed to monopoly privileges, 
particularly those enjoyed by the landed classes. Not 
surprisingly, they had no support among the bourgeoisie or the 
landed. 
These men were supporters of the French Revolution, and the 
success of French arms against foreign invasion between September 
and November led many of the Scots lower orders to 
believe that 
radical reform was achievable and imminent. 
The result was an 
enormous spur to the movement's recruitments 
But if the 
societies prudently concealed their glee at 
French advances, others 
could not. The years of pent-up 
frustration among the Scots commons 
again burst out in a series of riots 
in November, celebrating 
French victories. Dundas was burned in effigy 
in Perth, 
disturbances in Dundee lasted a week and local uproars 
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elsewhere thoroughly alarmed the ruling class. The Friends 
of the People did not support these riots, but they were still 
blamed by government supporters for encouraging them by inciting 
discontent, and they were considered to be in league with the 
French revolutionaries. 
6 
Between 11 and 13 December, a convention of the Scottish societies 
met in Edinburgh to draw up a petition calling for parliamentary 
reform. Among the 170 delegates, a struggle was evidenced between 
the supporters of moderate reform within the existing constitution 
and those who wished for universal male suffrage and annual 
parliaments. The former carried the day, but while the dispute 
was not advertised, government were well aware of it, as also 
of the potentially treasonous address from the United Irishmen, 
read to the convention by Thomas Muir, an advocate fast rising 
to prominence in the movement.? 
Even as they met, however, the delegates were facing the 
gathering momentum of an immense reaction by the ruling classes 
to all their activities. This reaction and the government's 
struggle against reform, would set the tone of 
Scottish politics 
for the next decade. 
Dundas had been in Scotland from October and was the intended 
butt of the Perth riot. 
8 Now he could observe the alarm of the 
propertied classes. They had 
begun to draw back from approval 
of any sort of reform and the events of 
the Autumn, including the 
September massacres of aristocrats in France, 
had shaken them. 
The impact of the November riots was conveyed to 
the Duke of 
Buccleuch by a neighbour, Sir William Maxwell. 
Persuaded by 
"unknown emissaries of sedition", the 
lower orders in Dumfriesshire 
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believed that monarchy should be abolished, that government was 
preparing heavy additional taxes and that by uniting and resisting, 
the common people "will infallibly obtain justice, freedom, equality, 
and a division of landed property". Paine's work was in wide 
circulation and Maxwell spoke for many in "dreading the con- 
sequences that may arise from the present discontents, the absurd 
doctrine of equality, and the spirit of licentiousness, which 
seems everywhere to prevail in these kingdoms, amongst the lowest 
classes of the people". 
9 
The upper classes began to fear revolution. 
"It appears to me", warned Sir William Pulteney, "that if mischief 
is to be set to work, it is likely to begin, in Scotland or 
Ireland ... & that great vigor 
[sic I to extinguish the first 
flame is of very great moment ... The period of Christmas when the 
work people are idle, is a likely time for beginning a riot". 
10 
In the face of this near panic, Dundas delayed his return 
to London. From Edinburgh he worked to concert the forces of 
government and the propertied classes, for by now "Every body 
of character, respect and property are [sic ] so much of one mind 
here on all the great principles of real government... The contest 
here is with the lower orders of the people, whose minds are 
poisoned up to the point of Liberty, Equality and an agrarian 
law". 
11 
Through November, Dundas described to Pitt the detailed 
strategy to quell the unrest. The radical meetings would 
be 
spied on, to give warning of their plans. 
Cheap, loyalist 
pamphlets would be subsidised 
by government and the newspapers, 
which "have not been friendly to us 
in this country", would be 
given "a perfectly right direction". 
More military force was 
- ,r 
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requested for Scotland. The clergy of the established church would 
be pressed to preach loyalty to their flock, but of the seceding 
clergy, whose congregations were all too keen on reform, Dundas 
was less certain. On a material level, Dundas, pointing to 
the wet Summer and the "wofully [sic ] deficient" crop, requested 
that grain exports be prohibited and that the tax on waterborne coal 
be repealed to allow a cheap substitute for the poor peat harvest. 
He also called on Pitt to make pragmatic use of his surplus 
revenue to remove some unpopular taxes. Another part of his 
strategy was to organise meetings and addresses to government 
by loyalists in Edinburgh, "which I take for granted will be 
immediately followed throughout the country ... 
". 12 Finally, on 
1 December, he inaugurated the most notorious part of the govern- 
ment reaction. The Scots sheriffs and magistrates were circulated 
and asked to gather evidence for prosecuting publishers and 
circulators of seditious writings. 
13 
This was to be the prelude 
to the state trials. 
Much of Dundas's strategy was implemented. The clergy of 
the established church rallied to the government cause and 
Dundas arranged a truce between the feuding Moderate and 
Evangelical wings of the kirk. 
14 
The church was thus able 
to present a united, loyalist front to its congregations and 
its efforts were of much comfort to government. 
15 
Dundas's 
apprehensions about the seceding churches were well 
founded, 
however. Government was unable to make serious contact with 
them until 1798 and in the meantime "a great majority indeed of 
16 
the dissenting clergy were notoriously disaffected". 
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The coal duty was repealed in 1793, the single most popular 
act of Dundas's career among the Scottish population17 and the 
expected bad harvest failed to materialise. 
18 
One project 
investigated but not ultimately pressed, was a Scottish militia. 
Dundas proposed a bill to create such a force and it was popular 
among his advisers and among those who hoped for places in the 
new establishment. 
19 
Gradually it became clear, however, that 
a militia would be unpopular with the people and to this was added 
the suspicion that it would merely serve to arm the disaffected. 
The plan was dropped. 
20 
The government had much success in forming associations of 
loyalists to counteract the radicals. Starting in Edinburgh with 
the so-called Goldsmiths' Hall Association, these spread quickly 
from early December but they were populated mainly by the propertied 
classes. There were few members from the lower orders and the 
loyalists as a whole did not enjoy the support of the general 
public. 
21 
This experience was paralleled in the campaign to promote 
loyal addresses. Most issued from private gatherings and gave 
unqualified support to King and constitution in the struggle 
against sedition. Where the popular voice was able to interfere 
in such meetings, designedly loyalist declarations were sometimes 
polluted with resolutions calling for reform. 
22 
In general, 
however, the tone of these meetings can be seen in the attempt by 
two individuals to persuade the Glasgow Merchants' House that 
reform could be countenanced at a proper time. 
They "were told 
that we considered the word reform in the present times, as tanta- 
mount to rebellion, & that it could not 
be admitted into our 
resolutions". 
23 
Even in the counties, loyal addresses could meet 
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opposition. In Berwickshire, George Home was wary, "as in the 
West end of the county there are many people inimical to 
administration, and to everything which they think comes from 
them... ". In the end, with "some murmurings" and a considerable 
delay, it was carried. 
24 
As the struggle between the loyalists and the radicals developed 
through December and January, the real success of the former was 
achieved by intimidation. 
25 
This involved the use of the 
considerable economic sanctions open to the ruling classes 
against the predominantly tradesman membership of the reform 
groups, together with local harassment and the threat of legal 
action. 
26 
The campaign was intense and effective. On 11 
December, John Dunlop reported, perhaps prematurely, that the 
Friends of the People "are greatly disconcerted & frightened. 
There will not be any more of their meetings soon... ". 
27 
The 
loyalist associations were offering rewards for information about 
disseminators of Paine's works and in late December, the Lord 
Advocate wrote to Dundas with "the most comfortable accounts of 
the progress of loyalty" and with his plans to prosecute the 
producers of seditious pamphlets. 
28 
These trials commenced 
in the Justiciary Court in January and government now firmly had 
the initiative. The radicals were on the defensive, with the 
terror of jail or banishment before them. So intense was the 
pressure on them, that by January their numbers were in serious 
decline. For the first time in three months, government 
supporters were optimistic but not complacent: 
"Any hazard 
from the seditious principles lately propagated in this country 
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is at an end for the present, but it is smothered rather than 
extinguished", wrote George Home. 
29 
The government had survived the crisis of November and 
December, partly because it had not lost its nerve and principally 
because of the manner in which the propertied classes had rallied 
round. This last was further encouraged by the execution of 
Louis XVI and the French declaration of war on Britain (1 February). 
Some opposition men had already moved to the government side30 
or had joined in loyal addresses. Opposition generally, however, 
while approving the defence of the constitution against the lower 
orders, hung back from a full endorsement of government. 
31 
This 
is clear in Berwickshire (above), and it can also be seen in Lord 
Bute's attitude, supporting government measures while despising 
ministers. 
32 
The first effect of the war was on those who were either 
independent in politics or only weakly attached to opposition. 
Colonel William Fullarton was among the first to rise to the national 
emergency, sending Dundas a letter, summarised by a clerk: "Is ready 
to serve or be of any use in these times - all former distinctions 
of party sh. be set aside". 
33 
Alexander Fergusson of Craigdarroch, 
continuing his correspondence with the Lord Advocate, displayed 
similar sentiments34 and Sir David Carnegie also signalled his 
approval of government. 
35 
Queensberry may have taken this 
opportunity to rejoin administration. 
36 
For a period, the Whig party proper remained relatively intact, 
but the widening split between the conservative Portlandites and 
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the Foxites threatened this unity. The Foxites still numbered 
many among their ranks who wished for parliamentary reform, while 
Fox himself still regarded the threat to the constitution from 
the power of the Crown as of more importance than domestic sub- 
version or foreign war. His continued vocal opposition to Pitt 
further reduced his supporters. 
37 
Government had been negotiating 
with the Whig Lord Loughborough for many months, and in January 
38 
he defected to ministry, receiving the vacant Lord Chancellorship. 
Soon after, Sir Gilbert Elliot, John Anstruther, Sir James 
Erskine and Sir John Sinclair, all opposition MPs, joined 
Windham's 'Third Party' in separating themselves from Fox's 
leadership, to support the war. 
39 
For a while thereafter the 
erosion of the Whigs was halted and Portland's strategy of 
opposition combined with a support for Pitt's war policy just 
sufficed to preserve unity. This undoubtedly suited many of his 
Scottish adherents like Mackenzie of Seaforth, who considered the 
war "just[, ] expedient & unavoidable" and who, with others, was 
40 
concerned at the direction Fox was taking. 
The Scottish county and burgh reform movements, already in 
difficulty were both early victims of the general reaction to 
innovation. The county reformers met in December 1792 in an 
atmosphere very different from that of their July meeting. Henry 
Erskine produced a bill for ending nominal votes and extending the 
franchise to men holding land valued at £100 annually. Robert 
Dundas had been apprehensive that Erskine would succeed41 but in 
fact resistance within the meeting forced him to withdraw a motion 
calling for the bill to be considered 
immediately by the counties. 
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Instead, he admitted the danger of canvassing the matter at "so 
critical a period" and agreed to the Advocate's motion that the 
counties should consider it on 30 April, with a view to a further 
convention in May. 
42 
This was a tactical victory for the Advocate, 
and in March a meeting of Midlothian gentlemen, friends of his, 
circulated the counties with a report on the bill, adverting to the 
current threat of unrest and declaring their intention not to send 
delegates to the May convention. 
43 
The county meetings of 30 
April generally concurred. They were thinly attended, with 
freeholders dominating and some evidence that the lesser heritors 
were persuaded to stay away. 
44 
In general, they rejected the May 
convention and this killed county reform for a generation. 
45 
Burgh reform lasted little longer. A Commons committee, 
established after efforts by Sheridan, reported in June 1793 upon the 
abuses in Scottish burgh government. It was the last gasp and, 
aware of the tide against them, the reformers accepted the advice 
of their London committee and suspended agitation. 
46 
If the war enjoyed a broad measure of support among the Scottish 
political classes, the same cannot be said of the people as a 
whole. A sympathy for France's struggle against despotism, 
combined with a fear of economic ruin, made the conflict 
unpopular. 
47 
Fears of commercial dislocation seemed all too 
justified. A business crisis had been gathering pace since 
November 1792 as an over-extension of credit reached its limit. 
The declaration of war triggered a fall in confidence and the 
demand for money rose, causing a liquidity crisis, a wave of 
bankruptcies and unemployment. 
48 
Edinburgh and Glasgow were 
I 
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particularly hard hit and from the latter John Dunlop wrote to 
Dundas in April, "that distress is hourly augmenting, and I shall 
not be surprised to see a general stoppage of payments take place 
in the course of a week, or two at farthest, unless some plan of 
relief be instantly adopted". 
49 
The crisis lasted through June 
and the course of it can be seen in the anguished entries in the 
diary of George Ramsay, the Edinburgh banker. 
50 
It was 
ultimately ended only when government, supposedly at the suggestion 
of Sir John Sinclair, allowed the issue of exchequer bills as loans 
to merchants, taken on the security of their goods in hand, 
51 
The radicals were in fact able to reap very little advantage 
from the crisis. 
52 
Still harried by government and its allies, their 
fall in numbers continued. A second General Convention in April 
1793 sponsored the organising of Scottish petitions for peace 
but these were ultimately few in number and were brushed aside 
by parliament. This failure sent the movement into another 
spiral of despondency and decline. The state trials of Thomas 
Muir and the Reverend Thomas F. Palmer in August and September 
1793 went a long way to reversing this collapse. 
Muir had been indicted for sedition, in particular for his 
reading of the address by the United Irishmen to the First 
Convention. He had fled to France and latterly seems to have 
intended to migrate to America. The realisation of the straits 
to which the Scottish radicals were reduced caused him to abandon 
this plan and to return to Scotland, apparently with a view to using 
his trial as a public debate from which to revive the reformers. 
The trial in August was never likely to be fair. The climate 
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of loyalist reaction, the disposition of the judges and the 
mode of jury selection all militated against this. But Muir 
did himself no favours. He rejected the services of the brilliant 
Henry Erskine - it would have stopped his plans to pronounce on a 
variety of political matters - and conducted his own case. As 
a defence Muir's was poor and concluded with an extraordinary 
address to the jury that did much to convince them of his guilt. 
But even conservative opinion was shocked by the sentences of 
OF seven 
fourteen years transportation visited upon Muir and upon Palmer, 
whose own trial followed shortly. The outrage among the reformers 
served to spur them to new exertions and a significant revival took 
place in their ranks53 such that they felt able to call a third 
General Convention. This was more outspoken than any before 
and openly called for universal male suffrage and annual 
parliaments. It also broke completely the now strained links 
that the Scots radicals had had with those in the Whig party 
still pressing for reform. 
This convention was rapidly followed by the so-called British 
Convention of November 1793, to cement a new alliance between Scottish 
and English radicals. The authorities had watched it all with 
growing alarm: "I hope they will not break up their meeting without 
doing something which will entitle us to interfere", wrote the 
Advocate. 
54 
Nor did they. They were forcibly dispersed on 
5 and 6 December and more sedition trials followed in the New Year, 
with William Skirving and two English radicals, Gerrald and 
Margarot, joining the exodus to Botany Bay. As with their 
predecessors, the defendants were hardly given a fair trial but 
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contrived to make matters worse by their ill-advised conduct in 
court, infuriating the choleric Lord Justice Clerk, Braxfield. 
55 
Nor did these trials cause the radicals to gain strength as they 
had done from Muir and Palmer's misfortunes. Government followed 
up the convictions with a series of hammer blows against local 
societies that succeeded in driving the whole body underground. 
56 
A small fringe of the mortally wounded movement began to 
contemplate violence, something the upper classes sensed quite 
quickly. 
57 
In February, there were attempts to suborn some of 
the Scottish fencible regiments, alarmed at the prospect of service 
abroad. 
58 
In May, the government stumbled on the 'Pike Plot', 
the plan by a minority of radicals for an armed rising. It was 
smashed by a wave of arrests and the execution of one of the 
conspirators, Robert Watt. The Advocate was jubilant: "We 
have the public voice completely with us in the whole affair. 
Nobody believed that the plan was so serious as we proved it". 
59 
By October, the Lord Provost of Edinburgh's confidence was probably 
widespread: "all is peace and loyalty, and likely so to continue". 
60 
For three years the radicals in Scotland would be impotent but the 
ruling class's fear of them was never to abate. 
The fear of an uprising led government to form armed loyalist 
associations, the volunteers. This was an old idea of Dundas's61 
and by early 1794, the time was ripe. In mid-February he sent 
the Lord Advocate proposals for raising such units and the 
latter was enthusiastic. 
62 
The proposals were canvassed 
privately 
63 
and included a plan to establish the office of lord 
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lieutenant in the Scottish counties. The system was Dundas's 
own conception and in later years he would be exceedingly proud 
of it. 
64 
By 6 March, Dundas had the King's approval to start appointing 
lord lieutenants in each county, with the proviso that appointees 
should be "the persons of most rank and weight ... unless their 
political principles are such as would render their nomination 
improper". 
65 
In fact, there seems to have been no upsets 
over the appointments, Dundas simply choosing the major 
landowner in each county. 
66 
Such was the accord between 
government and the Scottish Portlandites that several of the latter 
were appointed, including Mackenzie of Seaforth, Graham of Kinross, 
Macleod of Cadboll and Tweeddale. 
67 
The commissions were issued 
in April and while the office was new, 
68 
its importance was 
understood: "There must be a key-stone to the arch -a rallying 
point, somebody to look up & resort to - which in the state we 
are now in is absolutely necessary". 
69 
Plans were already circulating for raising volunteers70 and 
this work, a prime function of the lieutenancy system, began in earnest 
from mid-year. 
71 
From the start, they were seen as a force for 
maintaining internal order rather than as a defence against 
invasion. There were fears that the disaffected would enter the 
ranks72 and the units raised consisted almost exclusively of men 
of property, with entrants carefully vetted. 
73 
Recruiting was not 
necessarily easy, however, and there is clear evidence that many 




theless, in time a reasonable force was assembled and the 
Edinburgh Almanac for 1797 lists some 48 local corps. 
75 
The 
yeomanry corps of cavalry were even more exclusive and as we 
will see, Dundas attributed a special long-term role to them. 
The volunteer corps as a whole gave much comfort to the Scottish 
nobles and gentlemen, both in the way that they were thought to 
intimidate radicals and in the manner in which they could act to 
quell local disturbances. 
76 
They were latterly much expanded 
(see below) and in 1802, Lord Advocate Charles Hope, pointing to 
their general utility would "not be answerable for the tranquillity 
of Scotland, if the volunteer force is given up". 
77 
Such tenuous links as remained between the Scottish radicals 
and the Scottish Whigs all but ceased in late 1793. They had never 
been strong, for the Whigs had clearly understood the threat posed to 
their own cherished projects of constitutional reform by association 
with the broader demands of the radicals. 
78 
John Morthland, the 
Whig advocate, had been a Friend of the People, as had Lord Sempill, 
who was cashiered from the army for his politics. 
79 
The most 
vocal parliamentary supporter of the radicals had been Colonel 
Norman Macleod, member for Inverness-shire. He had presented 
their peace petitions and had addressed them in pamphlets, 
counselling moderation in their conduct. By December 1793, 
even he had abandoned them, although it did him no good with 
government, for whom he remained a marked man. 
8° 
In any case, 
a profound change was overtaking the Whigs. 
By the Autumn of 1793, a large portion of the Whig party, 
actuated by the same horror of revolution felt by Pitt's supporters, 
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stood apart from Fox's condemnation of the war and Grey's 
calls for reform. Under Portland's leadership they inclined to 
an open and active support of the government in its pursuit of a 
war that was going badly. Late in the year there were significant 
Whig defections to ministry, including the Scot, Gilbert Elliot 
who had hitherto followed Windham's semi-independent line. In 
January 1794, Portland formally broke with Fox, leading his 
adherents to a general support of ministers and in July a full 
junction of Portlandites and government took place. 
81 
This alliance was not achieved without difficulties and these 
partly involved Dundas. Initially Windham was to be Secretary at 
War, Portland to be Home Secretary and Dundas to become Secretary 
for War, a new post including the direction of war policy, hitherto 
a part of the Home Secretary's duties. Windham and Portland bridled 
at this but Pitt was determined to retain war policy in the hands 
of himself, Grenville and Dundas. After much haggling, during 
which Portland was even offered the Foreign Secretaryship, he 
accepted the Home Office as offered. At this point, Dundas 
decided to resign, detailing his motives in a letter to Pitt 
of 9 July. His new office would be seen as a sinecure and he 
as a "puppet", since the principal direction of the war would 
inevitably remain with Pitt as First Lord of the Treasury ("all 
modern wars are a contention of purse"). In any case, there 
were already too many ministers in the Cabinet concerned with war 
policy. 
82 
Pitt was shocked and in a letter clearly showing the depth 
of their friendship, entreated him to remain. 
83 
Dundas was not 
to be moved. 
84 
Ultimately, his mind was changed only by a letter 
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from the King and, more importantly, a visit to Wimbledon by a 
"distrest [sic I and agitated" Pitt. Now the shock was Dundas's 
and, taken aback, he agreed to stay in Cabinet: "rather than [having] 
seen him continue a moment longer in that state, I would [have] given 
85 
him my life rather than [have] seen him suffer as I did". 
There is no real reason to believe that Dundas's action was 
motivated by pique or by resentment at the way in which his old 
office was being taken from him, and the issue seems genuinely 
to have stemmed from his fear of being seen to hold an unnecessary 
office. 
86 
Once this last hitch was settled, the arrangement 
proceeded smoothly. 
While the direction of war strategy remained almost exclusively 
with Pitt, Dundas and Grenville, the Portlandites were otherwise 
treated as equal partners in the new coalition and were admitted 
to a full participation in almost every aspect of government. In 
Scotland, we have already seen that some Portlandites had accepted 
lord lieutenancies prior to the arrangement and after July there 
were more benefits to them. Mansfield was appointed President of 
the Council87 and Sir Thomas Dundas was given a British peerage. 
In time, Kinnoull would be made Lord Lyon88 and Mackenzie of 
Seaforth would also receive a peerage. Other Scots Whigs who 
joined government with Portland included Sir John Shaw Stewart, 
Robert Graham of Gartmore and John Campbell of Cawdor. 
89 
There was little change in the manner in which Scotland 
was governed. Montrose wrote to Dundas in October, "I shall 
continue to consider you as Minister for Scotland, till I am 
informed to the contrary... " 
90 
and Scottish management indeed 
remained with Dundas. 
91 
Portland, possessed of an even temper and 
I 
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political probity92 was realistic enough to recognise, as he 
stated it to the Earl of Dumfries, that "you &I did not become labourers 
in this vineyard till a late hour... ". 
93 
In general, it is clear 
that he did not sponsor attempts by his Scots allies to assert 
unrealistic or premature claims to Scottish patronage, failing, 
for instance, to support the over-ambitious claims of his old friend 
94 
Robert Cullen to a seat in the Court of Session in April 1795. 
Much of the Scottish patronage of the Home Office was distributed 
according to long standing conventions, and to that extent Portland's 
hands were already tied. But these rules - mainly relating to 
appointments to local posts such as church presentations, 
commissaries, keepers of sasine registers - usually rested on 
some assessment of local influence and the Scots Portlandites 
could expect to benefit from them in any case. There is little 
evidence that the Duke tried to remodel these principles. If 
anything he reinforced them as for instance in his re-iteration of 
the need to demand certain qualifications of candidates to be appointed 
as sheriffs-depute. 
95 
Henry Dundas was critical of Portland's tenure 
of the Home office96 but surprisingly this is not an opinion shared 
by later historians, who see him as exercising his duties con- 
scientiously. 
97 
Certainly any inspection of the Home Office 
correspondence concerning Scotland shows that he took a careful 
interest in most of the business under his charge. 
If Dundas had criticisms of Portland, they remained friendly. 
In March 1795, George Home agreed that "his Grace shows a marked 
attention to Mr Dundas" because of the crucial part played 
by 




In practice, Portland gave the Dundases a free 
hand in Scotland. At times his attitude seemed almost to show 
an unwillingness to interfere in Scottish affairs. Thus despite 
having clear knowledge of many of the candidates for the vacant 
seat in the Court of Session in early 1796, he handed the final 
choice to the Lord Advocate, satisfied of their being united in 
the aim of finding the candidate who would give the most 
satisfaction. 
99 
Portland also exercised tact. Thus when 
the Rev. Robert Walker, a minister who had contributed to a 
Whig success in Scottish church politics in 1789, came looking 
for his reward in 1795, Portland, recognising that the matter 
ultimately had to go to Rundas, counselled his secretary to be 
circumspect in his enquiries concerning Walker's fitness. 
100 
Only once does there seem to have been a serious difference 
between Portland and Dundas, when the former insisted on 
appointing Robert Cullen as a judge in November 1796, against 
Dundas's efforts. 
101 
It does not seem that Portland or 
Dundas particularly disagreed about how to cope with the 
political and economic problems cast up in Scotland by the war. 
As well as reshaping the political map, the war presented 
other advantages to government through the vast expansion of 
military and naval patronage. Prior to 1793, the comparative 
paucity of correspondence concerning military patronage suggests 
that Dundas was able to offer such favours only rarely. 
102 
He 
could occasionally extend a helping hand, surprising John Hamilton 
of Sundrum with the offer of a free commission for a son in 1788,103 
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and assisting William Wemyss, the Fife MP, to place a half-pay 
lieutenant on full pay in an Indian Regiment in 1791.104 These 
and other examples suggest that Dundas could count on a trickle 
of such patronage. 
105 
Two Scottish regiments, the 74th and 75th 
Highlanders, were raised in 1787 by Sir Archibald Campbell and Colonel 
Robert Abercromby, but Dundas had little gain from this, leaving the 
nomination of officers to the two colonels and asking only one 
appointment for a son of Lord Swinton. 
106 
Occasionally he would 
have windfalls, as in March 1790, when a Captain Lumsdaine, desperate 
to avoid West Indian service, offered his company to be allotted 
free to any half-pay captain, in return for Dundas's promise of 
an invalid company. 
107 
There were flurries of applications to 
raise men at the time of the Nootka Sound and Ochakov Crises in 
1790 and 1791, but otherwise the general situation remained as 
Dundas had described it to an aggrieved and importunate Earl. of 
Breadalbane in 1787: 
"... your Lordship may probably think it 
what the connexions [sic I of other peo 
the way of military promotion since the 
am rightly informed you will find there 
stagnation of it except in so far as it 
purchase". 108 
right to enquire 
ple have got in 
peace, and if I 
has been a total 
proceeded from 
Given the much reduced size of the peactime army there is no 
reason to believe that Dundas fared any better or worse than other 
politicians in providing military patronage for his friends and 
allies. The short supply of such favours probably strengthened 
his position, for while it was open to anyone to apply to the 





All this changed with the outbreak of war. It is not easy 
to determine the amount of patronage obtained by Dundas but all 
the indications are that it was considerable. 
110 
As Scots 
manager and latterly as Secretary for War, 1794-1801, he was 
uniquely placed to give advice as to the acceptance or rejection 
of offers to raise regiments and he was not slow to encourage 
various Scots to come forward with offers. 
" 
The reforming of 
the Scots Brigade was his particular pet project 
112 
but he was 
also involved in the advancement of Cameron of Erracht's plans 
to raise the 79th Highlanders113 and in two regiments raised by 
Colonel William Fullarton114, among others. From 1794, Scotland 
would raise some fifty one regiments of fencibles, men whose 
service was confined to domestic defence. 
115 
Dundas played a 








In most regiments new-raised, the commanding officer had 
the nomination of the officers to serve under him. In regular 
regiments of the line this was no small consideration and Colonel 
Thomas Dundas, raising the 68th foot, reckoned to sell his 
ensigncies at £250 each. 
119 
Such transactions were not allowed 
in fencible regiments but the power of appointing officers in them 
was still a considerable plum. 
120 
Inevitably Dundas could benefit 
from those so gratified, as in the case of the Earl of Home, for 
whom he obtained a company in Hopetoun's regiment. 
121 
The united 
nature of the war effort and the accession to the government fold of 
much of the old opposition, saw Graham of Balgowan and Mackenzie of 
Seaforth both raising regular regiments. 
122 
Even Breadalbane, whose 
187. 
ambiguous political stance continued, was admitted to the benefits 
of such patronage. 
123 
Such operations did not always work to 
government's advantage, however, and we will see that far from 
encouraging loyalty to administration, disputes over the officering 
of the Angus fencible regiment contributed to the fall of the 
local MP, a close ally of Dundas. Nor did the understanding between 
government and opposition extend beyond a certain point and Colonel 
Norman Macleod's offer to raise a regiment, prefixed with his 
124 
disapproval of the war, was not taken up. 
Apart from the raising of regiments, a vast sea of military 
patronage opened to the supporters of government. Much of it 
was vested in the Commander in Chief, Lord Amherst to 1795, the 
Duke of York thereafter, and any politician could apply to him. 
Nonetheless, as Secretary for War, Dundas was well placed for 
access to him and he was besieged with applications from those 
aware "that to men who have interest, every difficulty, vanishes 
125 
in a moment thorough [sic I the influence of their friends... ". 
The Duke of York's time at the Horse Guards was a period of extensive 
reform in the British Army 
126 
and he occasionally refused Dundas's 
requests, where they did not conform to rules he had prescribed. 
127 
Nonetheless, Dundas seems to have done very well for himself and 
among the hundreds of letters applying to him for all the variety 
of military appointments and promotions that the war cast up, 
are numerous letters of thanks for favours obtained. Sir James 
Steuart Denham MP was placed on the Scots staff, 
128 
Mackenzie of 
Seaforth's brother was promoted, 
129 
Lord Dalhousie's military 
career was considerably advanced by Dundas's efforts130 and 
188. 
the Marquess of Tweeddale's nephew was appointed to the majority 
of a Hottentot corps at the Cape. 
131 
There are many other 
examples. On the fringes of the successful were those who had 
to wait patiently until their turn came, men like Lord Belhaven 
pressing for promotion132 or Colonel John Callendar looking for 
confirmation of his rank. 
133 
Even ungratified, many would 
remain loyal to government in the hope of things to come. The 
principle of 'hope deferred' with the supplicants left dangling 
in expectation, was an enormous benefit from a system of this 
sort. 
The construction of barracks in many Scottish towns to control 
popular unrest gave further openings for patronage. 
134 
Offices 
connected with these situations were in the gift of the Secretary 
at War and the Barrack Master General135 but they were generally 
"conferred in consequence of political recommendations by Members 
of Parliament"136 and while it seems that latterly the War Office 
pressed the appointment of military men, 
137 
the posts remained 
the objects of politicians' attentions. 
138 
In a Scotland relatively poorer than England, a military career 
presented one major drawback. Most promotion was made by purchase 
and the sums involved could be considerable. 
139 
Not a few requests 
to Dundas involved attempts to obtain advancement without the outlay 
of money for commissions. 
140 
This pitfall to the ambitious Scot 
was not present in the senior service. 
Since the ship and its equipment were state property, there 
was no system of purchase in the Navy141 and a naval career began 
when the captain took an individual aboard as a midshipman. Not 
189. 
surprisingly, Scottish captains tended to favour their own and 
one Englishman wrote of his fellows, 
"the officers appeared a niceset of gentlemen, but, 
the captain being a Scot, they were all, nearly, from 
the same country, so that I found myself a sort of 
lonely person among them". 142 
It was from the pool of men introduced to the service by the 
captains that the officers were almost exclusively drawn. Their 
commissions came from the Admiralty and securing them required 
interest either with an admiral or, most desirably, the First 
Lord of the Admiralty. 
143 
It was at this level that Dundas 
could operate, dealing with the successive First Lords, Chatham 
(1788-94) and Spencer (1794-1801). 
As with the army, naval patronage was in limited supply before 
the war. Dundas's office as Treasurer of the Navy (1783-1800) 
gave him influence in appointing pursers144 and Clerks at the Navy 
Office, 
145 
and it was generally perceived that he could "do a great 
deal for navy people". 
146 
While it was perfectly open for 
politicians to apply directly to the Admiralty, not a few like Sir 
Robert Laurie, finding "that nothing is to be got in ye navy without 
interest", would turn to Dundas for help. 
147 
There was a steady 
flow of requests to him for influence to procure promotions and he 
would make his recommendations. 
148 
As with his military patronage, 
it is difficult to gauge the extent of his success. A memorandum 
of 1790, showing promotions that he obtained during the Spanish 
Armament Crisis, is suggestive. 
149 
Four lieutenants were made 
commanders. Among them, Andrew Christie of Burntisland had the 
support of Charles Hope 
150 
and Philip Durham was the son of a 
190. 
prominent Fife family, supported by two MPs. 
151 
Twelve midshipmen 
were promoted to lieutenants, and these included Robert Honyman, of 
a prominent Orkney family and later to be an MP, 
152 
Philip, son of 
Sir Robert Anstruther of Balcaskie, a Fife landowner 
153 
and William 
Renton, patronised by Home of Wedderburn. 
154 
Two individuals 
promoted on the Halifax station complete the list. While some 
of these promotions seem to have been rescinded on the threat of 
war disappearing, 
155 
the list indicates the potential importance 
of such patronage in maintaining the government's influence in 
Scotland, particularly given the number of Scots who had chosen 
a navy career. There was always potential for gain from 
situations of the sort presented by James Dalgleish, soliciting 
promotion for his son, and assuring Dundas, "you may depend on my 
endeavours to support any recommendation you may be pleased to 
make to the Town Councill [sic ] of Q'ferry [sic ] for filling up the 
late vacancy of a Member of Parliament". 
156 
The expansion of the fleet during the war extended the available 
patronage and Dundas's papers show a stream of individuals benefiting 
from his influence. His interference with Admiral Sir John Jarvis 
advanced David Milne, an Edinburgh man, to the rank of lieutenant 
157 
and a later effort pushed him to the rank of post captain. 
Midshipman George Rannie, a protege of Lord Haddington, was 
raised to a lieutenant with Dundas's help. 
158 
Lieutenants could be 
made commanders, as in the cases of Thomas Dundas159 and John 
Inglis 
160 
and commanders could be helped to post captaincies, as 
was the nephew of Major General James Stuart. 
161 
A few favours 
went to relatives of Scots clergymen and this probably 
did Dundas 
191. 
no harm in his church management. 
162 
For others, the usual 
rules of patronage probably applied, although they were rarely 
as explicitly stated as by Sir Thomas Livingstone of Westquarter, 
who was advised by a friend, "that I could scarcely have a right 
to expect that you [Dundas] would interest yourself in my favour, 
till I had made known my determination in respect to political 
matters, & had assured you, of my firm adherence to your 
interest". He duly made the declaration and within a few years 
was thanking Dundas for his appointment as post captain. 
163 
Some 
were more subtle, like Richard Oswald, who carefully associated an 
account of his Kirkcudbrightshire politics with a request for the 
promotion of a brother to master's rank, 
164 
James Clayhills, who 
told David Scott MP that his support in Angus politics depended on 
a brother's promotion, was so crude as to receive no countenance. 
165 
On an overview, it is clear that the government must have 
gained considerable advantage from the flood of naval and military 
patronage into Scotland during the war years. Nonetheless, the 
impact of this flood should not be exaggerated. It did not all 
flow through Dundas's hands, although the commonly held view that 
it did caused him no harm. More importantly, the fact that much 
of the old Scottish opposition backed the government war effort on a 
non-partisan basis, meant that the basic prerequisite for political 
tranquillity already existed. These men did not require favours 
to be won over. The corollary of this was that after the war 
they would not necessarily feel bound to Pitt or Dundas by favours 
granted during the national emergency. Colonel Thomas Graham of 
Balgowan is a perfect case in point. 
166 
192. 
At a wider level, the war almost certainly contributed to the 
process by which the Scots political classes and their hangers-on 
were coming to share more fully and wholeheartedly in the 
fruits of empire. The Scots as a whole had always been 
possessed of some advantages in such pursuits: 
"The education of the country in general still continues 
to above their rank, [sic] It is so particularly with 
the better sort of farmers['] sons and when they have 
two or three[, ] one of them generally lands in the army 
or the marines". 167 
An analysis of the commissioned officers of the Royal Navy 
1793-1815, has suggested that, in proportion to their respective 
populations, the Scots enjoyed an equal share of such positions 
with the English. 
168 
The careers of Admirals Keith, Duncan and 
Cochrane-Johnstone were only the most public manifestations of this. 
No comparable discussion is available for the army but at least 
one writer has asserted that the Scottish contribution to the 
war-effort in numbers of soldiers raised, was out of all proportion 
to its population. 
169 
The Scots could be proud of Sir John Moore 
and of the two Abercrombies, Sir Ralph and Robert. Of Sir Ralph, 
the Duke of York's secretary wrote: 
"none of our generals are more capable... he has 
indiscriminately employ'd persons of all country's [sic 
about him, and his only guide appears to have been to 
select men of merit wherever he could find them, and that 
the majority of those in the army are Scotchmen, I have no 
hesitation in saying". 170 
The Scots themselves were conscious of their role in all this. 
One candidate for a marine commission described Scotland as 
"that 
country [to] which Great Britain is so much indebted for its 
government and the bravery of an army & navy which protects so happy 
193. 
a nation from the daring insults of our enemies' . 
l71 
Sir Ralph 
Abercromby wrote of the Helder Expedition of 1799, that "if this 
172 is a Scots expedition, they have born[sic ] the brunt of the day". 
The Scots participation in other parts of the empire was very 
evident in the period and the aspirations and horizons of the political 
classes clearly broadened. How far Dundas himself was responsible 
for the growth of an imperial consciousness in Scotland is harder 
to determine. He certainly helped many Scots forward but it is 
likely that his main service was in the encouragement that his own 
success as a British politician gave to his countrymen to try for 
employment on the wider stage. East India has always been associated 
with Dundas's name and the mechanics of Indian patronage have already 
been discussed. Scots had been going out to India long before 
Dundas had any influence in British politics, however, and historians 
of East India have long pointed to an increasing Scottish presence 
there from the mid-eighteenth century. 
173 
The importance of Dundas 
was to make Scots more aware of the opportunities in what one of them 
called "Your India". 
174 
The West Indies also saw the arrival of 
numerous Scots and this can be more directly attributed to Dundas, 
a consequence of the civil and military posts opened up by his war 
strategy of attacking French colonies, rather than trying to storm 
mainland Europe. Always a less popular field of employment 
because 
of the unfavourable climate, 
175 
nonetheless several Scots found 
themselves in high positions there. Lord Dunmore was Governor of the 
Bahamas 1787-96, Lord Balcarres of Jamaica 1794-1801, Seaforth of 
Barbados 1800-6, and Admiral Cochrane-Johnstone governed Dominica 
1797-1803. Lesser men also went West and Ninian Home was Lieutenant 
194. 
Governor of Grenada through Dundas's offices. 
176 
This patronage 
was of some use to Dundas in Scotland, where, for instance, the 
appointment of the Assistant Commissary to St. Domingo in 1795 
gave him the support of the influential Bushby family in 
Dumfries-shire. 
177 
In 1801, Dundas was forced to explain to 
Hiley Addington the particular importance of a Tobago appointment to 
his Aberdeenshire politics. 
178 
Scottish penetration of the diplomatic 
service was also well advanced by the time Dundas came to power. It 
has been calculated that between 1760 and 1789, one in every seven 
appointments to the diplomatic service were Scotsmen and they 
numbered among their ranks Sir Robert Murray Keith, Sir Robert 
Ainslie and Joseph Ewart. 
179 
The complete satisfaction of the Scots upper classes with the 
benefits of the Anglo-Scottish Union, was concisely described by 
Lady Dundonald in 1800: 
"The happy situation of this favoured Kingdom may obviously 
recommend the same union to Ireland, they may observe many 
good effects from our union with England, they see a 
Secretary of State, a Chancellor of Britain, a Commander 
in Chief of the Army, and several renowned Admirals[, ] 
all Scotchmen. Ireland may in like manner share in 
shining in the service of the Empire... ". 
The rapid diminution of the ranks of the political opposition 
in Scotland from 1793 onwards, the general terror of rebellion from 
below and the great quantity of military and other patronage now 
at government's disposal, all combined to provide the main 
preconditions for what some contemporaries called 'The Dundassian 
Domination'. 
181 
In 1785, when Boswell wrote of Dundas as a despot 
aiming for control of the political class and its representatives, 
it was largely rhetoric. From 1793 until the end of the war, 
195. 
opposition to the Scots government party was liable to the 
worst construction being put on it. Henry Cockburn wrote 
eloquently: 
"Jacobinism was a term denoting everything alarming 
and hateful, and every political objector was a 
Jacobin. No innovation, whether practical or 
speculative, consequently no political or economical 
reformer, and no religious dissenter ... could 
escape from this fatal word". 182 
A profession of attachment to King, constitution and government 
now became the indispensable last clause in every solicitation for 
favour. It is misleading to describe this as "studied sycophancy 
with ulterior motives in view". 
183 
For some it may have been 
that. For most it was a far more serious matter. As the Rev. 
Thomas Somerville put it, 
"In the present situation of this country, I am sensible 
that a principal respect is paid to the political principles 
and conduct of the candidates for ministerial favour, inde- 
pendant [sic I of other qualifications", 
184 
There is every reason to believe that many people had their prospects 
blighted by suspicions as to their political principles. One clergy- 
man wrote of an applicant for a professorship, whose loyalties were 
in doubt, "whilst that is the case[, ] were he a Sir Isaac Newton 
he can have no support from me". 
185 
A lot of this went on, and 
many innocents suffered from the innuendos of their rivals: 
"... I much fear that if the character of individuals 
in this country are to be estimated by the opinion of 
Lord Melville's friends that it will be found that every 
person disconnected with him is tainted with 
Jacobinical 
and immoral principles... ". 
186 
Against this background, some counties hitherto hotbeds of 
opposition to Dundas and to government, 
became tranquil, as 




tranquility also extended to the peerage elections. 
After over two years of legal disputes, the House of Lords 
decided on 23 May 1793 that Scottish peers with British titles 
had a right to vote at the peerage elections. 
188 
A little later, 
while finding in favour of two of the six peers who had claimed 
to be elected in 1790, they ordered a by-election to elect 
a third. 
189 
In the long term, since British peers tended to 
support government, 
190 
the former decision was of considerable 
importance. Dundas, who had long argued the need to re-enfranchise 
the British peersl9l would later explain: 
"In truth once we carried the quaestion [sic ] in 
the House of Lords ascertaining the right of the British 
peers to vote in the election of the sixteen representative 
peers, there has been no cabal or party intrigue amongst 
them. They look up to government, and if government have 
a decided wish and act with decency and discretion ... there 
can be no doubt of success". 192 
Other considerations played a part. The consensus among the 
peers as to the need to support Pitt obviously reduced potential 
opposition. The improvement in government management methods, so 
apparent in 1790, was continued. In August 1793, Buccleuch would 
write that he had little wish in future to be so forward in election 
management as he had been in 1790193 but he remained central to 
government interference for years to come. Addington, writing 
in 1802, described the system: 
"... I have understood that, for some years past, there 
has been no positive interference on the part of govern- 
ment: but that it's [sic I principal friends on the spot, 
of great authority, & influence, & well acquainted with 
the sentiments of the elective body, have been chiefly 
instrumental in forming those arrangements, by which the 
administration of the country has been strengthen'd during 
the whole of His Majesty's reign, & particularly within the 
last twenty years. Of late the Duke of Buccleugh [sic ] 
has, I believe, taken the lead; &I doubt whether any one 
could be so acceptable to the nobility of Scotland". 
194 
197. 
The full effects of the new political climate took a little 
while to be felt. Napier wished to stand at the by-election of 
7 August 1793 caused by the Lords' decision, but he was dissuaded 
by Buccleuch, who wanted the friends of government to support 
Lord Somerville to whose conduct in the previous election they 
owed obligations. 
195 
Tweeddale also decided to stand as an 
Independent Peer and solicited Buccleuch's vote: "it hurts me 
to think I should be the first of my family [who] has not been 
always elected - and further as my family is large it prevents 
me acquireing [sic I freinds [sic I for them which in after life 
may be a great loss". He received a firm but friendly rejection. 
196 
Tweeddale's canvass was very active and gave the government managers 
cause for alarm197 but in the end he abandoned the contest, possibly 
in protest at the government's interference. 
198 
Napier heard that 
"our opponents were in great wrath with Lord Tweeddale, for 
199 having offered his services without their privacy [sic I and consent 
and this may have had some influence. His retreat was too late to 
prevent two signed lists being presented in his support at the election 
meeting. Hopetoun decided not to stand, reportedly because he was 
expecting a British peerage, and the ultimate lack of an opponent 
to Somerville was a relief to the election clerks who had yet to 
receive formal notification from the House of Lords as to the 
eligibility of British peers to vote, and who feared the 
consequences of a contest. 
200 
In fact the election was quiet, 
although Lauderdale objected to the votes of six British peers. 
201 
In these years the party of Independent Peers fell into 
abeyance. Kinnoull and Mansfield, both British peers and 
198. 
unhappy about the right to vote afforded to them by the Lords' 
decision, tended to boycott the elections. 
202 
Others, moved 
by the circumstances of the times, fell into a comparatively 
comfortable association with the government peers. Tweeddale's 
independency soon wore off. Hopetoun's case is interesting. 
Despite his sister's marriage, "his new formed conection [sic ] 
with Mr Dundas and Regiment"203 does not seem to have corrupted 
his principles. The death of Lord Elphinstone led to another peerage 
by-election on 23 October 1794. Hopetoun allowed himself to be 
persuaded to stand by Dundas, in order to prevent any contest, but 
concluded his agreement to Dundas's proposal "in confidence that 
no ministerial influence shall be used". 
204 
To Portland, Dundas 
drily remarked, "He does not explain whether he means none at all or 
none against him". 
205 
The evidence is limited but the government 
campaign seems to have been discreet. 
206 
In practice, little exertion 
was required, since Hopetoun could count on the combined support of 
the government party, his old friends among the Independents, and 
the Portlandites who had recently joined Pitt. 
207 
Erroll and 
Galloway, both supporters of the old government group, 
had been 
rumoured as candidates208 but they did not stand. 
Buccleuch 
was again able to dissuade Napier from standing 
209 
and Hopetoun's 
return was unopposed. 
If the election of 1794 had shown the new understanding 
between 
the old government group, the Independents and 
the Portlandites, 
that of 1796 was a triumph for management. 
In the summer 
of 1795, Dundas had pressed the 
Earl of Haddington to be a 
candidate and while Haddington 




prospective candidates, including Dalhousie, Aboyne and Cassillis, 
applied for Dundas's countenance. 
211 
Cassillis indeed was not 
prepared to stand without the approval of Dundas and Buccleuch212 
and the Duke was again to the fore in election arrangements. As 
early as February, he had warned Dundas that "many young men wish 
to be candidates"213 and in March he spelt out the problem. He 
had tried to stop canvassing at present, to prevent premature 
engagements being made: 
"Our friends must act together and we must have no 
more candidates than freinds [sic ] we mean to support 
and bring in. We have often been perplexed by having 
too many freinds [sic ] of government upon the field 
at the same time". 214 
This was a little alarmist, for in the event only Lauderdale 
appeared as an opposition candidate. Dundas and his friends put 
together a list of sixteen candidates and after an initial adjustment, 
when Northesk replaced Hopetoun who had declined re-election, these were 
all returned. 
215 
The conduct of the election and its result 
reflected the essential unity of the peerage. The government's 
involvement was not so crude as to offend the former Independents - 
Cassillis wrote, "I am perfectly aware of the caution and delicacy 
with which this should be manag'd"216 - and the result was generally 
approved. Pitt supporters such as Napier, Somerville and Torphichen, 
were balanced with Independents and Portlandites 
like Dumfries, 
Strathmore, Breadalbane and Tweeddale. The defeat of Lauderdale, 
the seventeenth candidate, provided the only sour note to the 
election. He registered three protests at the proceedings and 
he also received the solitary vote cast 
by the embittered Lord 
Sempill, who described Lauderdale as 
"an honor to the peerage, 
217 
and was rather severe against government". 
All sixteen, as 
200. 
expected, were loyal supporters of government. 
218 
The election of 15 August 1798, brought on by Erroll's 
suicide, set the seal on the government's successes in the peerage 
elections. 
219 
Hardly was he in the grave but Dundas had advised 
Eglinton to begin a canvass220 and Buccleuch confirmed that he 
was "the most proper successor". 
221 
He was returned without a 
contest. Viewing all this, Portland could write to Lord 
Castlereagh, fretful about managing the Irish peerage in 1800: 
"... the election of the Peers of Scotland is now left 
intirely [sic ] to the managemt [sic ] of the great and 
respectable friends of Govt[. ] ... & it is now so well 
understood that as vacancies occur in the course of the 
Parlmt [sic ] or at the general election by the 
disinclination of any of the peers to Parlmty attendance 
(for it is now generally understood & considered that 
unless those who have served are desirous to withdraw 
themselves they are intitled [sic ] to a preference) the 
peers of the first respectability in point of rank[, ] 
fortune & character are to succeed[, ] that every idea 
of [a] contest is in a manner given up & the election 
is conducted with almost as little sensation as if 222 
succession was hereditary". 
2 
There was some exaggeration in this and there would be bitter 
contests at future peerage elections, but it adequately conveys 
the sense of the truce prevailing among the Scots peers between 
1794 and 1801. 
The growth of an imperial consciousness in the Scottish ruling 
elite discussed above was almost certainly accelerated 
by the very 
nature of the war itself. For the first time, the 
British 
propertied classes faced a foreign war where the stakes were 
far higher than the mere loss of a few colonies. From without 
they faced invasion and from within, the prospect of subversion. 
Both 'fronts' were perceived to pose a very real threat to 
the 
201. 
ordering of British society and to the privileges and status 
possessed by its leaders. This of course was the main cause 
of the general alliance of the Portlandites with the government 
party but the union was not unconditional and beneath the 
surface different threads are apparent in Scotland. 
The first of these was the gradual development of a Scottish 
Tory party, known to contemporaries as the Pittite or, later, 
Melvillite interest. 223 As early as 1794, a sycophantic favour- 
seeker had written of Pitt's as 
"that government which I am in my conscience convinced, 
has been the means under heaven now, [sic ] more than once, 
of keeping the crown on the King's head, of saving the 
laws[, ] the nobles, the order of society, the religion, 
the people, & their property from being reduced into one 
common ruin". 224 
It was a view that many Scots nobles and gentlemen would hold before 
the decade was out. 
225 
As we have seen the government's supporters 
before the war had been drawn from those who followed administration 
because it was the fount of patronage and from those who supported 
it through a traditional conservative rejection of opposition to 
the King's government. The threat of radical upheaval from below 
added a new element to the equation and led to an appropriate 
adjustment in conservative thinking. We have noted that there 
was a realisation that the radical unrest would endure and would have 
to be carefully watched. Dundas himself was acute in perceiving 
that this unrest would not end with the war, that a national 
response was required for what was a British problem, and that 
at base the struggle was between the emerging industrial society and 
its labour force, and the old landed order. Thus he chided Buccleuch, 
whom he believed to be opposed to establishing yeomanry cavalry: 
202. 
"... if the form & substance of this constitution is 
to be protected against the various combinations 
forming to disturb both, it must in a great measure depend on our being able to raise and keep up in the 
country after the establishment of peace the spirit 
of yeomanry corps, and thereby forming a connexion [sic ] 
between the gentlemen of rank and the yeomanry in England, 
and the persons of rank & substantial farmers in Scotland 
. at an expense not exceeding £100,000 sterg, we shall be able at all times to preserve in Great Britain a 
cavalry force of this description form'd from men of 
property and substance living in the country & not 
infected with the poison of large towns, and this to 
an amount not less than 20,000 men. I ask you if it 
is possible to figure [sic I such a bulwark of strength 
to the safety of the constitution of the country, as 
would arise from such a circumstance". 226 
If the defence of the social order was a problem facing the 
British rulers as a whole, so it became another factor in the 
gradual fusing together of English and Scottish politics. The 
gradual evolution of a British political nation had been going on 
since at least 1603 and in recent times had been evidenced in the 
emergence in Scotland of a Whig opposition tightly bound to that 
in England, and of course in the career of Dundas himself as a 
British politician. 
227 
Now in the wartime struggle, Dundas and 
his allies became a party inextricably identified with Pitt and his 
cause. When an anonymous analyst of the Scottish members elected 
in 1802 described twenty six of them "as invariably attached as 
rr 
partisans to the politicks [sic ] of M. Pitt and M. Dundas", nowhere 
was there any attempt to identify any separate or personal interest 
belonging to the latter. 
228 
In 1803, alarmed at Pitt's manoeuvres 
in English Politics, Dundas wrote that Scotland 
"is one great family of friends warmly attached to M[ 
r 
Pitt upon genuine public feelings and to my certain 
knowledge, there never was a minister possessed so great a 
personal interest amongst the noblemen and gentlemen of 
any country, as he does in that, and when you recollect 
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what are the characters and descriptions of those 
noblemen and gentlemen, I think you will agree with 
me that no man ever possessed a prouder support than 
he derives from the attachment of that country". 
This alliance, at the core of which were the friends Dundas 
had acquired before 1794, would form the basis of the nineteenth 
century Scottish Tory party. Pitt's image as the 'pilot that 
weathered the storm' was as admired in Scottish circles as it was 
in England. After his death there would be Pitt Clubs in Scotland 
as in England, devoted to the memory of the great defender of 
King and constitution 
230 
and a body of Scots would continue to 
act together as Pittites. 
described by Dundas: 
The spirit of this grouping was 
"The memory of an illustrious character who has done 
great and important services to his country, is a sacred 
deposit, which his country is bound to cherish, and the 
chosen friends whom he has left behind him, are peculiarly 
called upon to be the protectors of it". 
231 
About 1810, Melville had cause to try and assess the extent 
of his influence in Scotland. In Fife and Southern 
Scotland, he 
reckoned to count on the loyalty of Buccleuch, 
Hopetoun, Haddington 
and Galloway among other peers and Sir James 
Montgomery and General 
William Wemyss among several commoners. Elsewhere 
in Scotland, 
he could count on the probable support of eleven 
peers, including 
Gordon, Atholl, Moray and Seaforth, while among the 
MPs as a whole 
he might hope for the support of 
between eighteen and twenty one 
men. 
232 
It seems clear that this was the core of 
the Scots 
Pittites. 
The second major thread to 
Scottish politics in these years 
was the survival of an opposition. 
It is crucial to understand 
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that many who supported government after 1794 were merely 
marking time. Some were intimidated into silence but for most 
it was a voluntary recognition of priorities during the national 
emergency. Thus in writing of the independent freeholders of 
Kirkcudbrightshire, a local laird could observe that "in that 
body I know of a great majority who are not only loyal subjects 
& steady friends to our excellent government [i. e: constitution], 
but also warm supporters of our present deserving ministry". 
233 
It is an interesting distinction to make. Later, in 
Stirlingshire, it was noted that in measures of national defence, 
"those who were in opposition to the administration seem to make 
a point of coming forward, & offering their services for the 
defence of the country, against an invading enemy. .. 
". 234 Those 
that felt able to join in this truce in Scottish politics, to support 
government without abandoning their principles, included, besides 
the mass of the Scots Portlandites, the general body of those who 
had opposed Dundas either on personal grounds or out of distaste for his 
methods and system of management. It was to this truce that 
Colonel Fullarton alluded when he wrote to Pitt, "... I have never 
been considered as a personal adherent of your administration, even 
when concurring in some of its leading measures to 
235 
Occasionally 
other forces can be seen at work and both Fullarton and Sir David 
Carnegie, formerly opposition MPs, had to endure harassment in 
their counties from men who resented their support for government. 
236 
It is the continued existence of this large pool of latent dissent 
that explains the speed with which opposition was able to re- 
mobilise in Scotland in the years after 
1801.237 
Some of the Scottish Whigs remained with Fox and stayed in 
open opposition after 1793. For them these were 
desperate years. 
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Henry Erskine was now their principal leader, with the Earl of 
Lauderdale in close support. Each year they would gather in 
January to celebrate Fox's birthday and the dining list, 
always obtained by government, gives a fair indication of the 
Edinburgh-based opposition. The list for 1795 names, among 
others, Erskine, Breadalbane, Sir Henry Moncrieff and several 
advocates, including Malcolm Laing, Adam Gillies, Charles Ross, 
Robert Cullen, Bannatyne Macleod and John Morthland. 
238 
That 
for 1796 includes Colonel Norman Macleod MP, and Mansfield, the 
Edinburgh banker. 
239 
Some were regarded by government as the most 
decided republicans in Scotland. "The others must certainly 
have a fellow feeling, when they thus associate with persons of 
that description", concluded the Lord Advocate. 
240 
As a group, 
the advocates were vulnerable to pressure. There is evidence 
that as early as 1792 government began to discriminate against 
the Scots Whigs in legal appointments241 and in the years 1792-1801 
only Cullen and Macleod Bannatyne were to reach the bench, Bannatyne 
in the face of the strongest possible opposition from the Dundases. 
242 
The Whig lawyers found it hard to get business243 and opposition in 
general were denied access to government favours. When George 
Cranstoun, a Whig advocate, devised a stratagem to become an 
assessor for Edinburgh, Lord Advocate Dundas made the most 
244 
strenuous private exertions to stop him. 
Henry Erskine's presiding at a November 1795 meeting in 
Edinburgh to petition against two bills 
before Parliament, provided 
government supporters with a chance 
to deliver what was the most 
brutal blow to the surviving opposition in Scotland in these years. 
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A response to an attack on the King, the Treasonous Practices 
and Seditious Meetings Bills were open to wide interpretation and 
do not seem to have been popular in Scotland. Opposition organized 
a petitioning campaign against them and had some success. 
Government supporters were at pains to discredit this, writing 
of the Glasgow petition "that most unwarrantable means were used 
to procure signatures", while the signatories in Duns were 
derided as the "disaffected & worthless part of the community". 
245 
The petitioning was undoubtedly approved of among the lower orders 
and this seems to have scared off some of the Whigs who might have 
been expected to support it. 
246 
Erskine's support for the petition 
in Edinburgh roused the government supporters to fury247 and eight 
of the most prominent advocates called on their brethren to take 
the unprecedented step of ejecting him from the Deanship of the 
Faculty and to elect Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate, in his stead. 
248 
This was duly done on 12 January 1796.249 George Home's opinion 
of the struggle gives the clearest indication of the bitterness 
of the times: 
"I cannot be sorry for any mortification Harry Erskine 
may be exposed to, he most richly deserves it all, and 
more than he will meet with, ... he will 
find some to 
vote, and he will likewise find dumb supporters who have 
not impudence to give what may be held a publick 
recantation of the seditious principles they 
have 
boasted of with him in private ... Every man who 
is 
not now a declared and determined friend of government, 
is a secret enemy, or from disapointed 
[sic ] ambition 
or some other cause, [is] disposed to give their250 
countenance and protection to those who are... 
". 
For a time after this, party political resistance 
to the 
government party in Scotland weakened. 
United by persecution, however, 
the Scottish Foxites kept together waiting 
better fortune and taking 
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what limited opportunities were presented for harrying govern- 
251 
ment. 
If the political opposition in Scotland was largely neutralised 
in these years, it should not be thought that Dundas's management 
of the government interest encountered no resistance. Certainly 
these were good years for him. His personal interest was greatly 
extended in 1793 when he surprised his friends by marrying Lady 
Jane Hope, sister of the Earl of Hopetoun252, and in 1798 his 
daughter Montagu married George, son of Sir Ralph Abercromby. 
253 
In time, the combined kindred would almost ring the Firth of 
Forth with MPs. 
254 
To his nephew, the Lord Advocate, sitting 
for Midlothian, Dundas would add another, William, who sat for 
the Anstruther Easter burghs from 1794. Added to Dundas's personal 
interest was his power as manager of the alliance of interests that 
he had built to support Pitt, and, increasingly confused with both, 
was his position as head of a Scots Tory party. By 1802, he 
could boast that his influence was not "of a nature to be 
dissolved by the breath of any minister it . 
255 
There was much 
truth in this but while there was an obvious decline in party 
based opposition, there was no halt to essentially local electoral 
squabbles, the resolution of which had ever been the duty of 
government managers in Scotland. In the 
1790s, Dundas was not 
always tactful in this work. In part this must 
have reflected 
the numerous calls on his attention as a cabinet minister 
but it was 
probably also a sign of the extent to which 
he could use the power 
he derived as a British minister to lord it over the 
Scots 
political nation. The 
"Dundassian Domination" was not merely 
208. 
seen as the repression of the lower orders; it also involved 
the continuing activity of Dundas as government manager, 
channelling the electoral activities of the nobles and gentry. 
The sullen resentment at his activities prior to the war persisted 
and this in part explains the continuing latent anti-government 
sentiment noted above. Even a government supporter, Lord Fife 
could be driven to distraction: 
"I wonder the country does not see how much it is in 
their interest to support independency... Mr. D--s 
wants to put down every independent man, and to 256 
anihalate [sic ] that character as much as possible... ". 
The North East was indeed more tranquil in these years than 
it had been, but there were still undercurrents of unrest. In 
early 1793, Dundas hoped to appoint Sir James Grant as Cashier 
of Excise and to place William Grant of Beldornie in his stead as 
MP for Banffshire. This was complicated by the appearance of other 
candidates, including Colonel Patrick Duff of Carnousie, a man not 
well affected to Rundas, 
257 
David McDowall Grant, brother of 
McDowall of Garthland, and Lord Fife's son, Sir James Duff. 
258 
Fife solicited Dundas's support but received a frosty reply 
reminding him of the British peerage granted by government, and 
hinting at his ingratitude. 
259 
This only encouraged Fife to 
contemplate flying in Dundas's face260 and the potential 
for 
a bruising election probably explains why 
Sir James Grant did 
not resign. 
261 
The animosity between Dundas and Fife over this 
262 
business continued for months. 
In 1794, in Morayshire, Dundas's ire was raised 
by Alexander 
Cumming Gordon of Altyre who was encouraged 
by the illness of the 
209. 
sitting member, Lewis Grant, and by rumours of a dissolution, to 
offer himself as a candidate for election. 
263 
He readily 
obtained the support of the Grants264 but while there was no 
question of his loyalty to government, 
265 
Dundas's own wish was 
to forward the cause of Alexander Brodie who had recently allied 
with Lord Fife. 
266 
He was annoyed that Altyre had not consulted 
him before announcing his candidacy and he was alarmed at the 
potential damage to the lattice of alliances he had constructed 
in the North East. Alexander Brodie thought likewise: 
"The solicitude you have shewn to secure the quiet of 
the Northern Districts in particular, and the favours 
you have bestowed for the purposes of conciliation, 
gave you every title to expect that no measures would 
have been adopted here, without your sanction, far less 
without your previous information". 267 
In fact, the anticipated vacancy did not appear268 but 
the atmosphere of a contest dragged on. Perhaps the major concern 
for Dundas was that Altyre had the support of the Grants, Grant of 
Ballindalloch advising Dundas not to support Brodie. 
269 
It was 
a forlorn hope. The Grants were in the weaker position, 
270 
though 
Dundas probably saw them more as a nuisance in their actions than 
as enemies. It certainly did not alter his support 
for them in 
Banffshire. A voting list of mid-1795 suggested Brodie would 
win 
271 
but Altyre was ultimately persuaded to stand down in 
1796 
by Dundas's exerting influence through Sir James 
Grant. 
272 
If Morayshire was in a ferment, Banffshire was 
little better. 
By early 1795, Fife and Dundas were reconciled 
but Sir James 
Grant's resignation to take up his excise office posed problems. 
Numerous freeholders, angry at the perceived attempt 
by Fife and 
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Dundas to foist William Grant on them, had formed the Banffshire 
Association, avowedly to curtail Fife's power. 
273 
They backed 
McDowall Grant at the by-election against Duff of Carnousie, 
who was again standing. 
274 
Fife initially proposed his son, but 
reluctantly fell in behind McDowall, stating to Dundas that "Col[. ] 
Duff professes his intention to oppose you, especially by his 
consequence in the East India House... ". 
275 
Dundas himself took 
no part in the election. 
276 
McDowall Grant was narrowly returned 
but Fife warned that the real motive of the Banffshire Association 
was to oppose Dundas and anybody he supported. 
277 
Dundas in 
fact was resolved to advance William Grant at the general election 
and by October he had the whole-hearted support of Fife, convinced 
that the Association was crumbling. The result was a comfortable 
win for Grant in June 1796.278 
This was the high point of Dundas's relationship with Fife, a 
reconciliation that had much to do with the latter's wish to have 
his British peerage extended to his nephews. In 1797 he complained 
that Pitt ignored his claims279 and in 1800 an attempt to interest 
Dundas in seating James Duff for Banffshire was bluntly rebuffed. 
280 
He persisted in advancing Duff and in May, in response to a further 
letter about his peerage, Rundas harshly advised him that all future 
requests for favours should be directed to Pitt or to the appropriate 
government department. 
281 Within weeks Fife seems to have been 
involved in a canvass against the sitting member for Aberdeenshire, 
282 
Ferguson of Pitfour. Henceforth, his association with Dundas, 
283 
although not with Pitt, was over. 
This caused Dundas little 
concern. By 1800, Fife was 
blind and his influence was much 
1 
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reduced from its former situation. 
284 
The South West of Scotland and its politics bears some 
comparison with the North East in these years. Here the Earl 
of Galloway, continuing his pursuit of a British peerage, remained 
loyal to government and in September 1793 even discussed plans 
to elect Dundas's son Robert for Kirkcudbrightshire. 285 Dundas's 
relationship with Galloway remained smooth until late 1794, when 
Lord Garlies, the Earl's son, without consulting his father, 
supported Wilberforce's call for peace talks. 
286 
Galloway was 
unconnected with this action but he would blame it for Dundas's 
subsequent ill-disposition to him. 
287 
The death in December 1794 of Alexander Stewart, member for 
Kirkcudbrightshire, found Dundas with no engagements. The Lord 
Advocate favoured one candidate, Patrick Heron of Heron and he 
soon had Dundas's support. 
288 
Dundas would later write that he 
289 
took part "contrary to my intention" but he nowhere explained why. 
Galloway supported Thomas Gordon of Balmaghie, while Richard Oswald 
of Auchencruive and Dunbar Douglas, a son of Lord Selkirk, completed 
the field. Heron was able to tap the resentments felt by other 
freeholders against Galloway's influence, but Oswald also drew 
support from this and it was crucial to get him to stand aside. 
290 
Galloway's people obtained the election writ, and so could determine 
the polling day, but Heron, Oswald and Douglas ultimately came to 
an arrangement whereby Heron stood as sole candidate 
for those 
opposed to Galloway. 
291 
This gave him the victory in March, and 
the independent freeholders were exultant: 
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"... we compleatly [sic ] defeated the Galloway & Broughton 
or opposition interest ... which was the object you [Dundas] 
wished. I trust the independent gentlemen now fairly 
emancipated from a tedious thraldom will be able to 
preserve their independence". 292 
On an overview, it is tempting to conclude that Dundas had 
decided to participate in the clipping of Galloway's wings by 
exploiting existing local tensions. 
293 
In May, Galloway, 
declaring friendship to Pitt and Dundas, again pressed for a 
British peerage294 and this objective almost certainly explains 
his tamely swallowing the insult involved in Dundas's support for 
Heron. In March 1796, Galloway again asked for support from 
Dundas for his candidate to oppose Heron's re-election. Dundas 
declined295 and Galloway knuckled under: 
"As I could not have the good fortune, on this occasion, 
to have your support in the Stewartry I gave Mr Heron no 
trouble, ... when you consider, we have been lairds there, 
since the twelve hundred [sic ], you will easily believe, 
I hope to be more fortunate, or at least my family[, ] on 29 a future occasion". 6 
It was an illusory grace. When he finally received his British 
peerage in 1796 his attitude changed and in terms of what he had 
had to endure from Dundas it is hard to blame him. Their 
relationship blew hot and cold297 and in September 1800 when 
Lindas was advised that one of Galloway's sons was to contest 
Kirkcudbright, he sent an unequivocal letter of support for 
Heron's canvass. 
298 
Galloway's support for Pitt would continue, 
but, like Lord Fife, his association with Dundas was over. 
In the years 1795-6 two elections engaged Dundas's attention 
more than any others, those for East 
Lothian and for Angus. Both 
demonstrated aspects of his grip on the electoral system. 
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The East Lothian by-election of November 1795 was caused by the 
appointment of the MP, John Hamilton of Pencaitland to public 
office. 
299 
Dundas had not adequately prepared the ground and 
would later say that he would have preferred to have seen his 
in-law Robert Colt elected to the county. 
300 
He had ignored 
rumours of an intended opposition301 and seems to have been 
genuinely surprised when the Marquis of Tweeddale persuaded Robert 
Baird of Newbyth -a relative oddly enough, both of Dundas and 
Tweeddale - to stand. 
302 
Both Baird and Tweeddale professed 
loyalty to government303 but Dundas's anger at being pre-empted 
in a county where he had a considerable personal interest, was 
made plain to Baird: 
"Perhaps it may be thought that the representation of 
any particular county or borough [sic ] may not be of 
much personal consequence to me; but when one finds 
himself in possession of an interest founded partly on 
private friendship, partly on family connections, partly 
on the gratitude of friends whom he has had it in his power 
to oblige, and partly, I flatter myself, on grounds of a 
still more public nature, he is not fond of allowing it 3 to be frittered away without his own concurrence". 
04 
Tweeddale received a similar scolding305 and Dundas, in order to 
protect his own interest, was precipitated into supporting the candidacy 
of Captain Hew Hamilton Dalrymple of North Berwick who had long 
306 
coveted the seat. 
Not all the aspects of the dispute are clear. Dundas saw it 
as the protection of his personal interest 
by means of the influence 
he could utilise as manager for Scotland. 
Tweeddale was quite 
open in saying he wished to reassert 
his family interest. 
307 
Although there is no clear evidence, it is possible that Tweeddale, 
as one of the Portlandites who 
had come over to government, was 
214. 
trying to assert a claim to a share of local power within the 
new arrangement of Scottish politics. If so, his awakening was 
rude. 
308 
The motives of others are a little clearer, and Dundas 
was driven to fury by the support Baird enjoyed from George 
Buchan-Hepburn. An advocate, a fellow student and friend of 
Dundas, he had been angling for a judgeship for years and Dundas 
hinted at dark motives in his conduct. 
309 
Both sides canvassed through the Summer 
310 
and by late June, 
Dalrymple was confident enough to reject a compromise proposed 
by Baird. 
311 
By then, Dundas probably had his own plans, which 
involved the seat for the Lauder Burghs, already promised to the 
Dalrymples through a quite separate pact with the Lauderdale 
family. 
312 
By September, he was negotiating with Lord Elcho 
for his influence in the Burghs313 and Robert Dundas met Tweeddale 
and Buchan-Hepburn to offer a compromise: Dalrymple would sit for 
the county with the support of Baird and friends, Baird would sit 
for the Burghs, with the support of Dalrymple and Dundas. 
314 
After 
some debate, the deal was agreed on 30 September. 
315 
Dundas 
wrote a conciliatory letter to Tweeddale, tactfully referring 
to their "misunderstanding" and approving the settlement. 
316 
Buchan-Hepburn was also mightily relieved and rejoiced to Robert 
Dundas "that we are all one man[ ]s bairns again 11 
317 
Dundas 
noted "that if he had formed a conspiracy, 
he has speedily 
repented of it"318 but local gossip was 
less kind about him. 
319 
If the confusion in East Lothian was partly due to Dundas's 
mishandling, the same cannot 
be said for the struggle for Angus in 
1795-6, a contest that demonstrated 
both the limits of the truce 
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between the Scots Pittites and their former enemies, and the 
limits of government power in local elections. 
320 
The member in 
1795 was David Scott of Dunninald, the India Company director and 
a close ally of Dundas. 
321 
Mainly London-resident, Scott dealt 
with the county through Sir David Carnegie, formerly an opponent, 
but more recently an adherent of government. Tension existed 
between the two, however, and by December 1793 they were no 
longer friends. 
322 
Scott, who should have been on his guard, 
continued to entrust his local political business to Carnegie, 
believing that he could derive protection from the latter's wish 
to stay in Dundas's good graces. 
323 
At the same time he did nothing 
to antagonise him, bending backwards to accommodate Carnegie's 
wishes in an exceedingly difficult and embarrassing church 
presentation dispute of early 1794.324 In the light of this, it 
is easy to understand Scott's anger and surprise on learning in 
mid-1795 that Carnegie was canvassing the county against him. 
Dundas threw all his support into Scott's scales325 but Scott 
quickly found that Carnegie had already secured a majority of 
the voters. Some had gone with Carnegie believing that 
he stood 
with Scott's approval, others were dissatisfied with 
the 
administration of county affairs and yet others 
deserted Scott 
"in a manner too infamous to describe", 
despite past obligations. 
326 
The organising and choosing of officers 
for the Angus Fencibles 
327 
had caused anger among the 
freeholders and it was in vain that 
Scott protested that it was his opponents, when acting 
as his local 
328 
agents, who had organised the regiment. 
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Scott had undoubtedly mishandled his political concerns 
in the county but his plight cannot be blamed entirely on mis- 
management. A friend, Lord Douglas, wrote of Scott's being 
"tricked" and of lies against him, 
329 
while it is equally clear 
that he was abandoned by several who owed him better. 
330 
It was 
with justice that he could moan that "Everyone that deserts my 
cause wishes to absolve from all obligation". 
331 
Angus had 
always had a strong group opposed to Dundas and there is little 
doubt that in attacking Scott they were also asserting the county's 
independence of government interference. It was also a "safe" 
protest, since Carnegie was himself a government supporter. 
332 
Dundas was enraged and would later write that "The pictures of 
ingratitude which that county has exhibited are not to be 
pa ralled [sic ], even in all my political experience. 
333 
The counter-attack against Carnegie waxed and waned. Neither 
as an individual nor as government manager did Dundas have much 
influence in the county but he did make limited inroads on 
Carnegie's support. 
334 
In late August, Lord Douglas was optimistic 
of Scott's success335 but Scott was less so and his mind was turning 
to an unusual stratagem. Soundings had convinced him that many 
declared for Carnegie were embarrassed at the deceptions he had 
practised on them. If Scott resigned immediately, causing a 
by-election, some who would vote for Carnegie, having fulfilled 
their promises, would support Scott at a later general election. 
336 
By late September, the Advocate thought it his only hope and 
337 
subsequent canvassing seemed to confirm this. 
Early in the 
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New Year he resigned his seat. In fact the April by-election 
returned William Maule. Carnegie did not stand, having divined 
Scott's plan and by this device retained the promises of support 
given earlier. He took full advantage of them at the general 
election in July, which Scott, with little chance of winning, 
did not contest. 
338 
Carnegie supported government "from 
principle & conviction"339 but Dundas could never forgive him 
the trouble and humiliation he had caused. 
340 
Angus had been left 
in turmoil341 but the damage spread further. In order to keep 
Scott in parliament, Dundas arranged for him to be elected for the 
Perth Burghs in April 1796, within days of his resigning the Angus 
seat. 
342 
The sitting member for the Burghs was Admiral George 
Murray, brother to the Duke of Atholl. Atholl's concern in the 
towns had already waned 
343 
and government itself had acquired a 
considerable influence in Cupar. 
344 
This was supposedly to be 
used by Dundas to help the Earl of Breadalbane elect General 
Alexander Campbell of Monzie345 but by November 1795 Dundas 
knew privately that the Burghs inclined to offer their seat to Scott, 
whose powers of patronage were well known. 
346 
Campbell went abroad 
in early 1796, confident of Dundas's support, 
but he had no sooner 
gone than Dundas played a hidden card. 
Admiral Murray had given him 
a letter of resignation to be used as 
he saw fit 
347 
and Dundas now 
published this, vacating the seat. 
Scott promptly declared his 
candidacy and, dispensing much 
largesse, easily won the by-election. 
348 
349 
Atholl, uninformed of Dundas's intentions, was 
furious. Breadalbane 
was also angry and decided to press 
Campbell's candidacy at the general 
election. It is hard to excuse 
Dundas's conduct. He could see 
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Campbell was likely to lose in any struggle with Scott350 but 
his desire to return his friend led him into actions that 
were at best insensitive, at worst ruthless. This was a 
domineering manager in action and it is hard not to sympathise 
with Atholl who had to add this bruise to the browbeating given 
to him by Dundas over the Perthshire election of 1794.351 
Fortunately for government, he suffered in silence. 
The general election of 1796 set the seal to the developments 
in Scottish politics of the three previous years. Dundas had 
promised his London allies to try and bring South a unanimous 
support for Pitt352 and to Lord Hobart he gave an extraordinary 
insight into his objectives: 
"... it appeared to me, upon a full review of the subject, 
that if I came to Scotland and exerted myself throughly [sic 
I might be able to prevent the return of any one member for 
Scotland, hostile to Government. The thing has never 
happened since the Union, and the temptation was strong to 
make the experiment. I am of course very busy, and it is 
my opinion, at present, that the whole 45 commoners, and the 
whole 16 peers will be warmly in support of the persons and 
principles of the present administration". 
353 
We have discussed the peerage election above, and the commons 
elections were held in the same atmosphere of co-operation from the 
Portlandites and of suspicion towards any opposition to government. 
Dundas reaped the full benefit of this in his managerial role 
354 
and there were only four contests, a striking change from 1790. 
The North East exhibited the same tranquillity as it had done 
in 1790 and the ring of alliances conceived prior to that election 
was not ruptured by recent 
difficulties in Moray and Banffshire, 
355 
In Inverness-shire, the election of Simon Fraser of Lovat, "a 
decided friend to the present administration", removed the detested 
I 
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Norman Macleod. Dundas had materially contributed to this. 
356 
In Angus, he abandoned opposition to Carnegie as a lost cause 
but the Perth Burghs with their contest between two government 
supporters caused him trouble. Dundas tried and failed to press 
compromise on David Scott and it was ultimately the intercession 
of the Earl of Kinnoull, a Portlandite friend to both Dundas and 
Breadalbane, that persuaded the latter to withdraw General 
Campbell's candidacy. 
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There was no contest in Fife, where Dundas had a personal interest, 
but the result was not entirely to his liking. The sitting member, 
Colonel Wemyss, had arranged to stand down in favour of his brother- 
in-law, Sir William Erskine but only later did Dundas give his 
support to this move and initially he did not approve of it. 
Later he would say that it was only "by my favour" that Erskine 
was elected at all. 
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A threatened contest in Clackrnannanshire, 
which boded very ill for Dundas's friend Sir Ralph Abercromby, did 
not materialise. 
359 
In Stirlingshire, Montrose brought forward 
the Portlandite Sir George Keith Elphinstone with Dundas's 
blessing, 
360 
while in the Stirling Burghs Cochrane Johnstone, a 
Hopetoun relative, beat off a strong challenge from the Whig Sir 
John Henderson. 
Dundas had most of his problems in the South. Sir Gilbert Elliot 
wished to stand for Roxburghshire and 
instructed a relative to begin 
canvassing in his absence. Without clear 
information about the local 
dispositions, the Lord Advocate approved this but it soon became 
clear that the Dukes of 
Buccleuch - who disliked Elliot - and 




persuasion of Portland and others ended 
Elliot's candidacy. 
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In Berwickshire, Patrick Home the sitting member had long decided 
to resign and George Home advised Dundas to support Baillie of 
Mellerstain in his stead. Privately, Home was conscious that 
Dundas favoured Sir Alexander Don - an opposition supporter, oddly 
enough - and Don began a canvass in January 1796.364 Dundas in 
fact put his weight behind Baillie who ultimately succeeded. 
There was little or no party political content to what was 
essentially a struggle between local factions . 
365 
In the South West, Dundas had hoped to seat his secretary, 
William Garthshore, in the Dumfries Burghs and it seems that he 
and Queensberry were not on the best of terms. Dundas indeed 
was receiving advice as to how the Duke might be pressured into 
such a deal and he enjoyed the support of the Bushby family who 
had lately fallen out with Queensberry. In the end a deal was 
reached whereby Dundas continued his support for Sir Robert Lawrie 
in Dumfriesshire while the Duke supported Dundas's brother-in-law 
Alexander Hope in the Burghs. 
366 
The retiral of Sir Adam 
Fergusson from his Ayrshire seat caused a contest, again between 
two government supporters. Colonel Hugh Montgomerie, backed by 
Eglinton, had obtained a provisional promise of support from 
Dundas in November 1795. Unfortunately Colonel William Fullarton 
had also gained the impression that he might expect government 
countenance and he took the field. 
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The resulting struggle 
was in many ways a reflection of older Ayrshire rivalries, with 
Cassillis - currently a government supporter - backing 
Fullarton and the latter asserting that Dundas took no concern 
in the contest. 
368 
After some anxiety for the Lord Advocate, 





Overall, Dundas could be well pleased with the elections 
and the most recent assessment of them has concluded that all but 
two of the MPs could be reckoned government supporters. 
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In 
fact one of them, Sir James St Clair Erskine, was abroad until 
1799, and however Dundas might view Sir David Carnegie, he claimed 
to be a government supporter. The passage of time resolved 
two problems. The death of Eglinton later in 1796 and the 
succession of Colonel Montgomerie vacated Ayrshire. Colonel 
Fullarton was seated at the by-election. 
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More embarrassing 
for Dundas was the situation of General Campbell of Monzie, loser 
in the Perth Burghs. He returned from service abroad, furious that 
Dundas's promises to seat him had come to nought. Fortunately 
the elevation of John Anstruther to an Indian judgeship opened the 
Anstruther Easter burghs to him and Dundas put his support behind 
Campbell's return. 
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Almost as soon as the elections were over, the government was 
facing a prolonged crisis, the worst of the war. 
373 
Secure in 
her colonies, Britain had little immediate hope of influencing 
events in Europe. There was every reason to fear the growing 
radical underground in Ireland, as well as the effect on the 
British economy of financing the war. 
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In October, Spain's 
entry to the conflict on the French side presented the serious 
threat of invasion and this would continue well into 1797. In 
February, the Bank of England had to suspend the convertibility 
of its notes in response to the panic caused by a French incursion 
and from April to June a wave of mutinies swept through the navy. 
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In July, a divided Cabinet sent Lord Malmesbury to France to 
attempt peace negotiations and Dundas felt that if honourable 
terms could not be obtained, the Pitt administration should 
retire. Both Pitt and Dundas were in any case at loggerheads 
with Grenville. They expected that he might split with them 
and outline plans were laid for Dundas to be raised to the 
House of Lords to lead the government party there, should the 
need arise. 
375 
In fact the peace negotiations proved abortive 
and the government soldiered on. Its internal disputes, and the 
differences between Dundas and Grenville, would be a continuing 
theme. 
In this desperate year there were several contradictory 
streams in Scots politics. A banking crisis, similar to that 
in England, precipitated by the revelation of the Midlothian 
Lieutenancy's preparations to counter invasion, led the Scottish 
banks to suspend specie payments. 
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Nonetheless, the ruling 
class held its nerve and remained largely loyal to Pitt. In 
March, the Foxite opposition had organized a petitioning campaign 
calling for the dismissal of Pitt as a first step to opening peace 
negotiations. This seems to have been popular among the lower orders377 
but the government fought back and the Advocate, Buccleuch and Charles 
Hope helped organize counter-petitions from the counties, burghs 
and other bodies in Scotland. They had much success. 
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There 
were also the first signs that the lower orders might be turning 
to support the war. The invasion scare had led government to 
encourage a new wave of volunteer recruiting and this led to a 
fundamental change in the social composition of the force. The 
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war, if not truly popular, was now seen as a struggle against 
French despotism, and the idea of serving became more widely 
acceptable. 
379 
By August 1800, Scotland had a nominal establish- 
ment of 32,208 infantry and cavalry volunteers, although in 
practice the real force at any one time was about 20,000.380 
This situation was not universally welcomed: 
"The Royal Edinburgh Volunteers were an armed 
aristocracy, who have done infinite service to the 
country: the corps now forming in all the Boroughs 
[sic 1, are a promiscuous armed democracy. From 
what I see and hear, I am convinced they have a 
jacobinical tendency, and may, when this temporary 
alarm is over, be attended with very serious 
consequences". 381 
As a force to combat invasion, the volunteers had very serious 
shortcomings. They were commonly tied to a particular locality 
by their terms of service and their lack of thorough training 
raised serious doubts about their military usefulness. Added 
to this was the more general problem of recruiting in Scotland. 
Four years of war had drained the country of men willing to serve 
in fencible and regular units. 
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After a brief but serious 
flirtation with the extraordinary plan of Captain E. MacPherson to 
raise a series of units based on the highland clans and led by 
their chiefs, 
383 
government attempted to raise a home defence force 
by compulsion. It led to one of the worst shocks of the period 
for the Scottish elite. 
In November 1796, Dundas had been sympathetic to a call by the 
Duke of Montrose for the formation of a Scottish militia384 but 
the matter had stood over until the New year, when Buccleuch, the 
Lord Advocate, Lord Adam Gordon (the Commander-in-Chief in Scotland) 
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and several others met to discuss national defence. They felt 
that an English-style militia would be objectionable to the 
Scottish lower orders and would take too long to establish. 
Instead it was resolved to encourage the volunteers, with 
the startling results noted above. 
385 
Over the next few weeks, 
several considerations operated on Dundas. Some of the 
Scots gentry favoured a militia as did some county meetings. 
So, initially, did the Lord Advocate. 
386 
Buccleuch, on the other 
hand, while not absolutely opposed, was aware that the landowners 
would not wish to be bothered with organising a militia, and he 
feared agitating the lower orders. 
inadequacies of the volunteers. 
387 
But even he admitted the 
This last point was the core 
of a memorandum sent by Dundas to the Advocate on 7 March, discussing 
the defence of Scotland. Persuaded by a "multitude of letters" 
from Scotland that many gentlemen now wished a militia, he looked 
to a force of 10-12,000 men, aged between 20 and 30, chosen by 
ballot. This would be deployed on the coast to repel invasion, 
while the volunteers would be left to keep internal order. 
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This memorandum was considered by Lord Adam Gordon and others 
on 24 March at a meeting where Dundas was represented by his son 
and the Advocate. Both were friendly to a militia, both were 
"considerably staggered" by the meeting. 
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Those present approved 
several of Dundas's ideas, but rejected the notion of a militia 
meantime. The lower ranks had "a rooted dislike" to compulsory 
service and it might "excite commotions". This in itself would be 
a distraction to the national defence and might encourage an enemy 
attack. Nor would it be easy to find the required officers and men. 
390 
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As a prediction it was astonishingly accurate but government had 
already made its mind up. Within days the acceptance of certain 
volunteer corps was suspended, an obvious first step to establishing 
a militia. 
391 
The Advocate drafted a militia bill in April, 
and while in May he feared opposition, it passed into law in 
July. 
392 
The act aimed at a force of 6000 men, aged 19 to 23, 
to be chosen by ballot from lists produced by parish schoolteachers. 
393 
Even then the debate continued, with Colonel Dirom detailing 
objections to the measure in a pamphlet and in correspondence 
with Dundas. 
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The first attempts to operate the act were every bit as 
unpopular as Dirom and others had warned. 
395 
There was a general 
dislike of compulsory military service, and a fear that the militia 
might, like the fencibles of the mid-century, be sent overseas. 
narrow age group ballotted automatically raised the chances of an 
individual's being chosen, and since most chosen would opt to pay 
a substitute, the act was in effect seen as a tax on them. 
396 
The resentment caused led to a series of riots in August 
and September at the parish meetings called to compile lists of 
The 
men for the ballot. Local volunteers and the military frequently 
had to intervene to restore order, and at Tranent on 29 August 
an English cavalry unit ran amok, slaughtering twelve people, 
part of a large mob protesting at attempts to commence the act. 
Faced with this extraordinary and frightening resistance, some 
elements of the ruling class panicked, calling for the act's 
suspension. 
397 
The government and key individuals kept their 
nerves, however, and their motive was bluntly described by 
McDowall of Garthland: 
.I 
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"From the temper & dispositions of many of the inhabitants 
scattered over Scotland I consider any concession[, ] however 
trifling[, ] as a death blow to our existence". 398 
This fear of social collapse stiffened the government resolve, for 
having got into the mess, there was no way back. 
399 
Gradually 
government gained the upper hand, partly by a process of delay to 
let people understand the act, partly by a process of progressive 
implementation. 
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By late September, the riots were over and 
government could survey the wreckage. George Home was convinced 
that trouble would recur: "we have scotched the snake[, ] we have 
not killed him". 
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Ministry were sure that the radicals were 
at the root of the unrest, but while individual radicals were 
involved, there is no evidence of a general plot. 
402 
George 
Buchan-Hepburn nonetheless trumpeted the justification for the 
Tranent massacre: "In short, we have great reason to thank God, 
all is now quiet, but our situation was, for some days critical, 
& the fate of Scotland hung upon our measures... ". 
403 
The full provisions of the act were put into effect by 
mid-1798 and the force ultimately had a strength of ten 
battalions. 
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In practice they were rarely up to strength. 
Service was massively unpopular and it was found very difficult 
to complete the units. 
405 
Nor did it prove easy to find officers. 
406 
It is difficult to argue that the militia was worth the effort put 
into it. Popular resentment was aroused and continued407 and the 
contribution to national defence was marginal. The upheaval was 
largely attributable to Dundas, who ignored the predictions of 
the experts, preferring instead the advice of such as agreed with 
his own preconceived ideas. 
408 
Aside from the dead of Tranent, the 
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other major casualty was Lord Adam Gordon, whose reputation 
never recovered from the panic into which the upheavals threw him. 
He resigned in 1798.409 
The perception that the Scottish radicals were again active 
was one of the more unpleasant shocks for government. Largely 
beaten underground, they had a small presence at the riots, where 
a new grouping, the United Scotsmen, was clearly identified. 
Government had closely watched attempts by the London radicals 
to rekindle the Scots movement410 and in late 1797, they arrested 
several officials of the United Scotsmen, obtaining convictions 
and sentences of transportation early in 1798. A mysterious 
organization, modelled on the Irish societies, it has left little 
evidence behind. Historians are agreed that they were few in 
number but are less unanimous about their significance. 
411 
In a 
sense the debate is irrelevant. They were revolutionary in intent 
and willing to co-operate with a French invasion. This was enough 
for government to be worried by an organisation that it so signally 
failed to penetrate. 
412 
The landed classes were again on their 
guard: 
"... there is a considerable portion of the common people 
not to be depended on: Some occasion has been given, & 
much advantage has been taken of it, & much pains bestowed, 
to break their attachment to their betters, & to withdraw 
them from that influence and subordination on which good 
government depends. My great consolation is that few if 
any men of great property and established influence are on 
the revolutionary side of the question: that its success must 
depend upon the exertions of France... ", 413 
In October 1797, Duncan's victory at Camperdown lifted some of 
the gloom but it was not clear until well into 1798 that France had 
228. 
abandoned her invasion plans. 
turned to his war finances. 
At the end of 1797, Pitt again 
The assessed taxes were sharply 
increased, annoying even his followers414 and to these demands were 
added the request for voluntary contributions from the better off, 
to help pay for the war. Dundas credited Buccleuch with the 
notion 
415 
and it was a success from several viewpoints. A 
considerable sum was raised but donations also came from the lower 
orders who contributed their mite. 
416 
This was considered of 
great significance and some saw it as another sign that at last 
the people were coming to approve government's measures and were 
pledging to uphold the constitution. 
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Overall, the confidence of the Scottish ruling classes survived 
the shocks of 1797 and by May 1798 there were clear signs of 
optimism about the future. 
418 
The secession of the Foxites 
from parliament in Summer 1797 meant that for the next three years 
there was little serious parliamentary opposition to Pitt, and this 
undoubtedly made life easier for government. 
Furber has written of Dundas that "signs of serious weakness 
in his political machine began to appear as early as 1797... 11.419 
In fact, the assertion is almost groundless and two main buttresses 
of the Pitt government's influence in Scotland - fear of insurrection from 
within, and of invasion from without - remained. Nor was there 
any great change in the nature of the problems facing Dundas's 
management of Scotland. The death of the 8th Duke of Hamilton 
in 1799 and the succession of the Whig 9th Duke, cost government a 
major support but the difficulties that Dundas had with the Earls of 
Fife and Galloway, described above, were of little importance. 
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Whatever their opinion of Dundas, their support for the King's 
government would continue. 
The crisis of early 1797 had some effect on Scottish parliamentary 
politics. Sir John Sinclair, sitting for an English seat, joined a 
fellow exile, Sir William Pulteney, to criticize government's 
handling of the bank crisis in February. This led to their 
involvement on 9 March with 28 other MPs in an attempt to form a 
'Third Party'. Their demands were for peace and retrenchment, 
while opposing Fox's calls for the repeal of the Treason and 
Sedition acts, but this independency quickly became outright 
opposition. 
420 
As a group, they troubled government little, who 
blamed Sinclair's conduct upon pique at being refused a peerage or 
a privy councillorship. By the end of the year, the Dundases were 
finished with him and Pitt removed him from the Presidency of the 
Board of Agriculture. 
421 
Alexander Allardyce had some passing 
association with the Third Party but he did not join it. 
422 
Similarly, Colonel William Fullarton seems to have been approached. 
He would later detail his record of supporting government and this 
included a careful avoidance of Sinclair and Pulteney's orbit. By 
1799, he was weary of government's repeated failure to give him 
military employment and permanent rank, and he wished to clarify 
rumours that Dundas intended an opposition to him in Ayrshire. 
423 
His fears were groundless. 
More straightforward were the problems posed to Dundas by Hew 
Hamilton Dalrymple, member for East Lothian. In May 1797, Dindas 
was aware that his loyalty was doubtful and that he was demanding 
a peerage for his family. Dalrymple wrote several letters showing 
that his continued support would depend on such a favour. Dundas 
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simply ignored them and an alarmed Dalrymple sought an interview. 
They met in July, when Dundas apparently settled the discontent 
by agreeing to help the family to an Irish peerage, 
424 
Of the by-elections between 1796 and 1802, only one was 
contested, that for the Stirling Burghs in 1800, caused by the 
death of William Tait, a close friend of Dundas. It was won 
by the Hon. Alexander Cochrane, another friend of Dundas, but 
only after a hard contest with Sir John Henderson who stood as a 
government opponent. The Stirling Burghs were confirming their 
reputation as the most corrupt and unmanageable in Scotland. 
425 
The Kincardineshire election of June 1797 had given Dundas 
some little trouble. Three candidates, Sir John Belsches Stuart, 
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Garden and Francis Russell, all stood 
for the vacancy caused by Barclay of Ury's death. The first 
two were friends to government and Dundas favoured Stuart. 
Russell, with the support of Maule of Panmure and Sir David 
Carnegie, was suspected of opposition tendencies, and he inad- 
vertently gained the support of David Scott. This put Stuart's 
election in jeopardy. 
426 
The issue of the election writ from 
London was mysteriously delayed, giving time to secure his 
position. On 19 May, Garden withdrew, making Stuart's election 
certain and Russell did not carry his opposition to a poll. 
427 
The campaign had probably caused Dundas more irritation than worry. 
Perhaps only one Scottish incident alarmed Dundas after 1797, 
the strange case of Thomas Smith. An Edinburgh baillie, he published 
a pamphlet in 1799 showing that the City was bankrupt. He was 




Recent writing has belittled the matter 
429 
but it 
caused much controversy. Smith denied plotting against Dundas 
but contemporaries were less sure. Even now it is hard to 
penetrate the gloom. The city had been governed for most of the 
1790s by two parties led by Thomas Elder and Sir James Stirling, 
who took power turn and turn about at council elections every two 
years. By 1798, the old alliance seems to have ruptured. 
Stirling's retiral was apparently expected in 1796430 but he 
again tried for the provostship in 1798. In the resulting 
contest he and one of his supporters, Thomas Smith, were 
accused of hostility to Dundas, something they denied. 
431 
Stirling seems to have been trying to extend his personal grip 
on the council to "bring in a very improper set", and the struggle 
stretched into church patronage and revenue appointments in the 
city. Dundas was bluntly warned by allies that it was part of 
432 
a wider plot to destroy his power in the city and the county. 
Smith himself was said to aim at putting himself forward as MP 
for the city with the distiller, John Stein of Kilbagie, as 
Provost. Perhaps this was far-fetched but the Stein/Smith 
connection was real enough. 
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By Autumn 1799, the crisis had 
arrived. In September, the Council split over the election of 
a convener and in the strange absence of any communication from 
Stirling, Charles Hope, William Dundas and the Lord Advocate decided 
to intervene. This caused resentment but it was effective and the 
Council was secured to the friends of Dundas and of government. 
434 
Stirling's provostship came to an end in October 1800 and he never 
again ruled the city. The Advocate distrusted him, although 
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Dundas subsequently gave him favours. 
435 
The full purpose of his 
intrigues was never clear and cannot now be divined from Dundas's 
papers. Smith's dismissal also allowed the continuing concealment 
of the burgh's financial crisis. 
By late 1799, there were more pressing matters to occupy 
government, most particularly the serious shortage of grain. 
436 
In Edinburgh oat prices rose to 37/- per boll and in February 
1800, the Advocate reckoned the Scottish crop to be between 1/3 
and 1/2 deficient. 
437 
The situation persisted well into 1800 
and renewed in intensity at the end of the year. It was only 
the good luck of the ruling classes that the discontent caused by 
this was not exploited by the radicals. 
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Worse was to come. 
Dundas had taken full advantage of the particular political 
conditions created by the war to extend and consolidate the power 
of the government party in Scotland. There was little reason to 
fear that anything would shake this grip. By late 1800, the 
radicals were largely neutralised, although this was not yet 
widely perceived. The common people, if grudgingly, now 
acquiesced in the war. Overall, it was a considerable achieve- 
ment. All Dundas' s activities as a war minister had brought the 
defeat of France no nearer, however. Britain was safe behind 
her navy and had acquired numerous colonies but by late 1800 
she could only contemplate a history of failure in her attempts 
to influence the war in Europe. Ministers were deeply divided 
between Grenville and Windham, who argued for a continental 
campaign and those with Dundas who pursued a policy of clipping 
off French colonies. Dundas himself was near the end of his 
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tether, physically and mentally drained, the victim of successive 
illnesses. He had tried to resign three times, in February 1798, 
November 1799 and April 1800. On each occasion, Pitt dissuaded 
him. 
439 
In September 1800, he even differed with Pitt over the 
offer of a naval armistice to France. So disgusted was he, that he 
considered retreating to Scotland. 
440 
The Egyptian expedition, planned 
at the end of 1800, promised success only over the horizon. It was 
but too apparent to a tired Cabinet and a weary country, that after 
eight years this was stalemate, a war without victory. 
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Whig. "I have in the first place", wrote Dundas, "no 
inclination that Dugald Stewart should succeed in any one 
single application which he ever makes; and on the contrary 
will on both public & private grounds uniformly thwart him if 
I can". 
245. SRO, Melville, GD51/5/21/5, James Sym to Robert Sym WS, 27 
November 1795; ibid, GD51/5/20, Rev, Robert Bowmaker, Duns 
to Dundas, 23 November 1795. 
246. NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 78-80, Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate 
to Henry Dundas, 27 November 1795. At this point, the Advocate 
was not certain that the Edinburgh Whigs would be able to 
organise a protest against the bills: "Without exception 
the leaders of all the clamour here, are those who are 
notorious for democracy. Harry Erskine and [Ferguson of] 
Raith excepted: neither of whom it is easy to say, of what 
principles they are, if they have any. To do justice to 
Bannatyne MacLeod, & those few others who were opposition 
people, they have not interfered in this business, & by my 
information have resisted all solicitations of the kind". 
247. Duke University, Melville papers, Lord Fife to Dundas, 7 
December 1795: "... on coming here [Edinburgh] I find the 
Dean of Faculty has outdone himself... ". Fife promptly 
ceased to employ Erskine and Charles Hay, another Whig, as 
his lawyers and advised his friends and relatives to join 
in the attack on Erskine's Deanship. 
248. Fergusson, Henry Erskine, 544-51, prints the various addresses to 
the Faculty of Advocates. Some of them can also be seen in NLS, 
Melville, Ms 351, ff. 17-18. The Deanship was an annually elected 
office and perhaps it was Erskine's bad luck that the election fell 
so close to the meeting. Tempers were given no time to cool. The 
°°---ecedented, because re-election was normally automatic 
p 
256. 
249. There are accounts of the run-up to the election in 
Fergusson, Henry Erskine, pp. 354-65 and Cockburn, 
Memorials, pp. 92-4. 
250. NLS, Melville, Ms 1053, ff. 63-4, George Home to [Dundas], 
11 December 1795. Dundas's own verdict on the incident, in 
which he talks of Erskine's factious use of the office, can be seen in DCRO, Sidmouth papers, 152M, C1801, OZ 17, Dundas 
to Addington, 4 May 1801. The dismissal caused little or 
no stir in England: BL, Huskisson, Add Mss 38734, ff. 169-70, 
Huskisson to [William] Hayley, 5 March 1796 (? copy). 
251. The struggles of the remnant of the Scots Foxites at this 
time became one of the central pillars of the history of 
the party that was eventually to triumph in 1832, and it is 
well told in Cockburn's Memorials. Cockburn was himself 
a nephew of Dundas and the latter, in discussing a plan to 
offer Cockburn a sheriffship in 1811, gives some hint of the 
way in which he found it difficult to comprehend the loyalty 
to each other felt by the Whigs; "It would be very desirable 
to bring Henry Cockburn out of his present connexion [sic ][. ] 
Nobody can give me a reason either how it began or why it 
continues, for every body tells me that his own way of thinking 
on every important subject is very different from theirs. 
Would there not be much good, if there is a vacancy of the 
Sheriffship of East Lothian to appoint him to that situation, 
and to offer it without any praevious [sic ] communication[? ] 
If he should be so ill advised from any false party honour 
to decline it[, ] no harm would be done, but good[, ] as it would 
prove to everybody that it was not the fault of government if 
such party nonsense was kept up in the Faculty": NLS, Melville, 
Ms 9, ff. 113-6, Melville to Robert S. Dundas, 24 May [1811]. 
252. SRO, Home of Wedderburn, GD267/l/17/2, George Home to Patrick 
Home, 20 February 1793: "Mr Dundas ... is engaged in a private 
business of his own ... and in my apprehension a foolish one 
beyond what I could have believed him guilty of, a marriage 
with a sister of Lord Hopeton's [sic 1, not but the young 
lady is very handsome and very deserving, but all his best 
friends I am sure will join me in opinion that he has no business 
with a wife". Perhaps Home was right, for there is some evidence 
in later years that the couple were not happy together: Matheson, 
Dundas, p. 322. 
253. Matheson, Dundas, p. 261. 
254. In the Parliament of 1796-1802, the Abercrombys held Clackmannan- 
shire. The Hopetoun family had relatives sitting for the 
Stirling Burghs, West Lothian, and East Lothian. In 1802 they 
would, with Dundas's help, make the strongest challenge for 
the representation of Fife. 




256. Taylers, Fife and His Factor, p. 252. The quote is well 
known and much used. The gross hypocrisy of Fife, a man 
who used nominal votes to force his will on several Northern 
counties, should not be overlooked. Nonetheless, other men 
could have said the same, with more justification. 
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Mss, Div. II, 500 
to William Grant, 
was an East India Company officer and a 
was slighted by Dundas's failure to resolve 
ing his rank. See Duke University, Melville 
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259. Taylers, Fife and His Factor, p. 245, Fife to Dundas, 9 May 
1793; SRO, Melville, GD51/1/198/4/1, Fife to Dundas, 27 June 
1793, Dundas to Fife, 6 July 1793 (copy). 
260. Taylers, Fife and His Factor, pp. 246-7. 
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EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500 [General] James Grant [of Ballin- 
dalloch] to William Grant, 28 June 1793 and also ibid, A. 
Pearson to Robert Graham of Fintry, 17 May 1793, where the 
arrangement is detailed. 
262. Taylers, Fife and His Factor, p. 252, alludes to Fife's 
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263. SRO, Bonar, MacKenzie and Kermack, GD235/9/l/55, Henry 
Mackenzie to Dundas, 4 November 1794, details some of 
Altyre's thinking. 
264. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/17/1, Henry Mackenzie to [Dundas], 
11 October 1794. 
265. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/17/2, Henry Mackenzie to Dundas, 
26 October 1794. 
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ungracious & unpopular one", see NLS, Melville, Ms 1053, 
ff. 48-9, Henry Mackenzie to [? Dundas], 21 November 1794. 
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GD51/l/198/17/5, Alexander Brodie to Dundas, 7 November 
1794. 
267. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/17/5,10, letters of Alexander 
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is from the second letter. 
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also Duke University, Melville papers, letters of Fife to 
Dundas, 18 March and 22 June 1796. 
280. SRO, Melville, GD51/1/198/4/10, [] Duff to Dundas, 4 March 
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283. KCRO, Stanhope papers, U1590, S5/06/28, Fife to Pitt, 28 July 
1803. This letter makes it clear that however much he resented 
Dundas, Fife still remained attached to Pitt. At this period, 
Pitt was out of office. 
284. Some of the points concerning Fife's loss of influence are 
mentioned in chapter two. In 1800, he had only six votes 
in Aberdeenshire: NLS, Melville, Ms 5, ff. 135-6, State of 
Aberdeenshire Roll, July 1800. In Morayshire, in 1802, he 
was "disliked & despised" and had twelve votes, "his own 
menials & dependents": NLS, Melville, Ms 1053, ff. 102-3, A. 
Cumming Gordon of Altyre to Robert Dundas, Lord Chief Baron, 
10 August [1802]. By 1806, Fife had also lost the services 
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Patrick, op. cit, p. 156. 
285. NLS, Melville, Ms 1053, ff. 23-4, John Bushby to [Dundas], 14 
September 1793. 
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287. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/31, Galloway to Rundas, 2 May 1795. In 
this letter, Galloway reviews the events of the previous six 
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288. NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 1-2, Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate 
to Henry Dundas, 3 January 1795; ibid, ff. 13-14, Patrick 
Heron to Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate, 15 January 1795. 
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289. SRO, Melville, GD51/1/198/14/9, Dundas to Galloway, 31 March 
1796 (copy). 
290. NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 13-14, Heron to Robert Dundas, Lord 
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Melville, GD51/l/198/8/1, William McDowall, MP to [Dundas], 
5 October 1795. 
292. SRO, Melville, GD51/6/198, William Copland to Dundas, 5 May 1795. 
260. 
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I shall regret exceedingly[, ] more from the idea of not 
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". 
NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 13-14, Heron to Robert Dundas, 
Lord Advocate, 15 January 1795. 
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support; see also SRO, Melville, GD51/6/1104/1, Galloway 
to Dundas, 15 August 1795. 
296. SRO, Melville, GD51/1/197/18, Galloway to Dundas, 21 June 
1796. 
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and Dundas: SRO, Melville, GD51/6/1104/2, Galloway to Dundas, 
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in the elections of East India Company directors: SRO, Bonar, 
MacKenzie and Kermack, GD235/16/3/14, Galloway to Dundas, 
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298. NLS, Melville, Ms 8, ff. 135-8, Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate 
to Henry Dundas, 15 September 1800; SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/14/11, 
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to Baird's standing, he had had no candidate in view: NLS, 
Melville, Ms 1, ff. 69-74, Dundas to Tweeddale, 23 April 
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tain H. H. Dalrymple to Dundas, 2 April 1795; ibid, ff. 87-90, James 
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302. For Dundas's expression of surprise, see SRO, Melville, GD51/l/ 
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303. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/9/3, Tweeddale to Dundas, 26 March 
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304. NLS, Melville, Ms 1, ff. 67-8, Dundas to Baird, 8 April 
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305. NLS, Melville, Ms 1, ff. 69-74, Dundas to Tweeddale, 23 April 
1795 (copy). 
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Dalrymple, differs from that given by Furber, Dundas, pp. 248-57 
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Dundas's letters to the Lord Advocate and to Tweeddale (note 300, 
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307. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/9/5, Tweeddale to Dundas, 15 April 
1795. Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate, was of opinion that part 
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NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 41-2, Robert Dundas to Henry Dundas, 
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309. SRO, Home of Wedderburn, GD267/3/15/4-5, George Home to 
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69-74, Dundas to Tweeddale, 23 April 1795 (copy). 
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September: NLS, Melville, Ms 1, ff. 60-1, Dalrymple to Dundas, 
2 April 1795. Tweeddale was certainly aware of his opponents' 
embarrassment: ibid, ff. 64-5, Tweeddale to Dundas, 3 April 1795. 
For the course of the canvass, see ibid, ff. 79-82, Dalrymple 
to [Dundas], 1 May 1795. 
311. SRO, Melville, GD51/1/198/9/10, R[obert] Colt to Dundas, 29 
June 1795. 
312. SRO, Melville, GD51/1/198/9/9, Dalrymple to Dundas, 15 June 
1795, alludes to a projected compromise under consideration. 
313. For the negotiations with Lord Elcho, see SRO, Melville, 
GD51/1/198/9/11, Elcho to Dundas, 11 September 1795; 
EUL, Laing Mss, Add. 3, Henry Dundas to Robert Dundas, 
Lord Advocate, 21 October 1795; NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 59-60, 
Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate to Henry Dundas, 27 October 1795; 
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SRO, Melville, GD51/9/99, George Buchan-Hepburn to Henry 
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318. EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, Henry Dundas to Robert Dundas, 
Lord Advocate, 3 October 1795. 
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SRO, Home of Wedderburn, GD267/31/75, George Home to Patrick 
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[Captain] H. H. Dalrymple to [Dundas], 16 January 1796. 
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Melville, GD51/l/198/2/6, Dundas to Robert Graham of Fintry, 
[n. d. ], (copy). 
322. SRO, GD51/6/958, Sir D Carnegie to [? Dundas], 16 December 1793. 
323. Duke University, Melville papers, David Scott to [Dundas], 1 
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he, and the powerfull [sic ] train of connexion 
[sic ] which he 
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of Marytown and Farnell and can 
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references: SRO, Melville, GD51/6/958, Carnegie to 
[? Dundas], 
16 December 1793; ibid, GD51/6/968/1-4, correspondence between 
Scott and Carnegie, 15-21 January 1794; Duke University, Melville 
papers, Scott to Dundas, 1 July 
1794; SRO, Melville, GD51/9/53, 
Scott to Dundas, 17 July 1794; ibid, GD51/6/1115, [Scott] to 
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in a letter to Robert Dundas of 23 June 
1795 in EUL, Laing Mss, 
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Mss, Div. II, 500, Robert Graham to Robert Dundas, Lord 
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any other for the period 1792-1801. It can be seen in NLS, Melville, Ms 7; SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/2; EUL, Laing Mss, 
Div. II, 500; and in Scott's papers, many of which were 
printed in C. H. Philips (ed. ), The Correspondence of David Scott Director and Chairman of the East India Company Relating 
to Indian Affairs (Camden Society, 2 vols, London, 1951). 
326. EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, Scott to Robert Dundas, Lord 
Advocate, 7 September 1795. Scott here sets out at length the 
problems that he had found in his canvass of Angus. 
327. Wrote one laird, "I heard some person observe that it was more 
a family than a County Regt": EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, 
Col. Alexander Duncan to Scott, 13 August 1795. There is a 
copy of this letter at SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/2/12. 
328. EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, Scott to Colonel Alexander Duncan, 
9 August 1795 (copy). There is a copy of this letter at SRO, 
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329. SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/2/5, Lord Douglas to [? Dundas], 30 
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Duncan to David Scott, 23 July 1795 and ibid, Alexander 





333. EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, Henry Dundas to Robert Dundas, 
Lord Advocate, 25 September 1795. Scott's failures as a 
local politician, his inability properly to court the 
freeholders and his neglect of the arts of socialising 
are the general themes of Sunter's essay. But by the 
late eighteenth century, while these were all legitimate 
considerations in county politics, nonetheless the venality 
of the electoral system was such that no freeholder would have 
been in serious doubt about why he was receiving "favours" 
from his MP, or what was anticipated in return. Dundas 
wrote of Maule's treachery, "it unhinges all those ties & 
obligations in life, by which one is enabled to support & 
aid one's friends": SRO, Melville, GD51/l/198/2/7, Dundas 
to [Lady Dalhousie], 16 July 1795 (copy). 
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Dundas to [Lady Dalhousie], 16 and 21 July 1795 (copies); 
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335. SRO, Melville, GD51/1/198/2/5, Lord Douglas to [? Dundas], 30 
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336. EUL, Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, Scott to Robert Dundas, Lord 
Advocate, 7 September 1795. 
327. NLS, Melville, Ms 7, ff. 33-5,41-2, letters of Robert Dundas, 
Lord Advocate to Henry Dundas, 22 and 29 September 1795; EUL, 
Laing Mss, Div. II, 500, Robert Graham to Robert Dundas, Lord 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE SCOTTISH REVENUE ADMINISTRATION 
At the top of the Scottish revenue administration stood the 
Treasury in London, presided over by the First Lord and four 
commissioners, with a staff of about thirty. Dundas's 
relationship with Pitt, the dominant figure at the Treasury, 
guaranteed his own influence in the disposition of the department's 
favours in Scotland. In day to day business, however, he and 
other politicians would commonly deal with the Chief Secretary, 
George Rose, or with Thomas Steele. The general oversight of 
the clerical work of Scottish business was long entrusted to 
William Mitford, a clerk who was also employed for their own 
business by the Scottish Exchequer Court and by the boards of 
customs and excise in Edinburgh. 
' 
Such an agent was necessary, 
for the Treasury bureaucracy displayed much unthinking carelessness 
in Scottish business. Of a simple appointment in 1807, Melville 
was informed "the warrant has not come ... matters of this kind 
are often delayed at the Treasury if the gentlemen there are not 
reminded". Melville himself deplored "those irksome delays 
which have at all times taken place at the Treasury". 
2 
More 
seriously, George Chalmers, an experienced Scottish lobbyist, 
wrote to Dundas in 1790 concerning his attempts to reduce the 
Scottish customs fees: 
"I cannot help at present mentioning to you that 
Scotland and in some degree you personally have been 
ill used by the uncommon delays in this business as 
there seems never any time at the Treasury to consider 
properly of any Scotch affair". 
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For all Dundas's influence, he was never able fully to 
make the Treasury work for Scottish interests, which sometimes had 
to suffer from the wider views that an English-based department 
had to take. This is partly a criticism, for after an initial 
burst of interest as Lord Advocate, he seems latterly to have 
taken comparatively little concern in matters concerning Scottish 
revenue. Only in one topic did he pay close attention, the matter 
of appointments and patronage, and here he probably approved of 
one of the major developments of the period, the extension of the 
Treasury's influence in Scottish revenue appointments. In the 
meantime, the Scottish officials not only had to endure the 
sometimes justified complaints of English observers, they had 
also to try to execute laws passed down that sometimes paid 
little attention to Scottish conditions. "I have frequently 
mentioned to your Lordship", wrote one official to the Chief 
Baron, "that it is difficult to make our Southern neighbours 
comprehend the difference between the local circumstances & ye 
habits of Scotland & of England ". 
4 
If ultimate power resided in the Treasury, it is worth 
observing that the number of Englishmen in Scottish administration 
was apparently less than it had been earlier in the century, when 
a marked Southern presence was almost obligatory. 
5 
The tradition 
of an English chief baron at the court of exchequer was broken in 
1775 with James Montgomery's appointment and in the years after- 
wards the hon. Fletcher Norton, a lawyer, was the only English 
baron. Of the excise commissioners, only Thomas Wharton was from 
the South, while among the customs commissioners, the sole Englishman 
was Richard E. Philips, promoted after years of subordinate service. 
6 
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It is unclear whether the concentration of Scotsmen was due to 
Dundas's influence. Perhaps in part it was a reflection of the 
maturity of the post-Union administration, able to run without close 
English supervision. Certainly the Scottishness of the administration 
was perceived and probably explains the resentment of David Reid and 
others at the appointment of Edward Earl, an Englishman, as a customs 
commissioner in 1807: 
"Whatever some of the conceited members of the London 
Board may have made some of the Treasury believe, I will 
venture to say, that there are Scotch men in the Revenue 
department in North Britain some of whom I named to your 
Lordship superior to any in the revenue in England in 
education, abilities and all the talents and that upon 
a fair trial this would be proved beyond a doubt; I7 
would therefore be sorry to see my countrymen degraded". 
On Pitt's arrival at the Treasury, he was given a booklet 
entitled "The Business done in the Treasury by the officers - 
distinguishing each particular Branch". As a document, it has 
errors and must be used carefully but the description of the 
Scottish administration in 1783 is a useful departure point. 
8 
The principal bodies in Edinburgh supervising the revenue 
were six in number, the Court of Dcchequer, the Stamp Office, 
the Boards of Customs and of Excise, the Tax Office and the Post 
Office. The Forfeited Estates Commissioners would shortly find 
their board abolished and like the Board of Trustees were responsible 
for spending rather than collecting. 
The Court of Exchequer stood at the top, its chief baron and 
four barons enjoying similar social status and salary to the lords 
of session. Between 1784 and 1806, eight men served as barons, 
most of them friends of Dundas. 
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Barons of Exchequer, 1784-1806 
1784: Lord Chief Baron James Montgomery, Barons Cosmo Gordon, 
Fletcher Norton, Sir John Dalrymple, David Stewart Moncrieffe. 
1790: Baron Archibald Cockburn vice Moncrieffe. 
1800: Baron George Buchan-Hepburn vice Gordon. 
1801: Lord Chief Baron Robert Dundas vice Montgomery. 
Chief Baron Montgomery owed his place to Dundas's family influence 
and they remained close, Dundas forwarding one son, James, to the 
post of Solicitor of Exchequer and later to higher office, while 
another, William, was assisted to military promotion. 
9 
Cosmo 
Gordon was brother to the Duke of Gordon's political agent. 
10 
Norton, though English, had a Scottish father-in-law, the excise 
commissioner Balmain, and was well affected to Dundas. Moncrieffe, 
placed in office in 1781 by Dundas and Lord Stormont, took little 
concern in politics. 
11 
Only Sir John Dalrymple was openly hostile 
to Dundas but he was little trusted by the Whigs and like others 
made his peace with government after 1794. Long an enthusiast 
for various economic projects, Dundas described him as "my volatile 
countryman ... He always mixes nonsence 
[sic] of various kinds into 
all his productions, but there [are] some clever ideas interpersed 
12 [sic]". Archibald Cockburn was Dundas's brother-in-law and 
also had the friendship of Buccleuch, 
13 
while George Buchan-Hepburn 
eventually lived down his dubious dealings in East Lothian politics 
to become another ally of Dundas at the Exchequer Court. 
The Court was, reported a memorial of 1807, "in some respects 
more an English than a Scotch court. Its forms of proceeding are 
entirely English. The judges themselves may be all taken from 
the English Bar. One of their number has always been an English 
lawyer". 
14 
Its duties centred on the accounting of the Scottish 
revenue. All the Scottish departments had to render accounts to 
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the barons usually through their respective collector or receiver 
general. 
15 
The barons in turn empowered the payment of the 
Scottish Civil Establishment, the list of individuals entitled 
to money from the Crown. This money was disbursed by the Paymaster 
who drew it from the sums passing through his dual office as 
Receiver General of the land and assessed taxes and from such 
sums as the barons ordered the customs and excise to turn over 
to him. 
16 
The Civil Establishment was itself approved by the 
Treasury every quarter before payments were made and no names could 
be added to the list without Treasury warrant. The Establishment 
listed the officers of the three courts of Exchequer, Session and 
Justiciary, together with all the officers of state, lesser crown 
appointees such as the King's chaplains and university professors, 
and the sheriff deputes. The list also included a considerable 
number of people drawing royal pensions. 
17 
Aside from overseeing 
accounts, the barons had a jurisdiction in revenue cases and were also 
frequently called upon to provide information to the Treasury about 
the administration of the Scottish revenue. Persons who wished 
grants of rights of fishings, of baronies, or of other crown 
rights had first to petition the Treasury, who would turn to the 
barons for a report. If approved, the Treasury would then authorise the 
appropriate grant. 
The Court had a few university bursaries in its gift, together 
with a small fund, the Exchequer Charity Roll, from which tiny grants 
were disbursed to deserving souls. When vacancies occurred, they 
were filled by a ballot among the barons and they were heavily 
18 
engaged in advance. This was almost the only patronage the 
Court had. 
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Historians have pointed to the Court's somnolence and 
one contemporary wrote that 
"their revenue matters are (it is supposed) so 
little burdensome as to leave them in general 
a great deal of spare time on their hands". 19 
In 1809 Chief Baron Dundas more or less admitted this but pointed 
to a recent increase in business. 
20 
The prevalence of sinecures 
in the Court had been noted by the Finance Committee of 1798, to 
whom the barons had opined that no additional checks or regulations 
were needed in the business of the office. 
21 
The work of Principal 
Auditor was done by a deputy and the office, held in 1795 by James 
T. Oswald, was actually made the subject of a rare reversionary 
grant to the Earl of Mansfield's son in return for the father's 
resigning the Justice Generalship. 
22 
Of the King's Remembrancer, 
in effect the Court's secretary, Dundas lamented "so efficient [a] 
situation in the court having been so jobbed about", but he was 
unable to stop it and it was the Deputy who would later be described 
as the barons' "acting officer in all business". 
23 
The Treasurer's 
Remembrancer was in a similar state and Argyll secured the post in 
1788 for Colonel Livingstone, who in turn made provision out of 
it for Archibald Ferrier and for the Chief Baron's son James. 
24 
The Court's work cannot have been demanding. When Moncrieffe 
died in 1790, Dundas noted that two of the barons were not attending 
court, while Baron Gordon was lame and blind for some time before 
his death in 1800.25 
If the Exchequer was laden with sinecures, worse was to be seen 
among the ranks of the receivers general who gathered in the revenue 
before sending it to London. 
26 
There were seven receiverships and 
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three in particular, those for the land tax, the customs and 
the excise, were prize plums. 
27 
That for the land tax had the most 
chequered history. The holder of the full commission received 
the revenues from the assessed taxes, for which he had a poundage 
on sums remitted to London, the Crown estate revenues, for which 
a salary of £650 just sufficed to pay a deputy and clerk, and the 
land tax. He also had any profits from investing the balances 
in his care. 
28 
Inevitably this last raised the possibility of 
accidents. Prior to 1806, eight men held the post. 
Receivers General of the Land and Assessed Taxes. 1766-1806 
1766 John Fordyce of Ayton (full commission). 
1781 Robert Scott Moncrieff (land tax only). 
1783 James Murray of Broughton (full commission). 
1784 hon. Keith Stewart (full commission). 
1795 John and Alexander Gordon (interim appointment). 
1795 John Hamilton of Pencaitland (full commission). 
1805 Alexander MacLean of Ardgour (full commission). 
Fordyce's tenure was disastrous. Initially, he exercised the office 
through a deputy, Innes, and he also paid an annuity to Keith Stewart, 
brother to the Earl of Galloway. 
29 
Two successive failures by 
banks in which Innes and Fordyce had lodged money left the latter 
owing government £56,000, for which he was removed from office. To 
some degree, the removal was mere show. He retained part of the 
commission and his successor, Robert Scott Moncrieff, had latterly 
acted as his deputy when Innes died. Fordyce confidently expected 
a return to office on repaying his debts. 
30 
The Fox-North ministry 
wished otherwise. Probably to avoid offending Fordyce's brother-in-law, 
the Duke of Gordon, they stayed proceedings against him but replaced 
him with Murray of Broughton. 
31 
When Pitt came to office, frantic 
or 
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negotiations began. With Gordon's support, Fordyce escaped 
prosecution and was found another post32 but he could not return 
to his old office, despite his entreaties. Scott-Moncrieff 
solicited re-appointment but wished - apparently unbeknown to 
Fordyce - to resume it without any obligation to his former 
principal. 
33 
In the end, the post was given to Fordyce's 
former pensioner (and Murray's brother-in-law! ) Keith Stewart, 
a Pitt supporter. 
34 
Fordyce's debts remained unpaid for years 
and even in a corrupt age his reputation for greed and intrigue 
made him loathed. His continuing friendship with Dundas did nothing 
for the latter's reputation. 
35 
Keith Stewart was but a marginal 
improvement. He too fell into arrears and for years after his 
death in 1795 government were pressing his sureties for payment. 
John and Alexander Gordon, appointed interim collectors by the 
barons in 1795, contrived in seven months to collect £40,000, half 
of which government was still looking for in 1797.36 Their 
successors, John Hamilton of Pencaitland and Alexander MacLean 
of Ardgour were both related to Dundas by marriage and seem not 
to have incurred any scandal. 
37 
The tales of receivers of the customs and the excise were less 
spectacular. Robert Campbell of Finab, who had obtained the 
Customs Receivership through the Duke of Argyll, paid an annuity to 
Edmonstone of Duntreath. 
38 
His death in 1790 opened the post to 
John, brother to Ilay Campbell, Lord President. Again, the Argyll 
interest was prominent in arranging this and again there were 
concealed annuities siphoned off to others. 
39 
The Receiver (or 
'Cashier') of Excise was Walter Scott of Harden until 1793, when 
his death opened the post for Sir James Grant of Grant. In fact 
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Grant's succession had to be delayed two years, apparently owing 
to the political situation in Banffshire and the office was held 
by Alexander Thomson and Alexander Alison in the meantime. 
40 
Grant would hold the post until his death in 1811 and it was of 
considerable importance to his financial situation. Both the 
receiverships of customs and excise carried salaries but were 
long exercised by deputies. As with the land tax, the real profit 
was in investing the balances in hand. The Select Committees on 
Finance in 1797 and 1798 deplored this and the subsequent pressure 
for faster remittance to London made all three offices less profitable. 
Nonetheless, the holders were compensated and the posts remained 
sought-after. 
41 
Neither the customs nor the excise receiver 
defaulted during the period. 
The revenues accounted for in the Scottish exchequer fell into 
two crude divisions, the revenues of the Crown and the public 
revenues. The Crown revenues ultimately came to the hands of the 
Receiver General from five sources: compositions and seizures of 
prohibited goods; the Hereditary and Temporary Excise; the 'New 
Subsidy' of customs; fines and forfeitures of excise and the 
Crown rents and casualties. 
42 
Some of this was levied by the 
customs and excise staffs, some was collected by the sheriffs. 
The rents of the bishoprics annexed to the Crown came through a Receiver 
General of Bishops' Rents, a post long held by Sir John Anstruther. 
There were other opportunities for patronage and while Hugh 
Warrender was the Chamberlain of the Earldom of Ross, it was well 
known that he surrendered his salary to Christian, sister to Henry 
Dundas. 
43 
The total of the Crown's hereditary revenues was not 
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great and was largely swallowed up in payments towards the 
Civil Establishment. 
The public revenue in 1797 was separated into eight branches: 
excise; customs; stamps; salt; land and assessed taxes; 1/- tax 
on pensions; 6d tax on salaries; and the Post Office. Of these, 
the least productive were the two levies on salaries and pensions. 
The 1/- deduction was made at source by the Paymaster of the Civil 
Establishment, who handed the money over to the lollector of the 
duty. The Collector in 1792 was Lord Balgonie and he later 
reckoned that the salary and poundage from remitting the money 
to London was worth £150 yearly. It was of some importance to 
him. 
46 
The gross receipt for the year ended 5 January 1798 was 
£4136, collected at a cost of £150.45 The 6d duty on salaries 
was levied in exactly the same way and was sent by the Paymaster 
to a Mr. Astle, the General Receiver for Great Britain. Astle had 
no Edinburgh agent and in 1797 the gross receipt was £3477, collected 
at a cost of £85,46 
The stamp administration in Scotland earned a gross receipt in 
1797 of £123,978, collected at a cost of £9311. This arose from 
the sale, by local sub-distributors, of the stamped paper which had 
to be used for newspapers and legal documents and of the stamps 
which had to be fixed to certain goods, including hats and gloves. 
47 
The organization consisted of an Edinburgh office with a Head Distributor 
and Collector, a Solicitor, an Inspector and others presiding over 
sub-distributors in the country. In 1784, there were 21 sub- 
distributors and by 1797 their number had increased to 24, each of 
whom employed several agents to sell the stamps. 
48 
In 1797, the 
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Head Distributor had a salary of £260, with poundages on various 
moneys collected and whatever he could earn from his balances 
in hand. Again, the Finance Committee was unhappy about this 
last. 
49 
There were three head distributors in Dundas's time, 
successively Alexander Menzies, Alexander MacLean of Ardgour and 
Robert Hepburn of Clerkington. Menzies was friendly to Dundas, 
an important point since the head collector appointed the sub- 
distributors. 
50 
MacLean was related to Dundas and Hepburn was 
formerly his secretary. 
The sub-distributors. earned a poundage on the stamps sold and 
in 1784 the emoluments varied from almost nothing in Orkney, to the 
massive £1303 earned by the Glasgow Distributor, Mure of Caldwell. 
Between 1782 and 1797, total poundages paid to these men rose from 
£1589 to £6393.51 Not surprisingly, the offices were political 
objects, usually considered to be in the nomination of the local 
MP, if he supported government. When the Stirling office fell 
vacant in 1796, a local politician observed to his MP, "it will 
afford you an opportunity of forwarding the interest of your 
friends here for it is an office which can admit of some slicing it . 
52 
The dispute over the attempt to appoint a Dundee distributor in 1798 
was one of the most involved tussles of the period 
for a minor 
revenue post. 
53 
The Select Committee on Finance of 1797 was 
surprised at the high poundage (10%) paid to the sub-distributors, 
a figure set in 1712 when business was small. This was subsequently 
reduced, to loud complaints from the officials, 
but the post remained 
54 
prized as patronage. 
The stamping of legal documents was neither easily nor wisely 
evaded and save for the exorbitant poundage - reduced 
from 1 August 
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1799 - the revenue as a whole seems to have been efficiently 
gathered. Nonetheless, at least two individuals, severally 
angling for the post of Inspector General of Stamps in 1790 and 1799, 
hinted at evasion. The latter wrote of 
"the inattention of country distributors of licences, 
who thinking themselves not subject [to] the scrutiny 
of any particular officer, large sums of money were 
annually lost to the state by permitting persons to 
run in arrears, which are still due". 55 
Certainly, some felt that there ought to be more distributors and 
there are occasional instances of distributors falling into heavy 
arrears but it is likely in fact that evasion was only bad on 
objects such as gloves. 
56 
One stamp duty was unique. The Post 
Horse Tax commenced in 1779, but was so beset by evasion that Pitt set 
it out to farm, and in 1787 he leased the right to collect all the 
Scottish duty to a George Smith, for £7420. Smith himself had to 
face so much evasion that in 1789 he endeavoured to give up the 
lease. Thereafter until 1837, the control of the tax in Scotland passed 
alternately between the stamp administration proper and various farmers. 
57 
It was not mere evasion of revenue that concerned most Scots about 
the stamp taxes, however. 
The Scottish sub-distributors merely sold stamps from London 
and their paper and vellum also had to come ready stamped from the 
South. This, as the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce pointed out, 
meant that Scottish-manufactured paper intended for 
legal purposes 
had to be sent South for stamping. The same was true of newsprint 
and banknotes and the overall effect was seriously to inconvenience 
both the purchaser and the native Scottish paper industry. 
58 
The 
consequence was an intermittent agitation from the 
1780s for the es- 
tablishment of an Edinburgh office with the power of stamping. In 
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1786, the Treasury, on the advice of the English Stamp Office, 
rejected the plea, save for a minor concession. 
59 
Further 
agitation eventually secured the principle that Scots paper could be 
carried to London for stamping at the expense of the stamp 
administration. 
60 
The imposition of a new stamp on banknotes in 
1799 led the lesser banks, with Dundas's blessing, to join others 
in a push for a Scottish Stamp office, to avoid the inconvenience 
of sending their currency to London for stamping. 
61 
For a time, 
success appeared likely, with numerous Scots applying for 
the anticipated commissionerships but in the end, nothing was 
done. Despite the support of Dundas and Pitt, the English stamp 
commissioners dug their heels in "and the matter was then dropped". 
62 
Renewed agitation in 1801 was similarly defeated, as was yet another 
push in 1805, when higher stamp duties again led to Scottish 
dissatisfaction. 
63 
As a story, it was a disturbing example of 
vested English administrative prejudice working to the detriment 
of Scottish interests. 
Until 1798, the Scottish customs service was responsible for two 
revenues, for those of customs on imported and exported goods and 
for what was effectively an excise tax on salt produced in Scotland. 
Beyond levying revenue, the service had also to enforce various 
laws relating to trade and navigation. In 1797, the gross 
receipt of customs was £284,578, collected at a cost of £46,128. 
The equivalent figures for the salt tax were £22,463 and £5,258. The 
department's accounts were rendered to the Barons of Exchequer, who would 
also require them each year to hand over money towards payment of the 
Scottish Civil Establishment. In 1797, such transfers totalled 
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£43,798. In other respects, the service answered directly to 
the Treasury, who allowed their salary bill every quarter and 
retained control over the size of the customs establishment. 
Petitions concerning the revenue or compositions for offences 
would go first to the Treasury, who would then refer them to the 
five customs commissioners at Edinburgh. If the Board was 
favourable, the Treasury would issue a warrant granting whatever 
the prayer of the petition was. Orders in Council concerning 
the quarantining of ships, or the export of certain goods such 
as military stores, would be transmitted through the Treasury. 
Leaves of absence for the commissioners had to have Treasury 
64 
permission. 
The Customs Commissioners stood high in Edinburgh society and 
were paid £500 a year, rising to £600 in 1788 and £800 in 1802.65 
Between 1784 and 1806, twelve men sat on the Board. 
Customs Commissioners, 1784-1806 
1784 Basil Cochrane, Adam Smith, James Edgar, James Buchanan, 
David Reid. 
Aug. 1786 Robert Hepburn of Clerkington vice Buchanan. 
Nov. 1786 John Henry Cochrane of Rochsoles vice Basil Cochrane. 
1791 Alexander McKonochie vice Smith 
1796 Richard Elliston Philips vice McKonochie 
1798 Sir Charles Preston of Valleyfield vice Hepburn 
1799 Shadrach Moyse vice Edgar 
1800 Henry Veitch of Elliock vice Preston 
Cochrane was of the Dundonald family and like Buchanan seems to 
have featured little in the affairs of the Board at this period. 
Adam Smith, the economist, was appointed through the Duke of 
Buccleuch, his former pupil, and he was a friend of Dundas, who took 
66 
a passing interest in his work. Edgar was an intimate of Dundas 
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and something of a character. 
67 
The dominant figure at the 
Board in these years was David Reid. Appointed by Pitt on 
merit alone - Dundas had favoured another - George Rose would 
endorse the common opinion: "I never knew a more zealous or more 
actively useful a [sic] servant of the public in the Revenue Depart- 
ment". His correspondence in Dundas's papers shows him to be 
completely loyal and one of his sons, Stephen, received an Indian 
cadetship through Dundas, while another, James, was advanced in a 
West Indian career. 
68 
Robert Hepburn, a Midlothian landowner, 
joined the Board through the interest of Buccleuch, with whom 
he was close, and his son Robert served as a clerk to Dundas. 
69 
John Henry Cochrane was a factor to the Duke of Hamilton and 
it was Hamilton who obtained Dundas's permission for Cochrane to 
purchase his namesake's resignation. In an age without retirement 
pensions it was a common procedure for elderly or ailing office 
holders. Wrote Dundas: "Old Cochran [sic] must resign to make 
way for young Cochran, and this by a private transaction with which 
Mr. Pitt and I can have no concern and must know nothing about". 
In office, he was attached to Dundas and his son James was given 
an East India writership. 
70 
The death of Adam Smith opened a place 
for Alexander McKonochie, a lawyer who had worked for Lord Douglas 
in his celebrated cause, and for others including Buccleuch and 
Queensberry in the Ayr Bank crash. He was also a friend of 
Chancellor Thurlow and had aimed at a seat at the Scottish Board 
for some time but his hopes had been barred by the discord 
between Pitt and Thurlow following the Regency Crisis. When 
Smith died, a correspondence drew out for some time and resulted 
in a temporary reconciliation between Premier and Chancellor, with 
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Dundas acting as honest broker and McKonochie receiving his prize. 
71 
In fact his stay at the Board was short. He was in poor health 
well before his death in March 1796. He had been trying to resign since 
late 1795 and with the approval of Dundas and the Lord Advocate, he 
entered into an agreement with Richard Philips, the Board's 
Secretary, to resign in his favour. His death before the arrange- 
ment was fully settled, caused only a minor hitch. 
72 
Looking at the 
Scottish boards, Sir John Anstruther had remarked of their staff 
"several are old & infirm". The promotion of Philips "a gentleman- 
like man and a good operative hand" continued what was apparently 
a policy of balancing the Board with professional man and political 
appointees. Hepburn's death in 1798 allowed Dundas and Pitt to 
pay off an old debt to Sir Charles Preston, who had waited several 
years for a reward for his parliamentary services. 
73 
Shadrach Moyse, 
appointed to succeed Edgar in 1799, had succeeded Philips as Secretary 
in 1796. With a good reputation and 47 years service, he was 
recommended to Pitt by Henry Dundas and the Lord Advocate. 
74 
Preston's death in 1800 cleared the way for Henry Veitch of 
Elliock to become a commissioner. Presumably his was a political 
75 
appointment but it is not clear who his patrons were. 
There were a few sinecures in the customs headquarters, most 
notably the Comptroller Generalship, 
held for life from 1786 by 
Alexander, Lord Balgonie but exercised by a deputy. 
76 
In 1798, the 
commissioners pointed at several offices that might conveniently 
be 
abolished, including Balgonie's post, an appointment 
of Inspector 
General of Outports held by Lord Colville and some other positions 
connected with the tobacco 
duties, long since transferred to the 
excise. 
77 The Secretaryship and Solicitorship to the customs all 
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appear to have passed in a regular line of promotion within the 
office. 
The Board presided over two administrations. The customs 
system centred on the collection of dues at head ports. In 
1784, there were 27 of these, each with a collector, a comptroller 
and a varying number of landwaiters, tidewaiters and other officials. 
By 1806, the establishment had expanded to 29 headports. There was 
also a fleet of five cutters. 
78 
The collector, as his title 
suggests, received the dues collected in his port and aside from 
his salary he could hope to earn a little on the money that 
accumulated between remittances to Edinburgh. The comptroller 
was both the collector's adviser and his check officer. In 
practice, the Customs Commissioners felt that the functions of 
the post were in fact already exercised by others and in 1798 they made 
the radical proposal to abolish it. This was too much for the 
Treasury, however, and despite the potential savings, the plan 
was vetoed on the advice of the English Customs Board. 
79 
The 
salt duties were levied in eight collections, five on the Firth 
of Forth, three on the South West coast. There was some overlap 
of staff and the local customs collector was also commonly the salt 
collector. The customs comptroller occasionally doubled as the 
supervisor of salt duties. 
80 
The overwhelming majority of officials in the customs and salt 
posts were appointed by the Treasury in London, who simply ordered 
the Edinburgh Board to issue their deputation to those named on the 
warrants sent down. The Board appointed a 
few minor staff at the 
head office and a small number of outdoor officers. 
81 
The 
consequence of this was that customs posts were almost 
all filled 
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by the politicians. Dundas spelt it out: 
"The whole system of local patronage is founded in 
the idea of the person using it, doing so according 
to its genuine intention for the general strength 
of government, & not from any private or personal 
considerations". 
McDowall of Garthland was similarly blunt: "my object must be to 
recommend to any vacancies in such a manner as to support my political 
interest in the county & boroughs". 
82 
The normal procedure was that when a vacancy occurred, the 
nomination was given by the Treasury to the appropriate local MP, 
provided that he supported government. If the post was in a Royal 
Burgh, it went to the burgh member, if in a county, it went to the 
county MP. There were variations. In some areas, a strong local 
interest would have the local nominations. Eglinton commonly nominated 
to vacancies in Irvine, while the Argyll family nominated to West 
Highland posts. Hamilton, before he fell out with Pitt, referred 
to Bo'ness, "which belongs to me". Later he would be put in his 
place. 
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In general, however, the MP had the nomination - he 
might allow or ask a relative or local manager to supervise its 
disposal - and Dundas would normally halt attempts to sidestep 
a member's 'rights' in the matter. 
84 
Dundas was kept informed 
of customs and salt vacancies85 but otherwise had nothing to do 
with the great majority of appointments which were settled 
between 
the politicians and the Treasury. The Treasury would turn to 
him where it was uncertain who had a particular right to nominate 
or where they were unsure of a man's loyalties. 
86 
Similarly, he 
would become involved in settling disputes, as in 
1797, when 
Ferguson, MP for Aberdeenshire and Allardyce, MP for the Aberdeen Burghs 
both claimed the right to nominate to a customs post in the town. 
87 
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Indeed, many of the letters in Dundas's correspondence concerning 
customs affairs relate to disputes, rather than to straightforward 
appointments. Dundas would also become involved where an MP was 
hostile to government. The offices in his constituency would be 
parcelled out to the friends of government and Dundas would assist 
the Treasury in identifying such men. 
88 
This of course would 
serve as a signal to local voters as to where their loyalties 
should lie. 
The consequence of all this was a service stacked with 
political appointees. Dundas, in appointing to offices at 
Leith, tended, like most burgh members, to take the nominations 
of the town council. 
89 
It is an indication of the subordination 
of the system to politics that in 1791, when the Collectorship at 
Leith fell vacant, a crucial post, overseeing the training of 
all staff for the East Coast, the Customs Commissioners had to 
approach Dundas, in his capacity as an MP, for the appointment. 
90 
There are other examples. John Dunlop, the financially embarrassed 
former Provost of Glasgow, was appointed Customs Collector at Bo'ness 
with the aid of the Duke of Hamilton. With little experience, he 
went to a post where he relied on his clerk to keep him right. 
The Duke of Atholl, against Dundas's wishes, appointed his son's 
tutor to the Perth Collectorship in 1796. The Aberdeen MP 
appointed his brother a collector there in 1797.91 
Dismissals engineered by local politicians to punish 
opponents were uncommon but not unknown. Me most 
blatant at 
this time was that of Wellwood Maxwell, Collector at Dumfries, 
removed through Queensberry's influence to make way 
for David 
Staig, the Provost. Maxwell conducted a long but ultimately 
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unsuccessful campaign for re-instatement. 
92 
There is also evidence 
of financial transactions being involved in appointments. One MP 
allowed a constituent to nominate a tidewaiter, who then paid the 
constituent a part of his income. When Sir John Campbell succeeded 
to the Glasgow Collectorship in 1789, his predecessor, Burrows, 
received quarterly payments from Campbell's brother. 93 
The salaries of customs officials below the level of comptroller 
were comparatively low, varying from port to port but in the range 
of £12 to £25 annually in 1797.94 These sums were supplemented 
by fees taken from merchants for calculating the duties due by them, 
a system that was a great grievance nationally. A Scottish 
campaign had begun in 1782 to alleviate the effects of this on coastal 
trade and to remove some of the fees, many of which were unknown in 
England. The effort persisted until 1792 and had some limited 
success, with a partial reduction of fees on the Forth in 1784, 
but in the end it failed. 
95 
The cost to government of ending 
fees and paying full salaries to the customs staff was too great to 
consider and the agitation ended on the outbreak of war. Only from 
1810 did progressive abolition begin. 
96 
Given the appointments system, it is surprising that the 
customs service functioned as well as it apparently did. The 
Commissioners were proud of their force and asserted 
"no country whatever can produce a set of more 
intelligent, well informed, up right officers, than 
what are at present upon the Scotch Customs Establish- 
ment, and that the Revenue of Customs in that country, 
is more fairly, at least as fairly collected as the 
Revenue in England is". 97 
Partly, this may have been the discipline of the service: 
"if a 
man is disgraced for fraud 
he is never reponed, for this good reason, 
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that in the customs they have no regular check for the discovery 
of fraud in their officers... ". 
98 
Similarly, the fact that most 
appointments were not made by the Commissioners, meant that they 
had no vested interest in protecting corrupt proteges. Nor 
could bribery of senior officers to obtain promotion be of much 
use in such a system. In all, however, it was probably by 
accident rather than design that the customs escaped the worst 
abuses so obvious in the excise service. It should not be forgotten 
that most customs taxes hardly touched the common man and this gave the 
customs staff a lower public profile than the hated excise gauger. 
There were some irregularities, of course. The discovery 
of frauds at Glasgow and Greenock led to dismissals in 1790.99 
In 1796, the Aberdeen Collector, Sime, and his comptroller were 
suspended for corruption. A local MP, claiming that Sime was 
the victim of a conspiracy by local merchants, urged his re- 
instatement and asked Dundas to investigate. Dundas was politely 
rebuffed. David Reid "never yet during more than forty two years 
service in the Revenue, knew the business of a port so conducted" 
and he detailed a string of irregularities that would eventually 
see both officials dismissed. 
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There may also have been a 
number of officers incapacitated by age, for it was not until 
1798 that the Board adopted the rule of admitting none over 45 
101 
years old. 
How did the service fare in these years? There is little 
doubt that the American war had left a shocking legacy. Smuggling, 
particularly on the West and South West coasts, impossible 
fully to 
police, had drifted out of control and it was the excise that reported 
in 1783 that "smugling [sic] practices to a very great & uncommon 
extent are carried on along the coast of Ayrshire 




The end of the war promised worse. In 1785, 
the Glasgow tobacco manufacturers complained of "smuggling which 
is now carried on in Scotland to such a height, that in a few 
years, if matters remain as at present, not a fiftieth of the 
quantity of tobacco consumed will pay any duty - even now the 
whole country is overrun with smuggled tobacco". As the year wore 
on, the situation gave every sign of deteriorating. 
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The 
government solution to smuggling was twofold, the lowering of 
taxes to reduce smuggling profits, and the use of force. Pitt's 
Commutation Act of 1784 greatly reduced the tax on tea and the 
effect in Scotland, where the smuggling of tea "immediately 
stopt", was dramatic. 
104 
Unfortunately there is some evidence 
that the smugglers merely substituted tobacco for tea in their 
cargoes. 
105 
The deployment of military force, particularly 
in the South West, had some limited impact against the smugglers 
but in 1791 it was again reported that smuggling was carried on to a 
very great extent in that region. One local historian considers 
that events did not turn against Dumfries smugglers until 1792.106 
Nationally the evidence is contradictory: "the business is of such 
a nature that it is not possible to ascertain very certain infor- 
mation". 
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Some indicators convinced contemporaries that 
smuggling had declined, certainly prior to 1793, 
but this may only 
have been a small reduction. 
108 
Any decline in the smuggling of conti- 
nental spirits, for instance, would have 
been more than balanced by 
the rise in illicitly produced domestic output. 
The excise 
experience during the war was that smuggling 
increased and there 
is no reason to suspect that the same 
is untrue for the customs. 
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The raising of taxes in wartime and the encouragement of smuggling 
to Europe would probably have stimulated smuggling inward. The 
continual requisitions by the Navy of customs and excise vessels 
cannot have helped. 
109 
If the customs service had difficulties in these years, the 
record of the salt tax officials is one of unambiguous failure. 
Since the Union, the Scottish salt manufacturers, predominantly 
based on the Forth, had enjoyed a theoretical monopoly of the home 
market. If English salt came North, it had to be sold at English 
prices which, by 1782, included a tax levied at 5/- per bushel. 
Scottish salt was only taxed at 1/6 per bushel. Unfortunately 
English salt was much cheaper to produce and this had consequences, 
explained in a paper by the Customs Solicitor, Osborn, in 1793. 
It was forbidden to refine English rock salt in Scotland but such 
salt cost only 4%d per bushel before tax, while Scottish salt 
cost 1/8d. Unprocessed English salt could be shipped to 
Ireland - the exporter could even claim a drawback - where it could 
be made into white salt for sale at 1/ld per bushel. This left 
the Scottish smuggler with a handsome profit on whatever quantity 
of salt he could buy and ship to Scotland. He could either smuggle 
it ashore or bring it over openly, claiming that it was duty-free 
salt for curing fish. Later it could be spirited away from the 
warehouses to its real market. The result was inevitable. Every 
time the price of Scottish salt rose, so did smuggling from Ireland. 
110 
By 1795, the North West coast and islands were almost wholly 
supplied with smuggled salt and in 
1797 one anonymous memorialist 
asserted that only 10% of salt consumed 
in Scotland paid duty. 
ill 
It was probably an exaggeration 
but perhaps only just. 
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The solutions were obvious enough. The salt tax could be 
abolished totally over Britain, or English rock salt could be 
permitted in Scotland at the Scottish tax rate. As early as 
1784, Dundas favoured the former and by 1785, plans were 
far advanced to commute the coal and salt taxes, shifting them 
onto malt instead. Of course, this was anathema to Scots salt 
producers who would be buried under cheap English imports. The 
plan, despite much support, was eventually defeated by what Lord 
Selkirk later called "very paltry objections started in Scotland". 
112 
Plans to allow English rock salt into Scotland at Scottish tax 
rates were proposed by Ilay Campbell in 1788, by the Customs 
Commissioners in 1793, and by a Scottish entrepreneur in 1798. 
Each time they were defeated, on the last occasion by English 
interests. 
113 
As if the situation were not bad enough, government 
raised the Scottish tax to 6/6d per bushel in 1798. Smuggling soared, 
the Scots producers were hard hit and those who still bought legally 
taxed salt joined the complaints. 
114 
A reduction to 4/- tax in 
1799 had only a marginal effect and smuggling continued unabated. 
115 
The transfer of the salt duties to the excise in 1798 had no 
effect. The Scottish salt owners blamed the smuggling on the 
laxity of "the present rate of superannuated salt watchmen" and 
called for higher pay to encourage recruitment of better staff-116 
The salt staff had no high reputation but they were given an 
impossible task, a task compounded by the monopolistic objectives 
of the Scots producers and the unwillingness of the politicians 
to tackle these vested interests. 
The Scottish excise in 1797 had a gross receipt of £851,775, 
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collected at a management cost of £75,862. This easily made it 
the most important branch of the Scottish revenue and its remit 
included duties on malt, beer, spirits and upon a whole range of 
manufactured goods. 
117 
Several taxes were transferred from the 
customs service to the excise in these years, including wine (from 
1786), tobacco (1789) and salt (1798). 
Five commissioners sat at the Excise Board in Edinburgh. They 
gave in accounts to the Exchequer Court and made over sums for the 
payment of the Civil Establishment. In 1797, these payments totalled 
£62,509. Otherwise, the excise service answered directly to the 
Treasury, to which they returned a quarterly state of their salary 
and incident bills, together with answers to the various requests 
for information periodically made to them. In most respects, 
the control exercised by the Treasury was very similar to that 
wielded over the customs. 
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The Treasury had complete control 
over the organization and size of the service but in crucial areas, the 
E. xcise Commissioners had great independence. Between 1784 and 
1806, 
ten men served on the Board. 
Excise Commissioners, 1784-1806 
1784: Alexander Udny, George Brown of Elliston, James Stodart, 
Thomas Wharton, Gilbert Laurie. 
1785: James Balmain vice Laurie 
1787: Robert Graham of Fintry vice Udny 
1789: John Grieve vice Balmain 
1803: Sir John Stuart of Allanbank vice Grieve 
1804: Frederick Fotheringham vice Brown 
Of these, Udny, a very long server, was 
by now of no importance. 
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George Brown was a distant relative of Dundas and 
his son's naval 
career was advanced by this connection. 
Associated with Buccleuch 
in his native Roxburghshire, Brown 
had a wife, Dorothea, who regularly 
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corresponded with Dundas, sometimes passing political gossip. 
Stodart was a former Edinburgh Provost who had backed Dundas 
and Buccleuch in their struggles with Sir Laurence Dundas. He 
was bankrupted in 1794 and while Henry Dundas obtained an Indian 
appointment for his son, Stodart would remain embarrassed to the 
end of his days. 
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Laurie, a former supporter of Sir Laurence 
Dundas, may not have been well affected to Henry but his tenure 
of office was short. 
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Wharton, the Englishman, had some 
connections with opposition figures in Scotland but it is not clear 
what effect this had on his conduct. He was not entirely comfortable 
at the Board. 
123 
Balmain, friendly to Dundas, was conscientious in 
his work but had only a short period in office. 
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The most 
prominent man at the Excise Board after 1787 was Robert Graham of 
Fintry, a Perthshire laird and an ally to the Duke of Atholl. His 
low income, excise commissioners were paid about £600 yearly, actually 
led him to seek resignation in 1793. In fact, while his financial 
problems persisted, he remained and as we have seen he acted as a 
local adviser to Dundas in Angus and Dundee politics. His 
letters to Dundas and others clearly give the impression of a 
bustling fellow, often out of sorts with his fellow commissioners, 
and this may give some clue to the ructions that 
beset the Board 
in these years. 
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John Grieve was another former Provost of 
Edinburgh. He had supported Sir Laurence Dundas 
but switched 
horses to join Buccleuch. As early as 1784, he was an unsuccessful 
aspirant to a customs commissionership. 
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Stuart of Allanbank 
received his appointment in 1803 with 
the support both of Melville 
and of the Queen. 
127 
The next appointment, Frederick Fotheringham, 
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was very much less to Melville's taste. Brother-in-law to 
Boyd Alexander MP, he was a Writer to the Signet in partnership 
with the son of the Excise Board Secretary, Pearson. He 
purchased the resignation of his predecessor, Brown, during the 
dying days of Addington's administration. It was commonly 
considered to be an objectionable appointment. 
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Of the Excise Board as a whole, it is striking that, unlike 
the customs, most commissioners had had no previous experience in 
the administration. Only Balmain, formerly the Excise Solicitor, 
seems to have been promoted. The rest of those appointed after 
1785, were outsiders. If the Board was apparently balanced 
in favour of Dundas, he and his associates were never comfortable 
with it. It had internal tensions and in one dispute of 1796 
over an appointment in the comptroller's office, Graham wrote of 
oard. 
129 
The loss of the Scard minutes "the old division" on the Board. 
before 1799 and the comparative absence of relevant correspondence 
make these differences obscure but they led people to distrust 
the commissioners. "Audi alteram partem is very necessary in all 
matters coming from the Board of Excise", wrote Justice Clerk Hope 
in 1807.130 Dundas may have had difficulties with opponents on 
the Board and the known indebtedness of Stodart and Graham cannot 
have encouraged confidence. Probably the most important 
consideration was the dominant feature of the excise administration 
as the century drew to a close: the stench of corruption. 
The excise system as a whole was comparatively free from 
sinecures and only the Receiver Generalship, the 
Comptrollership 
and the Auditorship were particularly blatant. 
The Auditorship 
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was held successively by the Duke of Argyll to 1786, by Sir 
Hew Dalrymple, 1786-1800, and by James McDowall, 1800-08. Only 
thereafter, and against the wishes of Robert Dundas, who wished 
it to remain a sinecure available to reward supporters, was the 
office made efficient. 
131 
The revenue was collected at two ports and in thirteen country 
collections. Each had a collector or collecting supervisor in 
charge, several supervisors and numerous officers ("gaugers") 
and assistants. The supervisors oversaw the work of the gaugers, 
and the outdoor officers as a whole would be subject to snap 
inspections by two general supervisors based at Edinburgh. Six 
examiners based at Edinburgh checked the books of the outdoor 
staff and provided a pool from which to promote supervisors. 
132 
In the thirteen country collections a total complement of 41 
supervisors and 447 officers was reduced to 39 and 367 respectively 
between 1785 and 1789. Thereafter, numbers rose and by 1801, 
there were 48 supervisors and 502 officers. 
133 
These men were 
constantly checking upon manufacturers in the districts under 
their charge and the collector himself would make eight rounds 
of his territory each year to receive the duties. Both the nature 
of the taxes and the inquisitorial form of the assessment made the 
134 
gaugers heartily loathed. In addition to its land force, the 
135 
Board controlled a small fleet of yachts. 
In theory, all the appointments and promotions were in the gift 
of the commissioners who would nominate 
in rotation to vacancies as 
they arose, 
136 
In practice the Treasury was increasingly prone to 
writing to the commissioners recommending 
the appointment or 
promotion of named individuals. 
137 
Often these letters were sent 
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in response to the badgering of Scottish politicians at the 
Treasury, wishing to have their own friends pressed forward. 
138 
The commissioners had never liked this and there are clear instances 
of the Treasury pressing forward singularly unsuitable candidates. 
In 1789, for instance, the commissioners had had to sack Gabriel 
Kay, a gauger who had only months before been recommended for 
promotion by the Treasury, after pressure by the Duke of Gordon. 
139 
The commissioners tried to resist. In 1793, Graham wrote to 
Dundas directly, outlining objections to a recommendation for an 
examiner, Robert Carrick, to be a supervisor. 
140 
In February 1796, 
the commissioners wrote to the Treasury, pointing out that with an 
establishment of 520 officers, they already had a waiting list of 
140 expectants, a list that Treasury recommendations served only 
to lengthen. The length of the wait not only made impecunious 
expectants vulnerable to the bribes of manufacturers whom they 
might later be surveying, it also blocked the aspirations of the 
sons of serving officers. The Treasury promised to moderate its 
demands, but after an interval the practice resumed. 
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In this 
field, at least, Treasury influence was expanding. 
The vast bulk of appointments still remained with the 
commissioners, however, and if the Treasury sometimes made unfortunate 
recommendations, those of the commissioners were worse. Many were 
clearly to gratify political connections and a 
list sent to Dundas shows 
six appointments to the service made in 
1793 at his request. Five 
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were clearly to benefit other politicians. 
There is no reason 
to doubt that many other appointments were made on a similar 
basis. Added to this was the miserable pay. In 1787, a 
gauger received £35 annually, a sum unchanged since 
1726. There were 
304. 
raises subsequently but the pay was never adequate to remove 
the temptation, even necessity, to take bribes. 
143 
Salary 
and recruitment system combined to produce a force of 
"maenial [sic] servants, misfortunate tradesmen, 
or manufacturers &ý, who have hitherto composed 
too large a proportion of those honoured with 
excise commissions". 144 
As senior posts fell vacant, so they too were filled by the 
commissioners, who were again subject to influence and outside 
pressure. The results were disastrous. In 1798, while publicly 
backing his fellows in their stand against Treasury interference, 
Commissioner Graham privately circulated many of the senior 
officers with his own plan for a sweeping reform of the appointment 
and promotion system. He proposed that promotion should be by merit 
alone, something not enforceable under the current system, and he 
had various ideas as to how it might be operated. The plan struck 
a chord with several correspondents and produced evidence of 
dissatisfaction with the quality of men reaching supervisor's 
rank. 
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Graham collected these replies in 1799 and added his own 
thoughts. He wanted a system where unsuitable men could not be 
promoted, could indeed be fired, and where the original appointments 
would come from the Treasury, who "should have it in their power 
to attend to the recommendations of those who support government 
wherever it can be done without prejudice to the public". He 
wished for a salary increase to the staff and suggested that a 
general investigation of these matters might 
be undertaken by 
an outsider, 
146 
professedly impersonal in its comments, his 
letter was a severe censure on the practices of 
his fellow 
commissioners. In part, it was probably a response 
to the 
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enquiries of the Select Committees on Finance of 1797 and 1798 
but it probably also reflected splits on the Board. It may 
in some way be connected with the extraordinary influence that 
the Lord Advocate acquired over excise appointments for a brief 
spell at this time. 
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In the end, nothing came of Graham's 
plan and the system resumed its old path. 
At no point in his discussion did Graham touch on what was 
probably the worst abuse in the excise promotion system, the 
corruption that it encouraged. There was a suspicion that some lesser 
officials undercharged manufacturers under their survey, knowing that 
these individuals might be able to forward their careers through 
exerting influence with the commissioners. 
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Worse, it was 
widely believed that promotion could be obtained by bribing the 
Board. It may be to this that General Supervisor John Leven 
alluded in 1797, when he wrote to Pitt, 
"Much, very much improvement might be made in the 
Revenue of Scotland; but, as any observations I 
could make upon that point would chiefly concern 
the Board and their Solicitor my very dependent 
situation make it too dangerous a subject for me 
to interfere with, without high countenance and 
protection". 
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For years it was rumoured that many of the 
lesser staff of the 
excise were indebted to traders under their survey, 
because they 
in turn were making forced loans and gifts to their collectors and 
general supervisors in order to get advancement. 
This hardly 
encouraged diligent survey work and 
it was said that the system 
of bribes went all the way to the commissioners. 
Further, 
several excise collectors were supposed 
to have shares in 
150 
The Dundases were aware of businesses under their survey. 
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the ill repute of the excise. In June 1804, alerted 
to another "job done at the excise office", concerning an 
appointment in the comptroller's office, the Chief Baron 




Nothing was done. In 1807, an astonished 
supporter of the Talents Ministry learned from James Dundas, 
Examiner of the Excise Yacht Accounts, 
"that every officer of excise, who looked for 
favour in preferment, found it necessary, & was 
expected to supply the Secretary with articles of 
consumption, the product of the district in which 
he was employed, ... 
" 
He also heard of 
"such abuses & malversations, not only in the 
Secretary[']s office, but at the board itself, 
as I thought it my duty to communicate ... to our 
friends in office; but I found them in full 
possession of the same facts through a different 
channel". 152 
The Talents were out of office before any good intentions could be 
effected and the storm when it came, broke from within. 
Early in 1808, Robert Graham wrote to the Treasury, 
justifying his conduct in the removal of an excise yacht 
commander. In doing so, he made a series of allegations about 
frauds and improper appointments to the yachts made by his fellow 
commissioners. The Treasury ordered an investigation to be held 
in camera by the Lord Chief Baron and the Advocate and they 
further 
ordered an examination of the repeated rumours that the commissioners 
were in the habit of receiving presents and 
loans from subordinate 
staff. The enquiry commenced on 
13 July 1808 and a two volume 
153 
report was sent to the Treasury on 
5 October. The results were 
extraordinary. None of Graham's allegations against 
his colleagues 
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were substantiated but the investigation turned up other 
discrepancies. Various proceedings brought to light concerning 
Graham meant that he could not be continued at the Board. 
Stodart's personal financial difficulties had led him into 
improper activity and Stuart was found to have taken loans from 
subordinates. All three were sacked. Fotheringham, who had at 
one point passed the accounts of a man later sacked, narrowly 
escaped. Adam Pearson, Secretary to the Board, was also 
dismissed and only Wharton came out totally unscathed. 
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In England, the excise department was more efficient than any 
of the other revenue departments. 
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This cannot have been true 
of Scotland, where what was apparently endemic corruption must have 
been detrimental to the collection of the revenue. Historians 
have debated whether it was better for revenue appointments to 
flow from the Treasury or from local commissioners. 
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Certainly, 
a comparison between the systems for choosing men in the late 
eighteenth century Scottish customs and excise services would 
suggest that a Treasury appointment system fared better. 
In other respects, the excise may have been little worse than 
its fellow departments. In April 1790, a speech by an English 
MP denouncing the failings of the Scots excise provoked a long 
letter from the commissioners to Dundas. The complaints had 
hinged on the apparently small amount of revenue collected and the 
commissioners pointed in their defence to the enormous proportionate 
rise in their takings since the Union. 
They also pointed out that 
the accounting system brought the sums paid 
by Scots for certain 
goods, notably tea, to account 
in the English revenue. Further, 
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the great difference between the English and Scottish populations, 
and the fact that money remitted to London excluded sums raised 
in Scotland but used locally for paying drawbacks, bounties and 
the Civil Establishment, both contributed to make the Scottish 
revenue look much lower in comparison to the English. In 
general, the commissioners pronounced themselves pleased with 
their officers' exertions and noted that far from being remiss, 
the service as a whole had to endure repeated complaints of 
rigour and severity. 
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It was a well argued defence and in terms 
of the particular accusations, apparently a reasonable one. We 
have seen that Pitt's reforms of the 1780s had some effect on 
smuggling and the excise probably benefited. Thus in 1793, the 
trade in wine was "almost drop't". 
158 
The war had a detrimental 
effect. Tobacco smuggling rose and the excise fleet had to be expanded 
to try and cope with a general rise in contraband trading. 
159 
Again, 
it is only fair to say that, as the customs service also knew, the 
task of properly patrolling the Scottish coast was an impossible 
one. 
In one range of duties, those on distilled spirits, popular 
demand, public policy and the failings of the excise itself, all 
combined to produce a shambles, a detailed examination of which 
gives a revealing insight into eighteenth-century politics and 
administration. 
Public demand for whisky had been rising since the mid-eighteenth 
century and when legal production increased 
dramatically in the 1770s, 
government began to take a close interest 
in the possible revenue. 
160 
Gradually, tax rates were raised and from 1781, private distillation, 
161 
hitherto popular and widespread, was prohibited. At this period 
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several considerable distilling concerns set up in the lowlands. 
Latterly known as "the Great Distillers", the most prominent 
was the group centring on two related families, the Steins and 
the Haigs. 
162 
In retrospect, it would be claimed that this 
legislation had failed and that illicitly distilled whisky came 
to dominate the Scottish market, while an increase in tax revenue 
actually came from Scottish sales of legal output in England. 
163 
The Highland dearth of 1782-3 led government to raise duties 
further to lower demand for grain and this reduced revenue. 
164 
Meantime the lowland distillers continued to make inroads into 
the English market. 
When Pitt came to office, problems were apparent with the 
Scots distillery industry. The lowland operators were showing 
a disposition to trickiness in resisting the attempts of excise 
officials to survey them, while everywhere illicit output was 
increasing. Pitt's "Wash Act" of 1784 addressed both problems. 
In the lowlands, duties were lowered but were levied on the wash 
used, not on the output. This simplified the gauger's work and 
his powers were increased. A highland region was defined, within 
which stills of 20-30 gallons capacity were allowed, 
licensed at 
£1 on each gallon of capacity. They were to use only 
local 
grain but were 'exempted' from paying malt 
duty. These concessions 
to the highlands were a recognition of the particular economic 
problems of the region and aimed 
both to encourage agriculture 
and improvement and to convert illicit producers 
into legal 
manufacturers. Finally, Pitt ended 
the privilege long enjoyed 
by Forbes of Culloden of producing whisky tax-free at 
Ferintosh. 
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The act of 1784 was to be renewed in 1786. In the interval, 
the highland concessions were slightly reduced by an act of 1785 
that restricted sales to the highland zone and limited the number 
of stills allowed per parish. 
165 
By now, the lowland distillers 
were engaged in a hard contest for the London market. It was 
feared that the English distillers would persuade English MPs 
to press for heavier duties on the Scots and this proved to be 
correct. The legislation of 1786 was a compromise between the 
rival distillers, made with Pitt's consent. The English had proved 
that the Scots had evaded duty and in consequence the system of 
licensing stills by capacity was extended over all Scotland. 
lowlanders paid 30/- per gallon, the highlands continued at £1. 
The 
An additional tax was placed on exports to England. These new 
duties caused the Scots little trouble but in 1788, the English 
distillers obtained another tax increase on Scots exports and 
saddled them with other disadvantages. 
166 
This and the price 
war bankrupted the Steins and the Haigs. When they resumed 
trading in the 1790s, they would concentrate on the Scots market. 
The years 1784-8 established the main problems for the excise 
service in dealing with the distilling industry. Now that tax was on 
still capacity, it paid distillers to produce as much as possible, 
lowering the average tax per gallon of output. By introducing 
new technology they could discharge their stills 10-13 times in 
24 hours. This was in 1793. By 1799, some could do it 100 
times in 24 hours. In general, such gadgetry was confined to 
the larger lowland distillers, with middling producers operating 
at slower speeds and highland manufacturers slower still. 
167 
A 
crucial consequence of this flood of output was a pronounced 
decline 
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in quality and a rise in demand for the better highland whisky, 
even although it remained more expensive and was not supposed to 
be sold in the lowlands. 
168 
For the politicians, the rapidly developed alliance between 
the distillers and the landed interest posed problems. At full 
production the lowland industry had a vast grain consumption and 
the operations of the Scots corn law seem to have thirled them 
more firmly to Scottish, as opposed to English, grain. 
169 
As 
early as 1785, a fall in lowland distilling led some to 
fear that rents might be unpaid by tenants unable to sell 
corn and cattle (the distillers fed great herds on their 
refuse) and the 1788 bankruptcies caused similar problems. 
170 
Nor were the lowland distillers slow to indicate to government 
the way in which their problems could become the problems of 
lowland landowners. 
171 
The connection between the legal 
licensed distillers in the highlands and their landowners was 
exactly the same and they were united in a desire to preserve the 
special privileges afforded to them. Highland producers were 
even more vital as a grain market than their lowland counterparts 
and the county meetings were always firm in opposing attempts to 
raise highland duties. 
172 
In these years, an extended struggle 
took place between highland and lowland interests. In 1785, 
George Home denounced the highland privileges: "in process of 
173 
time there will be a Fairntosh in every highland parish". 
So it proved, as highland whisky flooded South and East. 
Contemporaries disputed its significance. Lowland distillers 
claimed that it much reduced their market. 
There was no doubt 
that the highlanders had a licensed capacity to produce 
far 
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beyond their consumption, something that government recognised. 
174 
The lowland distillers had some success in mobilising politicians 
against the highland privileges, in particular William McDowall 
of Garthland, but the highland landowners publicly dismissed such 
claims, denying that there was a smuggling problem and arguing that 
attempts to raise highland duties and end their privileges reflected 
the lowland distillers' aim to monopolise whisky output and control 
local grain markets. 
175 
The accusation was probably true but 
the defence was disingenuous. By 1796, the Lord Advocate was 
convinced that unless the highland 'exemption' was ended, the 
lowland distillers would be ruined and spirits "must remain as much 
a drug as ever". The Excise Commissioners had always regarded 
the exemption as an experiment and were heartily sick of it. Some 
highland producers were using good quality lowland grain to make 
whisky that was then moved South for sale. "I can see no remedy", 
wailed Commissioner Stodart, "unless a wall could be drawn across 
the country as of old, with stations for an army of excisemen to 
guard it". 
176 
A Glasgow brewer pointed to another abuse, evidence 
that some lowland distillers had concealed interests in highland 
concerns and sold highland output as their own. 
177 
He reckoned 
that three quarters of highland production was sold in the lowlands 
in 1796, and in 1797 a major lowland manufacturer claimed that 
the market was so swamped with smuggled highland spirits, that 
he 
and his fellows could scarce sell enough to pay their workforce. 
17$ 
Even allowing for exaggeration, it is clear that the system was 
faltering and various remedies were unavailing. 
From 1797, a parliamentary committee sat to consider the whole 
business of the distillery revenue in Scotland and 
it heard evidence 
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from all parties. All the debates of the past decade were repeated 
and the committee concluded that while a licensing system should 
remain, the excise should have more supervision of the production 
process and the highland exemption should be abolished. 
179 
In 
fact little was done. The highland privilege remained with all 
its abuses and the reason is not hard to find. In 1796, the 
lowland distiller John Stein had denounced the highlanders as 
"these political favourites" and in 1797, McDowall wrote that 
"The Northern Potentates will come forward with all their 
force in favour of beer[; ] not what we drink but what they 
grow". 
180 
Quite simply, government did not wish to incur the 
wrath of the highland landowners by ending the privilege in which 
they had such a vested interest. The highland/lowland disputes 
would continue but they would be temporarily muted by bad crops, 
which forced government to prohibit all distilling in 1800-1,1804-8, 
and 1809-10. In pushing the general problem under the carpet, 
however, government clearly subordinated the best interests of 
the revenue to those of politics. 
The above discussion solely concerns the licensed distillers. 
Scotland also had a vast illicit industry. The legislation of 
1786 was for a time apparently successful in suppressing such 
activity, particularly in the highlands. 
181 
Success was not total, 
however, and a resurgence in the mid-1790s was related to the 
prohibition of legal production during the 
dearth of 1795-6. In 
December 1795, alerted to a massive outbreak of illicit distillation 




This went on for some time and had local 
successes183 but by 1797, John 
Stein was claiming that one half 
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of the whisky consumed in Scotland was illicitly produced. 
184 
The illicit distillers were benefiting both from the appalling 
quality of lowland legal output and from the continuing tradition 
of private distilling, the banning of which in 1781 had never been 
popular. Production facilities were easily available and consider- 
able quantities went to market, some of the highland output being 
moved South by convoys of armed smugglers. 
185 
It never 
proved possible to stamp out the small stills. Particularly 
in the highlands, they enjoyed the connivance of landlords who 
could hope to receive the distiller's profit as rent, and a JP 
was hardly likely to punish men to whom he was selling his 
grain crop. 
186 
There was also clear evidence that excise 
officials were colluding with smugglers. Some contrived to 
confiscate redundant equipment, leaving the working stills. 
In this way, the poorly paid excise officer could regularly obtain 
rewards for 'diligence' in a comfortable arrangement that caused 
little inconvenience to the distiller. 
187 
As early as 1797, a 
despairing James Stodart had seriously suggested that the excise 
might be better off if the highlander was again given permission 
to distil privately without duty in stills of two gallons or 
less. It was a testament to the straits to which the adminis- 
tration was reduced. 
188 
Despite all the abuses, the distillery was very profitable 
to government. The duty on lowland still capacity was raised 
progressively from £1.10/- per gallon in 1786, reaching 
£108 
in 1800. It seems that these increases winnowed out many 
lesser distillers over the years, much to the approval of the 
major firms. 
189 
Indeed, the major distillers usually managed 
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to keep pace with tax demands and the Excise Commissioners and 
the politicians came to take an increasingly jaundiced view 
of their claims of impending ruin at each successive tax 
increase. 
190 
It was also well understood that these men were 
not above fraud themselves. 
191 
The actual revenue to government rose steadily in these 
years and in 1799 and 1800 legislation was introduced to levy an 
extra tax on production excesses. In this way, it was hoped to 
choke off the distillers' ability to profit by rapid distillation. 
It seems to have had some success, for revenue rose dramatically 
from £255,000 in 1799 to £1,444,000 in 1800.192 
Raising revenue had not been the sole objective of government 
in its dealings with the industry, however. The raising of 
taxes was avowedly also to try and cut spirit consumption. In 
this government failed dismally, not least because the distillers 
always managed to keep their sale price well below the prices 
calculated by government when setting the tax. By the time an 
attempt was made to head off this problem with taxes on excess 
output, the damage was done and whisky drinking was widespread. 
Throughout the 1790s commentators were alarmed by the amount of 
drunkenness in the lower orders and some equated the persistence 
of radicalism with cheap liquor, 
193 
John Stein might argue 
that the morals of the people had not suffered 
by the legal 
distillery, that they would drink spirits regardless of origin, 
194 
but it was not the common impression. 
The land and assessed taxes in Scotland in 
1797 produced a 




county collectors who remitted the sums raised to the Receiver 
General in Edinburgh. The modes of assessment for the two basic 
taxes differed, however. 
The Scottish land tax was set in 1707 at £48,000 annually 
when the English land tax was at 4/-. To this was added the 
cost of collection. 
195 
The 66 Royal Burghs paid one-sixth of 
the total and their annual convention apportioned liability among 
them. The annual land tax act stated the amount due from each 
county and the county commissioners of supply divided the burden 
among the local landowners, in proportion to the valued rent of 
their several properties. The total valued rent for Scotland - 
in effect a rateable value - had been fixed since 1667 and when 
estates were altered by sale or purchase, it fell to the commissioners 
to determine the relative changes in valued rent on the properties 
concerned. The commissioners were all local landowners, men 
possessed of land of a valued rent of £100. They chose the 
county tax collector and the infrequent elections could sometimes 
become trials of strength between county politicians assessing 
potential support for future parliamentary contests. 
196 
The 
administration of the land tax was never totally smooth. 
The tax itself was comparatively high, since it was levied 
as a percentage (1-1%%) of the valued rents, which were themselves 
considerably higher than the real rents until near the close of 
the eighteenth century. Arrears that built up were carried 
forward. 
197 
There were also difficulties in recovering such 
arrears by use of law. 
198 
The county collectors received a salary 
from the commissioners for collecting the 
land tax and a poundage 
for the assessed taxes but they could also make profits on the 
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balances retained. Nonetheless, in the late 1780s, their lot 
was difficult. They were much oppressed by the work entailed 
in collecting Pitt's new assessed taxes and pursued an improvement 
in remuneration. 
199 
By the end of the century, things had 
improved and the land tax redemption and income tax acts had 
raised the Aberdeenshire Collector's income from £70 annually to 
over £800.200 By the new century, the post could be described 
as "laborious" but an Exchequer report of 1805 described it as 
"an office of considerable emolument". 
201 
The retention of 
balances by collectors could produce problems, however. If 
one went bankrupt, as happened in Ayrshire in 1797,202 the 
losses could be serious. The retaining of balances at a 
lower level was, as we have seen, mirrored in the practices 
of the Receiver General and the consequence was prolonged delays 
in remittances to London. In 1780, the Scottish land tax was 
2% years in arrear, a deterioration that continued. 
203 
The 
tax was made perpetual in 1798, subject to redemption, but the 
work of collecting the unredeemed tax and the assessed taxes 
continued. 
The assessed taxes in 1788 included levies on windows, 
inhabited houses, shops, male and female servants, carriages, carts 
and horses. The commutation tax, levied on windows, was a 
substitute for the much reduced tea tax of 1784.204 The assessments 
for Scotland for 1787-9, anticipated annual revenues of about 
£60,000 annually and by 1801 the figure had risen to £197,528.205 
This increase was a direct consequence of Pitt's policy of financing 




The assessment of these taxes was directed by the Tax 
Office in Edinburgh. This answered to the Tax Office in 
London and from thence to the Treasury. While it was 
accountable to the Barons of Exchequer as were the 
other boards, the barons also took a close concern in its 
functioning and organization. 
206 
The Edinburgh office had 
two surveyors general, three inspectors general, a comptroller 
and a solicitor. The surveyors general supposedly checked 
the surveys sent in by the county surveyors but in practice 
James Durham and John Carruthers, who held the posts for most of 
the period, left the work to their assistant. In 1785, the 
barons had made them pay him additional money for his work and 
about 1799 their places were ordered to be abolished, although 
Carruthers was still in post a decade later. 
207 
The inspectors 
general were more active, receiving an increase in their 
travelling allowances in 1790. Of the three in that year, 
one, William Tovey, can be identified as a political appointment, 
made by Dundas to gratify Sir William Murray of Ochtertyre. 
208 
The Comptroller of Taxes for many years was the conscientious 
Henry Mackenzie, the novelist and brother-in-law to Sir James 
Grant of Grant. 
In 1787, the organization in the country consisted of twenty 
surveyors with salaries ranging 
from £22 to £82.209 The increase 
in business over the next twenty years saw a continual expansion 
of the force and by 1805 there were 
43 surveyors, with the barons 
210 
advising that further division of the 
districts was necessary. 
In 1790, the Treasury admitted that the salaries were 
"barely 
sufficient to maintain them when 
in health" and their lot was 




The surveyors had always been appointed by the Treasury, 
who had taken the recommendations of the barons. In 1782, the 
barons had remonstrated at an unsuitable appointment made 
agains. their recommendation and were told that in future 
their advice would again be attended to. 
212 
In practice this 
did not happen. As in the Scottish excise appointments, the 
Treasury was extending its patronage and the surveyors fell under 
it. There is some confusion for parts of the 1790s, when the 
barons, in asking appointments for their own clients, would ask them 
from Dundas. 
213 
They certainly retained the power to make interim 
appointments to vacant posts. 
214 
In the main, however, the 
surveyorships seem to have been dispensed by the Treasury much 
as were the customs posts, with MPs friendly to government 
having the local nominations. Again it seems that Dundas 
generally only became involved where there were disputes. 
215 
Prior to 1801, when additional duties lengthened the time 
taken and prompted calls for a salary increase, the surveyors 
took about three months of each year to travel their districts, 
assessing liability for the various taxes. By 1801, each man 
covered about thirty parishes, a job that in England would be 
done by two surveyors and sixty assessors. The law had always 
allowed for the appointment of assessors by the commissioners of 
supply but it had never proved possible to 
find and recruit 
suitable men and so the work devolved 
largely on the surveyor. 
He made two copies of his assessment, giving one 
to the county 
land tax collector, the other to the Edinburgh office. 
Even 
when running at optimum, the 
long time it took to survey and 




Crucially, for eighteenth-century sensitivity, the mode of 
assessment was supposedly simple and did not invade a gentleman's 
privacy. There was evasion. Some taxes were very unpopular, 
notably the female servant tax imposed in 1785.217 In 1797, 
Anthony Macmillan, a former surveyor, reckoned that perhaps 
£10,600 of assessed taxes went unpaid, partly through evasion, 
partly through erroneous charging and mainly through the over- 
working of the surveyors. His proposed solution was to 
enforce the appointment of assessors to ease the burden. 
218 
If accurate, his guess suggested that 11% of the possible revenue 
was going unpaid. 
219 
The Select Committee on Finance of 1797 
criticised the disproportionately high cost of collecting 
these taxes in Scotland, although the Scottish officials argued 
that the Committee's calculations were erroneous. 
220 
Very little 
was done, perhaps very little could be done, given the peculiar 
difficulties posed by the local administrative problems. Pitt 
proposed but abandoned a bill to obtain faster collection and 
remittances, and the only significant improvement was the 
introduction in 1798 of consolidated tax schedules, an adminis- 
trative device that reduced the surveyors' paperwork. 
221 
Otherwise, the government's response to the problems caused 
by the growing burden on the surveyors was, as we have seen, 
continually to split districts and appoint additional men. 
The war years had added numerous new taxes. 
Macmillan had 
indicated the farm horse tax, the dog tax and the clock and watch 
tax, and from 1801, duties on 
horse dealers, armorial bearings 
and hair powder were transferred 
from the stamp administration 
to the assessed taxes. 
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The war led Pitt to new departures in taxation. In 1798, 
0 
he encouraged the Contribution Act (above, chapter three) and he 
also tried to broaden the tax net. From May 1798, the inhabited 
house tax was to be levied in Scotland on all houses with less 
than six windows. This had never been done before and the 
Scots politicians gradually realised that the lower orders 
would be unwilling and unable to pay. Attempts to enforce 
payment would stir discontent and, fearful of giving ammunition 
to the radicals, the tax was dropped, the Treasury returning 
what had been paid. 
222 
Pitt's Income Tax was his greatest departure. The first 
tax, imposed in 1799, levied a graded rate on people earning 
between £60 and £200 annually. Over this, it was exacted at a 
flat 10%. Individuals simply returned a statement of their 
self-assessed liability to the local income tax commissioners and 
the money was collected by the land tax collector. If the 
commissioners doubted any return, they could call for a precise 
schedule of an individual's income. There were commercial 
commissioners resident in Edinburgh and any individual earning 
his income largely from commerce could opt for assessment by 
them. 
223 
In Scotland, each county had five income tax 
commissioners, chosen by the Barons of Exchequer 
from lists 
provided by the county commissioners of supply to the 
London 
Tax Office. These appointments were apolitical, save in Edinburgh 
where a dispute arose between the 
barons and the town council as 
to the right of appointment, a struggle certainly related 
to current 
224 
ructions in city politics. 
The local commissioners had powers 
to appoint assessors225 but difficulties 
in finding men commonly 
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led to the assessed tax surveyors doing much of the work. 
The income tax was so original that teething problems 
were inevitable. Henry Mackenzie discussed them in two reports 
of 1800 and 1801. The principal problem was in finding 
commissioners. The property qualification was too high and 
non-residence by many landowners meant that there was no great 
pool from which to draw men experienced in business matters. 
Mackenzie was conscious of evasion and called for a system of 
uniformly requiring a detailed income schedule from each taxpayer. 
This had been tried in one county with favourable results and he 
wanted stiffer penalties for attempted evasion. There was a 
suspicion of much evasion by the commercial classes. The 
delay in paying assessors and the failure to afford expenses to 
the commissioners was a constant complaint, while certain features 
of Scottish economic life contrived to make parts of the income 
act inoperable. No tax was levied in Shetland, for instance. 
Nonetheless, while inequality of assessment was complained of in 
Scotland, it was probably less than in England and overall, 
Mackenzie found "the principle of the tax is in general very 
popular". He even felt it could be broadened to include many 
earning less than £60 annually. 
226 
Nothing was done about any 
of this before the tax was abolished with the end of 
hostilities 
in 1802. 
When Addington reintroduced it in 1803, it was called Property 
Tax and the format was different. 
It was levied at source, all 
income had to be detailed on a schedule, 
income itself was more 
stringently defined, and the 
basic tax was set at 5%. The amounts 
levied rose greatly. The net assessments 
for Scotland grew from 
32 3. 
£295,145 in 1804 to £779,475 in 1808, and not all of this was 
due to adjustments in the rates or of liability to pay. 
227 
Again there were difficulties finding assessors in Scotland 
and the tax surveyors often had to do this work. 
228 
Probably 
evasion was much harder, for the tax fell in popularity as time 
passed. 
229 
Overall, it seems fair to conclude that the income 
and property taxes were as well administered in Scotland as in 
England and as efficiently as was likely under eighteenth-century 
conditions. 
Addington's other ventures with assessed taxes were less 
successful. The temporary loss of the income tax in 1802 led to the 
imposition of several additional taxes, further overloading the 
county surveyors. One duty, the inhabited house tax of 1802, 
repeated Pitt's mistake of 1798, by placing a 4/- levy on the 
houses of cottars and farm servants in Scotland. These people 
had no hope of paying - it was quickly named the "Beggars' tax" - 
and the Scots ruling classes saw this. Addington was quickly 
forced to order the suspension of the act where it touched the 
poorest Scots. 
230 
Similarly misguided was his attempt to remodel 
the assessed tax administration on English lines. An act of 
August 1803 aimed to remedy the obvious defects of the Scottish 
system, slowness of assessment and collection, 
by making the 
commissioners of supply appoint assessors 
for each parish. The 
commissioners' clerks were also 
to make copies of the county 
assessments for both the tax collector 
and the Exchequer Court. 
If the commissioner failed to appoint assessors, alternative arrange- 
ments were detailed 
to get the work done. There were serious 
problems. It was, as always, 
impossible to find enough assessors 
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and the work inevitably fell to the surveyors. The clerks of 
supply knew little of tax law and, if of any ability, already 
had enough local legal business to occupy them. That the 
assessments were no longer checked in the Edinburgh Tax Office 
was a retrograde step. As Henry Mackenzie pointed out, several 
of these ideas had been introduced, found wanting and discarded 
when the assessed taxes were first levied fifty years before. 
231 
Addington's apparent belief that English medicine would cure 
Scottish ills was much mistaken and in a report of 1805, 
Mackenzie detailed a variety of alterations needed to make his 
legislation effective in Scotland. 
232 
By the time the full 
failings were apparent, Addington was out of office and his 
successors were left to sort out the mess. It fell to the barons 
to pronounce upon the stupidity of treating Scotland as a Northern 
province of England: 
"we cannot help observing that of late several 
acts have been passed relative to Scotland, the 
provisions of which are in many instances but little 
adapted to this country... ". 233 
Last of the Scottish revenue gathering bodies was the Post 
office with a gross receipt of £78,287 in 1797, collected at a 
cost of £14,983. The Edinburgh office answered to the Postmasters 
General in London and was headed by a Deputy Post Master General, 
who in 1797 received a salary of 
£800 and a small sum from banking 
his receipts. 
234 The Deputy Post Master was appointed by his 
seniors in London but they would 
take government advice on the 
choice and it was a place which 
"should be fill'd by a Scotchman 
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firmly attach'd to Government Between 
1784 and 1806, there 
were four holders, 




A secretary, a solicitor and other officials 
completed the head office staff. 
237 
The country administration 
consisted of numerous local postmasters and postmistresses who 
collected the local dues. Most were appointed by the Postmasters 
General in London, who usually appointed alternately to vacancies 
and apparently took advice from their Edinburgh deputy. 
238 
In 
practice, this meant that local interests friendly to government 
would normally receive the appointments for their friends. 
Wrote one politician, "such little appointments ... flowing 
through me are essential to the stability and continuance of 
that certainty with which I hold and mean to hold the county 
against any interest in it". 
239 
Save for their concern at the 
slow remittance of money to London, the Select Committee on Finance 
of 1797 seems to have been satisfied with the department's work 
and its history at this period is one of expansion and broadening 
services. 
240 
Evasion and malpractice were as much present in 
the postal service as in the other branches of the revenue, however, 
and it was the job of two surveyors to keep a close eye on the 
service. The very low salary afforded to the local staff, as in the 
excise, did not always attract the best recruits. 
241 
One remaining board sat at Edinburgh, that of the Trustees for 
Fisheries and Manufactures. Established in 1727, the twenty 
one Crown appointees oversaw the disposition of funds for improving 
the Scottish textile and fishing industries. 
242 
Their income 
came from three sources, an annual sum of £2,000 taken from the 
customs and excise, surpluses on the malt tax levied in Scotland 
over £20,000, and about £3,000 annually from a British fund for 
encouraging flax cultivation. 
243 
Their expenditure was made 
N n 
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according to three-yearly plans, approved by the Treasury, and 
annual accounts had to be rendered as each plan progressed. 
244 
The trustees had neither profit nor patronage. 
245 
There 
was no salary and whereas earlier in the century, the appoint- 
ment of local stampmasters who oversaw the quality of linen 
marketed had been an important source of patronage to the 
trustees, this does not seem to be true of the Dundas years. 
246 
The Board was ill-attended, causing constant bother to its cons- 
cientious secretary Robert Arbuthnot. 
247 
Lord Balgonie agitated 
for a seat but a year after his appointment had still to be seen 
at the Board. 
248 
In early 1796, Arbuthnot was pressing for a 
vacancy to be filled but it was almost nine months before the Lord 
Advocate and Portland properly considered the matter and Portland 
felt Arbuthnot's complaints were exaggerated. 
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Portland was 
prepared to prompt absentees to resign completely but nothing was done 
and in 1808 most of the Board's work was done by five trustees. 
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Political considerations do not seem to have entered much into 
choosing trustees. Dundas was prepared to use the offer of a 
trusteeship to influence the Glasgow election of 1784,251 but 
the main consideration in appointing was whether or not the 
candidate would attend to his duty. Sir John Dalrymple was 
angling for an appointment for years and eventually got one 
despite widespread misgivings, probably because his attendance 
was guarantee . 
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The importance of the Board's work is harder to judge. Most 
of its attention was devoted to linen rather than to wool or 
fishing and Durie has concluded that its most important days 
were in the take-off period of that industry. By the late century, 
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the Board was dwarfed by the industry it had helped foster and 
so was relatively less important. 
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Nonetheless, contemporaries 
took its activities seriously. In fact, the most important 
government prop to the linen industry at this period was the 
bounty paid on the export of coarse linen. The anticipated 
depression when its removal was considered in 1788 caused 
considerable concern in the centres of linen production. 
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The Scottish fiscal administration had so many diverse 
elements that it is difficult to reach broad conclusions about 
the whole. Each had its own problems and peculiarities but 
some elements were common to the wider system. The Scottish 
political nation seems largely to have been indifferent to the 
operations of the administration as a whole, provided that it 
continued to produce patronage and perquisites to themselves and 
their friends and did not impinge upon their personal interests. 
Dundas was as guilty of this as any other and in 1790 Ramsay 
of Barnton, the banker, recorded rumours that the Arniston clan and 
their relatives enjoyed offices and pensions worth £23,000 
annually. 
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We have met some of them above. The consequence 
of this attitude was the continuing politicisation of appoint- 
ments. This was nothing new but it seems to have reached 
extremes in Dundas's time. Where limited standards were 
maintained in senior appointments, as with the customs, the 
services seem to have functioned acceptably, at least by contemporary 
standards. Where senior ranks became dominated by political 
appointees, as seems to have happened at the excise, catastrophe 
could ensue. 
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This indifference also manifested itself in the way in which 
political and institutional problems were allowed to frustrate 
revenue collection. The absurdity of the salt laws and the 
fiasco of the distillery legislation were well understood 
but there was no determined effort to get at the roots of the 
problems. Too many vested interests were at stake. Similar 
vested interests bedevilled attempts at administrative reform. 
The Select Committees on Finance of 1797 and 1798, which have 
been much mentioned above, were convened to determine ways of 
improving the financing of the war. Indeed the fantastic 
cost of the war, with its demands on all the revenues studied 
above, was the main cause of what improvements there were to 
the Scottish administration. These were few enough. A few 
sinecures were marked for abolition when their current holders 
died and some management costs were cut. Perhaps the most 
significant change was the success in at least curtailing the 
use made of public money for private profit by the various 
collectors and receivers. Otherwise the system was left 
untouched. This was partly a reflection of the limited 
vision of conservative reformers, for there were many offices 
that could have been swept away at considerable saving. Mainly, 
however, change was avoided because a serious shake-out would 
inconvenience too many influential people. Pitt would again 
consider administrative reforms in 1805,256 but their scope 
and effect was equally limited. Too many people had a vested 
interest in the comparative stagnation of the Scottish system. 
It is clear that certain institutional factors made some 
Scottish revenues difficult to collect. Of these, probably the 
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most significant was the high incidence of non-residence among 
Scottish landowners, when the effective collection of many taxes 
required their presence. That so many tax laws were based on 
English principles was no help and English ignorance of Scottish 
conditions was clearly a factor in making some legislation either 
unworkable or inappropriate in Scotland. It was English 
opposition that prevented the establishment of a full Stamp 
Office in Edinburgh. Nonetheless, there were enough Scottish 
politicians at Westminster to represent these points and yet, 
even with Dundas in the Cabinet, they failed to do so. To 
some degree entrenched English interests had the better of the 
Scots. But the Scottish representation in London was 
predominantly that of the landed interest and they may not 
have been interested in pushing matters that would often give 
their principal benefits to the growing commercial classes. It 
was another form of the indifference discussed above. 
The story of the revenue in Dundas's time is essentially 
one of the eighteenth-century system ticking over, with occasional 
adjustments and modifications. Fundamental reform would come 
only later. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE HOME OFFICE; CHURCH AND LAW 
Formed in 1782 out of the old Southern Department, the Home 
Office was the second department concerned with the day-to-day 
running of Scotland. 
1 
Its concerns were threefold: public 
order and the administration of the law; church and religious affairs 
and, after 1794, the lieutenancies and internal defence. As part 
of this work, the office had in its gift a considerable number 
of appointments in the established Church of Scotland, in the 
Scottish universities and in the courts and legal administration, 
together with a few small sinecures. 
Based in four rooms, the department was both small and 
surprisingly efficient by eighteenth-century standards. Like 
other offices, staff would occasionally mislay documents or 
overlook matters. This was particularly true at times of 
domestic unrest when business very much increased in the 
office2 and it could pay a supplicant to have a London agent 
to keep an eye on his particular affairs. 
3 
Nonetheless, the Home 
Office was never to have the reputation for sloppiness accorded 
the Treasury. 
4 
In the main this was due to the small staff. 
The Home Secretary would expect to see most incoming correspondence 
and making his decisions on it, would pass it to one of the two 
undersecretaries to prepare replies. Clerks beneath them 
would make the final copies. 
5 
Of the two undersecretaries, 
one was de facto permanent, the other political. Two men 
filled the permanent post in these years, Evan Nepean, 1782-94, 
and John King, 1794-1806.6 Both feature prominently in the 
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paperwork of Scottish affairs. While most politicians would 
deal directly with the Home Secretary, such was the frequency of 
correspondence from the Dundases that they would often settle 
7 
matters with an undersecretary. 
Much of the office's work was routine and staff would 
regularly resort to their records to identify precedents. 
In church presentations they were not above consulting the 
Scots Almanac if they were unsure who had the right of 
patronage! 
8 
There was also a well established system of 
memoranda books, by which parties could register an advance 
interest in forthcoming appointments. 
9 
Not all the clerks were 
efficient, and Dundas had four removed soon after the war 
began. 
10 
Nor was inefficiency all that Scotland had to fear 
from the Home Office. In May 1788, the King's letter to the 
General Assembly, prepared at the Home Office, contained some 
double entendres, causing "a good deal of noise" in Edinburgh: 
"This may be a very good joke to Lord Sydney or 
his Clerks, nor is there any harm in these apes 
of the Great vulgar [sic ], making what jokes 
they please at their social meetings, but if the 
ministry have a proper sense of decency and 
propriety they will not permitt [sic ] the same 
person to make any more jokes under their 
auspices". 
11 
The Home Secretary had several official links with Scotland. 
With the established church, the direct links were through the 
annually elected Moderator to the General Assembly and through 
the King's Commissioner to that body. This last was an annually 
renewable appointment and was held successively by the Earl of 
Leven and Melville from 1783 until his death in 1802, and 
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thereafter by Lord Napier. 
12 
The Commissioner would receive 
his commission, instructions and the King's letter to the assembly 
and he would later return the Assembly's reply and any other 
addresses, giving a report of the proceedings which would be passed 
to the throne. 
13 
The Moderator would also occasionally correspond 
with the Home Office. 
14 
As we will see, much more church business 
was done less formally, through Scottish clerics and politicians. 
In criminal matters, the main correspondents were the Lord 
Justice Clerk and the Lord Advocate. In 1804, Lord Eskgrove wrote 
that "down to this day [the Justice Clerk] has been treated as 
his Majesty[']s minister and adviser in all criminal matters 
arising in Scotland". 
15 
This essentially related to the issue 
of respites and pardons but could also involve major criminal 
trials. Earlier, the Justice Clerk's connection with the Home 
Secretary had been wider. In 1784, Lord Sydney was consulting 
Lord Justice Clerk Miller about the rise in emigration from 
Scotland16 and Miller was later pleased to style himself 
"correspondent of government for this part of the country". 
17 
This may well have been an endeavour by Sydney to bypass Dundas 
and it was not a duty that the Justice Clerk long continued. 
This was due primarily to the increasing influence accorded to 
the Lord Advocate. 
The Lord Advocate would normally be concerned with some of 
the Scottish criminal matters that came before the Home Office 
and on at least one occasion this involved privately criticising 
the savagery of Justice Clerk Braxfield's sentencing of some 
militia rioters. 
18 
It also fell to the Advocate to defend the 
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Crown's interest at law, for instance in cases where the right 
to a church presentation was disputed. 
19 
Increasingly, the 
office became one of the main channels of executive government in 
Scotland. It had always had a political role, with the Advocate as 
an MP often taking the lead in Scottish legislation. The period 
of Robert Dundas's tenure, 1789-1801, saw the office being given 
considerable, if temporary, influence over the Home Office's main 
Scottish concerns. This was partly attributable to his crucial 
position at the centre of the Scottish legal administration during 
the years of unrest but it was principally due to the position of 
his uncle both as Scottish manager and, for a time, Home Secretary., 
To Portland, Robert Dundas acted as a major channel of information, 
whether advising (inaccurately) that Edinburgh would welcome a 
militia, 
20 
giving details of the Irish passing into Scotland21 
or sending reports of public disturbances. 
22 
It was the Advocate 
at Portland's request who used his influence with the colonels 
of the Scots fencible regiments to try to persuade their men 
to cross to Ireland. 
23 
He was also a prime source of intelligence 
about radical activities, forming the main link between the centre 
and the Scottish localities, co-ordinating the observation of 
radicals by the local authorities. 
24 
In this role, he could 
assume executive powers as in 1797, when he ordered local 
officials in the West to repatriate many Irishmen crossing to 
Scotland. It was not, he admitted, strictly legal, "But we must 
not stop at trifles". 
25 
The dual role of Robert Dundas as both 
his uncle's sub-minister for Scotland and the Crown's principal 
law officer, reached its zenith during the militia riots. With the 
Home Secretary so far distant as only to be able to give encouragement, 
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it was on the Advocate that the main responsibility fell for co- 
ordinating the activities of the local lords lieutenant, the 
sheriffs and the military. Robert Dundas's successors in 
office had less political influence but the importance of the 
post as an instrument of government continued and there was 
leeway for them to make what use of the post they could. It 
was left to Charles Hope to describe it in 1806: 
"The Advocate is considered as representing 
Government in Scotland, to whom all men, all 
magistrates and all public boards have recourse 
in every emergency". 26 
The Advocate's main links to the regions were through the 
sheriffs. They were indeed 
"the real efficient instruments both for collecting 
information, and for executing any orders that at 
any time may be necessary within their respective 
jurisdictions". 27 
We will discuss the sheriffs below, but in general they seem only 
infrequently to have written directly to the Home Office, although 
there were exceptions. 
28 
Not until 1794, with the creation of 
the lieutenancies, did the Home Office had a regular and direct 
link to the localities. 
The County lieutenant's main business was overseeing the 
volunteers and, later, the militia. This generated a considerable 
amount of work for the Home Office. He had power to appoint 
deputies to assist him and this gave some facility to gather 
information. Buccleuch, among others, employed them to 
make a survey of the loyalty to the constitution of the 
inhabitants in his county. 
29 
It was to the lieutenants that 
Portland turned when he wanted information about the grain 
shortages of 1795-630 and they were in the habit of informing 
354. 
him of local occurrences, whether of French privateers cruising 
off the Uists31 or of grain riots in the Carse of Gowrie. 
32 
Again, at the time of the militia riots, he would receive a flood 
of information from them, but here, as we have seen, most had 
to turn to the Lord Advocate. Certainly this was informal, 
reflecting the Advocate's semi-ministerial role, rather than 
an official relationship. 
33 
The militia crisis indeed 
demonstrated some of the failings of the lieutenancy system. 
Absenteeism among the lieutenants who, like Roxburgh, began 
"to sigh most vehemently" for the pleasures of London, was 
high. 
34 
Many had to scurry North at the onset of the 
disturbances. In 1803, the office of Vice Lieutenant was 
introduced, nominated by the lieutenant and guaranteeing a 
resident to guide the deputies. 
35 
The government did try to 
emphasise residence as a qualification for a lieutenant's 
appointment but was never fully successful. 
36 
It could also 
be difficult to remove incompetent lieutenants, as was found 
in 1803, when the Fife Lieutenant, Lord Crawford, became incapable 
of acting from bodily and mental infirmity. 
37 
Nor was a resident 
lieutenant a guarantee of efficiency. In November 1800, an 
embarrassed Earl of Eglinton told the Advocate that a series of 
Ayrshire riots had taken place some two weeks before ever his 
deputies had informed him. 
38 
The Home Secretary was also the principal channel for 
conveying loyal addresses to the King and there are numerous 




Given the amount of Scottish business under the oversight of 
the Home Office, the attitude of the Secretary of the day was 
crucial to the operations of any would-be Scottish manager. Dundas, 
as Pitt's intimate was inevitably in a good position but a Home 
Secretary, by being his own man, could potentially still give 
him much trouble. 
Viscount Sydney, Home Secretary 1783-9, was not particularly 
outstanding in the post. These were quiet years and he 
apparently felt no need to exert himself. Nor was he high in 
Pitt's councils, despite the status of his office. 
40 
The 
limited evidence available suggests that his relationship with 
Dundas was not close. He was nominally a member of the Board 
of Control but like others he was effectively bypassed by Dundas 
who took the lead in Indian affairs. He told Pitt in September 
1784, that he was ready to leave the Board "to the ambition of 
those who like the department" but he wanted the rest of his 
own office "unincroached[sic ] upon by others". 
41 
If this was 
an attempt to protect himself from Dundas's demands, it was not 
a policy in which he was consistent. Dundas seems to have had 
little difficulty in getting his way at the Home Office and this 
was probably a reflection of Sydney's lassitude. Dundas's 
relations with Grenville, Secretary 1789-91, were 
friendly, with none of the mutual jealousy that soured their 
acquaintance in later years. Grenville's papers suggest 
that Dundas's advice was both regular and welcome. 
42 
Dundas's 
own period in the Home Office allowed him, as we will see, to develop 
and consolidate certain policies which he had hitherto been pressing 
z 
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from his position as Scottish manager. We have already seen that 
his successor Portland did not greatly interfere in Dundas's 
Scottish business and it was of some importance that he was 
not only conscientious in his work but was also disposed to 
continue the broad policy lines nurtured by Dundas. Portland's 
successors, particularly Pelham, Secretary 1801-3, were less well 
disposed to Dundas but even they departed little from the 
established practices of the Home Office in Scottish affairs. 
It is to the Home Office's concerns with legal appointments 
and the administration of the law, and with church appointments 
and politics that we must now turn. An examination of both tells 
a great deal about Dundas's management of Scotland and his 
policies. 
With a civil and a criminal jurisdiction the justices of the 
peace were the least important of the local public courts. 
43 
With 
a court in every county, the JPs were mainly landowners, named in 
commissions issued by the Lord Chancellor. These were re-issued 
irregularly when updating was necessary and while the nomination 
of individuals had usually fallen to the county MP, it was 
generally the case that by the early nineteenth century the 
selection was made by the lord lieutenant, the sheriff and the 
MP acting together. 
44 
Very occasionally the choice could take 
on a political aspect, as in 1804, when the Earl of Fife complained 
that four friends of his who had opposed the sitting MP for 
Aberdeenshire in 1802, had been omitted from a subsequent 
commission, "a mark of degradation to public and private 
character". 
45 
This was fairly rare, however. The JP Clerkship, 
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which was appointed by the Home Secretary, usually at the 
recommendation of the local MP if friendly to government, was 
much more political. 
46 
Typical of this was the Clerkship for 
Lanarkshire, procured by Sir Charles Ross in 1805 for Provost 
Vary of Lanark as 
4ý y part of Ross's burgh politicking. 
The JP courts had no high prestige in Scotland. Their 
criminal jurisdiction, relating mainly to breach of the peace, 
had been largely superseded by the Sheriff Courts. 
48 
In 
1797, the JPs proved near useless during the militia riots. 
Their civil jurisdiction was more important, much of it concerning 
wage disputes between masters and servants, maintenance payments 
for illegitimate children and small debts. 
49 
This last undoubtedly 
provided quick and cheap law and between 1784 and 1790, the Midlothian 
JPs alone dealt with 25,000 small debt claims. 
50 
In 1795, a 
small debt act broadened their jurisdiction with apparently 
good effects, although the workload on the active JPs rose 
steeply. 
51 
The Justices also held excise courts for enforcing 
revenue laws but we have already seen that in some areas they 
had a vested interest in being remiss about such work. 
52 
Despite 
many being named in the commissions, in many counties meetings 
were irregular and ill attended. In 1796, in Berwickshire only 
four or five Justices were active. 
53 
The story was similar in 
Midlothian and in the Highlands the problem was acute. 
54 
Each Royal Burgh had its own court with a jurisdiction 
covering minor crime, petty disputes and trading practices. 
55 
Like the JPs, these courts were overshadowed by other 
jurisdictions. That they were presided over by the bailies, 
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local politicians all, was no help to their reputation and at least 
one observer, calling in 1808 for their abolition, described them 
as "a most contaminated source of justice". 
56 
In 1784, there were twenty two Commissary Courts. 
57 
Twenty 
one were local and had a Commissary, a Depute and a Clerk. The 
weight of their business concerned the confirmation of testaments 
but they had powers in actions by widows and also maintained a 
register of deeds and a small debt jurisdiction. The Edinburgh 
office was presided over by four Commissaries and as well as being 
competent for registration of testaments from anywhere in Scotland, 
dealt with matters concerning legitimacy and divorce. 
58 
All the 
appointments were in the Crown through the Home Office and so 
were political. A list of advocates in 1806 shows that three 
of the then Edinburgh Commissaries, Andrew Balfour, John 
Anstruther and Archibald Campbell were Dundas supporters, while 
the fourth, James Gordon obtained his appointment by means of his 
electoral influence in Kirkcudbrightshire. 
59 
The same was true 
of the local commissaries. The appointment of Robert Stark to 
St. Andrews in 1795, was the first signal that government was 
cultivating an interest in the Cupar burghs. 
60 
Usually the 
local MP could expect to nominate to vacant commissaries and when 
Lord President Campbell wanted the Glasgow post for his son-in- 
law, he approached the MP, McDowall of Garthland. Described "as 
next to a sinecure", it had fees of £140 - 150 annually 
(no 
commissaries had salaries) of which one third paid a deputy. 
In the end there was confusion, with McDowall and Argyll pressing 
different candidates, and Dundas intervening to recommend a third 
man. 
61 
Commissary clerkships were similarly Crown appointments 
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and so pursued by the politicians. 
62 
Overall, the commissary courts were in decline. In 1788, 
the Dunkeld Commissary remarked, "Almost every other commissary 
exercises his jurisdiction so near to the established civil 
courts of sheriffs or burgal [sic I magistrates that his office 
is totally unnecessary, y, except in consistorial cases . 
This continued with the loss of business caused by the extension 
of the small debt jurisdiction afforded to the JPs and Sheriffs 
in 1795.64 Abolition of the commissaries was seriously 
considered between 1801 and 1803 but did not in fact commence until 
1823.65 
The twenty eight Sheriffs and Stewards Depute were the most 
important of the local Crown law officers. 
66 
They had a wide 
civil and criminal jurisdiction and their business was increasing 
with the growth of towns and population. They were also, as we 
have seen, absorbing work from lesser courts. As royal officials 
they had some small revenues to collect and they had also to take 
precognitions in local criminal cases liable to go before the 
Justiciary Court. 
67 
There was some work connected with enforcing 
revenue laws and with particular statutes, including overseeing 
the operations of the Entail Act of 1770 and the various corn law 
acts. 
68 
The Sheriff also received the writ for parliamentary 
elections. This was no little power and on at least one 
occasion a Whig Sheriff caused problems for Dundas's 
election management by bringing on an election sooner than was 
desirable for government supporters. 
69 
A Sheriff had to be an advocate of at least three years' 
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standing and his pay was not extravagant, prompting complaints 
in 1786 when the salaries, unchanged since 1748, ranged between 
£150 and £250.70 They would receive increases through the period, 
but government policy was not to make the office lucrative. It 
was seen only as a potential stopover for the holder - "a nursery 
for the bench", Charles Hope called it - who should not regard it 
as a permanent object. 
71 
Sheriffs were generally appointed at the recommendation of 
the principal landowners in a county and there are numerous 
examples, as in the prominence accorded Queensberry in the 
appointment of the Peebles Sheriff in 178972 and to Buccleuch in 
the Selkirk appointment of 1799.73 Lord Fife commonly chose 
the Banffshire Sheriff. 
74 
In Fife, without one dominant landowner, 
the sheriff chosen in 1803 had the unanimous recommendation of the 
county gentlemen. 
75 
The offices commonly fell to local men76 but, 
as President Campbell wrote, "Ministers will never allow that office 
to depend on local interest alone", 
77 
and Dundas and his associates 
tried to introduce and maintain certain standards. Applications 
for appointments were sometimes made blatantly on the grounds of 
electoral influence and Dundas strove to resist this. 
78 
He 
would himself have preferred to avoid appointing local men entirely, 
because of the dangers of local, political entanglements interfering with 
the integrity of the law, but, with a few exceptions, this proved 
impracticable. Since it was never possible to enforce the 
statutory four months residence required of a sheriff, only the 
appointment of a local man would guarantee some form of attendance 
to his duties. 
79 
Paradoxically, one of Dundas's innovations, the 
attempt to insist that candidates for sheriffships should 
be 
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practising advocates and should continue to practise after 
appointment, actually worsened the non-residence problem. 
While Portland and others would sometimes claim that this 
requirement was at the King's insistence80 it is clear that 
the notion actually started with Dundas during his years as a 
lawyer. 
81 
He was not entirely consistent in practising it. 
Moir of Scotstoun, appointed Sheriff of Aberdeen in 1795, at 
the recommendation of Gordon and others, was certainly not in 
practice. There were others. 
82 
Yet some clearly were 
debarred on this ground and this indicates at least some 
sincerity in Dundas's aims. 
83 
The clearest example of this 
was John Orr, Town Clerk and latterly Commissary of Glasgow. 
For twelve years from 1785, he pursued the Sheriffship of 
Lanarkshire with the support of the county, the MP Sir James 
Stuart Denham, and the Duke of Hamilton. Time after time, 
Dundas and others refused all solicitation, because Orr was not 
a practising advocate. 
84 
Despite his good intentions Dundas had only qualified success 
in his endeavours to improve the sheriff courts. Certainly, 
most of the failings of the old hereditary sheriffships were now 
long gone85 but of the generality of the sheriffs in 1792, George 
Home wrote 
"the Advocate has now become sensible how necessary 
it is that sheriffs should be men of at least decent 
abilities, both he and the publick suffer at present 
from some of them not being so". 
86 
Dundas was merely beginning improvements and the weight of the 
system was against him. In 1788, for instance, Queensberry could 
still insist on the appointment of an unsuitable candidate, 
Edward 
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Armstrong, to be Sheriff of Dumfries in place of his father, 
despite public unease and knowledge of his debts. In 1791, 
after three years of misconduct, he was caught cheating at 
cards and ultimately removed. 
87 
The Aberdeen Sheriff, 
Elphinstone of Glack, was bankrupt in 1785 and surrounded by 
so many irritated creditors that he found it almost impossible to do 
his duty. For some time he unsuccessfully tried to transfer to 
another county. 
88 
Non-residence by sheriffs depute was frequently complained 
of by locals89 and despite the recommendations of the Lord 
Advocate in 1810, it did not prove possible to enforce the 
statutory residence requirement. 
90 
The effect of this was to 
throw much of the sheriff court business into the hands of one 
or more substitutes appointed by the depute. 
91 
This was a 
considerable grievance, as "a Scotchman" explained to Lord 
Grenville: 
"The whole duties of... [the Deputes]... are 
devolved on substitutes, who are generally low, 
ill employed attornies, whose sole aim is to 
recommend themselves to the patronage of the 
great by serving their interest per fas et 
nefas[. 1 We may indeed appeal from their 
unjust sentences to our sheriffs themselves, but 
alas these gentlemen who mostly reside at Edinburgh, 
have their hands full of private business as lawyers, 
and that they may not be always troubled with such 
appeals, they confirm 19 out of 20 of such sentences; 
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This seems to have been fair comment and complaints of 
delay and 
expense in sheriff court proceedings were also made. 
93 
The 
substitutes were certainly underpaid 
but again this was government 
policy, to ensure that they did the work themselves rather 
than 
use the proceeds of a larger salary to 
hire another to do it. 
94 
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The remaining officials of importance in the sheriff court 
were the clerks, who kept the records. These were appointed 
by Dundas as Keeper of the Signet. In practice he sold the 
offices while ensuring that those appointed were suitably 
qualified. The income was quite considerable and three 
appointments in 1807 alone earned him £2874,95 
The Court of Session, headed by the Lord President and 
fourteen Ordinary Lords sat in Edinburgh as the supreme civil 
court. It had both a primary jurisdiction and appeal 
jurisdiction over the Sheriff and other inferior courts. 
Six of its Judges, one of them the Lord Justice Clerk, held 
'double gowns' and constituted the Justiciary Court, the supreme 
criminal jurisdiction. 
A considerable part of the Court of Session's work involved 
reviewing the decisions of lesser courts, and pleading before it 
was the monopoly privilege of the members of the Faculty of 
Advocates. Most business originated in the 'Outer House' where 
one of the Ordinary Lords would sit by weekly rotation pronouncing 
on the causes brought to him. A cause could be appealed from him 
to the 'Inner House' where a quorum of nine (and anything up to 
fourteen) Judges would collectively consider the matter. Much 
of this litigation had to be conducted in writing and could 
become 
voluminous. In all, it was a time consuming system with 
"a good 
deal of unnecessary discussion", particularly when all the Inner 
House Lords felt obliged to have their say. The considerable growth 
of commerce in Scotland in the period 
inevitably generated much more 
business and in 1805 it was reported that 
"the arrears of business 
left undone is daily increasing". 
96 
The Judges also presided over 
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the Teind Court, deciding in cases involving claims by clergymen 
for augmentations to their stipends paid by local landowners. 
It was not onerous work. 
97 
The Justiciary Court was nominally headed by the Lord 
Justice General but by the late eighteenth century this was a 
sinecure appointment for a politician. 
98 
The work was left to 
the Justice Clerk and his five Judges, who tried all crimes - murder, 
rape, fire-raising and robbery - in which the Crown had sole 
jurisdiction. In Spring and Autumn each year, its six Judges 
went on three separate circuits to the North, South and West to 
try the various defendants held in the sheriffdoms. Trial was 
by jury selected by the Court and the Lord Advocate (whose 
department led Crown prosecutions) from lists of heritors 
provided by the local sheriffs. 
99 
Neither Court was much respected at this period. The odium 
that attached to their personnel was shared. The Justiciary Court, 
with its powers of death and transportation, without appeal to any 
higher court, was naturally feared by the common folk. 
100 
Conversely, its brutal assaults on the Scots radicals confirmed 
it as a bulwark of the propertied classes. Justice Clerk Hope, 
putting his case for more pay in 1810, wrote: 
"The times are but just past, & seem to me to 
be fast approaching again, when the salvation of 
the country may depend on the character and firmness 
of the judge who is at the head of the Court of 
Justiciary". 101 
Discontent with the functioning of the Court of Session was 
widespread. The system was slow and subject to 
long delays. 
Increasingly its judgements were being taken to the House of 
Lords, because litigants knew "that an appeal at present acts as 
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a suspension for 3 or 4 years". 
102 
Between 1794 and 1807, the 
House of Lords had 501 appeals from British Courts, 419 of them 
from Scotland. 
103 
Connected with the delays was a discontent with the 
quality of justice. The Judges frequently made their own way 
with the law, like George Fergusson, Lord Hermand who "sometimes 
made little ceremony in disdaining the authority of an Act of 
Parliament, when he and it happened to differ". 
104 
The 
involvement of the Judges in election cases had long been 
a public grievance. 
105 
They themselves were often involved 
in local politics, Gardenstone taking an active part in Northern 
elections and both Lord Eskgrove and Ilay Campbell, Lord President 
held superiority votes in the counties. 
106 
Consequently when 
their decisions upon the validity of freeholders' qualifications 
could sometimes decide elections, 
107 
it is little wonder that 
their neutrality was questioned. A decision that went against 
Sir Thomas Dundas in a case arising out of the Stirlingshire 
election of 1790 was thought by some to betray bias on the bench. 
108 
In fact, there seems no direct evidence that the Dundases interfered with 
election case decisions, but of the Scots Judges as a whole, Grenville 
was informed: 
"it is truly indecorous, to use no stronger 
expression, that they shall go and take a decided 
lead in an election, on the merits of which they 
are again as judges impartially and without 
prejudice to determine upon... 
", 109 
More important was a general dissatisfaction with the standing 
of the Court and its personnel. 
Colonel Fullarton reported in 
1801, 
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"The Scotch Bench at present, is certainly not 
respected, and in some particulars is not 
respectable. The President, The Justice Clerk 
and Lord Meadowbank have sons at the Bar and they 
are employed under the general impression of the 
solicitors and agents, that by engaging these young 
gentlemen as council, they conciliate the judges. 
The present Lord Armadale was brought forward, under 
the same impression as applied to his father in law 
the late Justice Clerk Macqueen. While such ideas 
are entertained and acted on, it is impossible to 
maintain the sentiment and character of national 
justice unimpaired. Especially as the decisions 
of the Court of Session, of late years have 
frequently excited the disapprobation of the 
House of Lords". 110 
There was undoubtedly a smell of nepotism about the court. Partly 
this was a reflection of the narrow social group from which the 
advocates were drawn but it is also clear that good men were 
not reaching the bench. 
ill 
There were several reasons. There 
were no pensions for retiring judges, save by special arrangement 
and so at all times the bench had a number of men too old to be 
of use and so acting as a drag on business. David Ross, Lord 
Ankerville, had served thirty years before his death in 1805 and 
for the last two he had been incapable of duty. 
112 
The salary 
of an Ordinary Lord rose by progressions from £700 prior to 
1786, 
to £2000 in 1810, with additional payments to the President, 
Justice Clerk and the Justiciary Lords. 
"3 
This did not 
approach the rewards of a good advocate 
in private practice and 
it was recognised that this made 
it difficult to attract the 
best men to the bench. Inevitably this necessitated 
the 
advancement of lesser candidates. 
114 
The repeated refusal of 
Robert Blair, universally acknowledged the most 
talented lawyer at the 
bar, to take a gown until 1808, was a 
direct result of his wish to 
115 
build an inheritance for his 
family. George Fergusson deferred 
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advancement for similar reasons and Adam Rolland and Alexander 
Wight refused on slightly more personal grounds. 
116 
Political exclusion also served to keep talent from the 
bench. We have seen that the Faculty of Advocates was much influenced 
by opposition men prior to 1792. Their grip lessened thereafter 
but their presence was real enough. At first opposition sentiments 
were not a total bar to promotion and Wight was considered for the bench. 
Another case is John MacLaurin. Formerly a close friend of Dundas, 
they had parted company and he flirted with opposition. Nonethe- 
less, they were reconciled and he reached the bench in 1788.117 
Others, like Henry Erskine, were completely excluded and from 
1792, things were much tighter. Early that year, Chancellor 
Thurlow and President Campbell discussed the notion that men 
who made a show of being in opposition and subversive of 
constitutional order should be kept from legal office. 
118 
This quickly became the rule. Ilay Campbell was coy in alluding 
to the operation of this, writing of four opposition advocates: 
"[They] have all of them considerable practice & 
are sufficiently qualified in point of legal 
knowledge. Whether there may be other circum- 
stances attending their situation which fall to be 
enquired into before they are appointed to the bench, 
& how far any circumstances of a political nature ought 
to enter into the question, I cannot take it upon me 
to determine". 
119 
This exclusion continued for years120 and it gave a poor appearance, 
for it was generally conceived that excellent 
legal talents lay with 




effect was described in 1806: 
"For some years past, the patronage of the administration 
of justice in Scotland has 
been used, something like the 
wages of political intrigue... 
". 122 
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Certainly Dundas was prepared to admit that a large court might 
"afford a temptation not to be perfectly correct in the selection 
of the judges", 
123 
but how true was the accusation of political 
bias in appointments? 
The Court of Session had a considerable administrative 'tail' 
of small offices, some of them sinecures and these were inevitably 
prey for politicians. 
124 
The six Principal Clerkships in 
particular were much sought after. Charles Gordon, appointed 
Clerk in 1788, was patronised by the Duke of Gordon125 while 
John Pringle, appointed in 1793, received the post as a reward 
for combatting the radicals. 
126 
James Walker, appointed in 
1803, was the Marquis of Titchfield's Scottish agent. 
127 
It 
was the promotions to the bench itself that most interested 
people, however. 
Of the fifteen Lords sitting in 1784, all were familiar 
with Dundas and many were his friends. Three, James Veitch, 
Lord Elliock, John, Lord Swinton, and Lord Ankerville, were 
'Independent Friends'. 
128 
Ankerville indeed would oppose Dundas 
to the end of his career. 
129 
A fourth, Robert Bruce, Lord 
Kennet was associated with the Whigs. 
130 
Francis Garden, 
Lord Gardenstone, had supported government but his conversion 
to the cause of burgh reform in his last years 
led conservative 




of the appointments of Judges made after 
1784, shows fairly clearly 
what Dundas was trying to achieve and 
the constraints under which 
he was operating. 
Most appointments were made as a result of 
discussions between 
Dundas, the Lord Chancellor and the Home 
Secretary, with advice 
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from the Scots law officers. 
in the final decision varied. 
The relative importance of each 
Appointments of Lords of Session, 1784-1799 
1784, July 1 
1786, March 9 
1788, January 15 
1788, January 15 
1788, January 17 
1789, November 12 
1792, June 7 
1792, December 4 
1793, November 14 
1793, November 15 
1795, May 23 
1796, March 11 
1796, November 18 
1797, February 7 
1799, May 16 
1799, June 1 
1799, June 21 
1799, July 11 
Alexander Gordon, Lord Rockville vice 
David Dalrymple, Lord Westhall. 
Sir William Nairne, Lord Dunsinnan vice Robert 
Bruce, Lord Kennet. 
Sir Thomas Miller, Lord President vice Robert 
Dundas, Lord President. 
Robert MacQueen, Lord Justice Clerk vice Miller 
(promoted). 
John MacLaurin, Lord Dreghorn vice Miller (promoted). 
Ilay Campbell, Lord President vice Miller (deceased). 
Alexander, Lord Abercromby vice Alexander Gordon, 
Lord Rockville. 
William, Lord Craig vice Sir David Dalrymple, 
Lord Hailes. 
William Baillie, Lord Polkemmet vice James Veitch, 
Lord Elliock. 
David Smyth, Lord Methven vice Francis Garden, Lord 
Gardenstone. 
William Miller, Lord Glenlee vice Alexander Murray, 
Lord Henderland. 
Allan Maconochie, Lord Meadowbank vice Lord 
Abercromby. 
Robert, Lord Cullen vice James Erskine, Lord Alva. 
William Honyman, Lord Armadale vice Lord Dreghorn. 
William MacLeod Bannatyne, Lord Bannatyne vice 
John, Lord Swinton. 
David Rae, Lord Eskgrove, Lord Justice Clerk vice 
MacQueen, Lord Braxfield. 
Claude Boswell, Lord Balmuto vice James Burnet, 
Lord Monboddo. 
George Fergusson, Lord Hermand vice Lord Braxfield. 
The appointment of Lord Rockville in 1784 seems to have been 
at Dundas's behest. He was an uncle to the Duke of Gordon and 
in 
1787, the Duchess was berating Pitt for not promoting him to a vacant 
Justiciary gown. He was not an outstanding judge. 
132 
Lord 
Kennet's death in 1785 created the vacancy that Dundas 
had hoped 
would be a start to the reduction of 
the number of seats in the 
court, in order to raise the salaries of 
the remainder. In this, 
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as we have seen, he was defeated and while the post was filled 
with 'bad grace' by Dundas, 
133 
it was given to William Nairne, 
and he and Dundas remained friends over the years. 
134 
The arrangements of January 1788 were more controversial 
and followed on the death of Dundas's half-brother, the Lord 
President. Dundas himself was offered the post and seriously 
considered it, but eventually declined. 
135 
It was the first of 
two steps that closed his legal career. Ilay Campbell, Lord 
Advocate was Dundas's preferred candidate, in part because it 
would enable him to advance his nephew Robert to the Advocateship. 
In fact Campbell, without consulting Dundas, decided to waive his 
claims in favour of the Justice Clerk, Miller and let this be known 
before Dundas could dissuade him. 
136 
Miller, who received the 
office, was in indifferent health and while the predominant features of 
his character were "simplicity and integrity", the bar as a whole 
was probably not impressed. 
137 
It was not Miller's promotion 
that disturbed contemporaries but that of his successor as Justice 
Clerk. Robert MacQueen, Lord Braxfield, a protege of the 
Arniston family, 
138 
was not the choice of the bar, partly on 
grounds of snobbery. He was uncouth and gossip 
had it that he 




was warned about feeling among the advocates and while publicly 
pooh-poohing them, privately he tried to 
impress them on Campbell 
as a reason for taking the Presidency. 
Indeed, Dundas had 
great difficulty in preventing the Chancellor 
from making Braxfield 
President, 
140 
He would have made a good President - 
he was one 
of the greatest civil lawyers to sit on 
the bench - but as Justice 
Clerk his reputation for harshness and 
his conduct of the state 
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trials fully justified the misgivings of his contemporaries and 
overshadowed his real abilities. 
141 
He did much to confirm his 
grasping reputation by advancing several members of his family 
in the legal profession, provoking Ilay Campbell's envy. 
142 
His elevation allowed MacLaurin onto the bench. 
Miller's death in 1789, again led to Dundas being offered 
the Presidency, which he refused for the last time. 
143 
By now, 
Campbell, who had stood loyally by Dundas in the Regency Crisis, 
was willing to take the post. The matter was quickly settled, 
with the two of them applying to Grenville and Thurlow. 
144 
Interestingly, Thurlow presented the claims both of Campbell 
and Braxfield to the King but the King's preference was for 
Campbell. 
145 
It seems to have been a popular appointment146 
and it opened the way for Robert Dundas to become Lord Advocate, with 
the Solicitor Generalship falling to Blair. 
In 1792, Dundas was again considering reforming the Court 
of Session. Faced with filling the vacancy left by Rockville's 
death, he was now of the opinion that the bar could no longer 
supply fifteen Judges. After consulting the Chancellor he 
asked Campbell to consider alternatives "to render the court 
more usefull [sic I and more respectable". These included 
reducing the Judges to nine or redeploying them to do more Outer 
House business. In this second option, it would become possible 
to grade appointments, keeping inferior candidates in the Outer 
House. Dundas also had hopes of pensioning off aged Lords. 
147 
It was a plan as bold as that of 1785 and Dundas felt that the 
time was right. It confirms his reputation as a would-be 
legal reformer but in fact nothing came of it. Probably it was 
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lost in the frantic Summer of 1792, and Alexander Abercromby 
was appointed to the vacant seat after a short delay. His 
stay was brief but he was thought a good choice. 
148 
In anticipation of several vacancies on the bench, 
Dundas as Home Secretary wrote to Campbell in November 1792, asking 
for a statement of suitable candidates possessed of integrity, 
impartiality and firmness. 
149 
He was at once admitting that 
all question of altering the Court was ended and simultaneously setting 
down the standards by which his successors in the Home Office should 
make appointments. Campbell's reply detailed the claims of the 
better advocates and classified their pretensions. 
150 
Lord 
flaues 's death had made matters pressing and Rolland, Blair and 
151 
Fergusson, all on Campbell's list, had declined promotion. 
It was finally offered to William Craig, Sheriff of Ayr. He was 
scarcely known to Dundas, but was well recommended by Campbell 
152 
and received the post without solicitation. 
The deaths of Lords Elliock and Gardenstone in July 1793 
cleared seats for William Baillie to become Lord Polkemmet 
and David Smyth to be Lord Methven. Baillie was prominent 
in Campbell's 1792 list and also enjoyed the recommendation of 
the new Chancellor, Loughborough. Smyth's elevation was more 
problematic for Dundas: 
"The most material objection I have to that appointment 
is the Duke of Athole[sic ] having wrote to ask it, and 
I am perfectly decided to extirpate the 
idea from 
Scotland of any great man writing to me on the subject 
of a judge's gown, or thinking 
that they have the 
smallest right to interfere 
in it, one way or other, 
and far less to ask it as a 
favour". 
In the end, convinced of Smyth's 




criticism of Atholl is interesting, for it suggests one positive 
achievement in his legal appointments. It is true that the 
Judges appointed, at least prior to 1796, tended to be men well- 
affected to Dundas. It does seem, however, that Dundas started 
to break the age old connection between political influence 
and judicial appointments. The break was not total but it 
was real enough and he had begun early. In 1785, Boswell had 
accused him of wishing to make the bench more biddable to his 
politics. 
154 
Months later when Boswell, citing his support for 
Pitt's government, came looking for a gown, Dundas's reply was 
gleeful: 
"he [Dundas] cannot admit t 
any kind is the proper road 
That opinion was one of the 
thinking that the judges in 
numerous; if they were less 
would not be urged for such 
hat political merit of 
to judicial promotion. 
great foundations for 
Scotland were too 
so, such kind of merit 
a purpose". 155 
George Buchan Hepburn, who tried to connect his political influence 
in East Lothian to his hopes for a gown in 1788, received an even 
dustier reply. 
156 
The tragedy for Dundas was that despite all 
his efforts in this direction, he received little credit 
for 
them and history has instead focussed its attention on the 
other political aspect to his legal appointments, 
the exclusion 
of the Whigs. 
Lord Henderland's death in 1795 was the first vacancy since 
Portland had joined Pitt. Portland initially 
hoped to appoint 
an old friend, the opposition advocate 
Robert Cullen, but this 
was not practicable. 
157 
Henderland's session gown went to William 
Miller at the suggestion of Ilay 
Campbell and the Chancellor. 
158 
159 
The justiciary gown went to Lord Craig. 
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Portland's hopes of appointing Cullen revived in 1796. 
The place vacated by Abercromby's death was again refused by the 
best candidates160 and while Dundas inclined to William Honyman, 
son-in-law to Braxfield, Portland hoped for Cullen. There 
was considerable delay with Loughborough and Dundas failing 
to keep Portland informed, indeed almost dropping out of sight. 
In the end, Portland turned the decision over to the Lord 
Advocate, merely noting his preference for either Cullen or the 
President's son-in-law John Connell. 
161 
Robert Dundas and his 
Scottish advisers had already decided Allan Maconochie was the most 
suitable candidate for the empty Session gown and Methven for the 
Justiciary gown162 and they were appointed. 
163 
In consoling 
Cullen, Portland gave the clearest indication that he was 
following Dundas's precepts in making appointments: 
"I understand that it was either in contemplation 
or had been laid down as a rule, by way of [a] 
barrier against improper sollicitations [sic ] 
or applications, to offer the seats upon the bench 
as they became vacant, according to the seniority 
of those who actually were or ought to be considered 
as proper candidates for that promotion, always 
reserving as it may be supposed in cases of equal 
or nearly equal standing, that right of preference 
which the human mind can not & indeed ought not to 
divert itself from the desire of shewing in certain 
cases". 
164 
In fact Cullen's disappointment was short. With Lord Alva's death 
in May 1796, Portland again pressed his friend's claims, which were 
now strong. The Lord President was not enthused with this and 
he 
had to be reconciled to it by Dundas, who was also unhappy. In 
the end, Cullen was appointed, 
165 
Some of Dundas's fears would 
prove well founded and Cullen would oppose 
him in years to come. 
William Honyman came to the bench in 1797 with the recommendation 
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of Dundas and the Chancellor. 
166 
His connection with the Lord 
Justice Clerk and his involvement with the government party 
in Orkney politics meant that the appointment was not 
entirely approved of by observers. He received a Justiciary 
gown in 1799 but he latterly fell out with Dundas for reasons 
that are obscure. 
167 
He was involved in opposing the government 
candidate at the 1802 Lanark burgh election and in 1805 he 
was encouraging the Hamilton family to attack the Hopetoun 
interest in West Lothian. 
168 
In 1806, he and Lord Douglas 
regarded themselves as potential candidates for managing 
Scotland for the Talents ministry. 
169 
His judicial 
appointment was perhaps one of the few misjudgements that Dundas 
made in his legal patronage. 
The deaths of Swinton, Monboddo and Braxfield between 
January and May 1799 led to a complicated arrangement that 
summer, as the various contenders gathered. Swinton's death 
vacated two gowns and Portland insisted on his Justiciary gown 
going to Cullen and his Session gown to William Macleod Bannatyne. 
The Dundases were unenthusiastic about Cullen's promotion but 
seem to have regarded it as inevitable. 
170 
Bannatyne was 
another matter. Robert Dundas ha c long since written to 
Portland, recognising Bannatyne's qualifications but pointing 
to him as a supporter of parliamentary reform, an avowed adherent of 
opposition and an opponent of the war. This, Portland was warned, 
would not make his appointment as Judge popular with the Scottish 
propertied classes. 
171 
By 1799, Bannatyne's claims, pressed 
by the Marquis of Bute, were strong. Loughborough and Dundas 
inclined to appoint Claude Boswell, Sheriff of Fife. The 
Advocate by now admitted Bannatyne's pretensions on the grounds 
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that it would be improper to pass him over any longer, but he 
hoped that the final say would rest with the President. 
172 
In effect, Portland had already been given his way and 
Bannatyne was appointed. He was a good Judge but he would 
join Cullen in opposing Dundas in later years. 
Monboddo was replaced by Claude Boswell, Lord Balmuto. 
His elevation was due largely to his success in detecting the 
conspiracies of the United Scotsmen but it also allowed the 
Chancellor to advance a friend, Neil Fergusson, to the Fife 
Sheriffship. 
173 
Braxfield had been in negotiation to resign for some time 
before his death. Despite pressure, Robert Blair refused to 
take the Justice Clerkship, citing his ill health. It was 
eventually settled that Eskgrove would get the office, with 
Armadale getting Eskgrove's Justiciary gown. 
174 
Braxfield's 
death before the details were settled, did not interfere with 
the arrangement. The vacant Session gown fell to George 
Fergusson. The Lord President had preferred the claims of 
Alexander Fraser Tytler, and Fergusson had initially asked 
for a double gown. Since he had already refused this in 1796, 
it could not be re-offered and it was only after correspondence between 
the Advocate and the Chancellor, that the offer of a single gown was 
made. Fergusson accepted. 
175 
By the time of the next vacancy in the Court, Pitt and Dundas 
were out of office. Lord Stonefield, who 
died in June 1801, was 
replaced, after some delay, by Alexander Fraser 
Tytler. We will 
see later that the appointment, made 
by the Home Secretary, Lord 
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Pelham, did not involve consultation with Dundas or even, 
apparently, the Lord Chancellor. This seems to have been 
part of Pelham's endeavours to avoid surrendering his depart- 
ment's Scottish influence to Dundas. It was not in fact an 
appointment with which Dundas would have disagreed. 
176 
Five months after Pitt and Dundas (now Melville) returned 
to power, Lord Justice Eskgrove died. The new administration 
was weak and the Addington years had seen a revival of opposition 
both in Scotland and England. Melville had privately considered 
offering the Justice Clerk's post to Henry Erskine. It was a 
novel idea, recognising Erskine's considerable talents, perhaps 
producing some political conciliation in Scotland and at the same 
time blocking him from the Advocate's post should Fox come to 
power. Quite independently, the notion was canvassed by Lord 
Moira in private conversations with Charles Hope, Lord Advocate 
since 1801. Moira was an intimate of the Prince of Wales but 
was less close to the Whigs to whom he was nominally attached. 
As Commander-in-Chief in Scotland, Hope and he had formed a close 
friendship. 
177 
The offer was indeed made to Erskine, late in 
1804, but he declined, preferring to remain with his old political 
allies. 
178 
The Justice Clerkship was given instead to Charles 
Hope. 
After Hope's appointment, it would be some time before Melville 
again took any leading concern in judicial arrangements. 
The next 
vacancy, in 1805, would occur when he was occupied with 
his impeachment 
and at a time when the delays in Court of 
Session business and the 
number of Scottish appeals to the Lords 
had become such acute 
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embarrassments that the Home Secretary and the Chancellor had 
resolved on reform. Their plans, although aborted, commenced 
a period of three years of attempts at reform, culminating in 
Chancellor Eldon's division of the Court in 1808. It is a 
suitable point from which to try and draw some conclusions 
about Dundas's policy towards the judiciary. 
Lord Liverpool would describe Eldon's reforms 
"as a new aera [sic I with regard to appointments... 
It was declared at that time, and it has since been 
acted upon in the case of the Court of Sessions [sic 
that the person best qualified, whoever he might be, 
provided he was a man of good principles, should have 
the offer of the vacant seat upon the bench, without 
any regard to favour or political arrangement". 179 
This by implication, was a damning indictment of Dundas's years 
in power and it seems very unfair. Trained as a Scottish lawyer, 
Dundas was fully aware of the failings of the legal system. He 
tried to improve the standards in sheriff court appointments. His 
understanding of the problems facing the Court of Session led him 
twice to try to reform it, in 1785 and 1792. In both cases he 
was thwarted by outside influences. It is also clear that he 
made a determined and apparently successful stand against 
appointments based on political influence. At all times he 
took advice to identify the best candidates for vacancies but he 
was not always able to recruit them because too often they would 
refuse for financial and other reasons. In the end, Dundas 
himself 
began to wonder whether the bar could produce enough suitable 
candidates. He certainly failed to purge the 
bench of 
superannuated judges. This may have reflected 
the fall in the 
King's revenues during the war, leaving 
little cash for pensions 
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to "buy out" elderly Judges. But it is also interesting that 
even after statutory provision for such pensions was introduced 
in 1808, the problem continued and Dundas was the first to admit 
that some places in the courts were not properly filled. 
180 
That some of the best talent in the Scots law was recognised 
to be with the opposition, was no help to Dundas. He was clearly 
unhappy about elevating Cullen and Bannatyne but he did not resent 
their progress on grounds of narrow political calculation. He, and 
many others among the ruling classes, genuinely believed that it would 
be criminal folly to allow onto the bench men of dubious principles 
at a time when the very order of society was threatened. In this 
sense, the political struggles of the time inhibited Dundas's 
genuine wish to raise judicial standards and in the last days of 
his life he was bemoaning the 'spirit of party' in the Faculty 
that caused so much trouble. 
this stage he hoped that 
It is significant that even at 
"in the future selection of judges nothing need be 
considered or looked to but the personal character 
and the professional merits of those who may be 
desirous of seats on the benches of the courts of 
justice". 181 
This itself gives the lie to Liverpool's claims of a new system of 
appointing judges and casts doubt over assertions that in some way 
appointments made after Dundas's political demise were 
different 
in their emphasis from those that had gone before. 
182 
On 
an overview, it is hard to avo/ the conclusion that 
Dundas's general 
intentions concerning the yüdiciary were excellent. 
Unfortunately 
he was defeated by the 
y4rcumstances of the time, some of them 
structural to the legal profession, some of 
them political. He 
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deserved more credit for his efforts than he got. 
Of the church business that fell to the Home Secretary, 
that of presenting clergy to Crown patronages in the established 
church was the most time-consuming and complicated. 
There were some 940 civil parishes in Scotland, the 
ministers of about two thirds of which were chosen by local 
landowners, burgh magistrates, universities and others. The 
remainder were appointed by the Crown. 
183 
Choosing the minister 
in a vacant parish could be difficult, with landowners and 
inhabitants splitting into factions, through personal feuds, 
or differences over the merits of candidates. In Crown 
patronages, a dispute could become a politician's nightmare: 
"In short, let a kirk be vacant, & they fly like 
crows to fill it up. It may be impious to wish 
them all at the Devil, which in the bitterness of 
teizing [sic II have frequently done: But there 
can be no impiety in wishing the clergy to be 
immortal, that there may be no vacancies as long 
as I remain on the surface of this earth". 
184 
Normally the local MP would nominate the candidate to a 
Crown patronage but this did not necessarily provide a simple 
solution. The lament above concerned the 
disputed choice of 
a minister for Lanark in 1793. The 
burgh MP, who had only 
recently come to support government, 
did not concern himself. 
Part of the parish was in Lanarkshire and the county 
MP belatedly 
claimed a say. 
185 
Battle-lines had already been drawn, however. 
Lady Elizabeth Baillie, a local landowner, agreed to support 
any candidate put forward 
by the magistrates. They organised 
a public poll and in the end opted 
for James Mackinlay, minister 
of Kilmarnock. Lady Baillie would 
later hint that the magistrates' 
mode of choosing was unsuitable 
186 but it drove another landowner, 
381. 
Lockhart of Cleghorn, to fury and with the families of Lockhart 
of Lee and Baillie of Jerviswood he pressed another candidate. 
187 
There were conflicting claims about Mackinlay's political 
dispositions. 
188 
After weeks of dispute, Dundas, as Scottish 
manager and Home Secretary, found a compromise candidate, 
William Menzies. 
189 
The conflict was typical in terms of 
the passions invoked and the contenders involved, and there 
would be more like it in the years that followed. Several 
indeed were in the same area, notably at Larbert and Falkirk in 1793, at 
Slamannan in 1798 and at Polmont in 1800, all of them where local 
landowners fell out over choosing the minister. Of course not all 
presentations were contested, but government was anxious to avoid 
disputes because of the trouble and bad feeling caused. Dundas 
was in fact remarkably successful in curtailing such strife and 
the evidence suggests his rule was marked by fewer such 
difficulties than almost any previous period. 
190 
The reason for this appears to rest on Dundas's understanding 
of the problem. He was aware of two basic tensions, that 
between groups of landowners and that between the landowners 
as a whole and the ordinary parishioners, many of whom resented 
the 
very principle of patronage that allowed others to choose 
their 
preacher. It was the former tension that concerned 
Dundas. 
To the latter, he affected indifference: 
"As to the wishes of the tenants and the other 
parishioners, though I certainly should 
be happy 
at all times to accord with them, yet you must 
be 
sensible that it would not only 
be subverting the 
system that has been hitherto almost 
invariably 
observed, in disposing of the patronage of 
the Church 
of Scotland, but it would 
be introducing a dangerous 
precedent, which might eventually 
lead to the subversion 
of one of our most important establishments, 
if the 
wishes of the tenantry and the other parishioners 
were 
to be attended to in preference to those of a majority 
of the landholders". 
191 
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Dundas's careful attention to the landed interest was 
described by George Home in 1793: 
"It seems to be the generall [sic ] understanding 
of every man in this country that presentations 
are not to be given at the pleasure of the member 
of parliament but to the principal heretors [sic]. 
Mr Dundas was always so chaste in this particular 
in Midlothian that he has often given presentations 
to his political enemies in opposition to his 
freinds [sic ]". 192 
In his position as manager and Home Secretary, Dundas was able to 
foster and extend his system. As ever, the MP was the channel 
for applications to government and Dundas would normally approve 
applications provided that he was satisfied that the candidate enjoyed 
the support of the majority of the parish heritors. Quite often this 
'majority' would be calculated by totalling the valued rent of the 
property possessed by the landowners who were behind a particular 
presentee. 
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If he was not satisfied that a candidate had the 
support of the heritors, perhaps because the MP was trying to 
impose a minister on a parish to gratify other political friends, 
Dundas would intervene, 
194 
It is difficult to date the intro- 
duction of this principle. As late as 1788, George Home, quite 
knowledgeable in these matters, had to advise his cousin, the 
MP: 
"... I do not feel perfectly as you do with regard 
to bestowing of presentations. To give them to the 
majority of heretors [sic ] appears to me as sure a 
way of making friends, and a more certain way of not 
making enemies, than giving them to a particular 
application ... giving them 
to the majority will 
appear to all an act of justice, which will 
be the 
more thought of that it is litle 
[sic ] practiced [sic ]". 
Clearly Dundas's methods were not fully in operation at that 
date. 
195 
By 1793, it was on the way to becoming the norm, 
suggesting that the turning point was 
Dundas's tenure of the Home 
383. 
Office. Dundas would thwart improper attempts to sidestep 
196 
the MP's power of nomination but the MP's position was 
subtly changed and he could no longer exercise it with absolute 
freedom. Portland continued this system during his years in 
office and in any case he was always willing to take advice from 




Later Home Secretaries did 
These principles went some way to separating Crown 
presentations from politics. If the heritors (or burgh 
magistrates) had the main say, it mattered little whether 
the MP passing on the nomination was a supporter or an opponent 
of government. An opposition MP might find that the friends 
of government could obtain presentations directly from the Home 
Office over his headl99 but he might equally be able to succeed 
in nominations himself, provided he truly represented the heritors' 
wishes. 
200 
We have alluded to the unpopularity of the church patronage 
system among the people at large, and the politicians were well 
aware of this. 
201 
Throughout the century there had been local 
outbursts of unrest when parishioners with a memory of times when 
they had had more say in church patronage, would riot at the 
induction of unpopular presentees. 
202 
Nor did the occasional 
misuse of presentations as part of local electoral pacts do the 
reputation of the clergy any good. 
203 
One major consequence 
of the popular aversion to the patronage system was the 
continuing defection of parishioners to the various secession 
congregations outwith the established church. This concerned 
384. 
the ruling classes who, like Dundas, felt that the power of the 
clergy over their flocks was essential to their orderly behaviour 
and who feared the apparently unconstitutional principles of 
the secession churches. 
204 
Unfortunately Dundas's concern, 
as we have noted, did not extend to involving the parishioners 
in choosing their clerics. Nonetheless, it does seem that his time 
in power was marked by fewer local disturbances about presentations. 
Perhaps his system of effectively giving influence to local 
lairds allowed the wishes of some congregations to be gratified 
by compliant landowners. Some observers were convinced that 
the revolutionary scare had made local landowners, fearful of 
unrest, more willing to listen to the people below. The 
principal heritor at Denny in 1799, Morehead of Herbertshire, 
was prevailed on by the locals to let them choose a presentee. 
Morehead had apparently been much intimidated by the militia 
riots of 1797 and this had swayed his conduct. 
205 
Ultimately 
the popular choice fell on a John Dempster "notoriously wild 
[i. e. Evangelical] in church affairs" and it was 
left to a 
Moderate to lament: 
"I highly disapprove of the conduct adopted by some 
gentlemen of late, of applying for presentations 
to 
the man who is the choice of the people, 
because they 
say the times are dangerous". 
206 
Certainly this argument was in vogue and not all 
landowners would 
have held it in the contempt that the Duke of Montrose 
did. 
207 
These two developments in church patronage 
business, the 
recognised primacy of the rights of 
local heritors in making the 
choice and the apparent, 
if temporary, willingness by some landowners 
to listen to popular demands, 
had consequences for the two parties 
385. 
struggling for dominance in the Church of Scotland. 
The Moderate party in the Church had formed in the mid-eighteenth 
century. 
208 
During Dundas's years of power it was led first 
by the aged Dr Alexander Carlyle and then, from the late 
1780s, by Dr George Hill, soon to be Principal of St Mary's College, 
St Andrews. Hill also had the support of Drs James Finlayson 
and Henry Grieve in Edinburgh and of Dr William Porteous in 
Glasgow. The party had internal differences - Hill had little 
time for Dr Thomas Somerville, the Moderate historian209- and 
at the end of the period there was a near split between the 
Edinburgh and St Andrews wings. 
210 
In 1807, a Moderate 
summarised their policy: 
"... to render the established religion, its 
ministers, and the whole government of the 
church independent of the humours and prejudices 
of the people ... to 
leave ministers at liberty 
to inculcate without restraint the knowledge and 
practice of genuine religion and morals, and to 
cherish a spirit of subordination and of submission 
to lawful authority". 211 
This included a near total acceptance of the principle of church 
patronage and the party as a whole had a close working relationship 
with government. It was not a set of values that entirely agreed 
212 
with the congregations of the late century. 
The Evangelical ('Wild', 'Popular' or 'High Flyer') party 
was led by Sir Henry Moncrieffe Wellwood, 
Dr. John Erskine and 
Dr. Thomas Davidson, all Edinburgh ministers. 
They had long 
advocated the abolition of patronage and 
in this they were 
close to the popular mind. 
The Moderates damned them: 
386. 
"... in the opinion of many of the most respectable 
persons in this country, their system of ecclesiastical 
conduct lays too much stress upon the sentiments and 
prejudices of the people, and has therefore a tendency 
to engender a spirit of discontent not only with all 
matters connected with the administration of the 
government of the church, but also with the 
institutions of civil society". 213 
This was over-strong and the Evangelicals were angry at the way 
in which their opponents posed as the only true friends of 
government. In the main they were firm to the Constitution 
214 
and indeed they came from much the same social background as their 
opponents. 
215 
Far from wishing church patronage to be turned 
over to popular election, they wished it to be given to the 
local heritors and elders. This was not social radicalism. 
216 
Church politics had always centred on struggles to dominate 
the ecclesiastical courts and the Moderates had mixed fortunes 
for much of this period. This stemmed partly from their failure 
to dominate the presbyteries, save in a few lowland and East coast 
areas217 and there is much anecdotal evidence to show presbyteries 
balanced against them. 
218 
The Moderates had always been strongest 
in the General Assembly where a significant lay membership tended 
to work in their favour219 and this strength appears to 
have 
endured, with occasional lapses, until well 
into the nineteenth 
century. The party placed much dependence on 
local landowners 
to influence the many uncommitted clergy and elders sent to the 
Assembly. Thus Eglinton was of enormous importance to their 
attempts to steer the Ayrshire presbyteries 
in the 1797 debates 
concerning chapels-of-ease. 
220 Conversely, the active part 
taken against them by Argyll and 
Sir James Grant in the 1807 
221 
Clerkship election was seen as disastrous. 
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Dundas's attitudes also posed problems for the Moderates. 
Robert Dundas, Lord Advocate was an avowed champion of the 
Moderates222 but his uncle, explaining his views to a son 
who doubted the merits of supporting the party, was more 
circumspect: 
"I cannot agree in the extreme of the claims 
held up by what is called the Moderate Interest. 
Perhaps likewise I entertain some shade of 
difference with you as to the total exclusion 
of any other principle being attended to but the 
general political principles of a candidate for a 
church. The truth in my opinion lays [sic ] in 
the middle". 223 
What this meant in effect was that Dundas would try to help the 
Moderates, but only consistently with his general rules of 
church patronage. Landowners and others might be thought 
to have a natural disposition to forward Moderates, but time 
after time there are cases where Evangelicals stepped triumphantly 
into parishes, to Moderate chagrin. This happened at Slamannan 
in 1798, when the small heritors pressed an Evangelical candidate 
on an indignant Duke of Montrose, and at Denny in 1799.224 There 
are other examples. 
225 
Quite simply, Dundas, well aware of the 
essential constitutional loyalty of the Evangelicals, had no difficulty 
in subordinating the Moderate party's interests to his own wish for 
tranquility among the heritors and freeholders. In the long run, the 
effect was pronounced. The Chief Baron lamented in 1808: 
"The Popular party in the church ... are infinitely 
more assiduous in their measures, than our friends; 
& by applying through every possible channel, they 
have in the case of every vacancy of a church in 
Scotland, succeeded so often in putting in clergy of 
their way of thinking, that many presbyteries, which 
formerly & in my experience consisted of a great 
majority of Moderate clergy, are now gradually converted 
into Wild presbyteries & uniformly send to the Assembly 
members of that description". 
226 
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Dundas was not indifferent to the Moderates, however. 
He knew that the church ministers as a whole took their lead from 
the Edinburgh presbytery and that it was Edinburgh and neighbouring 
clergy who dominated church business when the Assembly was not in 
session. 
227 
Most previous administrations had stacked the Edinburgh 
presbytery with Moderates and Dundas was no different. 
228 
His 
success was delayed, however. The presbytery had long been in 
Evangelical hands and it was not until 1791, that the Moderates 
regained control. 
229 
Indeed, in later years it would again 
come perilously close to an Evangelical majority. 
230 
In 
general, if Dundas believed that a clergyman might prove to be 
democratic or radical in inclination, he would try to block his 
progress and it was all too easy for an Evangelical to find his 
prospects ruined by the artful slander of Moderate opponents. 
231 
Where possible, Dundas would bolster the Moderates. In 1791, the 
Moderate Dr Hugh Blair reported that with the Linlithgow presbytery 
finely balanced between Moderates and Evangelicals, it was vital 
that a Moderate obtain the vacant Linlithgow church. The 
competition had "drawn a good deal of attention to the issue" 
and Blair pressed the claims of two Moderates, Wilson and 
Meiklejohn. 
232 
Wilson had the support of a local heritor but 
the Hopetoun family, also heritors, had another candidate. 
233 
Dundas, involved as Home Secretary, had an ingenious solution. 
Through Lord Torphichen, he persuaded James Dobie, minister 
at Midcalder, to accept the Linlithgow charge. Torphichen, 
who had the patronage of Midcalder, promptly presented Wilson. 
234 
By this game of musical chairs the Moderates were strengthened 
235 
on the Presbytery. 
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The Moderates also did very well out of the chaplaincies 
in the government's gift, "the prizes in our ecclesiastical 
lottery", Hill called them. 
236 
In 1784, Dundas had written of 
one contender for a chaplaincy, "The circumstance ... of his being a 
candidate upon the Wild Interest would certainly have operated 
agt [sic ] him... ". 
Z37 
The appointments that he made broadly 
followed this principle. 
Appointments to Chaplaincies and Deaneries, 1784-1810238 
Date Name Post 
1784, Feb. -Mar. Dr Henry Grieve Dean and Chaplain 
1785, June Dr Alexander Carlyle Dean and Chaplain 
1786, January Dr James Gillespie Chaplain 
1788, July Dr Joseph McCormick Dean and Chaplain 
1791, June Dr George Hill Chaplain 
1793, September Dr Thomas Robertson Chaplain 
Dr David Johnston Chaplain 
Dr Thomas Hardy Chaplain 
Dr Thomas Somerville Chaplain 
Dr William Paul Chaplain 
1795, April Dr James Blinshall Chaplain 
1798, December Dr Gilbert Gerard Chaplain 
Dr Thomas Somerville Chaplain 
1799, July Dr George Hill Dean and Chaplain 
Dr Alexander Fleming Chaplain 
1800, March Dr William L. Brown Chaplain 
1802, November Dr George Gordon Chaplain 
1803, September Rev. John McKenzie Chaplain 
1805, September Dr Robert Muter Dean and Chaplain 























The position in the universities bore some resemblance to this 
pattern. At Edinburgh, where he was MP and at St Andrews where he 
was Chancellor from 1788, Dundas would claim 
"Every Professor ... has 
been appointed for more than 
twenty years past either actually by myself or upon my 
recommendation, and I have the satisfaction to reflect 
that in no one instance have I been mistaken. Endeed 
[sic 
the flourishing state of those universities is the best 
proof of it. I believe I may say the same as to the other 
39C. 
two universities, at least so far as the presentations 
have flown from the crown. I do not speak of them, 
however, with the same confidence as in all the 
appointments to those universities, I made it my 
rule to be guided by the recommendation of their 
respective chancellors". 244 
Whether the appointments were good ones is debateable. The 
Moderate grip on St Andrews was strong but not absolute. Dundas 
conferred numerous favours on the professors of the two Colleges. 
245 
Under Hill's direction the University came to have a bad reputation 
for nepotism and by 1807 one half of the professorate was closely 
connected to him by the ties of blood or affinity it . 
246 
This 
situation seems to have gone unchallenged until Dundas appointed 
Dr James Playfair Principal of United College in 1800. A 
Moderate, Playfair had Foxite connections but it seems unlikely 
that this was the main determinant of his conduct. 
247 
It is more 
likely that he was driven by a desire to appoint the best possible 
candidates to professorships and from 1804 onwards, he and his allies 
struggled with Hill's party in a prolonged battle for control of 
United College. 
248 
Hill was at times hard pressed 
249 but his 
struggle was essentially personal, to protect 
his family influence 
rather than that of the Moderates or of the 
University. By 1810, 




similarly seems to have been Moderate 
in leaning. From 1793, it 
was under the incompetent Principal 
George Baird, son-in-law to 
Provost Elder 
251 
and at least one clerical observer, 
looking at 
Dundas's professorial appointments, concluded 
that he considered 
them as no improper method of augmenting 
the livings of the town 
clergy. 
252 
Dugald Stewart, Professor of Moral Philosophy, 
presented the most obvious 
face of opposition within the university, 
but Dr Hunter, Professor of Divinity, was also a prominent 
Evangelical. 
391. 
At Glasgow University, the situation was different. 
Montrose, Chancellor from 1786, aimed for the public's 
advantage in his appointments 
253 
but he also attached importance 
to the "political opinions as well as to the learning and morality 
of those persons to whom the charge of educating the youth of 
this country is to be entrusted". 
254 
He would try to stop men 
of "wild principles" getting professorships but the task was a bed 
of nails for him. 
255 
The University was one of the spiritual 
homes of opposition in Scotland with John Millar, Professor of 
Scots Law, at its centre. An 'Independent Friend', he had 
educated both Lauderdale and Thomas Muir. 
256 
To the end of 
the century, he and his friends were in a strong position at 
Glasgow257 and it was not until 1804 that the supporters of 
government gained some ascendancy in the professorate. 
258 
The situation is less clear at Aberdeen, and it was here, as 
we will see, that the Moderate party was to suffer its most 
damaging defection. 
All these points form the background to the church politics 
of Dundas's era. The long struggle between Moderates and 
Evangelicals over the acceptance of patronage had flared and 
finally died in the early 1780s. This may have been due in the 
first instance to a recognition by the Evangelicals that Pitt's 
government, which supported patronage, was there to stay: resistance 
was futile. In retrospect, Dundas attributed the cooling of the 
ancient struggle to his own patronage policy. Since 
he was even- 
handed to the heritors, he in effect met some of the Evangelical 
demands. 
259 
0 Other struggles continued. Connections forged between the 
39 2. 
Evangelicals and the Whigs in the early 1780s, and much older 
links between Dundas and the Moderates, made church politics 
something of a reflection of secular politics. 
260 
The election 
for the Assembly Clerkship in 1789 and the Test Act agitation of 
1791 had seriously embarrassed the Moderates. In 1790, George 
Hill, pressing for the augmentation of small stipends, warned: 
"Schemes proceeding always from opposition, 
however improper in themselves, convey to the 
clergy an impression that that description of 
men are their only zealous friends, & that those 
who have power are backward to exert it for their 
relief; And this impression will concur with other 
circumstances to throw so tumultuous a court as 
the General Assembly more & more into the hands of 
opposition ... 
". 261 
Dundas was in fact completely unable to persuade the landed classes 
to support a 1793 bill for augmenting stipends. 
262 
As time passed, the Moderates' situation seems to have 
worsened as the Evangelicals gained in strength. The onset of 
the French Revolution did much to mask this, however. Portland 
instructed his Evangelical allies to temper their conduct263 and 
at the end of 1792, Dundas met the leading Evangelicals in Edinburgh, 
when a truce was agreed in church struggles. 
264 
To the disgust 
of the Moderates, part of the deal involved a wider distribution 
of Church favours and in September 1793, two Evangelicals received 
chaplaincies. 
265 
Loyal though they were, the Evangelicals would 
never fully escape the Moderate accusation that they were violent 
"in state politics, and disposed to engraft them into ... religious 
instructions". 
266 
Yet the Moderates definitely benefited 
from their opponents' comparative silence and the mid-1790s were quiet 
years in the Assembly. 
267 
Only two issues, the missionary activity 
393. 
of the Haldanes and the problem of chapels-of-ease, disturbed 
the peace. 
The Haldanes caused some stir from 1796, as they and 
their preachers traversed Scotland enthusing large crowds with 
evangelical religion. The established church viewed this with 
suspicion. The Haldanesi political loyalties were doubted 
268 
and hence the motives for their missions. George Hill was 
convinced that the aim of the missionaries was "to destroy 
that influence which the ministers of the church have over the 
public mind, and so to prepare the way for the operations of 
seditious demagogues". The Assembly of 1799 took steps to 
break what limited local links had been formed between established 
clergy and missionaries. This does not seem to have become a 
party measure and the Evangelicals and Moderates were agreed in 
opposing what amounted to an attack on ecclesiastical standards 
and methods. 
269 
More contentious was the issue of chapels-of-ease. As the 
population grew, some existing parish churches were unable to cope 
and in several places chapels were erected to take the overspill. 
The Moderates disliked this: chapels drew off income (collections) 
from the established churches, 
270 
they were thought to increase 
the influence of the Evangelical party, and they weakened the 
law of patronage. 
271 
Some, wrote Hill, 
"are erected upon account of dissatisfaction with 
the established minister, they become a 
licensed 
secession; And they may be, in certain circumstances, 
nurseries of sedition & fanaticism; the more 
likely 
to pervert the minds of the people that they 
have 
the name of being connected with the Church". 
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In 1795, against Evangelical opposition, the Moderates started 
moves to regulate chapels. 
272 
The result was an overture by 
the 1796 Assembly for the presbyteries to consider. Chapels 
could be refused by local presbyteries but permitted only by the 
Assembly. This, the Moderates felt, would remove the power from 
courts susceptible to local pressures, delivering it instead to 
the Assembly, where they could hope to dominate business. 
273 
The Evangelicals argued that the overture was unconstitutional - the 
Assembly was a court of appeal rather than of first decision - nor 
would local issues get a proper airing. They knew well that it 
was designed to obstruct chapels and they feared the gains the 
seceders would make from this situation. 
274 
The Assembly of 1798 
took the Moderate line and this served to slow the growth of chapels. 
275 
From about 1800, church politics warmed up. One symbol of this 
was the defection of the Moderate Principal William Brown of 
Marischal College, to the Evangelicals. He had tutored Dundas's 
grand nephews and his father as a St Andrews professor had 
forwarded Dundas's election as Chancellor. 
276 
In 1790, Dundas 
had hoped to appoint him to succeed his father but Hill and his 
associates blocked this. Brown's rage at this persecution of 
his father's family by the St Andrews oligarchy was central to 
his later conduct. 
277 
In 1795, with the support of Dundas, 
Lord Auckland and the Archbishop of Canterbury, Brown 
became 
Principal at Marischal278 and in 1800, he was made a royal 
chaplain. 
279 
That year he opposed Hill in the Assembly over 
a Fife church presentation, and the 
latter reported that Brown 
"is to put himself at the head of our opposition". 
280 
In 1803, 
he was described as a "factious and 
inflammatory leader" of 
395. 
opposition but he was defended by Lord Auckland who rebutted 
accusations that Brown was a democrat. In their private 
moments, Dundas's supporters admitted that Brown's church politics 
derived largely from his hatred of Hill. 
281 
It was another 
example of the way in which the Moderates could generate their 
own opposition. 
In 1805, the Moderates were defeated in a struggle in the 
Assembly over the appointment by the Town Council of Dr John 
Leslie to be Professor of Mathematics at Edinburgh University. 
They had fielded their own candidate, an Edinburgh minister, but 
their endeavours to arrange for him to hold the chair with his 
city living had caused offence. Professors Dugald Stewart and 
John Playfair began to press the claims of Dr Leslie. The 
Moderates claimed that some of his writings were heretical in 
content and for a time they had Evangelical support in opposing 
him. In fact the council pushed ahead with his appointment and 
the Evangelicals latterly accepted his professions of orthodoxy. 
Not so the Moderates, who by progressions brought their case 
to the Assembly. Here the Evangelicals backed Leslie and 
outvoted their opponents' attempts to have the matter referred 
to the Assembly's judgement. 
282 
This outcome was a blow to 
the Moderates and it discredited them among the thinking classes 
but the short term effects should not be exaggerated. They 
had suffered defeats before and the voting was not clear cut, 
with many abstentions on both sides. 
283 
What it does suggest 
is the underlying weakness of the Moderate position. The years 
of government indifference to their plight were 
beginning to 
be felt. Despite this, the party bounced back in 1806, electing 
396. 
their candidate John Connell to be Procurator of the Church, 
defeating the Evangelical candidate, Sir James Moncrieff. This 
was at an unusually busy Assembly and Connel's canvass was 
much helped by the popularity among the clergy of his father-in- 
law, Ilay Campbell. 
284 
The good effects of this were shaded the 
next year by the election to the Assembly Clerkship vacated by Professor 
Dalzel's death. The Moderates backed Dr. Dickson of Leith 
and they and their allies put considerable efforts into securing 
voters. 
285 
Despite their optimism, circumstances were adverse. 
The Talents were in power during most of the canvass and their 
lay allies pushed for the Evangelical candidate, Dr Duncan of 
Ratho. 
286 
To these were added defectors from the ranks of 
normally Moderate-supporting landowners and the Moderate clergy 
were themselves threatened with the loss of their chaplaincies. 
287 
Hill had hoped for compromise but a representation of the Moderate 
case to the Home Secretary, Spencer, made no difference and the 
Moderates were beaten 180 votes to 132, with three chaplains 
supporting Duncan. 
288 
With the return of the Pittites to power in 1807, church 
politics calmed down again. Melville resumed his discreet 
support for the Moderates, helping Dr William Ritchie to the divinity 
Chair at Edinburgh in 1809, after an anxious letter from Dr Grieve 
calling for the appointment of a Moderate. 
289 
The general 
government policy concerning church presentations remained 
unchanged, however. In this way, the 
long term problems 
afflicting the Moderates continued. Worse was threatened 
by the Scottish rule of Melville's son. He was completely 
indifferent to the Moderates, feeling that a candidate for a charge 
397. 
need only display general loyalty to the constitution, rather than 
particularly to the Moderates. It was a qualification that most 
Evangelicals could readily fulfil. 
290 
In conclusion, Dundas's policy towards the established 
church can be summarised as support for the Moderate party but 
only where it was consistent with his own, wider political 
objectives. One of the real concerns for Dundas in involving 
himself in church affairs was, as we have suggested above, the 
fact that the clergy of the churches generally were perceived 
by the political classes to have a considerable hold over their 
congregations. 
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In this sense, they were seen as one of the 
main agents of social control in the years of radical unrest. 
With the ready co-operation of the Evangelicals from 1792, the 
established clergy sermonized their flocks with one voice. 
There were others outwith the establishment, however. 
The Episcopalian and Roman Catholic churches gave the ruling 
classes little trouble. Several nobles and gentlemen were 
episcopalian and the group as a whole was much gratified by the 
measure of relief from penal disabilities granted to them with 
government acquiescence in 1792.292 The Roman Catholics, already 
hostile to the French Revolution, were brought closer to government 
by a measure of relief in 1793 and by the subsequent granting of 
293 
secret government funds to their clergy. 
More problematic for government were the seceding congregations, 
numbering between 100 and 
150,000 members and concentrated in Edinburgh, 
294 
Glasgow and the weaving districts. 
They were grouped in 
four sects, the Antiburgher, the 
Burgher Associate and the Relief 
Synods, and the Associate Presbytery. 
All were the offspring 
I 
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of earlier secessions from the established church, splits that 
were partly rooted in doctrinal disputes but mainly in the 
seceders' dislike of church patronage. In the secession churches 
the congregations chose their own ministers and in a real sense 
this acted as a safety valve for the established church, bleeding 
off the ranks of the discontented. For the ruling classes the 
seceders were disturbing, for their aversion to the established 
church was reflected in their secular politics and the clergy and 
congregations were considered to be "deeply disaffected". 
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In some 
places there is clear evidence that seceding clergy took a loyalist 
stance and some had links with established church clergy 
296 
but 
the body as a whole remained very suspect. 
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Young, the 
Antiburgher minister at Hawick, was deserted by his congregation 
for loyalist pamphleteering. The government breakthrough came 
in 1798, when Lord Advocate Dundas was secretly visited by the 
leading Burgher clergy, who came of their own volition in response 
to the apparently worsening domestic situation. They pledged 
to try and combat sedition among their congregations and soon 
after, they sent a loyal address to the Crown from the body of 
their clergy. 
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The effect of this declaration by men 
hitherto considered disloyal was thought by government to be 
considerable, and a regular sum was secretly allocated to one of 
their number, the Rev. James Hall, to help in the work of 
299 
encouraging loyalty among the clergy and congregations. Either at 
this point or later, similar links were established 
between government 
300 
and the Antiburgher clergy. Both connections were maintained 
over several years and went 
far to allay concern about the seceders. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
DUNDAS, ADDINGTON AND SCOTLAND, 1801-1804 
In February 1801, Pitt and several of his Cabinet, including 
Dundas, tendered their resignations when it became clear that 
the King would not countenance their plans for Catholic 
emancipation. The event caused a sensation and while Dundas 
reiterated the 'official line' that Catholic emancipation was 
the sole issue involved, 
' 
it is now clear that contemporaries were 
right to believe that other motives were also concerned. There 
was undoubtedly a measure of war weariness in the Cabinet. The 
Foxite secession from parliament in 1797, by removing opposition 
pressure, allowed previously latent divisions to surface in the 
government and there had been much disagrement over war policy. 
Similarly there had been a coolness growing between Pitt and the 
King. Pitt increasingly took his sovereign's support for granted, 
while the King, resenting this insensitivity, took to interfering 
in policy matters, operating through intimates of his own. 
Between 1799 and 1800, King and Cabinet differed on a variety of 
foreign and domestic issues and as the sovereign's estrangement 
grew, so it was nurtured by unscrupulous courtiers, notably 
Lords Auckland and Loughborough. The royal rejection of 
Catholic emancipation was in effect merely the straw that broke 
the Cabinet's back. 
2 
The resignation was quite unusual by eighteenth-century 
standards, in that the outgoing ministers undertook 
to support 
3 
the new government. On Pitt's advice, 
this was given to the 
Speaker, Henry Addington. Opposed to Catholic emancipation, the 
42 4. 
courtly and diffident Addington was to enjoy a much closer 
relationship with the King than Pitt had. In office he was the 
royal favourite and in a real sense he was more obviously the King's 
first minister than Pitt had ever been. 
4 
Unfortunately his 
administration was undoubtedly seen as second-best 
5 
and it 
was Pitt's promise of support and his persuasion of several 
friends to take office that underwrote its successful establishment. 
The King fell ill during the arrangement -a recurrence of his 
malady of 1788/9 - and for a brief period a regency seemed 
likely. Pitt took this opportunity to make it known that 
he would never again disturb the King's mind by pressing Catholic 
emancipation. This assurance and doubts about Addington's 
abilities, led to a hurried and confused attempt by some of 
Pitt's friends, including Dundas, to restore him to office in 
March. Beyond confirming onlookers in their suspicions about 
the real motives for the change of government, nothing came of 




Dundas had serious reservations about Addington's 
fitness 
for office but kept them to himself, avowing 
full support for his 
ministry, while preparing 
himself for a more retired life.? It 
was understood that he would retain a say 
in Indian and Scottish 
business and in both departments 
his nephew William was brought 
forward, in effect to represent the 
Dundas interest in government. 
To Lord Glenbervie, Henry Dundas 
had the appearance of a puppet 
8 
master behind the scenes. 
The Scottish arrangements were settled 
in April and May. Chief Baron 
Montgomery was persuaded to resign 
42 5. 
with a pension to allow the promotion of Lord Advocate Dundas. 
He was succeeded as Dean of the Faculty of Advocates by Robert 
Blair and Robert S. Dundas took his seat for Midlothian. 
9 
Charles 
Hope became Lord Advocate but while the office retained its role 
as a link between local and central government, it almost 
completely lost the sub-ministerial functions that Robert 
Dundas had exercised. The day to day oversight of Scottish 
politics remained with the Dundas family. Hope retained the 
Advocate's pre-eminence in framing certain Scottish legislation, 
such as the Passenger Vessels Act of 1803, and he also took a 
close concern in volunteer and militia affairs. 
10 
On 9 April, under friendly prodding from Ferguson of Raith, 
William Dundas was brought to say that with the help of his 
brother Robert, he would be able to govern Scotland. "We 
shall see", Glenbervie told his diary. 
11 
In fact there is no 
evidence of any dispute about Scottish management at this early 
stage and his Indian business complete, Henry Dundas left for 
Scotland in July. 
12 
In August, Hiley Addington, the Premier's 
brother, wrote to Dundas, "You may be assured that no Treasury 
Warrants, in which Scotland is interested, will be issued without 
your advice & direction". 
13 
When Colonel William Stewart, son to 
Lord Galloway, tried to obtain Addington's support in his 
Wigtownshire politics, the correspondence was simply referred 
for Dundas's advice. Dundas gave friendly counsel, advising 
Addington not to commit himself in a contest that had implications 
14 
for the politics of neighbouring counties. 
A little later, 
Hiley Addington received a polite but firm letter detailing a 
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mishap in a patronage matter that had befallen Ferguson, the 
Aberdeenshire MP. Dundas advised that more care be taken in 
such matters. 
ls 
In November, Hiley gave Glenbervie hopes of 
government support for his election to the vacant Aberdeen Burghs 
seat. In fact, Dundas espoused the cause of James Farquhar, 
brother-in-law to the late MP Allardyce, and he was elected. 
Glenbervie reported ruefully: 
"In my intercourse with the two Addingtons I have 
seen that the management of Scotland is left entirely 
to Dundas and his two nephews, and that Lord Pelham 
is left entirely out of it. From him I know that 
he is far from understanding that it should continue 
so". 16 
Pelham was Home Secretary until he was succeeded by Charles 
Yorke in 1803, and in common with others of Addington's Cabinet, 
he was not a politician of the first rank. 
17 
Somewhat conceited, 
he seems to have been jealous of his office's jurisdiction and 
while the distribution of local Scottish patronage followed the existing 
patterns set by Dundas and others, there is some evidence that Pelham 
resented the existence of a separate Scottish managerial system. 
Dundas's retreat to Dunira had led some to presume that he was 
totally retired, and Pelham was not short of correspondents advising 
him to take a hand in the government of the North. 
First to write was Colonel William Fullarton MP, long out of 
sorts with Dundas. Offering his services to Pelham as an adviser, 
he hoped that the 
"Northern Hive ... should evince 
their hiving 
qualities around your Lordship. If properly managed, 
they will enable you to suck honey out of thistles18 
and will reserve their stings 
for your opponents". 
In August, Charles Innes, the old Portlandite electoral agent, offered 
similar services, 
19while in November Sir David Carnegie MP, addressed 
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Pelham "in whose department this country is now particularly 
placed". 
20 
Perhaps these correspondents and a sense of his office, 
explain the assertive mood in which Pelham approached the first 
major patronage application from Dundas, concerning two vacant 
professorships at St Andrews. William Dundas sent Pelham a 
note "for his approbation", naming the two to be appointed. 
21 
Unaware of Henry Dundas's position as Chancellor at St Andrews, 
and miffed at what he conceived as impoliteness from his nephew, 
Pelham initially asked Montrose, Chancellor of Glasgow, for 
advice. 
22 
In the end Henry Dundas had his way, but as late 
as mid-December, he found it necessary to state that the names 
were his recommendations made after consulting the University. 
23 
The vacancy on the Scots bench occasioned by Lord Stonefield's 
death in June 1801 had also to be filled by Pelham and he was 
besieged with advice. Dundas had apparently decided to avoid 
making any recommendation as between several good candidates24 
and Pelham does not seem to have sought his opinion. Blair 
had again declined. 
25 
Sir David Carnegie recommended Charles 
Hay but Pelham had already had a less flattering description 
of him as "a rank democrate", a Foxite and a drunkard. 
26 
Pelham 
had confessed to Fullarton that he did not know whom to choose 
and Fullarton promptly wrote him a 
long detail, recommending 
William Robertson. He was not so close to Dundas as the other 
candidates but neither would 
his appointment be seen as a hostile 
act. It would serve to show 
Scotland that Dundas was not to be 
considered as undisputed manager and 
Fullarton coupled his advice 
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had confessed to Fullarton that he did not 
know whom to choose 
and Fullarton promptly wrote him a 
long detail, recommending 
William Robertson. He was not so close to Dundas as the other 
candidates but neither would 
his appointment be seen as a hostile 
act. It would serve to show 
Scotland that Dundas was not to be 
considered as undisputed manager and 
Fullarton coupled his advice 
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with a warning about the dangers of according Dundas unrestricted 
influence in Scots affairs. 
27 
Montrose was driving at a similar 
idea in January 1802, advising Pelham to cajole Blair to the 
bench. Such an arrangement 
"would give an air 
... & show that yo 
own collecting: to 
very attentive, at 
that they max form 
of power". 2o 
of energy to your administration 
u acted from materials of your 
which point the Scotch are now 
the eve of a general election, 
an opinion of the scource [sic 
Montrose certainly wanted Dundas's influence lessened for, as we 
shall see, the two were by now at loggerheads. Latterly, 
Pelham had asked Lord Minto to investigate the candidates and 
after a brief enquiry, Minto pointed to Alexander Fraser Tytler. 
29 
This seems to have been decisive, for he was appointed in February. 
The new judge was a friend of Dundas, whose influence was not likely 
to have been diminished by the appointment. 
Henry Dundas was not seen in London until April 1802. This 
was partly due to his wish to retire but principally to his 
disapproval of the peace preliminaries with France, revealed in 
December. These involved Britain ceding her most important 
conquests, including the Cape, Malta and Minorca. Nationally 
the reaction was mixed but war weariness and Pitt's endorsement 
of the terms as honourable and advantageous swayed many. 
Parliamentary opposition was correspondingly limited but it 
included Grenville and his followers who opposed government, 
openly breaking with Pitt. 
30 
Dundas was horrified by the 
preliminaries, seeing them as 
disastrous to the security of the 
Empire and he was furious at Pitt's involvement 
in framing the 
429. 
treaty. While his views were revealed to a few intimates, 
he said nothing publicly and avoided going to the opening of 
parliament, where he would have been obliged to speak out 
against government and against Pitt. 
31 
His silently remaining 
in Scotland was taken by some to indicate his support for 
government, combined with a disapproval of certain parts of the peace. 
With this impression, Colonel Alexander Hope MP begged Dundas not 
to withdraw from public life but to continue to manage Scotland 
and give his general advice to government. Dundas's reply was 
oblique but expressed his wish to continue in retirement. 
32 
With his continued retreat at Dunira, it is little wonder that 
Walter Scott could believe in January 1802 that "There is at 
present no establishd [sic ] Minister for Scotland ". 
33 
In fact, 
Dundas's retiral did not yet extend to Scottish affairs. 
The first major difference between Dundas and Addington 
was already brewing and concerned elections in Fife and 
Stirlingshire. Both counties were dominated by lairds rather 
than noblemen and both had proved difficult for government to 
'manage'. Only in Stirlingshire was there a prominent landowner, 
Montrose, and the gentry had long made it their study to curtail 
his family's ambitions. 
34 
The crisis began with the elevation 
of the county MP, George Keith Eiphinstone, 
to the Lords. His 
family, with Montrose's support, advanced 
Captain Charles 
Elphinstone Fleeming and asked for Dundas's support. 
Rundas declined, 




The result was two elections for Stirlingshire 
in 1802: an uncontested by-election 
in January and a hard-fought 
430. 
general election in July. 
By now, Montrose was in the second rank of British politicians. 
He had a seat in Cabinet and had been offered but declined the 
Lord Lieutenancy of Ireland in February 1801.36 He was outraged 
to be opposed by Dundas and in December he wrote to his friend 
Pelham, resigning the Stirlingshire Lieutenancy and his seat at 
the India Board in protest. 
37 
Pelham dissuaded him from 
resigning but the Duke was still furious at being humiliated in 
his own county by a man using the influence of government against 
him. 
38 
He waited till January before speaking to Addington, 
when he asked that Dundas and Abercromby should withdraw, or 
that government should take sides "even against the supposed 
present all powerful influence of Mr Dundas". 
39 
By the 
time Addington turned to the problem he had also to consider 
events in Fife. 
Dundas had not been happy with Sir William Erskine's election 
for Fife in 1796, and by 1801 he was resolved to return his 
relative, Colonel John Hope, then on foreign service, at the 
next general election. 
40 
The canvassing began in early 1802 
and Dundas's being out of office does not seem to have harmed 
his interest. 
41 
Someone must have discussed Fife with Addington, 
because on 31 January he wrote to Dundas, saying that he understood 
Dundas to be opposing old established interests in Fife and 
Stirlingshire, both hitherto loyal to government. If Dundas 
did not desist, government influence would be used against 
him. 
42 
Now Dundas was furious, describing Addington's letter 
as founded on misrepresentation. To Pitt, Dundas denied that 
Montrose's was an "old established interest", nor did he think 
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'government' would be able to help him in Stirlingshire. 
Concerning Fife, Dundas himself claimed to have the principal 
personal interest. He concluded, writing of government, 
"If they let me alone and allow me to be quiet, 
they need not be afraid that I have any disposition 
to stand between them and the full exercise of their 
ministerial authority, but it must be done with 
decency,... ". 43 
To David Scott, Dundas pointed out that Montrose had taken 
"the magnificent line of walking over us", until he realised 
that an independent Scots county would not tolerate this. Pitt 
and Addington might persuade Abercromby to withdraw but it would 
have to be done with civility. Dundas concluded by hinting at 
plans to abdicate as Scots manager. 
44 
On 7 February, Dundas was able to tell Pitt that an 
arrangement was likely in Fife, whereby Sir William Erskine 
would be elected but would resign his seat if Colonel Hope wanted 
it on returning home. 
45 
By 15 February, the matter was settled 
between Dundas and Erskine but this was kept secret to avoid 
offending the freeholders, and the canvass was continued for a 
while before Hope's candidacy was ostensibly withdrawn. 
46 
The 
campaign had actually gone in Hope's favour but despite D undas's 
prodding on his return, he proved unwilling to take the seat47 and 
48 
the Dundas/Erskine pact remained secret. 
It is less clear what happened about Stirlingshire. The 
canvassing continued through February and on to the general 
election in July, when Elphinstone decisively defeated Abercromby. 
49 
We will see that Dundas and Addington had made their peace in April 
and it seems likely that administration ultimately took no side 
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in the struggle as was usual when two government supporters 
fell out. Montrose would nurse a grudge against Dundas 
for some years. 
50 
Recent writers have concluded that the two contests arose 
from Dundas's high handedness. 
51 
This is only true up to a 
point. Dundas had an established interest in Fife and was no 
upstart there. At least one observer felt that the opposition 
to Hope was "an unhandsome proceeding". 
52 
In Stirlingshire there 
is also room for exonerating Dundas. Montrose had never 
understood how to treat the county and there is justice in 
Dundas's accusing him of arrogance. 
53 
Abercromby undoubtedly 
had the support of many disenchanted with Montrose's interference 
in the county election of 1796.54 
In April 1802, Dundas went to London and had a full discussion 
with Addington. Partly it concerned Pitt, who was now, to 
Dundas's annoyance, standing aloof from government, sulking at 
Walmer. Dundas agreed to try to intercede with him. Dundas 
and Addington also resolved their "personal misunderstandings" 
about Scotland and despite his continuing wish to retire, Dundas 
agreed to "take the same charge of our Scotch affairs as I used 
to do, and endeavour so to connect my publick interest and friend- 
ships as to strengthen and maintain the power of government in my 
own country". The question of his getting a peerage was also 
discussed. 
55 
While he was in town he also took a brief part in 
Indian affairs. 
56 
In June, he left for Scotland. The King 
had visited him at Wimbledon and was so pleased as to tell 
him that he must keep the management of Scotland 
57 
and in July 
Glenbervie noted that 
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"Dundas is to be still King of Scotland and William 
Dundas under him undertakes for Scotland in the 
House of Commons". 58 
Dundas is likely to have been behind the discomfiture of Sir 
David Carnegie who, canvassing the Aberdeen Burghs, believed 
from Pelham that Addington would not interfere with him. Later, 
he would be surprised to learn that Addington had written a public 
letter expressing support for Dundas's friend Farquhar. 
59 
The retiral of Pitt's administration from office and the 
ending of the war had changed something of the atmosphere of 
British politics. For some time, the perceived radical threat 
had receded and in 1802 the last Scottish sedition trial for some 
years ended with a comparatively lenient sentence for the accused, 
Thomas Wilson, a Fife weaver. 
60 
Thereafter, official concern 
about radicalism was largely confined to the sometimes alarmist 
Lord Advocate Hope. 
61 
For the first time since 1793, politicians 
could look to other problems. 
62 
Thus Addington began revising 
the tax system, in a sense taking up economical reform where 
Pitt had left off. 
63 
Over Britain as a whole, the new climate saw a resurgence of 
opposition activity at the general election in July 1802.64 
Scotland, Dundas reported 
"the democratical [i. e. Whig] interests of the 
country have been more alive and active than I 
have known them for these some [sic ] years past. 
They broke out in the various corners of the 
Kingdom like conspirators at the same moment in 
all the burghs where they thought people were off 
their guard, that they had a chance of 
success;.. . 
'. 
He had spent much of July at Edinburgh, concerting election 
In 
arrangements and in this he was broadly successful. There were 
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eleven contests in the constituencies. 
66 
In Stirlingshire, 
Dundas's personal interest was pushed back, while in Lanarkshire 
the opposition of Lord Archibald Hamilton and the new Whig 9th 
Duke of Hamilton forced Dundas's old friend Sir James Steuart 
to retreat without a contest. Lord Armadale joined the 
Hamiltons in a less successful assault on the Linlithgow Burghs. 
In Aberdeen, Ferguson of Pitfour beat off a similar opposition 
attack by General Hay. Contests in Inverness-shire and 
Dunbartonshire were of little concern to Dundas, since all 
the candidates would support government. 
67 
The victories of 
his friends Patrick Heron in Kirkcudbrightshire and Andrew 
McDouall in Wigtownshire in bitter contests with the Galloway 
family, filled Dundas with undisguised glee. 
68In 
the Inverness 
Burghs Alexander Cumming Gordon at last found himself a seat 
by ousting Sir Hector Munro. The contest for the Stirling 
Burghs was, as always, hard-fought and in the end, the returning 
officer declared both Sir John Henderson and Captain Alexander 
Cochrane to be elected. An election committee in London 
eventually found in Cochrane's favour. With the commons elections 
as a whole, Dundas was well pleased: 
"A more steady and attached representation never 
came from Scotland. Not one of our old steady 
supporters have lost their seats, and some changes 
to the better". 69 
His pleasure was tempered by the unseating of Heron after 
Galloway's son raised a successful petition against him but, 
overall, in the first flush of victory, Dundas reckoned that 
twenty six of the Scots members were loyal to Pitt and himself, 
another nine were potentially supporters of Pitt, five would 
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follow Addington and five were "opposition at heart". 
7° 
There 
is little evidence to suggest the Dundas-Pitt grouping lost 
ground. 
7l 
The peerage elections were also satisfactory to government. 
Dundas had anticipated opposition from the Duke of Hamilton and 
the Prince of Wales and he asked Buccleuch's advice as to 
candidates. 
72 
Addington's only involvement was to indicate that 
if the current sixteen wished to continue, they could do so. 
73 
In fact only Torphichen stood down and three candidates, Balcarres, 
Elphinstone and Lauderdale, tried for his place. Dundas, knowing 
Balcarres to be the popular choice, had written to thirty four 
of his friends in the peerage advising them of government's wishes 
and he dissuaded several from standing as candidates. He would 
later regard his canvassing as decisive. Competition was not 
eradicated but it was rendered ineffectual. Lauderdale was 
personally popular and hoped to benefit from the changed 
political climate74 but he was unable to get enough votes because 
it was felt that his election would be disrespectful to the previous 
government. Elphinstone had the backing of the Prince of Wales, 
but he too apparently bore the stigma that votes for him would 
be "oppositional [sic ] to the King[']sministers". 
75 
In the 
end, the well organized government canvass, in which Buccleuch 
was fully involved, carried Balcarres and the old fifteen. 
76 
Early in August 1802, Dundas's influence helped appoint 
Robert Trotter of Bush as Deputy Post Master General for Scotland, 
another example of his continuing grip on Scots affairs. 
77 
That 
same month, Dundas was formally offered a peerage. 
78 
He was 
personally indifferent to the honour but yielded to his friends 
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who argued that his remaining in public life was essential to the 
continuance of the political influence that he had built up for 
supporting government. 
79 
His title, Viscount Melville, Baron 
Dunira, was not in fact made public until December. This 
was partly because of the need to settle the necessary elections 
consequent on his leaving the Commons but mainly because serious 
doubts briefly arose as to whether future generations of the 
family would be financially able to uphold the dignity of a 
peerage. 
80 
More and more, he was slipping into retirement 
and he felt no inclination to attend the opening of parliament in 
November, merely advising Addington on the proper mode of 
summoning the Scots representatives. 
81 
By late 1802, some of Addington's Scottish legislation was 
causing discontent. The disbandment of many volunteer corps 
at the war's end had caused the ruling classes some concern82 
but this was minor compared to the irritation caused by the ill- 
advised extension of the inhabited house tax of 1802 to cottars 
and farm servants. Most were unable to pay and the act had 
to be partially suspended. 
83 
It seems likely that Addington 
acted partly on the old English belief that the Scots were 
undertaxed and this policy of economic 'thorough' definitely 
underlay his thoughts when he turned to the malt tax. 
The malt tax increase of April 1802 broke the convention 
established in 1725 that Scottish malt paid only half the English 
duty. The Scots landed classes were incensed. The original 
justification for the Scottish indulgence - the inferiority of 
their grain - had been much weakened by improvements in Scots 
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agriculture and Addington knew this. 
84 
The rise in tax was 
accompanied by a stagnation of Scots barley sales from late 
1802, and from Michaelmas until early in 1803, several 
Scots counties were agitating for a restoration of the old Anglo- 
Scots tax ratio. 
85 
An April 1803 meeting of landowners in 
Edinburgh took a different view, believing that their difficulties 
stemmed not from the tax rise but from the importation of 
English grain. They proposed confining the lower Scots duty 
to Scots grain and wanted English barley to pay English duties 
when brought North. 
86 
The Chief Baron was less convinced. 
Acknowledging a stagnation in grain prices, he attributed it 
not to some new-found realisation by Scots distillers and brewers 
of the merits of English grain - the argument of the meeting - 
but to the collapse of English grain prices to below those of 
Scotland. This he blamed on over-importation of foreign grain 
to England during the shortages of 1801-2. When the poor Scots 
harvest of 1802 raised prices, so the English stockpile was sucked 
Northwards. He saw no solution until English grain prices rose 
and meantime he felt that Scots farmers should accept this and 
cut their prices. He saw no benefit and many disadvantages 
in pressing for a change in the law and wished the landowners 
to leave the matter to the legislature. 
87 
The landed classes 
continued their agitation discreetly, not least because their 
objective of raising grain prices would infuriate the commercial 
classes. Addington ignored them. By May 1803, European 
affairs were dominating politics and he was unlikely to be 
receptive to Scottish complaints when he had officials like the 
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Chief Baron on his side. His financial administration was 
noted for its disapproval of local privileges and he may also have 
been influenced by the gratuitous and unofficial advice of the 
Glasgow Excise Collector Corbet, who urged him to stand firm 
against Scottish claims, arguing that some of the loudest 
complainers had benefited from irregularities in the tax's 
collection. 
88 
Ministers began to prepare for renewed war in the Autumn 
of 1802 
89 
and Addington attempted to bring Pitt into government 
to buttress it against the storm. Lord Grenville had separated 
from Pitt and often acted in opposition, but the two retained 
links. 
90 
In November 1802, they discussed plans for a joint 
return to office but these ended with Grenville determined not to 
sit in Cabinet with Addington, and Pitt, for his own part, decided 
not to return to power without Grenville. 
91 
Yet Pitt was unwilling 
finally to break with Addington. His resentment of his former 
subordinate had been growing steadily since mid 1802. Bored 
with retirement, perhaps jealous of Addington's recognised financial 
skills, Pitt's irritation was fanned by his intimates. He had 
received no advance warning of Dundas's peerage and this had 
annoyed him92 yet he was also angered by what he imagined to be 
a slight on Dundas's former administration of the Navy implied 
in Addington's December budget speech. Pitt had progressively 
withdrawn from the advisory role he had played for Addington 
and by December, he was privately highly critical of him. The 
two met in January 1803, when Addington tried to coax Pitt to end 
his long absence from politics. In this he failed, Pitt vainly 
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demanding that he withdraw his recent budget, but they parted 
cordially enough. Addington would not take the rebuff and 
needed Pitt in office. He turned to Melville, by March 1803 
in London. 
93 
With Pitt's irritation at Melville's peerage he may not 
initially have been the most acceptable mediator. The offer 
he broached was even less acceptable. Addington would resign 
to serve alongside Pitt as a Secretary of State, with Chatham 
as Premier. Pitt's blunt response was communicated by Melville 
on 22 March. Pitt was concerned at government policy but had no 
wish to take office or to attend parliament. He had no brief 
for Chatham as Prime Minister and in any case the chief minister 
had to be the finance minister, with the King's confidence and 
without division of power. 
94 
In short, Pitt would serve under 
nobody. Thus far it does not seem that Melville disagreed with 
Pitt's position. 
95 
Addington's response was selfless and he 
offered to resign the government to Pitt. On this basis they 
met on 10 April. In the interim, Grenville met Pitt and told 
him that he would join him in office but only if Addington and 
others were relegated to unimportant posts. Pitt's acquiescence 
in this blighted the negotiations. He told Addington that he 
would only take office at the King's desire and would choose his own 
Cabinet. Addington had hoped that Pitt would not insist on 
Grenville - who had taxed him hard in opposition - coming 
immediately to office. Pitt would give no such assurance and 
was clearly bent on consigning Addington to the Lords. Addington 
was shocked but digested the proposal. His Cabinet, unwilling 
to have Grenville's friends thrust on them, rejected it and by 
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14 April the negotiations were dead. Crucially, however, Pitt 
had not told anybody explicitly and publicly whether he really 
would insist on Grenville's return to office. This remained 
his secret. 
96 
Even as these negotiations proceeded, the Earl of Dumfries, 
one of the sixteen representative peers, died on 7 April. A vacancy 
had not been unexpected and Addington and Pelham had discussed 
what to do in August 1802.97 Dundas had advised in September that 
Elphinstone would probably have the easiest election because of 
his links with the Prince of Wales's party - now growing among 
the peerage - and because of his canvassing at the previous general 
election. Nonetheless, if government chose to oppose him, 
Dundas felt they could succeed. They would have to act firmly 
and without delay, however. 
98 
The immediate crisis passed, and 
Addington did not reply to Dundas. 
99 
Consequently the vacancy 
of 1803 found government without a preferred candidate. With a 
hint of reproach, Melville told Addington that a contest was 
inevitable and that he would support Lord Kellie: "it is altogether 
your own fault, if you had any wish about it. It is probable, 
however, that you have not". 
100 
Addington indeed declared 
that same day that he took no part in the contest101 and a 
three-sided struggle began, with Melville and Buccleuch supporting 
Kellie, and the friends of the Prince of Wales severally pushing 
for Lauderdale and Elphinstone. By 4 May, it was clear that Kellie 
was ahead, but Melville's friends were conscious that if Lauderdale 
were to stand aside his votes would mostly transfer to Elphinstone, 
making Kellie's success more problematic. 
102 
Elphinstone was more 
acceptable to his fellows than Lauderdale, and his 1802 candidacy 
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had secured him promises of votes from peers who would normally 
take Melville's lead. 
103 
On 20 May, perhaps under pressure 
from the Prince of Wales's friends, Lauderdale stood down. 
In a letter probably intentionally ironic, he wrote that the 
honour and independence of the Scots peers would be best served 
by this withdrawal. 
104 
The result was as Melville had feared. 
Elphinstone gained many of Lauderdale's votes and was elected 
on 16 June. 
105 
Melville's defeat was due to several unusual 
factors. Kellie was relatively unknown to the peers106 and 
had lost out to Elphinstone by taking Dundas's advice not to 
contest the 1802 election. The votes gained then by Elphinstone, 
who had ignored Dundas's request, were crucial to his later 
success. So also was government's neutrality. 
107 
This 
neutrality was to become indicative of Addington's later 
policies to Scotland and in England it angered Pitt, who 
believed it had been a device to assist Lauderdale. 
108 
On 18 May, at the height of the peerage canvass, war 
resumed with France. Melville was gloomy at Pitt's failure 
to return to power but the two were still close and he reluctantly 
accepted that if Pitt did take office, he would have to do 
likewise. 
109 
The next few weeks would stretch their 
friendship to breaking point. On 23 May, Pitt spoke in favour 
of the war but some construed his speech as criticism of the 
110 
government. On 2 May, despite agreeing with Melville to 
oppose Fox's call for Russian mediation, Pitt spoke for it in 
the House. 
lll 
Melville's opinion of this about-turn is not 
known. In early June, government was faced with censure motions in 
both Houses and the ensuing events completed Pitt's alienation from 
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Addington. On 28 May, Melville had advised Pelham that 
government should meet the censure in the Lords head-on and 
defeat it. 
112 
Pitt, however, pressed the idea that government 
should move the orders of the day, in effect shelving the 
censure rather than facing it directly. So when Melville 
met Addington on30 May, now advocating that Pitt's plan should 
be followed in both Houses, it is easy to understand why 
Addington referred pointedly to his preference for Melville's 
original advice. 
113 
To avoid the censures would reek of 
cowardice and humiliate the government, and Addington knew 
full well who was behind Melville's change of opinion. 
114 
In the Commons vote of 3 June, Pitt tried to move the orders 
of the day but was in a minority of fifty eight, nine of them 
Scots. 
115 
Government proceeded to defeat the censure heavily. 
Similarly in the Lords, Melville's attempt to follow Pitt's 
lead was heavily defeated. 
116 
Melville did not regard his vote as marking hostility to 
government117 but among the minority who supported Pitt in the 
Commons was William Dundas and he resigned his India Board office 
the next day. 
118 
It was now clear that Addington would remain 
in power meantime and Melville, removing to Scotland, wanted a 
last settlement with Pitt. On 26 May, the two had been in full 
agreement. Pitt was resolved not to encourage attempts by 
'factions' to promote his return to office and his principal 
object was the King's peace of mind. By 'factions', Melville 
meant the Grenville party. 
119 
Subsequent events changed this 
accord and Melville's letter to Pitt of 16 June was very different 
in tone. In March, Melville had believed that Pitt's return to 
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power was certain120 and he knew that Pitt's attitude to Grenville 
had been the obstacle. He believed that Pitt's public reputation 
would be damaged if it were perceived that his continued absence 
from government was owing to an unreasonable insistence 
upon humiliating Addington's friends by restoring Grenville 
to office. 
121 
Now Melville wanted to know Pitt's intentions. 
Pitt had resolved to discuss his plans for a Cabinet with none 
but the King, but Melville "on the eve of retiring", claimed, 
"I have a right to share in your confidence". He warned that 
Grenville's and Addington's friends could not be mixed in office 
and Pitt would have to decide between those of his friends who 
had supported Addington, as Pitt originally wished, and those, 
like Grenville, who had not. Pitt had stated he would never 
join any faction to force a government on the King: how could 
he now consider taking into office men who had acted on opposite 
principles? Until the King knew that Pitt would not try to 
bring Grenville into the Cabinet, he would not call on him. 
If Melville knew the direction of Pitt's thinking, he could make 
discreet use of it and while he wrote of the loyalty of the Scots 
ruling classes to Pitt, he hinted at their probable dissatisfaction 
if they perceived that Pitt was allowing Grenville to interfere with 
his return to power. Melville's was an emotional letter, the only 
one in his long correspondence with Pitt that suggests the depth 
of their friendship. 
122 
Pitt responded quickly, and the two 
met. 
123 
Melville gave two accounts of their conversation. It 
lasted hours but was ultimately unsatisfactory to him. Pitt 
was unwilling to discuss his views on Grenville unless Melville 
swore secrecy, which he was not, apparently, prepared to do. This 
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seems to have convinced Melville that Pitt did intend to press 
Grenville on the King. Crucially the two agreed on one point, 
that the King himself did not want to see Pitt returned to 
power, having apparently been annoyed with Pitt's conduct 
in the late negotiations. When Pitt and Melville parted, 
it seems that they did so on cool terms and they did not 
communicate for eight months. 
124 
From Scotland, Melville 
declared an intention of continuing support for government 
and he was displeased with Pitt's continued carping and sniping 
at Addington. 
With the resignation of William Dundas and Melville's return 
North, the government of Scotland fell to others. Melville's 
last major work in Scots affairs had been his nomination of Sir 
John Stuart of Allanbank to be an Excise Commissioner in May125 
and the supervision of the peerage election in June. Addington 
now decided to forego the services of a Scottish manager and rule 
directly from London. Later he would write that his government 
would prove 
"by its conduct, that it is determin'd to keep 
clear of narrow influence, & cabal, & to act 126 
fairly, & impartially by the people of Scotland". 
In part, this decision was forced on him. The Melvillites might 
give a general loyalty to government but after their votes in 
June they could not continue to manage Scotland. Addington's 
policy was the logical culmination of his occasional interference 
in Scots affairs since 1802. Further, the government apparently 
had massive support in parliament and the conduct of a few potentially 
unreliable Scots was of less consequence when the generality of the 
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Scots ruling classes fell in behind government to support 
the war. 
127 
This change in Melville's status was not 
apparent to most Scots, however, not least because government 
still consulted him on some matters. In July 1803, Alexander 
Trotter expressed a perception that would remain prevalent: 
"every thing in the quarter you mention still 
remains under the recommendation of Ld M. It 
wou'd therefore be ruin to the business to make 
application in the 1st instance to any other 
person... ". 128 
The 1803 parliamentary session saw a flurry of Scots 
legislation. The lot of parish schoolmasters was improved 
by a long overdue act, initially suggested by Colonel Fullarton 
but actually carried by Lord Advocate Hope against considerable 
opposition from the landed classes. 
129 
From June 1801, the 
highland landowners had been alarmed at the prospect of extensive 
emigration by their tenants and their agitation and the conclusions 
reached by inquiries by committees of the Highland Society of 
Edinburgh and the House of Commons led to three acts in June and July 
1803.130 The first, the Passenger Vessels Act, was ostensibly 
designed to improve travelling conditions for emigrants. In 
practice it was aimed at raising the cost of emigration. 
131 
The 
second and third acts granted sums totalling £40,000 towards 
public works in the Highlands to promote employment. All three 
acts were Scottish in origin but Addington took a close concern 
in them and his support gained him praise in the North. 
132 
Much less popular was the malt duty increase of 5 July 
1803. Announced in June, it was spoken against by William 
Dundas, and by 24 June an amendment had apparently been made, 
curtailing the increase on malt particularly made from bere. 
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Such was the row that Addington established a Select Committee 
to examine the relative levels of Scottish and English malt 
taxes. 
133 
This did not report until after he had left 
office but it gathered much evidence of a declining market 
for Scots bere due to the higher malt tax and to competition from 
the now relatively more favourably priced English grain. 
134 
It 
is unlikely that the government gained from the damage caused 
to the Scottish landowners by this legislation. 
We have already noted the badly misconceived attempt by 
Addington to restructure the Scottish assessed taxes administration 
in 1803.135 This seems to have been the worst of a series of 
legislative errors made by the government. In 1802 and 1803, 
William Dundas and Lord President Campbell were obliged to employ 
Alexander Mundell, a London solicitor, to check bills introduced 
to parliament 
"in consequence of Scotland having been included 
in some public bills which ought to have been 
confined to England, of others applicable to 
Scotland having been inefficient from want of 
words to make them operative according to the 
law[, ] language & forms of proceeding there, & 
also by reason that a number had been conceived 
in such manner as to occasion great doubts whether 
they extended to Scotland or no". 
136 
Scottish legislation had always been subject to a certain amount 
of negligence in drafting but it is not clear why the problem should 
have been so unusually bad at this time. 
Whatever the effect on the Scottish gentry and officials 
charged with making sense of Addington's legislation, these 
administrative failings had little impact on the political nation 
as a whole. Britain was again at war and it was as a war leader 
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that Addington would be judged. The backdrop to Addington's 
opening moves was an initially stout support from Pitt 
137 
followed by a dispute over the July budget and Pitt's retreat 
to Walmer for much of the rest of the year. 
138 
Addington had 
tried to strengthen his position in May by bringing Tierney 
from opposition but Pitt's signal that he was critical of 
government, while unprepared to enter systematic opposition, was 
very damaging. Addington's parliamentary majority did not reflect 
the doubts in his leadership felt by much of the political nation. 
Paradoxically, this was despite his prudent preparations for 
defence, his successful restructuring of the income tax for 
war finance, and the initial successes of British arms. 
139 
At root, the political classes could only see his government as 
inferior in comparison with the galaxy of talent then outside 
office. Added to this were glaring failures in an otherwise 
sensible defence programme. 
In England the rush of volunteers called for to meet the 
anticipated invasion was so great that government, faced with a 
shortage of arms and instructors, had temporarily to suspend 
recruiting. The disappointment, bafflement and insult felt by 
those rejected, opened to a wide audience the doubts felt as to 
Addington's leadership. The events have long been recognised 
as having dealt his reputation a grave blow. 
140 
A similar 
situation developed in Scotland. Late in June, Lord Hobart 
outlined the government's plan for a Scots force of 23,000 
volunteers, allotted between the counties in proportion to the 
respective local offers of service that had been flooding in since 
March. 
141 
Melville criticised the plan since several counties 
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could easily exceed their quotas and government would 
consequently have to reject later offers. Such rejections 
would occasion disgust and foster the impression that government 
wished to discourage the Scottish volunteer establishment. 
142 
Indeed signs of irritation at the government's handling of the 
volunteers would shortly appear. 
143 
In July, Melville learned of government's Training Act, to 
introduce males aged 17-55 to arms and drilling. 
144 
He had 
advocated similar ideas himself but felt that this plan was too 
ambitious and would outstrip the resources for training and 
equipment. He would have preferred the full adoption of the 
current volunteer offers, a form of arming to which the country 
was habituated. 
145 
The final act envisaged two forms of service. 
Men could be conscripted, with compulsory drilling periods between 
March and September and the prospect of being merged with regular 
formations in the event of invasion. Alternatively they could 
form local volunteer corps, liable for service nationally as 
integrated units during any invasion. Government clearly 
preferred that people should serve in the latter form. 
146 
In effect this was to be a volunteer force additional to that 
envisaged in June but it was almost immediately announced that 
any units so formed would receive allowances and training 
considerably less than those given to the existing volunteers. 
There would now be two classes of volunteers. 
147 
Melville was 
angry at this "shabby and paultry [sic ] system of saving" and 
pointed to Perthshire where it was unlikely that some 4000 men, 
who had offered to serve, would now be willing to do so when they 
could see neighbours with better allowances because they had been 
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permitted to enrol sooner. It was desirable to raise the force 
without disgust and without compulsion, but this would now be 
difficult. 
148 
A few days sufficed to confirm his view of the 
policy's unpopularity. 
149 
The allowances were not amended and the state of affairs 
occasioned was a theme of subsequent letters by Melville. As 
he had suspected, there were problems about finding weapons 
and instructors. 
150 
By Autumn, he expected a French descent 
on Scotland and felt that one in the North East would meet little 
resistance. This he blamed on government, who had "triffled [sic ] 
with the spirit of the country" by departing from the proposals 
of June and he wrote of the "diffidence and discontent of which there 
has certainly been too much in the course of the Summer". 
151 
Again 
in December, he wrote of the mismanagement of the volunteers "by 
which government has annoyed every corner of the country'. 
152 
The above is Melville's view of events but he had his finger 
on the political pulse and it bears a resemblance to events in 
the South. 
153 
As in England, mishandling of the national 
armament dealt a blow to government's credibility. It did not, 
however, lead to a breach between government and the Scots 
Pittites. 
Partly this was because many of them echoed Melville's 
sentiments, even as the volunteer fiasco developed: "It is my 
duty and inclination to support government and animate the 
country... if. 
154 
Partly it was the lack of an alternative. Pitt 
was absent from centre stage. Melville, still unhappy about 
the failed negotiations of April, pointed out to Alexander Hope 
that his earlier prophecies were being proven true, 
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"that this part of the Kingdom at least would not 
relish the idea of having an inefficient adminis- 
tration because Mr Pitt would not accept without 
Lord Grenville. In truth there is at this moment 
existing in this country a great want of confidence 
in government, but the blame is laid at the door of 
Mr Pitt, and it is most unpleasant to observe the 
effects it produces". 155 
With some foreboding and a lack of confidence, the Scots 
ruling classes went about aiding the war effort. A picture of 
the Scots Tories' sullen support was given to Addington by 
Colonel Thomas Maitland MP, brother to Lauderdale. He warned 
that despite past events, it was widely believed that Melville 
still had the patronage of Scotland. This perception was working 
to Melville's advantage, continuing his adherents' grip on Scots 
politics. They were acting "at all times in a lukewarm, and 
in most in a hostile manner to government" and both Melville 
and the Chief Baron had publicly spoken in a manner hostile to 
administration. In counties where Melville's supporters predominated, 
they worked to hinder the execution of government measures. Addington's 
only resort was to signal, by some high appointment unconnected 
with Melville, that Scotland should look to government for its 
direction. Maitland's suggested signal was the appointment of the 
Foxite Robert Hay as a judge. 
156 
Addington recognised Maitland's 
letter as "an offer, clumsily disguised, to be the Duke of Argyll 
or the Ld Melville of Scotland". He was aware of difficulties 
in the North but felt that they would recede. 
157 
In truth, 
Maitland was exaggerating. The difficulties facing Addington's 
policies were nationwide and there is no evidence in Melville's 
papers that his discontent went the length of Maitland's 
description. 
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Addington's perception that all was not well in Scotland 
may have led him to make a public demonstration of the new 
realities of Scottish politics. This, or gross insensitivity, 
is the only feasible explanation for the events that Melville 
described to the Chief Baron in December. In a bitter letter, 
he recounted that in the Spring he had taken to London a list 
of people for whom he wished pensions. After failing to support 
government in the Lords in June, he had resolved to tell 
the supplicants that he could no longer provide for them. 
Addington dissuaded him, however, and said that his 
recommendations would be implemented. In fact, nothing was 
done until December, when Melville was told that Treasury funds 
could not extend to paying the pensions. Almost immediately 
he learned that other pensions to an almost equal amount had 
been granted to others, not of his nomination. To his anger 
at this, was added the humiliation of having to explain to 
friends that he could not fulfil his earlier promises. Yet even 
now he did not turn against government and the incident did not 
cause a split between Melville and Addington. The significance 
of the incident is probably that Addington was signalling to 
Scotland that Melville was no longer the fount of government 
patronage. 
158 
Still Addington made no attempt to appoint any 
local manager of his own. Melville described this in February 
1804: 
"Government, (so far as this country), is in a 
strange predicament. It may seem odd to say so but 
I really don[']. t find a person in it disposed to think 
or speak favourably of them... nobody knows anything 
directly of it or from it. There is nobody to give 
the tone of anything they are doing or intend to do 
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in the present moment, so that every thing 
is left to conjecture. I am in the same 
predicament I have been for many months, a 
perfect bystander, and decline giving 
advice". 159 
Even as he wrote, the pace of events was quickening against 
Addington, who was shortly about to learn the folly of leaving 
his Northern ramparts unguarded. 
Disillusion with Addington's government had gathered as the 
year progressed. The rising in Dublin in July, the hitches in 
defence planning and the fear of invasion all contributed to this, 
and the administration increasingly lacked confidence in itself. 
160 
An overpowering desire to remove Addington began to draw together 
the disparate groups in opposition. By late January 1804, 
Fox and Grenville had a working alliance to try and expel 
Addington and replace him with a broad-based administration. 
Pitt held aloof, saying that he would support some opposition 
measures but would not join a systematic opposition. 
161 
Pitt's 
motives are now clear enough. He knew secretly that the King's 
hostility to him was cooling and this made him cautious in his 
conduct to Addington lest the King's mood be changed. 
162 
Unexpectedly, the King's mental illness returned in February 
and the question of a regency opened. Publicly Pitt said he would 
support government only on the merits of each measure, 
163 
privately 
he prepared for the expected struggle and wrote asking Melville 
to come South. 
164 
Melville refused. He did not agree with 
Pitt's wish for a regency styled on that proposed in 1788, feeling 
that the circumstances were now different. The earlier crisis 
had been sudden and government was popular, while the Prince 
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was considered to be controlled by opposition. None of this 
was now true and the country was not in dread of opposition. 
Indeed, an unfettered regency would probably benefit the 
country if it led to a new, efficient administration, whereas 
a 1788-style regency would allow Addington to continue. 
Anyway, Melville was convinced that if the King did not die, 
he should be got to abdicate on his recovery. He advised 
Pitt to avoid intrigue and concluded: 
"I cannot figure to myself in what respect I 
could be of the smallest public use, and I am 
not [sic ] sure if many people might not [sic ] 
have the good nature to attribute to me that 
amidst all my resolutions of retirement, I had 
taken the first opportunity of returning to fish 
in troubled waters". 165 
When Pitt replied, the King had apparently started to recover. 
He restated his views on a regency and pointed to evidence of the 
King's friendlier attitude to him. He conveyed less substantial 
rumours that some near to the King and in the Cabinet now felt 
the need for a change of government, and if Pitt were called 
on, he would want Melville's assistance. 
166 
Melville was 
now vital to Pitt's planning and he spent some time with Lady 
Melville, then in London, divining whether Melville would 
consider a return to office. Lady Jane reported Pitt's 
determination that if called on he would try to form a 
broad-based government. This might not be possible, however, 
and he might be forced to head a narrow administration of his 
own adherents. He would not force anyone disagreeable on the 
167 
King. 
For a while, Pitt waited. He believed that government, 
supported by the King, could not be removed without a lengthy 
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struggle, damaging to the national interest. Gradually his view 
changed. On 24 March, Chancellor Eldon visited him. He 
wanted to know whether Pitt would take power, leaving Addington 
in Cabinet. Pitt replied that Addington could not remain 
in Cabinet but would be provided for. He was told that 
Addington's friends would not give him up and that in any 
case the King was not well enough to discuss such matters. 
To Alexander Hope, Pitt now revealed his determination openly 
to oppose government. He would wait until the King was 
recovered and would then inform him of his motives before 
taking any steps. For his reasons, Pitt assigned the manifest 
incompetence of the government in the face of threatened invasion, 
and the low esteem it enjoyed abroad, wrecking any chances of a 
foreign alliance. 
168 
In fact events in Scotland had already 
overtaken Pitt. 
Francis Rawdon Hastings, Earl of Moira, had been Commander- 
in-Chief in Scotland since 1803 and would later marry the Countess 
of Loudoun. Close to the Prince of Wales, he had become popular 
with the Melville party and he and Lord Advocate Hope had become 
good friends. 
169 
On 22 March, he met Hope to inform him that 
the King remained unwell and that government planned a council 
of regency to include the Prince and Addington. The Prince was 
resolved to have nothing to do with this and told Fox that Moira 
would be his first minister in any regency. Moira, with the 
Prince's reluctant approval, was determined to form a broad 
administration, including Fox and Pitt. Now Moira was using 
Hope and the Melvillites as go-betweens with Pitt. 
170 
Melville 
wrote for Pitt's advice (24 March) stating that no-one in Scotland 
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had confidence in Addington and that any strong government 
would have the support of the country. 
171 
Pitt replied 
(29 March) that the King was better than reported but that 
a regency was still possible. Pitt did not trust the Prince 
and was determined not to serve as other than first minister. 
He repeated the plans that he had detailed to Lady Melville 
and to Alexander Hope. If his letter to the King produced no 
effect, Pitt would try to defeat government by parliamentary 
measures and he asked Melville to send as many Scots supporters 
as possible to Westminster. 
172 
Melville approved of all this but 
suggested that Fox and Grenville should be informed of Pitt's 
wishes for a broad administration to include them, even if in 
the short term, the King forced him to form a narrow one. 
Failure to have an understanding would result in Pitt's 
administration being as weak as Addington's. Melville agreed 
to mobilise his Scots allies to remove Addington by force if 
necessary. 
173 
Next day (4 April) he promised the votes of 
twenty six MPs. 
174 
Melville was clear on one point: he 
was not coming South himself. The main battle would be in 
the Commons where he could not directly interfere, and his 
influence would be best exerted in Scotland. He was now 
retired and only if Pitt was forced to form a government on 
his own could Melville be expected to take office. To Alexander 
Hope he explained confidentially that his income did not allow 
175 
him to resume a political career. 
In England, the Pittites prepared. Montrose was informed 
of their plans, 
176 
while Lord Advocate Hope, a Melvillite with a 




William Dundas to concert with the Scots MPs. He had now decided 
to oppose the Army of Reserve Suspension Bill, remarking to 
Colonel Hope "we shall have employment enough ready for our 
friends from Scotland as they arrive". 
178 
In fact, the 
first move in this new state of affairs was on 16 April, when 
Pitt and Fox jointly opposed the Irish Militia Bill. Govern- 
ment's majority fell to twenty one, with six Scots, four of 
them Melville's friends, in the minority. 
179 
That same 
day Melville informed Pitt of the Scots support coming South 
and of the strategy to be adopted. Of the supposed commitment 
of the Cabinet to Addington, Melville was scathing 
"I trust the exertions about to be made will teach 
them and something [sic ] higher than them[, ] that 
the mere favour of the K. without a corresponding 
confidence on the part of the publick, cannot in 
this country support the pretensions of a minister". 
180 
This was good Whig doctrine: it was also in complete contradiction 
to Melville's expressed opinion for years past on the King's 
right to choose his own ministers. 
181 
Pitt was so sure that the division on 16 April had shaken 
government, that he thought victory in the Lords might also be 
possible and he begged Melville to join him (17 April). Even 
if he could form an administration including Fox and Grenville, 
he wanted Melville at the Board of Control and with "the 
management of Scotland". 
182 
Finally persuaded, Melville came 
South, "with his pocket full of proxies, and a friendly 
attendance of commoners". 
183 
Addington was already in contact 
with Pitt, in effect looking for terms, and Pitt himself had told 
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Fox and Grenville of his plans. 
184 
On 22 April, he passed to 
the Chancellor his letter for the King, which was delivered five 
days later. 
185 
Addington's removal was fast approaching. On 
23 April, a motion by Fox for a committee to consider the 
country's defence saw a government majority of only fifty two. 
Fourteen Scots MPs were in the minority, twelve of them friends 
of Pitt and Melville. 
186 
On 25 April, the government majority 
fell to thirty seven at the vote on the Army of Reserve Suspension 
Bill. Sixteen Scots stood in the minority with Fox and Pitt, 
fourteen of them Melville's friends. 
187 
For a government 
that had so recently enjoyed massive majorities, this was 
disastrous. On 29 April, Addington declared his resolution 
to resign. 
188 
The negotiations to form a new government began. 
In discussing Addington's relationship with the Scots 
politicians, some points are salient. As in England, he was a 
second choice leader. Even his friend Montrose would later write 
that he 
"has not compass of mind, & energy of character, 
sufficient for the supreme direction & controul [sic ] 
of public affairs in this country, [although] he is 
certainly neither without talents, or honorable 
feeling". 189 
Addington was not without friends in Scotland. He could call on 
Queensberry, Montrose and Lord Leven among the peers and 
among the commoners he had perhaps half a dozen followers. But 
he did not try to construct a personal party in the North. While 
he enjoyed Melville's confidence, this was unnecessary but even 
when he had broken with him, he failed properly to publicise 




Even Montrose, who might have been expected to know better, 
would say that Melville had never been out of power. 
190 
When the storm broke in 1804, Addington had no-one to rally 
any Scots supporters and was confronted, as Fullarton had 
long since warned, with an empire within an empire. 
191 
This 
had been the nightmare of English governments since the Union: 
a Scottish manager using the influence that they had given him 
to bring them down. It was left to Lord Leven to pronounce on 
it: 
"But in as far as the support of this part of the 
country is an object to Govt[, ] I must confess it 
struck me, & many others, that the nomination at 
the Gen. Election so to speak, of so many members, 
was left entirely to Mr D. to whom most of them are 
so much devoted, who seems wt his family to forget 
what minister created him a peer & who yielded to 
him a patronage, which now acts forcibly with him, 
against his patron". 192 
Addington and his friends would not forget what they saw as 
Melville's treachery. 
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PITT'S LAST ADMINISTRATION AND THE TALENTS MINISTRY: 
SCOTLAND, 1804-1807 
From the outset, Pitt's second administration was in serious 
difficulty. After Addington's resignation, the King turned to 
Pitt for a statement of his intentions and Pitt indicated (2 May) 
that he wished to form a broad administration, including Fox and 
Grenville. The King absolutely refused to have Fox in the Cabinet. 
He was, however, prepared to allow his supporters to enter government 
and Fox selflessly discharged Grenville and his other allies from 
their obligations to him, urging them to take office without him. 
In fact in a display of party loyalty they refused to abandon 
him and chose to remain in opposition, convinced that events would 
force the King to admit Fox to power. Pitt himself was bound by his 
own principles that the monarch should never be forced to have ministers 
who were unacceptable to him. In this view he now had to take office 
to protect his sovereign, but it was clear that he could only form 
a ministry from his own supporters and from what he could salvage 
of Addington's government. Inevitably, the new government was 
narrowly based and weak. 
1 
The Fox-Grenville group was a formidable opposition and it had 
the full support of the Prince of Wales, whose star had 
been rising 
since 1801 as the public perception of his father's age and 
precarious health had gained ground. Melville neither 
liked nor 
respected the Prince but he was increasingly conscious of the 
threat posed to the constitution by the Prince's alienation 
from 




time he hoped that Pitt would allow him to offer Lord Moira a 
place in government, so that Pitt could be seen publicly to aim 
at a broad administration. 
3 
This did not prove possible, 
apparently because of the Prince's public pronouncements, and 
Pitt decided to make no proposal to Moira. 
4 
Nonetheless Moira 
remained on good terms with the Scots Pittites and for some time 
he was courted, particularly by Charles Hope, in the belief that 
he might be the agent for reconciling King and Prince. 
5 
In his tight situation, Pitt insisted that unless Melville 
took the Admiralty, Pitt would not form a government. Melville 
reluctantly accepted, believing that he would only hold the post 
for a year or so. 
6 
His personal finances were precarious and 
did not benefit from an appointment where the expenses exceeded 
the salary. 
7 
Lord Hawkesbury was made Home Secretary and William 
Dundas became Secretary at War. Montrose became President of the 
Board of Trade and one of the Postmasters-General, but he had to be 
persuaded for he was still angry at the treatment that he had received 
from Melville in 1802.8 The management of Scotland was again firmly 
in Dundas family hands. William Dundas and Melville's son Robert 
were more prominent in this work than hitherto, a situation partly 
brought about by the illness and subsequent long convalescence of 
Chief Baron Dundas from Autumn 1804. 
The nature of Pitt's parliamentary problems was clear enough. 
The 'New Opposition' under Fox and Grenville could muster 150 
followers and as an opposition was more effective than any for some 
years. Addington retained the loyalty of about 60 MPs. On a 
major vote in June it was clear that Pitt's majority in the House 
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was only about 40 and he began to look for ways to win over 
Addington, hitherto aloof. 
9 
Among the Scottish MPs, it was 
reckoned that Pitt could count on 38,10 yet even in the North 
there were problems. The general revival of opposition, first 
marked in the Addington years, continued and gained from the 
respectability conferred on it by Grenville. Dynastic changes 
had brought Whigs to the fore in several Scots noble houses, of 
which the most notable was that of the Hamiltons. 
11 
The Marquis 
of Bute, formerly a Portlandite Whig, also drifted back to 
opposition. 
12 
The Marquis of Stafford, with numerous personal 
links to Grenville and annoyed at Pitt's inattentiveness to him, 
joined opposition early in 1805.13 Melville had long since noted 
the growing influence of the Prince's party among the Scots peers. 
14 
For much of the Summer of 1804, Melville was busy with naval 
affairs, preparing the fleet that would ultimately triumph at 
Trafalgar. From the start it was, as he recognised, "particularly 
and industriously propagated, that nobody but Scotch connections 
will be favoured at this office" and Melville was determined to 
disprove this by doing "equal justice to all so far as my means 
enable me". 
1S 
In fact he derived relatively little patronage 
from being First Lord of the Admiralty. His predecessor, St 
Vincent, had given away most of the available posts and for 
months Melville had to respond to applications with the reply 
that while ships were still being prepared, he could only make 
notes of candidates. 
16 
Yet even such notes were patronage of 
a sort and when Melville left the Admiralty in April 1805 he gave 
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his successor twelve long lists of individuals whose pretensions he 
had marked for various posts. 
17 
Scottish domestic politics were comparatively tranquil until 
the Autumn. The government and administration of Scotland 
proceeded much as it had done during Pitt's first term of office. 
There was some attempt to address the administrative mistakes made 
by Addington's government18 and Pitt's cost-cutting was again felt 
by Scottish office-holders. 
19 
Otherwise there were no great 
departures in Treasury or Home Office policy. 
The death of Tweeddale, a representative peer, caused a by- 
election in November, with both Kellie and Lauderdale standing. 
Kellie had early sought Melville's support20 and this time - not as 
in the 1803 election - he had the full weight of government behind 
him. Robert Dundas helped co-ordinate the canvass in Edinburgh. 
21 
He did not regard the election as a foregone conclusion and at times 
Kellie was worried. 
22 
In the end, the election of 14 November 
saw him victorious but Lauderdale's hard campaign, an indication 
of opposition strength, had given the Pittites food for thought. 
23 
The legal promotions following the death of Justice Clerk 
Eskgrove also caused a stir. He was replaced by Charles Hope, 
but not before the post was offered, at Moira's suggestion, to 
Henry Erskine. 
24 
Hope's replacement as Advocate was Sir James 
Montgomery, son to the former Chief Baron. Montrose, until now 
very friendly to Pitt, 
25 
was furious. His own candidate for 
the appointment, Archibald Colquhoun of Clathick, was passed over and 
Montrose tried to resign his government offices, claiming that his 




eventually persuaded out of this decision only after Pitt had 
sponsored a meeting between the two feuding nobles. 
27 
Melville's last Scottish business of 1804 involved the 
re-arrangement of revenue posts following the death of his 
relative John Hamilton, Receiver General of the Land Tax. This 
bereavement and the illness of the Chief Baron had depressed 
Melville and the year ended on a gloomy note. 
28 
In the last weeks of 1804, Pitt had been casting around 
for allies to strengthen his government. In November, he had 
attempted to reconcile the King and the Prince in the hope that 
Moira could then be brought into government. With the Prince on 
his side Pitt would be able easily to draw supporters away from 
opposition. The plan in fact foundered29 but negotiations with 
Addington were much more promising. With the help of the King 
and Lord Hawkesbury, Addington was persuaded with his friends to 
take office and he was ennobled as Lord Sidmouth. Unfortunately 
it was but a short-lived 'marriage of convenience'30 and was 
ended by events surrounding Melville. 
A Commission of Naval Enquiry, established by Addington's 
government, had examined Melville's conduct while Treasurer of 
the Navy. 
31 
Their confidential investigation had latterly 
focussed on large sums of money which should have been lodged 
with the Bank of England in the years 1786-1799 but were not. 
Melville's initial response to the investigation was that while 
he had ultimately accounted for all the moneys concerned, he had 
subsequently destroyed the relevant private papers. Further, some 
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of the money had temporarily been used for confidential 
government purposes, which he would not discuss. There 
was never any question of money being lost, but Melville's 
answers began to look disingenuous once it became clear that 
his deputy, Alexander Trotter, had regularly lodged large sums 
of naval money for private profit at Coutts' Bank. Trotter, 
a Midlothian laird, had become a rich man and Melville was well 
aware of it. 
32 
The publication of the 10th Report of the Naval 
Enquiry (18 March) revealed all this, exposing Trotter's misuse 
of government money and Melville's apparent involvement in it. 
Rumours of the Enquiry's findings had circulated for weeks and 
now a storm broke. A belated and inadequate letter from Melville 
to the Commissioners on 28 March failed to answer the questions cast 
up by the investigation and Pitt's opponents now began a general 
attack on Melville. Pressure grew for his resignation. On 8 
April, Samuel Whitbread MP, now Melville's lead pursuer, tabled 
resolutions declaring him to be guilty of breaking the law. Pitt's 
wish to oppose the resolution directly was rejected by Sidmouth, who 
forced government to the expedient of trying to refer the matter 
to a Select Committee. In this Pitt failed. The motion was 
defeated by one vote in the Commons, after Wilberforce threw his 
followers against Melville. Melville's resignation on 8 April 
was inevitable. Pitt, who had refused Wilberforce's entreaties 
to abandon his old friend, was shortly forced to ask for him to 
be removed from the Privy Council also (5 May). 
By 9 May, William Hope, MP for Dumfriesshire and a friend of 
Melville, had ostentatiously left London. Melville's son-in-law 
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George Abercromby, MP for Edinburgh, prepared to do likewise. 
Alexander Hope, perhaps at Pitt's prompting, tried to divine 
whether Melville felt it advisable that his friends should 
continue to support Pitt. Hope felt that they should, since 
if Pitt resigned it would be a sacrifice of the King, an 
abandonment of foreign allies, and a handing of the government 
to Melville's persecutors. 
33 
In reply, Melville doubted the 
significance of the two departures. William Hope intended to 
leave parliament and Abercromby had long since told Melville that 
he too would resign if Pitt was forced to continue in office 
relying on Sidmouth's support. Melville was certainly aware 
of a revulsion among his friends against being involved with 
Sidmouth. He was also conscious of a current of thought that 
felt Pitt should dissolve his government - it had no permanency - 
and give his aid to the King to form a stronger one, which he 
could either join or oversee. Meantime, however, Melville had 
no reason to doubt Pitt's political judgement and he took it for 
granted that his friends would remain in town to support govern- 
ment. 
34 
This reply would have more than satisfied Pitt. His 
precise attitude to Melville at this period is unclear. It is 
too much to suggest that Pitt now 'courted him for his political 
interest rather than for his statesmanship'. 
35 
Their friendship 
had been damaged in 1803 but this had largely been forgotten and the 
limited evidence available suggests that Pitt intended to give his 
friend stout support as much on personal as on political grounds, 
36 
By progressions a motion was tabled in the Commons calling 
for Melville's impeachment and he obtained permission to address the 
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House in his defence on 11 June. He gave a powerful reply to 
allegations against him but in his conclusion he was ill-advised 
in doubting the justice of a prosecution. Worse, the terms of 
his refusal to disclose the confidential government purposes for 
which he disbursed some £10,000 in Scotland about the year 1786, 
were construed as arrogance. These failings in his speech were 
decisive in turning the House against him, with Wilberforce's 
group being joined by some of Sidmouth's friends in the majority. 
37 
For the next year, much of Melville's time and energy would be 
devoted to preparing his defence against the impeachment. 
Melville's difficulties had dealt a heavy blow to Pitt's 
government and Pitt proceeded to make things worse. In 
appointing Charles Middleton, later Lord Barham, to succeed 
Melville at the Admiralty, he angered Sidmouth who had his own 
candidate. Barham's appointment was designed to allow Melville's 
return at a later date. 
38 
Pitt himself was angry at the way in 
which Sidmouth's friends had joined the attack on Melville and 
he indicated that they could expect no government appointments. 
In July, Sidmouth resigned and began to listen to overtures 
from Fox. 
39 
The parliamentary recess gave Pitt a breathing 
space and he could derive comfort from the French abandonment 
of their invasion plans in August and from the victory at 
Trafalgar in October. It was only a respite. In October, 
Charles Hope wrote, "If the allies fail, Bonaparte will recur [sic] 
with redoubled fury on us, &a strong government will be more 
40 
necessary than ever. Mr Pitt cannot stand as he is". 
Melville had returned to Scotland in August. His descent 
from power was a major shock in the North and Cockburn would later 
N 
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write that "the main spring of the Scotch pro-consular system 
was weakened". 
41 
This is an exaggeration. The bulk of 
Scottish MPs had remained loyal to government and a large 
proportion of them had supported Melville in the Commons' 
votes. 
42 
Melville's influence would continue strong, even 
during the administration of a government basically hostile to 
him. Only in the field of church affairs does the impeachment 
seem to have had any impact, and the Evangelical party may have 
gained in the Leslie case and in the election for the Procurator 
to the Assembly from Melville's misfortunes. 
43 
William Dundas now took the lead as Scottish manager and 
Thomas Grenville optimistically reported that the elections there 
"in case of dissolution, are stated to me to be less promising 
to government". 
44 
In fact the only two by-elections of this 
period, in the Wigtown and Perth Burghs, showed little evidence of 
this. The Perth election in particular, in which Melville saw a 
friend, David Scott, defeated by a relative, Sir David Wedderburn, 
served only to indicate, once again, the unpredictability of burgh 
Politics. 
45 
Surprisingly the Pitt government chose this moment to advance 
an attempt at major reform in the Scots law, and this without 
initially consulting the Scots politicians. By September 1805, 
the delays in expediting Court of Session business and the 
numerous appeals to the Lords were presenting serious problems. When 
Lord Ankerville died, there had been a negotiation in progress to obtain 




His replacement was delayed and it was from the 
Home Secretary, Hawkesbury, that a surprised Chief Baron learned 
that it was planned to reduce the number of judges. 
47 
The 
reaction from the Scots law officers was unanimously hostile. 
The Chief Baron wrote to William Dundas. While admitting the 
need for reform, he warned that any attempt to reduce the size 
of the Court would lead to a repeat of the discontent of 1785. 
In any case, it would violate the Treaty of Union. The plan 
seems to have come collectively from Hawkesbury and Chancellor Eldon, 
although the Baron suspected the involvement of William Adam. 
48 
The Scots law officers wrote with their own plans in mid-October. 
They pointed to the Court's failings but rejected the idea of 
diminishing it. Instead they suggested the division of the Inner 
House into two separate courts. This would allow the judges to 
be better prepared and would speed up business. They also pointed 
at the idea of an intermediate court of appeal to stop unnecessary 
appeals to the Lords. They were adamant that the vacant judgeship 
should be filled immediately. 
49 
William Robertson was in fact 
appointed soon after. A candidate since 1801, he was close 
to Melville and his friends. 
50 
All plans to remodel the Court 
disappeared in the Winter of 1805-6 as crisis enveloped Pitt's 
government. Nevertheless, reform was now firmly on the agenda 
and the plans of the next government were very different. 
By the last days of 1805, Britain's international position 
was much as it had been at the end of Pitt's first ministry. The 
nation was secure behind its navy but Britain was almost powerless 
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to intervene on the continent. This situation was confirmed 
in early December when the Austro-Russian armies were smashed 
at Austerlitz and effective continental opposition to Napoleon 
ceased. At home, Pitt now had a parliamentary majority so 
narrow as almost to be meaningless. The pressures of this 
desperate situation, combined with years of overwork and alcohol 
abuse, finally broke him. After two months illness, he died 
on 23 January 1806. Melville and his wife were distraught at the 
loss of their old friend and to this was added Melville's realisation 
that he would have to face his impeachment alone. 
51 
The remnants of Pitt's Cabinet resigned and after some 
attempts to avoid the inevitable, the King asked Grenville to 
form a government. This took office in February, with Grenville 
at the Treasury, Spencer as Home Secretary and Fox as Foreign 
Secretary. Sidmouth's friends were also included but the 
Pittites, once Grenville's allies in office, were not invited 
to participate. This exclusion was considered a great insult 
to Pitt's memory, not least by Melville, and it influenced the 
Pittites' attitude to the new ministry. 
52 
Yet paradoxically 
the Pittites for some time believed that Grenville would eventually 
have to turn to them to protect him from the radical plans of Fox's 
followers and this wait for the call also conditioned their actions. 
53 
The major decisions of the new government regarding Scotland 
were made in February and Melville, convalescing at Bath after a 
short illness, was almost a bystander. Before knowing that Pitt's 
friends were excluded, Melville had wanted the King to form a strong 
government, including Fox and Grenville. He felt that it should 
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be supported by everybody. Only if this government then 
attacked his friends would he support systematic opposition and in 
this event, with his Scottish allies, he had no doubt of success. 
54 
At the formation of the new administration, Lord Moira was given 
the Ordnance and he also claimed to have the management of 
Scotland. Even as Pitt's ministry had seemed to be falling in 
January, Moira expecting high office, had tried to recruit Melville's 
aid. 
55 
Now he renewed his attempts. If Melville and his friends 
supported government, Moira as manager would only allow a few 
sackings of Scots office holders to reward "the most hungry" 
of the Scots Whigs. Otherwise Melville's friends would not be 
disturbed. 
56 
Moira lost little time announcing this to the Scots 
MPs, informing them that he would be "a father" to them, as 
Melville had been. 
57 
Melville's reaction was cautious. Unwilling 
to dabble in politics while his prosecution was pending, he was 
aware that Moira could have little influence in Scotland without 
his support. 
58 
He wrote a letter ostensibly showing that he 
would acquiesce in any temperate government of Scotland by Moira. 
59 
Privately he prepared for a period of retreat, even contemplating 
the surrender of the Edinburgh seat to Henry Erskine60 and he began 
to calculate how his friends might stand if they could not reach 
accommodation with government. 
61 
Other conditions were also coming into play. By now the English 
Pittites had resolved to act together in a body. Unless their 
interests were attacked or questions were agitated hostile to 
Pitt's principles, they would generally support government. 
In 




opposed to the idea of factious opposition and to the concept 
of party, this strategy appealed to Melville. He believed 
that eventually the group of Pitt's followers would split up 
63 
but meantime he avowed a wish to associate with any of Pitt's 
friends who might feel obliged to keep together to protect Pitt's 
name and the principles for which he stood. 
64 
Still reprobating 
party politics65 he was nevertheless taking his share in one of 
the major developments of the period, the gradual evolution of 
a British Tory party, gathered around the memory of Pitt. A 
few days later he wrote "Our Scotch friends must be the last to 
abandon that standard". 
66 
It is clear that Melville regarded 
his Scottish allies - Buccleuch, Dalkeith, Hopetoun and the rest - 
as a strong group. He had little fear that a hostile government 
could injure them and he saw them as gathered together upon 
principles rather than for the pursuit of political advantage. 
67 
This confidence explains the apparent equanimity with which he faced 
the prospect of Lauderdale managing Scotland. 
Melville and his son were agreed on all this and on 10 February 
Robert Dundas informed Moira that the Scots Pittites would be acting 
with their English brethren and that if government should split, 
they would support Grenville. 
68 
Moira misunderstood this, believing 
it constituted a refusal to support government. Unwilling to 
become involved in expulsions of Melville's friends - inevitable 
if they opposed government - he decided to 'resign' as Scottish 
manager. Privately, he offered to help protect some of Melville's 
allies from the Foxites. 
69 
Moira's withdrawal was no real upset 
to either Melville or his son, neither of whom had been convinced 
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that he really would have the management of Scotland. 
70 
Their coolness ended Moira's plans. It is clear that he had 
averted a purge of Melville's friends from their offices in the 
first days of the governmental and the actions of Melville and 
his son were not wholly approved by their Scots allies, who now 
feared that Scotland would be managed by Lauderdale. 
72 
This 
did not happen. On 12 February, William Dundas was preparing 
to meet Grenville73 and the next day Robert Dundas knew that 
Grenville was not going to commit Scotland to Lauderdale. 
74 
A 
little later, on 24 February, William Dundas had a meeting with 
Grenville at which he detailed the attitude of Melville's friends 
to government. Grenville indicated that he had no plans for a 
general sweep of Scottish placeholders and that Lauderdale would not 
be his sole adviser. 
75 
Grenville and Spencer had in fact decided 
to keep the management of Scotland in their own hands. 
76 
Here, 
as far as Melville's friends were concerned, matters rested. They 
knew that the activities of the English Pittites might draw them 
into open opposition and Melville feared that Fox's activities 
might have a similar effect. 
77 
For a while, however, there 
78 
was peace. 
The decision by Grenville and Spencer to retain Scottish 
patronage in their own hands was not to the satisfaction of the 
Scottish Foxites. Lauderdale, the Marquis of Douglas, Moira and 
Stafford had collectively suggested the measures necessary in 
Scotland and this had included the replacement of Melvillite 
office holders. 
79 
Lauderdale provided a list of these on 12 
March80 but Grenville - probably to Moira's quiet relief - chose 
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not to act. 
Initially the only changes were in the law. While Spencer 
had private reservations 
81 
the elevation of Henry Erskine to 
be Lord Advocate in place of Montgomery was inevitable. The 
Solicitor General's appointment was more problematic and the 
replacement of Blair with the intemperate John Clerk was made 
over the strongest protests from Justice Clerk Hope. 
82 
In 
the Court of Session Lord Methven, who had died in January, was 
replaced by the Foxite Charles Hay, now Lord Newton. 
Grenville was under some pressure from his Scottish allies 
to make at least some changes and attention quickly focussed on 
Melville's relatives Alexander MacLean the Receiver General and 
George Buchan, the Stamp Solicitor. Melville was relatively un- 
concerned at the prospect of their dismissals but the Justice 
Clerk, then in London, protested "that there was something 
so unhandsome & revolting in the time [sic] of doing this, when 
Lord M's back was at the wall ... 
". 
83 
This intervention seems to 
have been effective, for the two were not removed till later. Hope 
also learned that Grenville and Spencer were disposed to interfere 
as little as possible in Scottish elections. Clearly the Scots 
Whigs wanted more than this. Some rewards were more easily 
bestowed, and Breadalbane, Cassillis, Eglinton and Lauderdale 
each received British peerages. Grenville had to reject a 
request that Sempill be restored to the army and his cashierment 
of 1793 reversed. 
84 
The position of the Scottish Whig party was, as we have noted, 
stronger than it had been for some time. The families of 
Hamilton, 
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Argyll (from May 1806), Cassillis and Eglinton were led by Whigs. 
Bute and Breadalbane, long Portlandites, lent their support to 
the new administration and there were other supporters among 
the nobility including Elgin, Selkirk, Sempill and Stair. Most 
were Foxites, and with the exception of the Stafford (Sutherland) 
family there was virtually no Grenville party in Scotland. 
85 
Fox and Grenville could also count on the general support 
that Scots could be relied on to give to the government of the 
day. Galloway, long disenchanted with Melville, supported 
government totally, on the basis that it was the King's 
administration. 
86 
Queensberry supported government on a 
similar basis. Several MPs were like Colonel Dickson, 
sitting for the Linlithgow Burghs, who "supports the present 
administration (as he did the last)". 
87 
Given that Melville's 
friends were not in outright opposition to government, a strange 
truce could prevail in Scottish politics. Thus Melville's relative, 
Sir Charles Ross, could profess support for administration even 
while he opposed friends of government in his local politics. 
88 
There were some embarrassing defections from the ranks of Melville's 
friends. William McDowall of Garthland, indebted to successive 
governments for loans on his West Indian estates, would have been 
obliged to give Grenville some support. Instead his support was 
enthusiastic and he even tried to persuade Grenville to give 
him 
the Keepership of the Privy Seal, held by Melville. 
89 
Later he 
advanced a bill to alleviate his debts at the expense of 
his 
sureties, who included a furious Chief Baron Dundas. 
90 
Altogether 
more humiliating was the conduct of William Dundas. 
Even as Pitt's 
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administration was winding up, he had obtained the promise of 
a reversion of an office held by his brother the Chief Baron. 
This was bad enough in Melville's view, but he had no sooner 
received it, than he signalled to Pitt's friends that he felt 
bound to adhere to the politics of the Staffords, whose Sutherland 
seat he sat for. Despite his protestations, he was in effect 
separating himself from the Pitt party. Melville was livid. 
It was a disgrace on William and he was removed from the family's 
confidential councils. 
91 
Grenville's policy of tolerance, of not besieging the Scots 
Pittites provided that they did not oppose government, was frustrating 
to the Scots Whigs. They could see that people like Sir Charles 
Ross and James Brodie of Brodie, another apparent convert, were 
likely to be only fairweather friends. They could only look 
askance when, for instance, Grenville indicated to Lauderdale in 
April that he would not countenance plans to unseat Abercromby 
in Edinburgh, nor would he help the Foxite William Maule in his 
attack on the sitting MP for the Montrose Burghs, a Melvillite 
but also a government supporter. 
92 
The fears of the Scots Whigs 
were confirmed by the result of Melville's impeachment. 
The Select Committee investigating Melville's case had taken 
much evidence since July 1805, including some that showed not only 
that he had received loans from Alexander Trotter but that he must 
also have been aware of Trotter's misuse of public money. 
93 
In 
the end, the managers of the impeachment reduced this evidence to 
ten charges against Melville. 
94 
Melville was angry at the extent 
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to which the investigators had examined the most innocuous of his 
private affairs. Worse, he was conscious that despite a public 
perception that he was "wallowing in wealth", the projected legal 
expenses were already beyond his means. 
95 
He had never been 
rich and most of his costs had to be met by a massive loan from 
Hopetoun. 
96 
He never saw his impeachment in any light other 
than as a political "persecution" and nowhere in his intimate 
correspondence with his son is there even a suggestion that he 
saw himself guilty of any impropriety. His friends had always 
regarded him as incompetent in his personal finances and attributed 
his problems to this. 
97 
There is little doubt that he was afraid 
of revelations about his use of secret political funds and that 
this lay at the heart of his refusal to discuss some of his 
expenditures. Yet it is unclear whether this refusal stemmed 
from fears that discussion would hurt him personally or that it 
could damage public policy. 
98 
The power of Fox and Sidmouth 
in the new government convinced Melville that his prosecution 
would be extended and expensive and that the Lords might not 
give him a fair hearing. 
99 
Robert Dundas discussed all this 
with Grenville on 10 March and Grenville agreed to ensure that 
the trial was not delayed. Grenville himself had avoided taking 
part in the proceedings against Melville but he did not feel at 
liberty to dictate his wishes to colleagues. "It is evident 
therefore", reported Melville's son, "that there is no chance 
of its being made a government question in your favor 
[sic], & the 
100 
utmost we can expect or attempt is to neutralize them". 
The trial was held in Westminster Hall, from 29 April to 




defended by, among others, the Whig William Adam and the defence 
was skilful, demonstrating repeatedly that Melville personally 
had broken no law. His friends were concerned. Lord Kellie 
wrote, "my mind cannot be easy - seeing so many doubtfull [sic] 
folks among us! " 
102 
and he despaired at some of Melville's 
supposed supporters who did not stay for the end of the trial. 
103 
In fact the final votes by the peers saw Melville acquitted on 
all the charges, but the majorities were lowest on the two that 
alleged his connivance at Trotter's misuse of funds. 
104 
This 
effectively meant that the suspicion of Melville's guilt lingered 
and the stain was never effaced. This was not immediately 
apparent, however. Melville was jubilant and a large part of the 
Scottish political nation joined in celebrations. Melville's 
nephew reported, 
"I really believe no event almost ever occurred which 
has excited such warm & general feelings of joy in 
Scotland. The Scotch papers will show you part, & but 
a part of the expressions of rejoicing in public". 
105 
The rejoicings included a well-attended public dinner in Edinburgh 
and there was also a general illumination of the city. 
106 
The one 
major loser from Melville's acquittal was Lord Moira. Having 
early described the impeachment as unjust, he had voted against 
Melville in the Lords. 
107 
His association with Melville's friends 
dropped stone dead. 
These celebrations were a further shock to the Scots Whigs 
and they again pressed for a purge of Melville's friends from their 
offices. 
108 
MacLean and Buchan were finally replaced in their 
revenue posts by two Whigs, Sir William Cunynghame and James 
Gibson. 
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Nonetheless on 28 June, the Whig contender for Edinburgh, James 
Mansfield, lamented: 
"... the Melvellits [sic] are more high than you 
almost can imagine and unless ministers means [sic] 
to have a Melvillite parliament returned they must 
take stronger measures than they yet seem disposed 
to do, it is really most distressing to think of the 
scrapes they have brought all their friends into by 
their ill timed moderation ... However we have accounts 
today that the rejoicings in Scotland for the acquitted 
felon has [sic] roused them. I shall believe it when 
I see them act". 109 
The vote of congratulations to Melville by the Society of the 
Writers to the Signet was the prompt for Lord Douglas to write to 
Grenville about "the sensation a late acquittal has excited in the 
metropolis of Scotland" and to press for the long proposed 
dismissals. In particular he pointed at the improper conduct 
of Robert Dundas, as Keeper of the Signet, involving that Society 
in politics. 
110 
Grenville's response was to restate his position, 
that Scotland should not be governed as a separate part of the empire, 
but that it should be ruled directly by ministers in London. He 
was determined to rule in a spirit of moderation, although showing 
countenance only to those who were friendly to government. 
ill 
This 
was not the reply that Douglas wanted. Privately Lord Spencer began to 
think that government might indeed have to give more aid to the Scots 
Whigs. 
112 
One immediate outcome was the appointment of Lauderdale 
in place of Gordon as Keeper of the Great Seal. 
Government subsequently agreed to some sort of a wider purge 
of Melville's friends 
113 
but it had not taken place by 6 August 
when Henry Erskine again pressed it. He specifically asked 
for four removals from law offices and advised that "their being 
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speedily made is absolutely necessary for changing the political 
current in this part of the kingdom if , 
114 
On 18 August Erskine 
was again pushing Spencer to make changes as "the best means 
of checking the prevailing influence of Lord Melville and his 
party". He reported that the earlier removals of Buchan 
and MacLean had been explained away by Melville's friends, 
who variously claimed either that Melville would soon form a 
political alliance with Grenville, or that government was not 
strong enough to consider removing Melville's friends. 
Spencer was given a brief history of the political division 
in Scotland between Dundas and his opponents in the years after 
1784. Some of Melville's friends now supported government: 
"Others affected a moderation to avoid the con- 
sequences of direct opposition; but the greatest 
part have hoisted along with Lord Melville the 
standart [sic] of defiance and the real friends 
of administration are confined to the original 
opposers of Lord Melville". 
In this way, Erskine proceeded to explain that the Scottish Foxites 
were loyal to government "as a united cabinet". It was essential 
that those appointed after the removals should be unconnected with 
Melville. Even apparent converts should not be trusted. Erskine 
detailed his candidates, whose appointment would "give a check to 
a formidable opposition which cannot be defeated but by measures 
of the most marked as well as decided hostility if , 
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By early 
September, Spencer and Grenville were agreed that it was time 
for removals 
116 
but a month later Erskine was still complaining 
of the strength of the Melville interest and the manner in which 
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they misrepresented their relationship with government in 
order to maintain their influence in Scotland. 
117 
For whatever 
reason, Grenville and Spencer had done nothing further regarding 
Scotland before parliament was dissolved. 
The dissolution was a shock to Melville, who saw it as an 
indication of the extent to which the King was now subdued by 
"a sturdy faction, acting under the auspices of the apparent 
heir of the Crown". 
118 
It was equally unwelcome to Henry 
Erskine: 
"This early dissolution will play the deuce with 
us in Scotland. I hope the loss will be made up 
in England". 119 
There were contests in twelve Scottish seats 
120 
and extensive 
activity in over a dozen others. Much of it involved struggles 
between Melville's friends and the Scots Whigs and from the Whig 
viewpoint, the results fully reflected Grenville's early temporising 
policy towards the Dundas interest. 
The Aberdeenshire contest between Ferguson of Pitfour and 
Hay of Rannes was rooted in an old county feud, with the Gordons 
backing Pitfour and Lord Fife supporting Hay. Hay enjoyed 
government support and in the end the poll was close, with 
Ferguson winning by only two votes. 
121 
In Banffshire, Sir 
William Grant easily overcame Sir James Duff, who was supported 
by Lord Fife and government. 
122 
Further south, the Whig Robert 
Ferguson of Raith had canvassed Fife since February and Melville 
advised Robert Dundas to support William Wemyss's candidate. 
123 
Wemyss stood himself, hoping to profit from his relationship to 
the Grenvillite Lord Stafford. Grenville in fact was persuaded 
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of his unreliability and government support ultimately secured 
the county for Raith in a victory that gave the Whigs much 
satisfaction. 
124 
The Lanarkshire contest between Sir Charles 
Douglas, backed by Melville and Buccleuch, and Lord Archibald 
Hamilton, was an easy victory for the latter, a staunch Whig. 
Similarly the Hamilton family avwca. me a challenge for the 
Linlithgow Burghs led by Sir Charles Ross against their 
candidate William Maxwell. In both seats, however, the Hamiltons 
felt that Grenville had not been as forceful in their support as 
he might, particularly after their warnings about Ross's likely 
duplicity- 
125 
In West Lothian, Henry Erskine renewed his old 
claim to the county and he had government support. 
126 
It did 
him no good against the Dundas-Hopetoun interest and he latterly 
turned his attentions to the Dumfries Burghs. Here Buccleuch backed 
Colonel Alexander Dirom, well disposed to Melville and inclined to 
support government. 
127 
Queensberry, belatedly hearing that Dirom 
did not consider himself connected to government, threw his weight 
behind Erskine. 
128 
This, with the support of the opportunist 
Provost Staig of Dumfries, carried the Burghs after a tight 
contest. 
129 
In Dumfriesshire itself, Queensberry's support 
guaranteed the success of Melville's relative, Captain William 
Johnstone Hope. 
130 
This support was given despite government's 
wish for the success of Hope's opponent, Sir John Lowther 
131 
Johnstone. 
The Aberdeen Burghs were contested by James Farquhar and John 
132 
Ramsay, a Foxite, who won despite government's declared neutrality. 
In the Stirling Burghs Sir John Henderson evicted the Melvillite 
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Alexander Cochrane133 while in the Glasgow Burghs a complicated 
contest saw Archibald Campbell defeating the ministerial 
candidate, Boyd Alexander. 
134 
The Tain Burghs contest 
was essentially a local feud between Sir John Sinclair and Lord 
Seaforth, whose candidate won. 
135 
Elsewhere, several struggles did not come to a poll. Threats 
of opposition in Clackmannanshire led George Abercromby to leave 
his Edinburgh seat to secure his home county. 
136 
The attack 
did not materialise. The Whigs had early hopes for the 
Edinburgh seat but these were ruined by Grenville's failure to 
ostracise the Melville party. The Whig candidate could only 
bewail the fact that 
"this procrastination has been fatal to my views, 
and has allowed the Melvellits [sic] to rivet 
themselves so fast in this city that I might as 
easily attempt to give the Hill of North a shove137 
as to attempt to move this city at present,... ". 
The Whigs contemplated opposing Robert Dundas in Midlothian 
but eventually decided against. 
138 
In Kincardineshire, a 
confused contest saw the Melvillites backing two successive 
candidates (one had to drop out) against the Whigs who successively 
fielded three (one died, one dropped out). In the end, William 
Adam carried it for government. 
139 
In Perthshire, Colonel 
Alexander Campbell canvassed against Graham of Balgowan. 
Government declined to take sides in the struggle and Campbell, 
although well disposed to Melville, did not have his support. 
140 
In the end, Campbell withdrew. 
As Whig electoral manager, William Adam made a report on the 
Scots elections. A recent analysis of this has suggested that of 
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the MPs returned, 28 were government supporters, 14 were 
opposition and three were doubtful. It was a relatively poor 
showing and may even have exaggerated government support. 
141 
The Scots Whigs, hindered by government's equivocal stance, had 
failed to break the entrenched Melville interest in the Commons. 
Henry Erskine had initially been apprehensive about the 
extent of Melville's continuing influence with the peerage142 
but the results of the peerage election of 4 December were 
more to government's satisfaction. Ministers circulated a 
list of sixteen candidates -a return to the old practice. 
143 
There was some confusion, in that one candidate, Kinnaird, 
initially declined to stand and was replaced by Saltoun. 
144 
Later he changed his mind and for a time seventeen candidates 
appeared to have government support. 
145 
Of these government 
candidates, eight were in the previous parliament. 
146 
Melville wrote to several peers with his own list of thirteen 
candidates, avowedly supporting them because they were friendly 
to the politics and principles of the late Pitt. 
147 
The confusion 
in the election that followed arose both from the fact that several 
candidates were on both lists, and from the government's insistence 
that its candidates should as far as possible exchange votes with 
their fellows, rather than with other candidates. 
148 
There is 
little doubt that the operation of this hurt Melville's friends. 
Some who were not on the government list found that others who 
149 
were would not exchange votes. Others of Melville's 
'friends' 
150 
tried to steer a neutral course. Napier, loyal to Melville, 
was unhappy at what he perceived would be the effect of Melville's 
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letter. Melville responded that it would only influence the 
friends of Pitt, but he was afraid "that even in the exalted 
order of the peerage there are still more who look to the 
present powers, rather than to past services". Melville's 
letter would at least identify his and Napier's friends. A 
major problem arose from friends of Melville who, while well 
disposed to Pittite candidates would, from personal ties, also 
vote for certain other candidates. In effect those on the 
government list not only had the full advantage of acting as 
a party but could also benefit from a trickle of votes from 
Melville's allies. Melville could only advise that his friends 
should carefully supervise the exchanges and transfers of votes 
between them. 
151 
The unusually high number of 24 candidates 
also contributed to making the contest unpredictable, 
152 
In the end, government was pleasantly surprised when fifteen 
of its candidates were elected. The sixteenth, Sempill, was 
unpopular with his fellows, 
153 
and Saltoun, who had trailed 
along after Kinnaird's re-emergence as a candidate, was latterly 
dropped entirely by government. 
154 
Of Melville's list only seven 
were elected and all but Lord Aberdeen were already on the govern- 
ment list. The remainder, including staunch Pittites such as 
Strathmore, Kellie, Haddington and Napier, were brushed aside. 
The overall result of the 1806 elections - the survival of 
a large if damaged Melville interest - worried the Scottish 
Whigs 
but they had little justification for their fears. The fear, in 




to the King, had been the spur to Grenville to press George III 
to grant a dissolution as a decisive show of their influence 
on him. 
155 
The government had gained ground in England and 
this, combined with the belief that the King was now reconciled 
to his ministers, served to demoralise the Pittites in the 
South. This was also seen in Scotland, where Melville was 
reproached by a friend, 
"I hear you return 30 out of 45 Scotch Members 
but with all that power, I fear you are a languid 
party". 156 
Melville was repeatedly urged to come to London to join 
opposition, but he declined. He had no love for government 
after their attacks on him, but nor would he indulge in factious 
opposition. He had believed that the King had disliked his 
ministers but the King's allowing them to dissolve parliament 
had removed any such belief as a rational basis on which to 
conduct an opposition. Melville was angry with Grenville for 
his participation in the Prince's virtual usurpation of the 
Crown and he certainly had a disposition to speak out against 
the Prince. He was well aware that other politicians, mindful 
of the rising sun, might not be enthusiastic about following him 
in this. 
157 
Robert Dundas approved of his father's aversion to "contentious 
opposition" but felt that Melville should give some lead to his 
followers. He disliked the indiscriminate opposition of the 
Pittites but he did not think that the country would gain from 
their not attending parliament. He wanted Melville to concert 
with the leading Pittites and he shared his father's doubts about 
5O 
making an issue of the Prince's activities. Unlike his 
father, he did not believe that enmities between the Pittites 
and the various parties in the government would necessarily 
be permanent and for his proof he pointed to the bewildering 
variety of alliances and unions that had taken place since 
1782.158 
Melville had in fact already changed his plans. Spencer 
Perceval, now a prominent Pittite, had apprised him of the weakness 
and apathy among opposition. Perceval wanted Melville to come 
forward and to persuade his associates to attend parliament. As 
a postscript, Perceval wrote of the King's being surprised by 
Grenville's demand for a dissolution. Because the Pittites had 
not communicated any willingness to form an alternative government, 
no assumptions could be made about the King's attitude to Grenville 
based on his allowing the dissolution. Quite simply, the King 
had had no choice. 
159 
This letter, with the first detailed 
account he had had of the political scene for some months, was a 
revelation to Melville. He now felt obliged to come South to give 
some direction to his friends and it is clear that his motivation 
was the news of the circumstances in which the King had granted the 
dissolution. If the King's real opinion of his ministers was 
uncertain, this might give a wholly different complexion to the 
prospects of such Pittites as opposed government. 
160 
It would 
also allow Melville to oppose the King's government while remaining 
true to his principles of supporting the King's wishes in politics. 
Intially Melville had thought that his son might lead his 
friends in criticising government for their mishandling of the 
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organisation of the volunteers for national defence, a subject 
that had certainly caused disquiet in Scotland. 
161 
In fact 
the Scots Pittites were almost immediately presented with a 
focus for opposition much dearer to their hearts, when ministers 
at last began to proceed with their plans to reform the Court 
of Session in February 1807. 
The Scottish Whigs were aware of failings in the Scottish 
revenue administration but their plans for reform had focussed 
almost exclusively on the legal establishment. Their radical 
solution to the manifest failings of the Court of Session was 
to remodel it along English lines, splitting it into three 
chambers with concurrent jurisdictions, bringing jury trial 
into civil causes, and introducing an intermediate Chamber of 
Review. 
162 
It was Grenville who announced the plan in mid-1806 
and he had discussed it with Lord Armadale. 
163 
The later bill 
was drafted by John Clerk, the Solicitor General, and Adam Gillies, 
a Whig advocate, with some advice from Lauderdale. 
164 
Grenville's 
outline proposals were actually in the hands of Edinburgh lawyers 
before ever he informed the judges, and this caused much offence. 
165 
It typified the Whigs' determination to prevent potentially 
obstructive judges becoming involved in the work, and in the 
coming months the Justice Clerk and others would repeatedly 
complain of being kept in the dark by Crown officials. 
166 
In June 1806, a Committee of the House of Lords resolved on the 




Then the wrangling began. The bill was drafted 
over the Summer, with no apparent consultation with the 
judges or 
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with ex-Chancellor Eldon. The drafters had a reverence for 
English law forms and no small part of the outrage in Scotland 
came from the belief that they were attempting to abolish Scottish 
law. 
When it finally appeared in February 1807, the bill was 
badly drafted and the objections to it were substantial. 
168 
The Chief Baron complained at length about not being consulted. 
He objected to the Chamber of Review and to the idea of three 
chambers, asserting that Scotland could not find talent enough 
to fill them. Of the bill generally, 
"It seems to me to do, what your Lop. [sic] denies 
& disclaims - Abolish the law of Scotland, & intro- 
duce the law of England so far as regards jury trial, 
in all cases whatever; with an implied, obscure & 
very doubtful exception of such actions only as are 
strictly feudal, & affect the real rights & estates 
of the landed interest of Scotland ". 169 
Charles Hope was similarly blunt. 
170 
Before seeing the bill, 
he warned that jury trial in civil causes would be unpopular in 
Scotland. In commercial disputes it would be hard to find 
jurors who were not in one way or another connected with the 
parties involved. 
171 
He preferred a two chamber system for the 
Court, warning that the three chamber plan was generally regarded 
as "a job ... merely to create another 
President if . 
172 
Nor did 
he support the review court, designed to reduce appeals to the 
Lords. It would merely be another opportunity for delaying cases 
and would not function equitably. Further, it would violate the 
Treaty of Union. Grenville politely brushed Hope aside173 and when 
Hope finally saw the bill, he had little time to comment. His 
verdict was pointed: 
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"As the bill stands at present, I have no hesitation 
to say, that I am decidedly of opinion, that the 
objections to it are insurmountable, and I am positive 
that I could easily convince your Lordship". 174 
Grenville was determined to press matters and left only three 
weeks between the first and second readings of the bill. 
175 
Meetings of the Writers to the Signet and of the Advocates were 
held to consider it, and government worked hard to 'pack' them. 
176 
In fact, the Faculty was deeply divided and while it voted approval 
of the reforms proposed, the Advocates only narrowly voted for the 
principle of a chamber of review, with the minority including 
a number of the younger Whig lawyers. An apparent majority in 
favour of dividing the Court into three chambers actually disguised 
fairly equally divided opinion. 
177 
The Scottish judges also differed. Eleven agreed to send 
a memorial to the Lords detailing objections to the bill but the 
four Whig judges disagree d. 
l78 
The senior Scots judges were 
summoned to London to state their case but were followed hotfoot 
by three dissenters. 
179 
By now it was beginning to dawn on Grenville that all was not 
well with his plans. Following a series of particularly persuasive 
speeches by Eldon, he announced on 18 March that the clauses 
introducing trial by jury would be removed from the bill. In 
fact it was already too late, for Grenville was shortly removed 
from office. Reform did not go away, but in the long run 
perhaps the most important effect of Grenville's endeavours was 
to foster a divergence between the older Scots Whigs under Erskine 
7 
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and Lauderdale and the younger, under Francis Jeffrey. This 
division would become much clearer over the next decade. 
180 
The Scots Tories could take no credit for the demise of 
Grenville's bill. Melville had spoken against it181 but more 
time would have let it be passed comfortably into law by the 
government majority. It would have been a perfect example of 
a Scottish group using English support to foist a measure of 
doubtful popularity on their fellow countrymen. 
182 
Grenville's fall - "the mucking of Geordie's Byre" Huntly 
called it183 - was quite sudden and had nothing to do with the 
opposition. The King, having blocked his ministers' plans for 
limited Catholic emancipation, demanded an assurance that the 
matter would not be raised again. They would not give this 
assurance and resigned on 18 March. 
It had been a year of very mixed fortunes for Melville and his 
friends. Pitt's death had been a hard blow but paradoxically it 
had served to strengthen their links with their English allies. 
Grenville and Spencer had never fully faced up to the problem 
of what to do with Scotland and against all the evidence they 
had persisted for too long in a policy of neutrality to Melville, 
reining in their natural allies, the Scots Whigs. In the end it 
was unimportant in British terms, since government's English 
majority was large enough to allow the luxury of indulging a 
significant body of opposition in Scotland. Government's initial 
neutrality is part of the explanation for the survival of so strong 
a party around Melville but attention has also to be paid to Melville's 
own explanation; twenty years of support for William Pitt's government 
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and principles had done much to weld together a formidable body 
of the most powerful men in Scotland. Even for a determinedly 
hostile government, it would have been a tough nut to crack. 
The Scots Pittites never forgave Grenville for the few attempts 
that he did make to disturb them. 
For Melville it had been a miserable interlude. There 
is little reason to doubt that even in 1804 he would have 
preferred to have remained in retirement. Now, not only was 
his old friend dead but his reputation had been brought low by 
the impeachment. With feeling he would describe the outgoing 
administration as "that abominable vermin"184 and he looked to 
its successor for vindication. 
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CONCLUSION 
The history of the political management of Scotland in the 
twenty years from 1807 is essentially an account of the work of 
Robert S. Dundas, for Melville did not return to office. George III, 
having forced Grenville out, turned to the friends of Pitt who formed 
an administration under the ageing Portland. The new government was 
weak but not impossibly so, and in England it would derive some 
support from anti-Catholic feeling. Nonetheless it could not 
afford the odium of having Melville back in office and in later 
years his bitterness would grow as the full implications sank in 
of the stain cast on his name by the impeachment. He was restored 
to the Privy Council, however, and he took a full part as Scottish 
manager in the general election that was called almost immediately 
after Portland took office. Government was very successful in 
Scotland. Among the MPs it was reckoned that administration 
could count on the support of about 301 and in the peerage election 
Melville's suggested list of candidates swept the board. This 
was not least because his friends had learned the lesson of the 
2 
previous election and had acted as a fairly tight party. 
Those of Melville's friends who had been sacked by the previous 
government were restored to office and other rewards were bestowed 
on the Melville party. His management of Scotland was expected 
to continue but by July 1807 he was complaining that he did not 
have the full support of government in the necessary work. Without 
any more stimulating duties, the charms of managing Scotland 
were now lost on him: 
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"I look forward with horror to the situation of 
what they call Minister for Scotland, in which 
there is no room for the exertion of any real 
talent I may possess, and one is liable to the 
perpetual annoyance of hungry and greedy beggars 
beating at your door and disturbing the quiet and 
repose of your life" 
3 
By the end of 1807, Melville had effectively transferred all his 
Scottish business to his son. 
4 
Thereafter, he continued as a 
willing adviser to his son and to his old friends and a steady 
stream of memoranda on Scottish, European and Imperial affairs 
flowed out of Dunira, some of them solicited, most not. Now 
he was "retired and buried at the foot of the Grampian Mountains"5 
but it was not a happy retirement. Always he denied it, but he 
yearned for the call to office if only to vindicate himself and to 
wipe out the memory of the impeachment. This could never be and 
his resentment came to manifest itself in something approaching 
to a jealousy of his son's advancing career. Although to the 
last they remained close, Melville's sometimes sordid, half- 
denied attempts to return to office, together with the hurt and 
embarrassment that these manoeuvres caused his son, provide a sad 
epitaph to his career. 
6 
Henry Dundas died on 28 May 1811, the anniversary of Pitt's 
birthday, and he is buried in the parish kirk at Lasswade. 
Any retrospective view of Henry Dundas and his government of 
Scotland must begin by observing that he has never enjoyed a 
popular press among his own countrymen. This is not surprising. 
Like most of his contemporaries in politics he was unpopular with the 
common people. Even among the political classes he had a certain 
reputation for venality and jobbery. The story of his impeachment 
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has done much to colour the folk memory of him as a villain who 
escaped justice. Against all this has to be balanced the opinions 
of his many friends. They were conscious that he might at times 
have chosen his associates more carefully, but none of them 
appear to have believed that he was a dishonest man, either 
generally, or in the particular events that led to his impeachment. 
It has also to be remembered that Dundas was operating at a time 
when the whole power structure of British politics was under 
question for the first time since the upheavals of the mid- 
seventeenth century. To later eyes his spirited resistance to 
democratic reform has inevitably cast him in the villain's role. 
It is more important to remember that in doing so he represented the 
wishes of most of the ruling class. 
Dundas has been accused of being a political hack, with few 
principles and only limited vision. It is true that he was 
completely pragmatic in his approach to political problems but it 
is not fair to say that he lacked certain driving motives. In 
his policies as a British minister he was determined that the 
Empire should expand and that it should be well defended. This 
is clear from his war policy in the West Indies and the Mediterranean 
and in his administration of British India. It was because of his belief 
in these objectives that despite some pressure, he refused publicly 
to endorse the peace terms of 1801. In his domestic politics, 
Dundas displayed a clear awareness of the threat posed to the 
established social order by demands for reform from below. The 
major economic changes that would reshape Scottish society did 
not really gather pace until after 1820 but Dundas could see the 
omens - the expanding towns and the emergence of a discontented 
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urban workforce - and he tried to prepare for the long-term 
defence of the interests of the landed classes. This empathy 
with the aims and aspirations of the landowners is a major 
theme in itself and we have observed it several times. In his 
personal political principles Dundas consistently adhered to the 
belief that it was the King's right to choose his own government. 
This need not be dismissed as merely a justification for reaping 
the advantages of supporting (or not opposing) successive 
administrations. Dundas was seen to adhere to it even when, as in 
the case of the Addington and Grenville governments, it was not 
necessarily in his interests to do so. When he broke with 
Addington, it was because he felt that the national interest 
required his removal. When he openly opposed Grenville, it was 
in the belief that the King would not necessarily disapprove. 
tiundas was not alone in having such principles and there were 
still many "King's men" in politics. It was not his fault if 
he was abused for holding such beliefs by people who preferred 
to act out of principles of loyalty to a party. Nor should 
Dundas be portrayed as utterly opposed to reform. Certainly 
he suppressed the radicals but he had passable credentials in 
his support for Scottish county reform and he appears to have been 
genuine in his support of Pitt's plans for English electoral reform 
in 1785. In all this he was again broadly in line with the 
Scottish politicians. 
We have seen that Henry Dundas "did not engross the politics 
7 
of Scotland in the last two decades of the eighteenth century". 
His influence arose partly from his own personal qualities, 
from 
his relatives and friends, and partly from the influence 
that he 
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gained from acting as Pitt's Scottish manager for nearly twenty 
years. There were some technical differences in the manner in 
which Scottish administration was conducted but otherwise Dundas 
was firmly in a tradition of managers that stretched back through 
the Argyll family, past the Union of 1707, to the Earl of Lauderdale's 
direction of Scottish affairs in the 1660s. The work involved 
using government influence to return friends to parliament, whether 
by bolstering existing local interests, or promoting alliances 
among groups friendly to government. It was these traditional 
managerial methods, allied to the natural Scottish disposition 
to support the government of the day, that underpinned Dundas's success 
as a manager prior to 1792. Among the political classes, open 
resistance to his activity all but collapsed between 1792 and 
1794, when the terror of radical upheaval drove most of them behind 
Pitt's banner. The very close friendship between Pitt and Dundas 
meant that there were few tensions or jealousies in their relation- 
ship and this gave Dundas unusual power as a manager. The 
"Dundassian Domination" was not merely visited upon the radicals. 
Those politicians who opposed Dundas in Scotland, particularly 
the Whigs, had an even harder time than the men who had earlier 
opposed the Argylls. Nor was Dundas above using his power as 
manager to bully men who were otherwise government supporters. 
This could apply either in the wider field of Scottish legislation 
- the 1785 project to alter the Court of Session, 
for instance - or 
in the narrower arena of local electoral politics. That said, 
Dundas' s power had its limits. Some local interests could 
cheerfully bid him defiance and, beyond his and government's 
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reach, he could do little. Even in the worst period 1793-1801 
the Scottish Whigs, much reduced, managed to survive, as did 
pockets of independent resistance to Dundas. Both groups 
were able to thrive again during the Addington years and they were 
never fully beaten. 
In his management of Scotland, Dundas had, like the Argylls, 
to act with the broad consent of the landed classes, and naturally 
he exercised it largely to their advantage. Overall, his 
administration presents a mixed picture. The Scottish political 
system was clearly becoming more venal, but Dundas's machinations 
in elections and patronage were neither more nor less corrupt than 
those of previous managers. He took little real concern in the 
Scottish revenue administration and, like most politicians, his 
limited interest centred on trying to find posts for his friends. 
While economical reform and the demands of war finance were 
focussing attention on the need to overhaul the structure, actual 
reforms were relatively few and the system as a whole was left to 
stagnate. In Dundas's church policy, political expediency was 
again the watchword. Church patronage was deployed carefully 
to ensure harmony among the landowners involved, if not among the 
congregations. Church and university preferments were used, where 
practicable, to benefit the Moderate party. In the law and in 
legal appointments, Dundas's policy was clearly aimed at reform 
and at improvements in standards. His success was only partial, 
mainly because the weight of structural failings in the system was 
against him. 
The Scottish manager was expected to represent Scottish interests 
at Westminster. There is little doubt that Dundas was good at this, 
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not least because of his close friendship with Pitt , and his 
skills in protecting Scotland's concerns were acknowledged. 
Yet England was clearly the senior partner in the Union and 
English requirements could simply override Dundas's wishes. This 
was fully demonstrated in the repeated rejections of Scottish 
demands for a proper Stamp Office in Edinburgh. 
At times Dundas's attention wandered far from Scotland. His 
work as a cabinet minister made it more and more difficult for 
him to focus attention on his Scottish management and he had to 
delegate a proportion of it to his nephews, Robert and William 
Dundas. At other times he would complain of boredom at the 
tedious nature of the work. Nonetheless in most of the 
essentials - supervising its government, representing it at 
Westminster and protecting its interests - Dundas fulfilled the 
role of the modern Secretary of State for Scotland. In this too, 
he was merely in the tradition of previous managers. Perhaps the 
most obvious difference is that Dundas and his predecessors answered 
to an electorate of a few thousand, where the modern Secretary answers 
to several million. 
What lasting marks has Henry Dundas left? There are perhaps 
two worth considering. The first is that in his role as a 
British politician he "personified the triumph of the Scottish 
Union of 1707". 
$ 
The early Scottish resistance to the Union had 
long gone and Jacobitism was becoming a distant memory. With its 
own political structure, church and legal establishment, Scotland 
remained in some ways almost semi-independent. Yet as the eighteenth 
century wore on, the Scottish ruling class came to identify itself 
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as being British, in a community of interests with its English 
brethren. This process came near to completion in Dundas's time 
in politics. It was certainly accelerated by the threat posed by 
the radicals to the collective British ruling class but even before 
this the Scottish elite had come to look at the British Empire 
both as a field of government in which to participate and as 
an opportunity for patronage in which to share. This became 
marked in Dundas's years. We have noted the way in which his 
patronage and activities at the India Board had turned many Scottish 
landed families to look abroad for gain. In many cases he had 
nothing to do with particular appointments to Indian or imperial 
service, but his activities and those of his friends had made others 
alive to the opportunities. 
Dundas's second legacy was his role in the formation of what 
became the nineteenth-century Scottish Tory party. He had always 
denounced those who acted on the principles of loyalty to a party 
and he cursed opposition based on party connection as one of the 
major threats to the country during the reign of George 111.9 Yet 
in his own way, and although he might have denied it, he made his 
accommodation with the system of party politics now gradually 
emerging in Britain. Pitt's years in office and his principles - 
the defence of the King's right to choose his governments, the 
protection of the constitution and of propertied rights - 
had, 
against the background of popular unrest, welded a strong 
following 
to his name. Dundas was among the foremost in his personal 
devotion to Pitt and his principles. Events after 1801 divided 
the former governing group between Pitt, Grenville and 
Addington but 
the magic of Pitt's name meant that his 
following remained substantial. 
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It included many in Scotland, where the Pittite connection focussed 
solely through Dundas and where the post-1801 fragmentation was 
largely avoided. This Pittite/Melvillite interest, founded on 
the support of major nobles like Buccleuch, Atholl and Gordon, 
together with numerous other landowners, remained largely intact 
even in the years after Pitt's death. In this sense, the cohesion 
of the Scottish group meant that the development of a Tory party 
was initially more advanced in Scotland than in England. In the 
South it was not until 1815 that the various fragments of the pre- 
1801 governing party gradually returned to the flag held by the 
Pittites. Although its members commonly rejected the name, this 
regrouping formed the basis of the British Tory party, and the Scots 
Melvillites, now led by the Second Viscount, were fully part of it. 
That Henry Dundas was able to pass the leadership of this 
group to his son was not the least of his achievements. By 1810, 
the limited damage done to the Melville interest by Grenville's 
government and by the occasional maladroitness of Portland's 
administration had been fully repaired. Robert Saunders Dundas 
was in command of the Pittite party built up by his father and the 
Dundassian Domination had another seventeen years to run. 
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